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This study tries to incorporate some psychological and sociological insights into
microeconomic analysis. While I have long been interested in psychology and sociology, my
concern with the specific subject of this book has its main origins in certain experiences
during my econometrics studies at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. In particular, I
remember a discussion on the desirability of economic growth in a seminar on theoretical
economics, in which I disagreed with the teacher Prof. C. van Eijk. One of his arguments in
favour of economic growth in developed countries was that there arc still so many needs to
be fulfilled in these countries. Implicit in this argument, however, was the assumption that
needs are exogenous to the economic system. It was precisely this crucial assumption and,
more generally, the desirability of ever continuing economic growth that I came increasingly
to question. In order to investigate these issues further I joined a group of Dutch economists
who had the same doubts and who, following Bob Goudzwaard and Harry de Lunge,
advocate an "Economics of Enough". Through my experiences in this group and by attending
many lectures and seminars in social and economic philosophy and sociology, I learned to
place the problems mentioned in a wider social-scientific context.
In addition, I became increasingly fascinated by the immense significance which paid
work has for people in our Western societies. When I thought about it, I realized that this
must have something to do with so many needs being satisfied (as well as dissatisfied) in
and by means of a job. Indeed, one can say that almost the entire needs hierarchy of Maslow
is involved (exceptions are the needs for sleep and sex, but even these needs are fulfilled in
certain jobs). Nevertheless, the resulting strong want for paid work (which may be referred
to as "job libido") seems again not exogenous to the economic system, but rather subject to
endogenous change. For example, nowadays married women in OECD countries have, on
average, a much stronger want for paid work than they had some decades ago, and this
change does not seem exogenous to developments in the economy. Traditionally, economists
have attributed the ensuing increases in female labour force participation to alterations in
budget and other kinds of constraints, but historical and econometric evidence strongly
suggests that shifts in preferences are also important causes.
Against this background, I was very happy when, after graduating in econometrics, I got
the opportunity to conduct doctoral research at the economics department of the University
of Limburg on the possible role of psychological and sociological factors in an economic
analysis of labour supply. I began by constructing a general utility-maximizing framework,
in which I integrated economic as well as some psychological and sociological motivation
theories. However, although successful in terms of my own research objectives, this broad
approach turned out not to fit in very well with the rather restrictive research culture of
mainstream economists. Therefore, after two years I decided to shift the emphasis to an
analysis of a non-linear dynamics of preference formation in labour supply. This had the
advantage that I could use my skills and experience in non-linear dynamics and, more
specifically, catastrophe theory, which I had acquired during studies of theoretical physicsprior to my econometrics studies. Moreover, I found it fascinating to see how collective
phenomena in human behaviour resemble those in the behaviour of atoms and molecules. On
the other hand, my ability to master the complexities of the non-linear dynamics of
preference formation contributed to making the research extensive as well as fairly abstract
and technical. Therefore, I was glad to be aided by my supervisors, Joan Muysken and Chris
de Neubourg, in learning to write papers and chapters of this book which were not too long
and not too technical. Yet, I feel I have not completely succeeded in that.
More generally, Joan and Chris helped me to adapt to the economic research culture.
Moreover, they urged me to restrict myself so as to finish the project within reasonable time
limits. Still, I was stubborn enough to exceed time schemes repeatedly, since I felt the
project as well as a part of myself needed that. This brought me in continual conflict with
other parts of myself and it made necessary frequent appeal to the patience of my
supervisors. I thank them for their help as well as their patience. Furthermore, I am indebted
to Joan and Chris for bringing me in contact with the work of George Akerlof. This work
has been a constant source of inspiration for me, since I feel very much at home with his
broad, interdisciplinary, and yet formal approach. Another source of inspiration has been the
work of Arie Kapteyn, Bernard van Praag and their fellow workers, and I am indebted to
Arie for helpful comments on chapters of this book. At Maastricht my most valuable and
pleasant discussion partner has been Lex Borghans, with whom I could discuss all kinds of
aspects of my research. I thank him for that. Furthermore, my gratitude goes to John
Spangenberg, Geert Woltjer and Sabine van de Zande for their moral and other kinds of
support, to Arjen van Witteloostuijn for helpful advice, and to Stephen Lea, Siegwart
Lindenbere. Joan Muysken. Chris He Neuhourg, Erik de Regt, Jacques Siegers and Daniel
Weiserbs for useful discussions and/or comments. I am indebted to Hans Maks and Hans
Peters for their comments on this thesis as members of the evaluation committee, especially
the latter for his detailed remarks. I thank Sorin Ducaru, Erik van Ballegoij and Marcel
Jansen for drawing the figures and most tables, Aad van Mourik and Ruud Leliveld for
advice on the lay-out of this thesis, and the latter also for his contribution to the design of
the cover of this book. Moreover, I am indebted to Bob Wilkinson for his advice on the
English of this book, to Huub van Kan and Maud Soudant for printing support, and to Jan
van Ours for kindly sending me data on labour force participation rates.
Last but not least, my sincere gratitude goes to my parents for giving me the cultural bag-
gage and inspiration which is needed for this kind of research, and for their strong and
continuous trust in my risky undertakings. I am also very grateful to my wife Hilda for her
moral support and for having so much patience with me having so little energy left for her
and the housekeeping. Finally, I thank my little daughter Karuna for making me feel more
and think less.
Maastricht, September 1993CHAPTER 1
Introduction
A remarkable phenomenon in economic science is that the assumption of stable preferences
or tastes is still a point of departure of many of its models, despite the fact that there is
growing evidence to the contrary. One striking example of preference shifts in the field of
labour supply is given by the changes in attitude of "emancipating"' married women
towards their participation in the labour market. Since World War II female participation in
the labour force has strongly increased in many OECD countries. Traditionally, economists
have been trying to explain these developments as the result of changes in pecuniary
variables like the women's own wage rate, the income of the husband and the tax system,
and of changes in demographic and socio-economic variables like the number of children
and the level of education of the women. Although such variables can account for a
substantial part of the increases in female labour force participation, they seem only a part of
the truth. Historical evidence as well as casual observation strongly suggest that changes in
habits and social norms and social influence processes have also played important roles in
the female participation increases. Such changes and processes directly affect the preferences
of the women involved, implying that the assumption of stable preferences should be
relaxed.
Allowing unstable preferences makes most economists feel uneasy, since they are not
used to it, since it tends to make their models much more complex and since it urges them
to think about psychological and sociological issues. Historically, the division of labour in
social science has relegated the study of preference formation to the realms of psychology
and sociology. Nevertheless, in contrast to this division of labour, social reality is not
separated in disjunctive fragments. In particular, this holds for the reality of the rises in
female labour force participation, such that the present state of separate research on this
subject by economists, sociologists and psychologists is unsatisfactory. It seems highly
desirable to integrate sociological and psychological insights into the economic models of
female labour force participation. The present study aims to contribute to that.
Although the importance of preference formation was recognized by early economists
(e.g., Marshall, 1920, App. H, Sec. 3), attempts to incorporate preference formation into
' In American English the terms "emancipating" and "emancipation" seem to have a stronger and
more ideology-laden meaning than in British English. Therefore, such terms arc put between quota-
tion marks in this study.mainstream economic theory seem to be relatively recent. Duesenberry (1949) was among
the first to give a systematic treatment of (endogenous) preference formation in the context
of saving and consumption behaviour. In the wake of this pioneering work two major
theories of preference formation have been developed, namely the theory of ;';u#v/dua/
/or/na/ion and the theory of (fte/iav/oura/,) pre/i?re«ce //irmtepentfenctf. Individual habit
formation is the phenomenon that an individual gets used to a certain behaviour and that this
reinforces her/his preferences in favour of that behaviour. Behavioural preference interdepen-
dence means that relevant others displaying a certain behaviour affect an individual's
preferences with respect to that behaviour.-* Another, but related theory of preference
formation has been introduced by Akerlof (1980). His theory of socia/ cusfow models the
impacts of beliefs in social norms on economic behaviour as well as the feedback of that
behaviour on the social norm beliefs. Finally, the counterpart of individual habit formation is
/nd;V;Y/Ma/ fo/i#-rw/i .w/r/ar/Vwi (e.g., Iannacone, 1986). This is the phenomenon that an
individual gets increasingly satiated with a certain behaviour, thus weakening her/his
preferences in favour of that behaviour in the long run. It is usually considered as a part of
the theory of individual habit formation.
All three theories of preference formation, including individual long-run satiation, seem
highly relevant for the development of the female labour force participation and, more
generally, for the labour supply behaviour of women as well as men (think of work ethic
norms). On the other hand, research on this subject is rare (see the next section).
Therefore, the present study will apply the three preference formation theories to labour
supply by incorporating them into the microeconomic theory of labour supply and by
deriving implications of this incorporation. In doing so, the three preference formation
theories will be extended and integrated. Moreover, the focus will be on the effects of non-
linear forms of dynamics of the preference formations in combination with aggregation from
the microeconomic to the macroeconomic behaviour.
Sections 1.1-1.5 of this introductory chapter give more detailed accounts of the
contributions of the successive chapters of this study to the state of the an of the three
preference formation theories. Section 1.6 provides a motivation of the theoretical and
deductive approach of this study and gives some directions to the reader.
* In principle, preference formation can also be exogenous to the socio-economic system as, for
example, expressed by a time trend on some parameters of consumption demand or labour supply
equations. Usually, however, a certain degree of endogeneity of preferences to the socio-economic
system seems likely, so exogenous preference formation did not receive much attention in the
literature.
' In the literature this is usually referred to as preference interdependence, but I add the adjective
"behavioural", since there arc also other kinds of preference interdependence (see Sec. 5.1).
* Two other important types of endogenous preferences arc those influenced by advertising (see,
e.g.. Galbrailh. 1*»S8. and Schmalensec. 1972) or by prices (sec. e.g.. Pollak. 1977). However, in the
context of labour supply such endogenous preferences seem less important than those mentioned
above.1.1 Individual habit formation .<
Whereas individual habit formation in consumption has been the subject of a large number
of theoretical and empirical investigations (see Pollak, 1978. and Muellbaucr, 1988. for
surveys), individual habit formation in labour supply has received much less attention. Only
a few empirical studies have been conducted. Phlips (1978) gives an empirical analysis of
individual habit formation with respect to consumption categories, leisure and transaction
money in a linear expenditure system. Using household data, Johnson and Pcncavel (1984)
investigate a similar linear expenditure model for individual habit formation with respect to
total family consumption and leisure times of husband and wife. Hotz et al. (1988) estimate
a more sophisticated specification for individual habit formation with respect to leisure.
Finally, Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) develop and estimate a detailed model of both
individual habit formation and behavioural preference interdependence with respect to leisure
or labour times of husband and wife (see also Sees. 1.2 and 1.3).
While the studies of Phlips, Johnson and Pencavel, and of Kapteyn and Woittiez assume
myopic (individual) habit formation. Hotz et al. extend this to rational habit formation.
Myopic habit formation means that the individual does not take into account the feedback of
her (or his) present decision on her future preferences. In contrast, in rational habit formation
models the individual has perfect foresight with respect to this feedback and takes fully into
account the ensuing future utility costs or benefits of his present decision. However, as
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, p. 374) put it, "by making no concession to imperfect
knowledge or to questions of calculation", rational habit formation models "arc extremely
implausible as descriptions of observed behaviour" (see also Akcrlof, 1991).' Moreover,
Muellbauer (1988) and Winder (1988) report that empirical evidence on life cycle
consumption appears to favour myopic rather than rational habit formation. On the other
hand, Pashardes (1986) obtains the opposite result. For labour supply there is no empirical
evidence, but in that case myopic habit formation may be a more plausible approximation
than in the case of consumption behaviour, since labour supply decisions tend to be less
frequent than consumption decisions and hence may induce less awareness of habit
formation.
Anyway, all four labour supply studies mentioned above suggest that, especially with
respect to leisure, habit formation is rather strong. Still, the habit formation is shown to be
mostly stable in the sense that the stability conditions for the long-run equilibrium arc
fulfilled. Such a stable long-run equilibrium is the result of a long-run multiplier process in
which, for example, a person who has been induced to take a part-time job, gets used to the
smaller amount of leisure, which makes her prefer even less leisure and take a job of more
hours, which she also gets used to, which makes her prefer even less leisure and take a job
of even more hours, etcetera until a long-run equilibrium is reached. A simple extension of
such a model of stable habit formation can explain how after taking a part-time job a person
can develop a strong orientation towards paid work and may even develop into a "workahol-
ic". On the other hand, such a model cannot explain why some long-term unemployed,
* On the other hand, rational habit formation models may be very important in a normative
welfare-theoretical context (see Pollak. 1976b, p. 296).4 C/iapter /
although having lost their old job involuntarily, become little motivated to get a new job.
Similarly, such a stable habit formation model can give an explanation of the strong
orientation of many housewives to household work, but it may not adequately explain how
in a process of "emancipation" the same women can develop a strong orientation towards
paid work.
The present study models such profound changes in preferences and behaviour as the
outcomes of unstable habit formation as in the addictive consumption model of Becker and
Murphy (1988). The unstable habit formation is described by an unstable long-run
equilibrium which is located between two stable long-run equilibria. This leads to a
polarization in behaviour and habit state: on the one hand, when the initial hours of work are
above the unstable equilibrium value, the habit formation induces a rise in hours towards a
stable equilibrium of relatively high hours and ensuing accustomization. Such an equilibrium
may describe the behaviour and habits of an "emancipated" woman with a job or a
workaholic (when the number of hours worked is very high). On the other hand, when the
initial hours are below the unstable equilibrium value, the habit formation causes falls in
hours towards a stable equilibrium of low or zero hours and similarly ensuing accus-
tomization. The zero hours equilibrium may then correspond to a housewife or a "voluntarily
long-term unemployed" person. Since the initial hours depend on the time paths of
exogenous variables like the wage rate or rationings in the past, these time paths determine
which of the two stable equilibria is actually approached. This I call irutfvitfua/ /ry.stertfs/j.''
At certain values of exogenous variables the stable equilibrium which is approached may
become unstable and subsequently disappear (this is not recognized by Becker and Murphy).
As a kind of "snowball effect" this induces an unstable habit formation process towards the
other stable equilibrium. Such a transition is referred to as an /n</ivitfua/ caftmrop/ie in the
sense of Thorn (1975)7 Individual catastrophes in behaviour and habits may have occurred
(and still occur) in the "emancipation" process of individual married women. In contrast to
Becker and Murphy, I assume that the habit formation is myopic, since this seems a
plausible approximation for labour supply (see above). Moreover, it simplifies the analysis
and facilitates the introduction of more than one habit state variable for consumption,
household time (or leisure, see Sec. 2.3) and corporate time (or labour time).
Chapter 3 of the present study analyses this non-linear dynamics of individual habit
formation in labour supply for a general (additive) utility function. In particular, necessary
and sufficient (in)stability conditions are derived and in the case of instability schedules of
individual long-run labour supply as a function of the wage rate are obtained, displaying
individual hysteresis and catastrophes. At the end of the chapter the unstable individual habit
formation model is complemented by individual long-run satiation, and cases of discon-
tinuous short-run labour supply schedules are considered. Chapter 4 derives necessary and
* Sec Cross and Allen (1988) and Franz (1990) for the origins of the concept of hysteresis in the
natural sciences and for surveys of research on hysteresis in economics. See Goodwin (1977) and
Heincr (1983. p. 582) for hysteresis in relation to habits and behavioural rules.
' There is a huge literature on applications of catastrophe theory in various disciplines, ranging
from physics and biology to linguistics and history (see. e.g.. Zeeman. 1977). One interesting ap-
plication in economics is the generalization of the Kaldor model of a business cycle by Varian (1979)
and George (1981). One application in physics is Vendrik (1979a. 1979b).sufficient conditions for individual hysteresis and catastrophes for an additive quadratic
specification of the utility function, which is similar to the specifications used by Houthakker
and Taylor (1970) and Becker and Murphy (1988) for the case of consumption. Moreover,
this specification is used to trace the macrocconomic implications of the derived schedules
of individual long-run labour supply by aggregating them to schedules of average (i.e. per
capita) long-run labour supply under various assumptions on the individual variation in
utility function parameters, exogenous variables and habit states.
1.2 Behavioural preference interdependence
In contrast to individual habit formation in consumption, (behavioural) preference
interdependence in consumption has only been investigated in a limited number of studies
(e.g., Veblen, 1899, Leibenstein, 1950, Gaertner, 1974, Pollak, 1976a, and Kaptcyn ct al.,
1989). Leibenstein makes an important distinction between 'TM/M/MYIXON p/frv/s" and "r«»v«w
fta/K/waj?on qjtrw" (or "snob effects"). A bandwagon effect means that relevant others
displaying a certain behaviour reinforce an individual's preferences with respect to that
behaviour. On the other hand, a reverse bandwagon effect is said to occur when relevant
others displaying a certain behaviour diminish an individual's preferences with respect to
that behaviour (cf. the distinction between the reinforcing and weakening effects of
individual habit formation and individual long-run satiation, respectively). The literature
mainly focuses on bandwagon effects. A fortiori this holds for preference interdependence in
labour supply, on which there is only one publication I know, namely that of Kaptcyn and
Woittiez (1990). They model both preference interdependence and individual habit formation
with respect to leisure or labour times of husband and wife, and in an estimation for Dutch
cross-section data they find a significant contribution of preference interdependence. On the
other hand, this contribution is surprisingly small, considering empirical results for
preference interdependence in consumption.
Just like practically all models of preference interdependence in consumption, the
estimated model of Kapteyn and Woittiez implies a unique stable long-run equilibrium for
preference interdependence (at given long-run equilibrium values of the habit states). Such a
stable long-run equilibrium is the result of a long-run multiplier process in which, for
example, some members of a social group who have been induced to take a job, induce
other members also to take a job or to take a job of more hours, which again induces other
members to take a job too or to take a job of more hours, etcetera until a long-run
equilibrium is reached. However, analogously to a stable individual habit formation model,
such a model of stable preference interdependence cannot explain why members of certain
subcultures of long-term unemployed persons, although having lost their old job involun-
tarily, become little motivated to get a new job. Similarly, such a stable preference
interdependence model may not adequately explain how in a collective process of
"emancipation" social groups of former housewives can develop a strong orientation towards
paid work.
Again, the present study models such profound changes in preferences and behaviour as
the outcomes of unstable (bandwagon) preference interdependence as described by an
unstable long-run equilibrium between two stable long-run equilibria. In one of the latter6 C/iapfer /
stable equilibria a majority of the social group may not participate in the labour market. In
the other stable equilibrium a majority of the same social group may have a job. Which of
the two equilibria is actually approached at a certain moment depends on the past history of
the social group. This I call co//ec//ve /lysferesij. Moreover, under certain conditions the
social group may, as a kind of "snowball effect", collectively enter or leave the labour
market in an unstable preference interdependence process from one towards the other
equilibrium. This is referred to as a co//«7iVe carasrrop/tf. Such collective transitions within
social groups may have played (and still play) a role in the strong rise of the labour force
participation of married women in many OECD countries since World War II.
Chapter 5 of the present study analyses this non-linear dynamics of behavioural
preference interdependence in labour supply. First, a classification is given of the various
kinds of social interaction underlying behavioural preference interdependence and other
forms of preference interdependence in labour supply. Next, the social interactions
underlying (bandwagon) behavioural preference interdependence in labour supply are
summarized in a general model of (behavioural) preference interdependence with respect to
the average consumption, the average household time and the average corporate time in a
social group (as formulated by Iannacone (1989) for consumption only). An attractive feature
of this preference interdependence model is that its structure is analogous to the structure of
the general individual habit formation model of Chapter 3 (see also Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980, pp. 374-375). This analogy is employed in deriving necessary and sufficient
(in)stability conditions as well as schedules of average long-run labour supply as a function
of the average wage rate, displaying collective hysteresis and catastrophes. Note, however,
that, whereas the individual habit formation model holds for individual behaviour, the
preference interdependence model is formulated on the level of average behaviour in a social
group. This implies an additional complication in the preference interdependence model as
compared to the individual habit formation model, namely that of individual variation within
the social group. The stabilizing effects of this individual variation are illustrated for an
additive quadratic specification of the utility function. Then, for this specification necessary
and sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis can be derived. Finally, a
comparison is made between the different effects on average labour supply of unstable
preference interdependence and unstable individual habit formation. -.q
1.3 Collective habit formation *
A subsequent question is what a combination of the effects on average labour supply of
(unstable) preference interdependence and of (unstable) individual habit formation may look
like. For consumption demand, integrations of a (bandwagon) preference interdependence
model and an individual habit formation model have been made by Pollak (1976a) and
Alessie and Kapteyn (1991). For labour supply, such an integration has only been carried out
by Kapteyn and Woitticz (1990) (sec the previous section). For the sake of brevity, we referto these integrated models as models of <y>//mi'v<> Ziafr/r/onmiriVwi.* Again, all the collective
habit formation models mentioned imply or are estimated to have a unique stable long-run
equilibrium for the combined individual habit formation/preference interdependence process.
Just as the separate stable individual habit formation or stable preference interdependence
models, such a stable collective habit formation model cannot or may not adequately explain
profound changes in labour supply preferences like those mentioned in the previous two
sections. To model such phenomena in a more complete way we integrate the individual
habit formation models of Chapters 3 and 4 with the preference interdependence models of
Chapter S into (unstable) collective habit formation models.
First, for two moderately general subcases of collective habit formation with respect to
household time only, simple necessary and sufficient (in)stability conditions arc derived in
Section 6.1. However, these conditions turn out not to be the relevant (in)stabili(y conditions
in the case of preference interdependence and separately unstable individual habit formation.
For that case a modified relevant (in)stability condition is derived in Chapter 7. Accordingly,
Section 6.2 and subsequent sections of Chapter 6 are restricted to the case of preference
interdependence and separately sraA/c individual habit formation, whereas Chapter 7 analyses
the case of preference interdependence and separately «/i.v/a/>/«' individual habit formation. In
order to investigate the labour supply dynamics implied by the conditions in Section 6.1,
Chapter 6 considers an additive quadratic specification of the collective habit formation
model. It is shown that, in the presence of exogenous individuul variation, the individual
habit formation does not only reinforce the effect of preference interdependence, but also
counteracts it by amplifying the individual variation (a point not recognized by Kapteyn and
Woittiez). Moreover, as a generalization of the case of unstable preference interdependence
and no individual habit formation as treated in Chapter 5, necessary and sufficient conditions
for collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur for changing values of the wage rate are
formulated. Finally, preference interdependence and separately stable individual habit
formation with respect to consumption and corporate time are added to the models.
The case of preference interdependence and (separately) unstable individual habit
formation is analysed for the additive quadratic specification in Chapter 7. Then collective
catastrophes and hysteresis can arise as results of a sort of "/wo-i/a^? ractef". In the first
stage the unstable individual habit formation induces individual catastrophes of some group
members from zero to maximal corporate hours or the reverse. The second stage fires when,
due to a sufficiently strong preference interdependence, these individual catastrophes trigger
subsequent individual catastrophes of other group members to such an extent that collective
catastrophes arise. Then, for instance, a rocketing number of group members start to work a
rocketing number of corporate hours. Such collective catastrophes are described by the
modified (in)stability condition mentioned above. The implied labour supply dynamics is
analysed by considering the case of unstable individual habit formation and preference
interdependence as an extension of the aggregate additive quadratic case of only unstable
individual habit formation and no preference interdependence as treated in Chapter 4. First
considering unstable individual habit formation and preference interdependence with respect
This term has been inspired by the connection between individual habit formation and preference
interdependence as shown by Deaton and Mucllbauer (1980. pp. 374-375).8 CTiapter /
to household time only, two subcases are distinguished, namely Case A of individual
variation only in household time taste and individual habit formation strength and Case B of
individual variation only in susceptibility to social influence. For both subcases (necessary
and) sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes are derived as well as interesting long-
run average labour supply schedules with two domains of catastrophic behaviour alongside a
domain of persistent and hysteretic behaviour. Finally, unstable individual habit formation
and preference interdependence with respect to consumption and corporate time are added to
the models., . v ,
1.4 Dynamics of social norms J ; J ;
Another, but related theory of preference formation is the f/i^ory o/ soda/ custom (TSC) of
Akerlof (1980). This theory models the impacts of beliefs in social norms on economic
behaviour as well as a long-run feedback of that behaviour on the social norm beliefs. The
former impacts represent the effects of i/iftr/ia/izerf sor/a/ ziomw and soc/a/ row/re/ as are
well known in sociology. The latter feedback describes processes of internalization and
"externalization" of a social norm, by which beliefs in that social norm change.
In Chapter 8 a variant of the TSC along the lines of Romer (1984) is applied to labour
supply. First, an overview is given of possible social norms in male and female labour
supply. Only the implications of social norms in female labour supply are elaborated, but the
implications of social norms in male labour supply are similar. The application of the theory
of social custom to a so-called household norm is shown to be analogous in structure to a
limiting case of Case B of the additive quadratic model of collective habit formation in
Chapter 7 (see the previous section). This is with the proviso that the intergenerational
process by which social norm beliefs change in the conception of Akerlof is replaced by an
intrapcrsonal belief changing process. On a conceptual level, this analogy relativizes the
distinction between social norms and habits as made by Elster (1989, p. 100). If we envision
the concept of habit in a broader sense as general attitude or habitus (cf. Bourdieu and
Passeron, 1971) and with the qualification just mentioned, the effects and dynamics of social
norms in the theory of social custom can then be interpreted as one of the possible
"channels" through which unstable individual habit formation and preference interdependence
may proceed. Moreover, it is argued that the parameter restrictions on the additive quadratic
model which correspond to the labour supply application of the theory of social custom, are
implausible. This is important, since, among other points, the restrictions automatically imply
unstable individual habit formation, and hence individual catastrophes and individual and
collective hysteresis as well as very weak conditions for collective catastrophes, whereas in
the additive quadratic model stable individual habit formation and absence of catastrophes
and hysteresis are certainly possible (see also the literature in the previous section). Chapter
8 continues with a comparison with other applications of the theory of social custom by
Akerlof (1980), Romer (1984), Booth (1985) and Nay lor (1989). This comparison makes
clear that the present application adds two pairs of essential elements to the overall picture,
namely the pair of individual and collective catastrophes and the pair of individual and
collective hysteresis. Finally, the female labour supply model is further extended by
introducing the effects of a social norm of financial independence.//t/roducft'on
1.5 Dynamics of female participation
Chapter 9 of this study investigates the empirical relevance of the theoretical models which
are set forth in the preceding chapters, by applying them to the developments of the labour
force participation of Dutch and American married women since World War II. Whereas the
participation rate of Dutch married women was remarkably low and stable till I960, it grew
strongly after 1960. Econometric time-series analyses of this development have been given
by Mol et al. (1988) for the period 1889-1985 and by Romme (1987, 1990) for the shorter
period 1971-1985. Although the empirical results of the former study seem plausible, the
study suffers from the drawback of not explicitly taking into account the probably important
impacts of collective habit formation and social norms. In contrast, this is done by Romme,
who finds consistently significant, stable and important impacts of preference interdepen-
dence and social norms (in line with Kapteyn and Woiltiez). However, Romme's specificat-
ions of his participation equation are not systematically derived from an underlying
microeconomic labour supply model. Moreover, he does not distinguish the female cohorts
according to civil status (married or not) and number and age of children.
As an improvement on that. Chapter 9 of the present study derives general and logit
participation equations for a social group, cohort and subpopulation of married women with
school-going (or small) children on the basis of the theoretical models of the previous
chapters. These participation equations suggest that the participation equations of Romme
contain severe specification errors. Moreover, the equations derived by us have different
specifications for entry and exit behaviour as a result of hysteretic persistence effects of
individual habit formation. The modelling of such effects by Clark and Summers (1982) is
shown to be incorrect due to a severe aggregation error.
The endogenous dynamics of collective habit formation and social norm beliefs according
to our theoretical models turn out to imply long-run elasticities of the participation rate with
respect to the wage rate and other exogenous variables which vary with the level of the
participation rate according to a hump-shaped profile. This is shown to imply serious doubts
on the empirical simulation finding of Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) of a strong and
dominant impact of the own wage rate on the development of the participation rate of Dutch
married women since World War II. If we make a simplifying assumption, the hump-shaped
participation rate profile of the long-run elasticities is demonstrated to lead, in a regime of
constant relative change rates of the exogenous variables encouraging participation, to a
sigmoid shape of the time profile of the participation rate which is considerably "sharper"
than the sigmoid shape of a logistic curve implied by static labour supply models like that of
Hartog and Theeuwes. We call the former curve super-exponential-logistic. More adequately
than the logistic curve, such a curve can account for the empirical pattern of a remarkably
persistent low participation rate of Dutch married women before 1960 and a strongly
growing participation rate of these women after 1960. The persistence of the low par-
ticipation rate before 1960 is then partially explained by low values of long-run elasticities
of exogenous variables, whereas the strong rise of the participation rate after 1960 is
partially explained by higher values of such elasticities. In close connection, the persistence
of the participation rate of American married women just after World War II (Clark and
Summers, 1982) is explained as the result of hysteresis effects of individual habit formation.10
Such hysteresis effects are also shown to explain differences in as well as convergence of
participation rates among countries.
The strong rises in the participation rate of Dutch married women after 1960 and of
American married women after 1950 may have been caused by collective catastrophes within
social groups. Then the long-run elasticities of the participation rate of the social group
become infinite as a result of unstable preference interdependence. A necessary and
sufficient condition for such a collective catastrophe in the participation rate is derived. Just
as in Chapter 7, we obtain a labour supply schedule with two catastrophic domains alongside
a persistent and hysteretic domain. Aggregating such schedules to the level of cohorts or
(sub)populations is shown to preserve the hysteresis properties, but to "smooth out" the
collective catastrophes. Because of the scarcity of disaggregated data on the level of social
groups, the latter property severely hinders the identification of collective catastrophes on
that level. The hysteresis properties imply that the persistence of the participation rate of
American married women just after World War II can be explained not only by individual
habit formation, but also by unstable preference interdependence within social groups.
Finally, it is argued that the development of the participation rate of Dutch married women
after World War II may be conceived in a stylized way as the result of a cultural cycle
superimposed on an upward labour demand trend. The cultural cycle is caused by a
combination of collective habit (and norm belief) formation in a medium long run and
collective satiation in a very long run. Since the two mechanisms can be associated with
conceptions of Marx and Maslow (1943, 1970) respectively, the cycle is referred to as the
Marx-Maslow cycle.
1.6 Approach *s
The approach which has been chosen in this study is theoretical and deductive. It can be
regarded as an exploration of theoretical possibilities on the basis of non-linear dynamic
extensions of the microeconomic theory of labour supply. There are several arguments in
favour of such an approach. ••
First, on the one hand, historical evidence, casual observation and some econometric
evidence (e.g., Romme) suggest that the theoretical extensions which are analysed in this
study may have empirical relevance. Chapter 9 tries to make this plausible. On the other
hand, the econometric evidence based on essentially (log)linear collective habit formation
(and social norm) models cannot say very much on the plausibility of certain theoretical
assumptions of non-linear collective habit formation models. For instance, at first sight the
existence of an unstable intermediate long-run equilibrium seems in contradiction with the
fact that in the empirical studies by Phlips (1978), Johnson and Pencavel (1984), Hotz et al.
(1988) and Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) the stability conditions are mostly fulfilled.
However, these conditions apply to averages of (other) stable equilibria over the persons to
which the data employed refer, implying that on average the stability conditions are met
without excluding the existence of an unstable intermediate equilibrium. More generally,
empirical testing of non-linear dynamic phenomena seems very difficult and may require the
development of new estimation methods and/or data. Furthermore, it is problematic to assess
in advance which out of the wide range of non-linear dynamic extensions is more plausible11
than the others. For example, in Chapter 4 it is argued on the basis of the empirical studies
mentioned above that a combination of (locally) unstable individual habit formation with
respect to household time and stable individual habit formation with respect to consumption
has a higher chance to occur than the opposite combination. However, this is only a
conjecture, so it seems premature to rule out the latter combination. More generally, it seems
a sensible research strategy to construct an overview of more or less plausible non-linear
dynamic extensions of the microeconomic theory of labour supply within an integrated
framework with certain limits (e.g., chaos is excluded by the assumed form of the
differential equations). Such a strategy also seems sensible for the following additional
reasons.
When one wants to obtain a deeper insight in a non-linear dynamics of labour supply, it
turns out to be very useful to explore the possible scope of such a dynamics. Moreover, such
a deeper insight can lead to an integration of partial theories. A striking example from the
present study is the integration of the theory of social custom of Akcrlof into collective habit
formation theories. More generally, an exploration of the scope of possible extensions of the
microeconomic theory of labour supply can clarify a deep controversy between neo-classical
economists and their critics on the scope of microeconomic models. For instance,
Biirgenmeier (1991) criticizes the microeconomic theory of labour supply for its inability to
account for important institutional, psychological and social aspects. However, the
development of labour supply research in the last two decades has shown that such aspects
can be incorporated into the microeconomic theory of labour supply to a considerable extent.
In particular, the present study demonstrates that even extreme labour supply phenomena like
profound preference changes can be covered by extensions of the microeconomic theory. At
least to the author, the way this is done seems to do sufficient justice to the fundamental
nature of these preference changes in the present context, so it may meet some objections of
the critics. On the other hand, there remains a fundamental divergence of views on the
validity and scope of the one-utility maximizing model (see, e.g., Etzioni, 1988, Lutz and
Lux, 1988, and Biirgenmeier, 1991). In my view this model can account for the multiple and
even conflicting motives which are abundant in female labour supply and applies not only to
conscious (or rational) choice behaviour, but also to non-choice behaviour. However, an
argumentation of this view would lead us into the problematic and extensive discussion
about the concept of rationality in economics and is beyond the scope of this study.
Therefore, I confine myself here to the above brief statement of my view of the scope of the
one-utility maximizing model, which underlies the present study.'
The present study thus remains within the microeconomic framework of one-utility
maximizing. On the other hand, it fleshes out this framework in a much broader way than is
usually done by neo-classical economists. Hopefully this contributes to broadening the views
of such neo-classical economists. However, I am not too optimistic about the short-run
possibilities to bring the positions of the neo-classicals and their critics nearer to each other,
since the polarization between them seems to be reinforced by strong sociological and
psychological interests as suggested by the theoretical models of the present study (according
' Detailed arguments for and against aspects of this view can be found in a discussion by letter
between Mark Lutz and the author. Copies of this discussion are available from the author.L2C/iaptf r /
to the theory of social custom, motives of reputation and reduction of cognitive dissonance
lead to a polarization into two extreme comer equilibria).
Notwithstanding all these advantages of the theoretical approach of the study, the
theoretical models developed remain to be tested empirically. Unfortunately, in connection
with the difficulties involved, this is beyond the scope of the study, but it is intended to be
a subject of further research. Another possible limitation of this study might be raised by
sociologists and especially psychologists who find the behavioural assumptions of the
theoretical models too crude. However, they should bear in mind that these assumptions
about motives on a micro level are made in order to derive their implications for the labour
supply behaviour on a macro level. To allow such derivations the assumptions should be
sufficiently simple, while, on the other hand, making the assumptions more complex will not
often imply an essential difference in macro dynamics. The latter robustness of the macro
dynamics is suggested by the mathematical theories of non-linear dynamics, in particular
catastrophe theory.
An implication of the theoretical and deductive approach of this study is that the analysis
tends to be rather abstract and technical. I have tried to avoid more technicalities than
necessary or to relegate them to appendices, but some sections and subsections are still quite
technical. For readers who are interested in "concrete results" rather than in obtaining
insights into the underlying structures, I have indicated the most technical sections and
subsections by an asterisk. The readers concerned are advised to skip through these sections
and to focus on the main propositions. Another point worth mentioning is that the analyses
often switch between speaking in terms of "she" and "he". This depends on whether the
model cases considered seem more relevant for female or male labour supply.
The next chapter gives a presentation of the standard microeconomic model of individual
labour supply and an overview of some extensions of this model, which are relevant for the
present study. At the end of the chapter the general structure and implications of the short-
run labour supply models to be used in this study are formulated. After that chapter the
study follows the outline which has been sketched in the previous sections.CHAPTER 2
Microeconomic Theory of Labour Supply
This chapter gives a presentation of the standard microeconomic model of individual labour
supply in Section 2.1 and an overview of some important extensions of this model in Section
2.2. The latter section discusses especially extensions which are relevant in the context of the
present study. Finally, Section 2.3 formulates the general structure and comparative statics of
the short-run labour supply models to be used in this study. ,
2.1 The standard model , ,, .-,..•, . .... . , ., ., . ...
In the standard microeconomic model of individual labour supply' a person is viewed as
selling from his (or her) total time endowment T of twenty-four hours a day a part as labour
time // against an exogenous price equal to the hourly wage rate w and as consuming the
remaining time L as leisure. The sale of W results in a total income
where y^ is exogenous other than labour income, e.g. property income*. The total income
y is planned to be spent on quantities of consumption goods X,,...,X^ with exogenous
prices p,,...,p^, taking into account the income-budget constraint
This constraint can be combined with (2.1) into the constraint
' See, e.g., Deaton and MueUbauer (1980, Sees. 4.1 and 11.1). Killingsworth (1983, Ch. I).
Pencavel (1986. Sec. 3.1) and Varian (1987. Ch. 10).
* This Kp may also contain (non-wage) transfer payments in as far as these arc exogenous, so
independent of other than transfer income. Most transfers, such as social security benefits, do depend
on other income and require an extension of the standard model (see Subscc. 2.2.3). A possible
exception is a base income provided by the government to everybody.14 C/mpter 2
v ""•• (2.3)
In planning his labour supply, the individual is assumed to maximize a utility function
f/"C^i Xn>i<) subject to the income-budget constraint (2.3) and a time-budget constraint
// +L -7*. .. i ..•-. (2.4)
The constraint (2.4) implies W = T - L, and substituting this into the constraint (2.3) we
obtain one overall constraint in the (Xj,...,X,,,L) space, which can be written as
n
£p,X, + wL £ w7 + /Q. ,., . , ,., . : , (2.5)
/-I
This is an interesting equation. Interpreting leisure as a consumption good and its
iry cosf per time unit in terms of forgone wage income as its price, we have on the left-hand
side of (2.5) the total "expenditures" on the consumption goods X|,...,X,, and L, and on the
right-hand side the maximum income attainable when all time is devoted to (paid) work. The
latter income is sometimes called /«// I/ICWTK' (Becker, 1965) or also implicit income (see
Varian, 1987). It measures the market value of the consumer's endowments of own time and
other income . The terms on the left show that full income is spent in part directly on
market goods X, X,, and in part indirectly on the time Z, used to generate utility rather
than earnings (Becker, 1981, p. 6).
An advantage of this approach is that it allows treating labour supply behaviour as similar
to consumption behaviour. Just as in the latter case, it is convenient to reduce the utility
maximization problem in terms of the n + 1 choice variables X, ,...,X^ and L to a problem
with two choice variables, viz. Z. on the one hand and an aggregate of all other goods
X|,...,X^ on the other hand. According to the composite cowwod/ry f/wwwn of Hicks
(1936)* this can be done in the following way. Assume that the prices p, ,...,£„ bear some
fixed ratio p to some base period prices pg, PQ,, , that is p, = ppg,, i = 1 n, where p
may vary with time, but is common to all prices so that the relative prices P,/Py. y * 'i
remain fixed at Poi^Oy ^ *-an then write the expenditures on X, X^ as
where X may be considered as a composite good quantity with price p.' Moreover, the
utility maximization problem can be split up in the following two steps. First, (/ " (X,,... ,X^ ,Z.)
is maximized with respect to X, X,, under the constraint formed by the definition of X
in (2.6) for each relevant X and L. This yields a maximal utility value for each relevant X
' This other income can be considered as the market value of an endowment of consumption goods
(sec Varian. 1987. p. 171).
* An essentially similar result was proved by Leontief (1936). See for modem expositions of the
theorem Dcaton and Mucllbaucr (1980. pp. 120-122). and Varian (1984, p. 147).
* Note from (2.6) thai /> can be regarded as a Paasche price index.Microgrowomif fteory of toto 5Mpp/y IS
and Z-, and hence an indirect or "derived" utility function l/(X,L). Secondly, l/(X,L) is
maximized under the remaining overall constraint in the (X.L) space, which is obtained by
substituting (2.6) into (2.5) *:
px (2.7)
For each possible combination of values of the exogenous variables, i.e. the price p,
wage rate H- and other income K^. the constraint (2.7) defines a budget set in the (X.L)
space as indicated by, e.g., the quadrilaterals OAfiC, CVt'flC and O/t"flC in Figure 2.1.
The upper frontiers of these budget sets, or budget lines Afl, Vfl and /t"fl are defined by
(2.7) with the equality sign = instead of £. The maximum consumption level (e.g., £M,
CM' or C>V) is attainable for L = 0 (so that all available time is devoted to work) and is
equal to the real full income (H'7" + KO )//>. Furthermore, the consumption level BC, at-
tainable for L = T, is equal to the real other income
if,.;,- -
0 T L
Figure 2.1 Determination of labour supply in the standard model. The bold lines are budget lines.
An optimal, i.e. utility maximizing, solution for (X.L) is now obtained by confronting the
budget set with indifference curves for the utility function {/(X.L). Usually, this utility func-
tion is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and to describe positive marginal
utilities £/^ and t/^ and positive and diminishing marginal rates of substitution -c/X/</L for
all relevant X and L. These properties imply, successively, that the indifference curves for
This two-stage utility maximization procedure should be distinguished carefully from the two-
stage utility maximization procedure in the context of two-stage budgeting (see, e.g., Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980. Sees. 5.1-5.2).
' See. e.g.. Siegers (1985, Sec. H.3.3).16
) are "continuous" and even smooth (no kinks), represent increasing utility levels
when moving outwards from the origin, and are strictly convex to the origin .
As can easily be seen from Figure 2.1 for a case of strict convexity, the "increasing utility
property" of the indifference curves implies that an optimal solution for (X,L) is given by a
point like D where the budget line just touches an indifference curve. In addition, it follows
from (he combination of strict convexity to the origin of the indifference curves and concav-
ity to the origin of the budget line' that this optimal point is unique. Under these conditions
two kinds of situations are possible. Both are pictured in Figure 2.1. For a sufficiently high
real other income K^/p ~ ^ ""^ * sufficiently low real wage w/p = co, e.g. co', the
optimal point is the ft/rnw 5O/M/IWI S, SO the person does not want to spend time on (paid)
work. However, when, at constant l^/p. to rises, the line AS rotates upwards around £
and becomes tangent to the indifference curve through B for co = co,. When co subse-
quently rises beyond CO,, the line becomes tangent to "higher" indifference curves at i/ifmor
points left to fl, for instance point £> for co • co^. So, for co > co,., the subject prefers to
participate to the labour market, whereas for co 5 co, he prefers not. Usually, the "threshold
wage" co, is called the real reKrvaitai vva^P. Because of the tangency of the line to the
indifference curve through B, it is equal to the marginal rate of substitution -dX/rfZ- for
L • 7\ For increasing real other income K^/p it can be shown also to increase.
It follows from the above analysis that labour supply is a function //(w/p,y^/p), which
is homogeneous of degree zero in (w.p.y^). Regarding the properties of this function the
following remarks can be made. First of all, one might wonder whether the interior solution
for (X,L) will continue to shift to the left, i.e. to lower Z, or higher W, when co further
rises at constant J^/p. At first sight, the answer may be yes. Assuming that leisure L is a
normal good, a rise in its price w seems to lead to a decline in £. because of the combined
working of a negative substitution effect and a negative income effect. However, there is a
crucial difference with the standard consumption demand model. Here a rise in H' means not
only an increase of the price of L, but also an increase in the market value vtT of the total
time endowment 7 and, consequently, of the full income y^ = HT + K^. Leisure being a
normal good, the latter increase implies a rue in L. This effect can be called a positive
* In my interpretation this means that, for any pair of points on the same indifference curve, linear
combinations of these points (on a straight line) in-between arc lying at the other side of the indif-
ference curve than the origin. In contrast to what is asserted by Dcaton and Mucllbaucr (1980, pp. 30
and 32), (his includes, in my view, cases in which indifference curves join an axis of the diagram and
stop there. Sec, for more on indifference curves, also Varian (1984. p. 113) or Maks (1981. Qi. 2,
Sec. 3). The assumptions on the utility function presuppose its existence, which is based on the
preference onlcring axioms of reflcxivity, completeness, transitivity or consistency, and continuity
(sec, e.g., Dcaton and Mucllbaucr. 1980. pp. 26-28. and Varian. 1984. pp. 111-112).
* This means that intermediate linear combinations of any pair of points on the budget line are
lying either on the budget line or at the same side of the budget line as the origin. Since the budget
line is linear, the former situation applies. The literature usually speaks of roitverfry of the budget J«.
In the present usual case that all points between the budget line and the origin are part of the oppor-
tunity set, this is equivalent to coneavi'rv to the origin of the budget //«. I prefer to use the latter
concept, since this better matches the concept of strict convexity to the origin of indifference curves.
'" See Killingswoith (1983. p. 8, footnote 6).Af irrof rowomic fteory o/ /gftow supp/y 17
gjfccf." The total effect of a change in H- on L can then be decom-
posed according to the Slutsky equation
From the left to the right, the terms in the second member of this equation represent the
substitution effect (at constant utility level I/), the normal income effect, and the endowment
income effect. In the third member the income effect terms have been added up, yielding an
always non-negative total income effect. When // = 0, so L = 7", this effect is zero, so an
increase in w will result in a pure negative substitution effect and thus a decrease in £. or an
increase in W. This effect has already been found above. However, when W becomes larger
than zero, the total income effect becomes positive and may, for larger values of W, overrule
the negative substitution effect. As easily seen, this is more likely to occur to the extent to
which leisure is a luxury rather than a necessary good. It would imply a AarAMWcZ-favM/j/ix
labour supply curve. Whether labour supply curves are backward bending in practice and if
so, for which kind of workers and in which kind of situations, are to be considered as major
empirical questions and of obvious practical relevance, for example, for analysing the
incentive effects of income taxation.
The analysis above was in terms of the /w«»mo/ wage rate w at constant p and Kg.
However, it follows from the homogeneity of degree zero of the labour supply function
//(w/p.yp/p) in (w.p.y^) that a rise in the ra// wage rate w/p at constant K^/p has the
same effect on labour supply irrespective of whether the rise is due to a rise in w at con-
stant p and KQ, a decline in p at constant H> and KQ/P, or a combination of these situ-
ations.'^ Therefore, a labour supply curve in terms of the real wage rate at constant real
other income has the same shape as the corresponding labour supply curve in terms of the
nominal wage rate at constant price and nominal other income. The effect of a, ceteris
paribus, increase (decrease) in the nominal or real other income on the demand for leisure is
a pure positive (negative) income effect. This implies that labour supply curves will shift to
the left and upwards, when other income rises, and vice versa.
If we want to derive specifications of the labour supply function //(w/p.K^/p) for
specific forms of the utility function l/(X,L), we can use, for *7p larger than or equal to
" Sec, e.g., Dcaion and Muellbauer (1980, p. 91) and Varian (1987. p. 173).
'* See Dcaion and Muellbauer (1980. p. 92). The possibility that work hours may be increased by
a fall in wages and. hence, by a rise in income taxation is regarded with incredulity by some politici-
ans, but is quite meaningful to many survey respondents (sec Atkinson and Slight/, 1980. p. 34,
footnote 5). Note that a shift of interior solutions to a comer solution with i. « 0 is implausible for
most jobs.
" The total effect of a decline in p at constant w and K^/p on Z, can be decomposed in a
negative (cross) substitution effect and a positive normal income effect as well as a negative endow-
ment income effect due to a decrease in K^, 10 keep Kg, /p at a constant level. As easily shown, the
two income effects add up to an always non-negative total income effect. Thus, we see that the total
effect of a decline in p at constant w and K^/p on £.. and hence on W. has the same kind of
components and has the same ambiguity of sign as a rise in tv at constant p and r^.Hj Chapter 2
the real reservation wage, the tangency condition, leading to the Second Law of Gossen for
the case of labour supply
ii- -£L-^. -^ i- v - (2.9)
For each relevant combination of values of Wp and ^/p, £, and hence // (as well as X),
can be solved from equation (2.9) in conjunction with the constraint equation (2.7). Note that
a Cobb-Douglas utility function (with an elasticity of substitution equal to one) implies, for
positive other income, a labour supply curve which merely slopes forward , whereas a
Leontief utility function describing perfect complementarity of consumption and leisure (a
limiting case of the standard model with zero elasticity of substitution) leads, for not too
large other income, to an only backward-sloping labour supply curve . Hence, for
modelling a backward-frenrfm^ labour supply curve a more complex specification of the
utility function is needed, e.g., a CES specification with a positive elasticity of substitution
smaller than one (see Barzel and McDonald, 1973) or an additive quadratic specification as
proposed by Gossen (1854) (see Sec. 4.1).
Finally, we remark that in the present situation of no full satiation, where the utility
maximum is attained at the budget line, the "smaller or equal sign" £ in the income con-
straint (2.2) can be replaced by the equality sign =. From the resulting equation in combina-
tion with (2.6) it then follows that X = K/p, i.e.. the composite good quantity X is equal to
the real total income >7p. This explains why total income often shows up as the other
choice variable than leisure in more traditional presentations of the standard model of labour
supply.'*
From the exposition of the standard model of individual labour supply in the present
section it may be concluded that, despite its simplicity, the model is rather powerful as well
as flexible. In particular, it explains the existence of a positive reservation wage threshold to
labour market participation and covers a broad range of possible shapes of the labour supply
curve. Thereby the theoretical notion of substitution and income effects has proven to be a
useful analytical construct. However, the model has. of course, also its limitations, and much
recent work on labour supply has been aimed at modifying and extending the model. In the
next section we will discuss some important extensions, especially those which are relevant
in the context of the present study.
'* See. e.g.. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980. p. 35). For zero other income the labour supply curve is
vertical.
" For other income larger than or equal to a certain threshold value (which may differ from
person to person), the labour supply curve is vertical at W « 0. The reservation wage can then be
coasidcrcd as infinitely high, whereas it is zero for other income below the threshold mentioned.
These properties play a role in discussions on a basic income provided by the government for
everybody.
'* Sec. eg.. Atkinson and Suglitz (1980. Sec. 2.2) and Siegers (1985. Sec. 11.3.4.2).rteory o/ /a/xwr 5upp/y 19
12 Extensions
2.2./
The standard microcconomic model of individual labour supply can be modified or extended
in several ways. In this context the distinction between utility maximizing models with a
p/anm'/]# /wnzon of one periorf and those with a planning horizon of mu/f;/>/<' /wiVwiv is
important." The standard model of the previous section is a one-period model. In such a
model the subject can be considered as planning his labour supply for one period JQ at the
beginning of that period. However, the subject may 5imu//a/ifou$/y, in the context of a career
planning, plan a time path for his labour supply in future periods f > JQ. This could be
modelled by a multiple-period or intertemporal utility maximizing model. Well-known
examples of such a model are life cycle and human capital models. In these models the
timing of behaviour plays an important role.'"
Yet, in my view, a 5fa>rr-ru/i or one-period labour supply decision tends to be taken not
simultaneously with a /ong-ru/i or multiple-period career planning, but ci/fcr, and fitting as
well as possible with such a planning. (Compare a tactic business decision within the frame-
work of strategic planning.) This career plan can then be conceived as being given for u
short-run labour supply decision." Thus, the short-run labour supply decisions may, to a
large extent, determine actual labour supply behaviour, whereas the long-run career plans do
so only through short-run decisions. As a consequence, these short-run decisions will take
into account their possible impacts on future oppo/Yu/ii/i'es for realizing the career plan, e.g.,
in the case of an unemployed person, the possible negative "screening device" effects of not
accepting a job offer now on future chances of getting a job^. Such anticipation in short-
run decisions on their expected long-run career effects can, to a certain extent, be incorpor-
ated into a one-period model via a job quality variable (see Subset. 2.2.S). This study
focuses on short-run labour supply decisions, and hence on corresponding one-period exten-
sions of the standard model of labour supply. The next subsections give an overview of
some of these extensions, namely those regarding imperfect information, taxes and transfers,
rationings and endogenous wages, psychic income of labour time, preference variations and
dynamics of state variables, and family labour supply.
" This distinction corresponds to the distinction between static and dynamic labour supply models
which is made by Killingswotth (1983). However, I do not think the latter terminology is very
fortunate, for reasons to become clear in Subsection 2.2.6.
'* See for surveys of multiple-period models, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Sec. 4.2 and Ch.
12). and. in the context of labour supply. Killingsworth (1983. Ch. S). See for the timing aspect also
Clark and Summers (1982).
" However, this does not exclude that, in the longer run. a career plan is adjusted, for instance in
connection with experiences of frustration of short-run labour supply plaas. In my view, as opposed
to the usual practice of multiple-period utility maximizing models, long-run career plaas tend to be
not as detailed as short-run labour supply plans, since (among other reasons) otherwise the latter
plans would be determined completely by the former, implying no room for a flexible response to
new (labour demand) opportunities (unless long-run career plans are revised fastly).
" See, e.g.. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980. p. 285). and De Neubourg (1985).20 C/iapfgr 2
2.2.2
In one-period models it is usually assumed (implicitly) that the constraints which the subject
takes into account, are identical to acma/ constraints, i.e., the subject has perfect information
and foresight with respect to the (complex) combination of all these constraints. This as-
sumption may be made more plausible by presupposing, by analogy to Marshall's "short
period" and in the spirit of Hicks, that the length of the period is such that the values of the
exogenous variables are (in sufficiently good approximation) constant during the period.^'
At the beginning of the next period the values of the exogenous variables are then assumed
to have, in general, changed (discontinuously), implying that labour supply plans are revised.
In practice, however, the length of such a period could be very short (think of price
changes!), whereas the "average period" after which labour supply plans are revised (e.g.,
about a year) may be much longer.** The latter period seems the more relevant one and
perfect foresight with respect to this period is, in many cases, implausible.*^ Therefore, it
appears appropriate to relax both the Marshallian presupposition and the assumption of
perfect information and foresight. In the present theoretical context this is not a problem. We
may assume that the subject plans her (average) labour supply for a period of certain length
(e.g., a year) on the basis of more or less correct expectations on the existence and structure
of constraints she will face and on the average (e.g., wages and prices) or total (e.g., other
income) values of exogenous variables affecting these constraints. If, after the period, the
constraints arc perceived to have changed or expectations have turned out to be false, the
expectations and, as a consequence, the short-run labour supply plan will be revised. Another
reason for revising the labour supply plan may be that the person's own preferences have
changed. More on these preference changes will be said in Subsection 2.2.6. In the follow-
ing, when speaking about expected or perceived constraints or values of exogenous variables,
I shall often, for the sake of brevity, omit the adjective "expected" or "perceived".
2.2 J Taws a/id
A second extension of the standard model consists of incorporating rax?5 and rra/u/irr into
the model. Taxes and transfers may affect the income constraints (2.3) and (2.7) as well as
the corresponding utility functions. Here we will discuss only the effects on the income-
budget constraints.*'* An important category of taxes is income taxation. Income taxes
*' In the analysis of Marshall these variables arc stock variables, and. in the context of the standard
model, the real wage rate and real property income could be considered as indices of human capital
and physical capital, respectively (sec Killingswonh, 1983. p. 45). In general, however, we do not
require that the exogenous variables arc stock variables or could be interpreted as such.
Reasons of this much longer period may be labour contracts, commitments, terms of notice and
application, rcplanning costs and adjustment costs of behaviour.
*•' This may even be the case for the Marshallian period because of imperfect information about
riMTr* constraints, in particular about current values of exogenous variables affecting them. See. e.g..
Dcaton and Mucllbaucr (1980. pp. 337-338).
*•* See Killingsworth (1983. pp. 340-343) for a discussion of the effects of taxes and transfers on
the utility function l/(X,L).Aficrogco/iom/r f^go/y o/ /g/x)Mr snpp/y
impose a liability on the individual that is generally a function of earnings or gross labour
income K^/ = wW and (different kinds of) gross other income. The latter income may
contain property income as well as transfers from the government or relatives. However,
these transfers are, in many cases, not exogenous, but negatively dependent on K^ and
exogenous kinds of gross other income K^o such as property income. They can then be
regarded as nfgafiv? inrom? raxfi and, together with the positive income taxes, be described
by a (net) tax function 'CGW -^GO )• Th'* results in a total w« income
K = Htf + Kco " Kwtf.Kco). '' /•"•'" (2.10)
Substituting this expression and (2.6) into the income-budget constraint (2.2), we obtain the
constraint j^ / .--'
px <; w« + KQO - f(wtf.ygo). ,y /• (2.11)
For most current tax systems, the rate structure of the positive income taxes is progressive
and the implicit tax rates of the negative income taxes are high and complex. The constraint
(2.11) then defines a budget line which has a highly non-linear, winding shape, is non-
smooth, i.e., has kinks, and is often neither concave nor convex to the origin. This has
various interesting implications^, but in the context of this study (see Sec. 2.3) it suffices
to consider as an example the impacts of one special and fairly simple negative income tax,
which is given by
oo) = 0. «/w« * K<jo !> *V (2.12b)
where K^ is a guaranteed minimum income and where (2.12a) implies an implicit tax rate
of 100 percent.^ Assuming K^o < K^, both the transfer regime defined by (2.12a) and
the no-transfer regime defined by (2.12b) can occur for particular values of the wage rate w.
Substituting the tax function for these regimes into (2.10) leads to the non-linear constraint
p* <S wW «• y^Q, j/ w// • Kgo ^ K^. (2.13b)
" See. e.g., Killingsworth (1983, Ch. 6) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980. Lecture 2) for surveys.
In order to analyse the effects of such a non-linear constraint, it is often convenient to linearize it
around optimal points (see. e.g.. Killingsworth. 1983. Ch. 6). The slope of the resulting linearized
budget constraint is equal to the real after-tax marginal wage rate and varies with hours supplied.
This makes the after-tax marginal wage rate ?/u/o£?/ia(u. However, in the theoretical context of this
study it is not necessary to pursue these linearizations.
This negative income tax is a special case of more general transfer schedules the implications of
which for labour supply are analysed by. e.g., Hanoch and Honig (1978) and Killingsworth (1983.
Sec. 6.3). Hanoch and Honig give also an illustration for a Cobb-Douglas utility function.22 Chapter 2
Resulting budget lines are depicted in Figure 2.2. They have a kink at the point AT', /f,. or
At , respectively, where the constraint switches from the transfer regime to the right to the
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Figure 2.2 Determination of labour supply under a negative income tax of 100 percent. The solid
bold lines indicate non-concave budget lines and the dashed bold line is a standard
budget line without the negative income tax.
Analogously to the standard model, there is for a sufficiently high real minimum income
^ (flC in Fig. 2.2) and a sufficiently low real wage vv/p = co, e.g. 0)', a comer sol-
ution 5 with no participation. However, when, at constant ^co/p (^C in Fig. 2.2) and
constant r\*/p, ® rises, the no-transfer segment of the budget line rotates around the point B
and becomes, for co « ©,., tangent to the indifference curve through 6 not at 5, but at an
interior point E. Thus, as a consequence of the budget line being not concave to the ori-
gin^, we have here a situation with rm> optimal points. Moreover, the transfer segment of
the budget line can never be tangent to an indifference curve, since its slope is always zero,
whereas the slopes of the indifference curves, i.e. minus the marginal rates of substitution,
are assumed to be negative (see Sec. 2.1).** Consequently, there are no interior solutions
on the transfer segment of the budget line and there is no comer solution B with tangency
" In the literature this is usually referred to as nonconvexity of the budget i^f. See footnote 9.
** Note that this impossibility of tangency is typical of an implicit tax rate of 100 percent, since
for an implicit tax rate of less than 100 percent the slope of the no-transfer segment of the budget
line is negative for positive real wages.Aficroeco/wm/c fAeory 0/ favour 23
of the segment to the indifference curve through S. For real wage levels above ©,. there is
one optimal point on the no-transfer segment of the budget line, implying that fi)^ is the real
reservation wage and that above this wage the labour supply curve is the same as in the
standard model. We may then have a backward-bending labour supply curve as in Figure 2.3
with a higher reservation wage than in the standard case and a discontinuous jump of hours
supplied at that wage.
H
Figure 2.3 Backward-bending labour supply curve under a negative income tax of 100 percent
(bold), a), = real reservation wage without negative income tax. A, « real reservation
wage with negative income tax.
Interesting questions are 0'j what determines the size of the increase <&,. - a), in the
reservation wage due to the introduction of the transfer scheme (/4/C/7" in Fig. 2.2) and 00
what determines the size of the positive difference between the total income ffl,. W ^ + K^o /p
for which people just want to work, and the guaranteed minimum income J\//p (£F in Fig.
2.2). Regarding question 0') Figure 2.2 suggests that the increase in the reservation wage is
larger as the guaranteed minimum income is higher and as the indifference curves are more
bowed, or equivalently, as consumption is less substitutable for leisure. Moreover, Figure
2.2 also suggests that such a relation may hold with respect to question 00. provided a
higher reservation wage implies a lower optimal L, i.e., provided the discontinuity in the
^ Note that this reservation wage is not, as in the standard model, determined as the marginal rate
of substitution for W = 0, but as the wage for which the maximal utility level of working without
transfer (£) is equal to the utility level of not working with transfer (6). Thus, in this case of a
budget line which is not concave to the origin, a /oca/ marginal utility analysis around W = 0 is not
sufficient to investigate the labour force participation decision, but a g/o/xi/ utility comparison
analysis is also necessary (see Hausman. 1980. Sec. 2).
30 Cf. KiUingsworth (1983. pp. 364-365).24 _^_ C/iapter 2 ^
labour supply curve occurs, as in Figure 2.3, in a forward-sloping part of it.^'
Of course, a negative income tax is usually financed by a positive income tax. This
lowers the no-transfer segment of the budget line, implying an even higher reservation wage.
A negative income tax could also be financed by a tax on consumption prices. It can easily
be seen from (2.6) and (2.11) that, if this tax is a uniform percentage of all consumption
prices, it has the same effects as a corresponding proportional positive income tax.
2.2.4 /?ar/om>]£.s anrf iru/oge/toitf wager
A third extension of the standard model is obtained by noting that the budget line may not
only be non-linear and non-smooth as in the case of the constraints (2.11) and (2.13), but
also aVsco/irirtMoiw. Discontinuous budget lines may arise for a variety of reasons. For
example, it is often argued that, at least in the short run, many workers can only choose
between working an institutionally fixed standard day, week and year, and not working at
all. The budget line then shrinks to just two discrete points. A second reason of a discontinu-
ous budget line may be a constraint on hours from labour demand. In as far as the subject
takes such a constraint into account in his labour supply plan, it sets an upper limit on his
planned hours of work, thereby truncating the budget line at some maximum number of
working hours per period. Thirdly, such an upper limit will also be imposed by consider-
ations of survival (e.g., enough sleep, Barzel and McDonald, 1973) or the health of the
labour supplier (Parsons, 1977). This corresponds to a minimal necessary number of leisure
hours which is positive. On the other hand, survival considerations will also dictate a mini-
mal necessary level of consumption. When the other income KQ or the guaranteed minimum
income K^ divided by /> is smaller than this level, it implies a positive under limit on
planned working hours which is inversely proportional to the wage rate w. '•us*'*
Killingsworth (1983, Sec. 2.4) distinguishes two kinds of approaches to these discontinu-
ous budget lines, namely disequilibrium and equilibrium approaches. In disequilibrium
analyses the discontinuous constraints are treated as exogenously given "raf/o/i//ig,j" of
labour supply. Assuming that such a rationing is taken into account in the labour supply plan
of the subject, it will, for example in the case of a two-point budget line, typically lead to
either non-participation with a higher reservation wage than without the rationing, or over-
employment, or underemployment." This is illustrated for the case of a backward-bending
labour supply curve under a negative income tax of 100 percent (Fig. 2.3) in Figures 2.4a
and 2.4b. In Figure 2.4a the labour supply ration W * falls outside the discontinuity in the
original labour supply curve, whereas in Figure 2.4b it is within this discontinuity. This
results in different rationed labour supply schedules with no overemployment regime in the
" It would be interesting to investigate these questions for the case of a CES utility function, but
this leads to complex analytical problems which arc beyond the scope of this thesis (cf. Hanoch and
Honig, 1978. pp. 11-14, for the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function).
•** Strictly spoken, the resulting budget line is not discontinuous, but. following Killingsworth
(1983. p. 47), we regard it as such.
" See. e.g.. Dcaton and Muellbaucr (1980. pp. 283-284) and Killingsworth (1983. pp. 48-52). The
results arc not based on a marginal utility analysis, but on a utility comparison analysis as in the case
of non-concave budget lines (sec footnote 29).Af jcro^ro/iomir fteory swpp/y 25
case of Figure 2.4b. As can be deduced from Figure 2.2, the reservation wages <5), are
higher than the reservation wage ©,. without the rationing, since the rationed values W of W
arc not equal to its optimal value W at <&,., and hence, at and in some interval above fi>,
yield lower utility than the non-participation value 0 of W at fl. At (S),. the utility of W
has become equal to the utility of non-participation, leading to a discontinuous jump from
W = 0 to W = W for w > fi),.- In the case of Figure 2.4a the latter rationed labour supply
can be argued to be initially larger and for higher w smaller than the optimal W on the
standard labour supply curve. This implies successively overemployment and















Figure 2.4 Labour supply schedules under a negative income tax of 100 percent and a two-points
labour supply rationing at W = 0 and W = W* (bold lines), ffi, » real reservation
wage without rationing. <&,. = real reservation wage with rationing.
In the case of an upper limit on hours worked from labour demand, usually the dise-
quilibrium theory of, among others, Clower (1965) is applied. However, in this theory ex
ante effective labour supply plans take into account, by definition, consumption demand
rationings (spill-overs), but not labour supply rationings, whereas the latter rationings affect
ex ante effective consumption demand plans. Only ex post a labour supply rationing affects
realized labour supply and makes it equal to the minimum of effective labour supply and
demand. When the effective labour supply and demand curves are continuous, this seems a
plausible procedure, but when the effective labour supply curve is discontinuous and the
effective labour demand curve crosses the discontinuity, it turns out to be incorrect. For
example, in the case where the effective labour demand is inelastic and is given by the
See. for an analysis of labour supply decisions under a social security system with a three-point
budget line and a CES utility function. Zabalza et a). (1980).
" See. e.g.. Ashenfelter (1977). Deaton and Muellbauer (1980. pp. 290-293) and Killingsworth
(1983. pp. 53-56).26 C/tapter 2
vertical rationing line in Figure 2.4b, realized labour supply can be shown to be given by the
rationed labour supply schedule drawn, and, as a consequence of the reservation wage being
raised by the rationing, this labour supply schedule clearly does not satisfy the minimum
condition. The fundamental reason of this phenomenon is that, at and in some interval above
the original reservation wage, the rationed values of W yield lower utility than the non-
participation value 0 of W (implying that "something is not better than nothing"), whereas
the minimum condition implicitly assumes that higher values of the decision variable yield
higher utility (implying that "something is better than nothing").
In the case of an upper limit on hours worked from a survival or health constraint the
same analysis can be applied. When the subject takes such a constraint into account, it can
be incorporated in his utility function as minimal required leisure time as, e.g., in the
extended CES utility function of Barzel and McDonald (1973). Analogously, in case the
subject takes into account a survival or health constraint on consumption, this constraint can
be included in the utility function as minimal required consumption (see also Barzel and
McDonald, 1973).
In equilibrium analyses of discontinuous budget lines, the "rationings" are considered as
endogenous wute of voluntary choices rather than as exogenous ro«.r/rai>itt on choice -
despite outward appearance to the contrary. For example, at least in the longer run, there
may be scope for some choice of hours between different jobs offering different rationings
of hours per day, days per week, or weeks per year. When such rationings are unattrac-
tive for the marginal labour supplier, they will be compensated by higher hourly wages or by
preferable (other) job qualities. Hence, at least in the longer run, the budget line consists of
several distinct points or segments reflecting different combinations of hours of work and
wage rates. Models of optimal employment contracts suggest that also the variability of the
wage rate over time and, in relation to that, the probability of unemployment during periods
of low product demand may be part of the job package that workers "buy" in exchange for
labour time, when they take a particular type of job with a particular type of firm. Further-
more, a full-fledged analysis should include the effects of different job qualities such as
working conditions. We will come back to this in the next subsection.
This example of endogenous "rationings" suggests that in a market cross section the
hourly wage rates reflect to some extent the other attributes of the job packages of which
they are a part. In that case the wage rate is a function of the other job attributes, which
forms a second fundamental reason besides income taxation and overtime payment for
treating the (after-tax marginal) wage rate as gndoggnoMJ in cross-section studies of the
supply of hours (and which could be considered as a fourth extension of the standard
model). Moreover, at least in the longer run, these job attributes or, equivalently, job
types are choice variables. As indicated above, such a choice variable may be the rationing
of hours worked such as implied by full-time and part-time work.'* Furthermore, (com-
* See Dcaton and Mucllbaucr (1980, pp. 286-287) and Killingsworth (1983. pp. 58-66).
" See. e.g.. Dcaion and Muclibauer (1980, pp. 286-287) and Killingsworth (1983. pp. 21-23).
'* In that case the conventional substitution and income effects do not apply (see Killingsworth.
1983. pp. 65-66). Sec for recent empirical applications, for instance. Tummcrs and Woittiez (1988)
and Van Soest et al. (1989).Aftcroecowom/c /teory <?/ /afrour ji<pp/y 27
binations of) rationings and wage rates and, more generally, job packages are not given once
and for all for every job, but are, at least in the longer run, subject to contract negotiations
by labour suppliers themselves or trade unions (e.g., reduction of working hours and contract
wages) or are subject to legislation (e.g., the standard working week and measures on
wages). Trade unions as well as the legislator can then be expected to take some account of
the preferences of individual labour suppliers (as well as of the employer's labour
demands)."
Finally, in the case of survival or health constraints on hours worked from minimal
required leisure and consumption, the person may choose either to respect such constraints
or not to respect them and consequently to get ill or to starved More importantly, the
minimal required leisure and consumption may be larger than those dictated by the survival
or health constraints: they may not only contain an exogenous "physiologically necessary"
component, but also an endogenous "psychologically necessary" component as a conse-
quence of individual habit formation and behavioural preference interdependence.'" When
other rationing constraints are not binding, this collective habit formation (see Sec. 1.3) is
the indirect result of voluntary behaviour choices in the past, and when, in addition, the
individual habit formation is rational (see Sec. 1.1), this is even an anticipated result of such
choicest
In such situations the "rationings" are exogenous with respect to the labour supply and
consumption demand decisions in the short run, but endogenous in the longer run. Following
Pollak (1978), we call such predetermined variables s/a/e van'a/j/w. "Rationings" are often of
this type, so in general we may say that a disequilibrium approach tends to make sense in
analysing the short-run impacts of "rationings" on labour supply, whereas an equilibrium
approach is often more adequate in an analysis of the long-run impacts of "rationings" on
labour supply.
2.2.5 Pjyc/i/c income o
In many cases a job is chosen not only because of its combination of rationing of hours
worked and wage rate, but also because of other attributes, i.e. job qualities such as working
conditions and career perspectives. Preferable job qualities yield by definition higher utility,
but this is not accounted for by the standard model, since the utility function in this model
depends only on consumption X and leisure L. Therefore, in a fifth extension of the stan-
dard model, the utility function should depend also on a vector of one or more job quality
variables ^ and, since more labour time W is likely to increase the effects on utility of
many of these quality variables, on //.*' Thus, we obtain a utility function
" See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 44 and Lecture 10).
** Compare a hunger strike.
*' See Pollak (1970. p. 749), Phlips (1978), Dcaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp. 374-375), Johnson
and Pencavel (1984) and Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990).
** See Subsection 2.2.6, Section 4.6 and Subsection 5.1.3 for more details.
** See, e.g., Woittiez and Kapteyn (1987, p. 22) for the case of dirty versus clean jobs.28
t?(X,/,,//,#„), where the total effect of // and ?„ on (7 is usually associated with "psyc/i-
/c i/icowie" of labour time.
Such a utility function can be relevant in several kinds of choice situation. First, in job
choice models X, L and A/ and one or more components of <jr,y may all be treated as
simultaneous (and interdependent) choice variables.*' The budget line could then be taken
as continuous with respect to X, L and W **, but, as we have seen in the previous subsec-
tion, for a given job the labour time W may, at least in the short run, also be rationed at one
fixed value W *. Job package combinations of the hourly wage rate w, rationed labour time //
and job qualities <7// can then be considered as discrete choice alternatives. Moreover, the
alternative of non-participation with W = 0 and no w and <?// could be added.
In a second situation the job a labour supplier has or, more generally, the job qualities
<7/S are given in the short run because of their attractivity, job rationing by labour demand or
search and moving costs'", whereas there is some scope for varying the labour time, e.g.,
for working less days per week. In that case X, L and // are the (interdependent) choice
variables, whereas <?// is exogenous with respect to the short-run choice. On the other hand, (7//
may be endogenous in the longer run, e.g., as a result of job choice, so in this choice situa-
tion </// is a state variable in the sense of Pollak (1978).
In a third, but related choice situation the job qualities <7// are not given in the short run,
but they vary with the labour time W in a way which is given in the short run. For example,
available full-time jobs may have more attractive job qualities (such as better career perspec-
tives) than part-time jobs. This might explain why in the Netherlands many women holding
a full-time job would like to work part-time, but nevertheless do not quit their current jobs
(Allaart et al., 1989, 1991). In such a situation the job qualities «?^ are functions <?,,(//,a)
of W with parameter(s) a which arc exogenously given in the short run. In a longer run,
however, these parameters may be endogenous, so they can be regarded as state variables
(instead of the job qualities themselves in the second choice situation above).
Substituting the functions <7,,(W,a) in the above utility function (7(X,L,//,«/^) yields a
utility function (?(X,L,W;a), where "; " denotes that a is given in the short run. Thus, in
this as well as the second choice situation short-run labour supply is described as the result
of maximizing a utility function 0(X,L,W) for given values of the state variable(s) (a or
<7^, respectively). In comparison with a standard utility function C/(X,L) such a utility
function has interesting implications, which can be derived as follows.
Substituting // • 7" - L into the utility function £/(X,Z,.W), we obtain a reduced utility
function t/(X,L). This, however, is not a standard utility function. As easily seen, its mar-
ginal utility l/^ is related to the marginal utilities ()^ and $,/ of the original utility function
as (/^ • {?£ - f);f. We call t/^ the wf marginal utility or net "psychic income" of W. At
** See. e.g.. Becker (1965. p. 498), Hamcrmesh (1974). Lucas (1977). Goedhart and Kapteyn
(1978), Van de Stadt (1981) and Sicbcrt (I98S). Such utility of labour time was already recognized in
the previous century by the early marginalists Gosscn, Jcvons and Marshall (sec. e.g.. Siegers, 198S.
Sec. H.3.2).
** Sec. e.g.. Woitticz. and Kapteyn (1987).
** Sec, e.g.. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1987).
" See Dcaton and Mucllbaucr (198a p. 286).Micro«wi0m/c fteory 29
diminishing marginal utilities** of /. and W, (^ may be smaller than t?^ for sufficiently
high Z. and hence sufficiently low //. implying that t/^ is negative (oversatiation with
respect to L). In the usual case of a positive marginal utility C/^ » t?^ of consumption, this
implies a negative marginal rate of substitution -dX/dL (see (2.9)) for sufficiently high £.,
and hence indifference curves like that in Figure 2.5 (see Ehrenberg and Smith, 1982, pp.
170-171). These indifference curves are assumed to be smooth and strictly convex to the
origin as in the standard case and to represent increasing utility levels when moving upwards
from the L-axis (now not from the origin).
T-H'
Figure 2.5 Determination of labour supply of a work lover under a standard constraint for (o -0
(solid bold line) and under a negative income tax of I(X) percent for low a> (dashed
bold line).
Confronting such indifference curves with standard budget lines, we obtain for zero wage
rate w (and positive other income K^) with a horizontal budget line an in/prwr optimal
point D' with //^ > 0. This describes (unpaid) volunteer work. Moreover, the real reser-
vation wage as being equal to the marginal rate of substitution for L = T is negative, i.e.,
the subject is prepared to give up money income in exchange of the positive net psychic
Strictly spoken, a derivation of labour supply requires only ordinal utility, for which the concept
of diminishing marginal utility has no meaning. However, to make interpretations easier we regard
the utility function as cardinal, so that we can speak in terms of diminishing marginal utilities.30 C/iaprcr 2
income of labour time //.*' Similar results are obtained for the budget lines in Figure 2.2,
describing a 100 percent negative income tax as defined by (2.12). For zero or sufficiently
low real wage co we have a unique interior optimal point D' with //** > 0 on the transfer
segment of the budget line. This describes work while retaining full or partial unemployment
benefits.*' itf ; :- * -.-••,••"-•
How will labour supply curves look in these cases? First consider the case without the
negative income tax. According to (2.9) the first-order condition for an interior optimum is
then given by C/^ = cof/^. This implies cV^ » 0 for oo = 0 and, in the usual case where
l/^ > 0, £/^ > 0 for co > 0. Assuming t/^ < 0 for all L (which is consistent with the
diminishing marginal rates of substitution in Figure 2.5), it then follows that a labour supply
curve will begin for to =0 at // > 0 for which £7^=0, and will remain right to the //
with £/{_ * 0 for higher co. In the special case of an additive utility function, so when the
marginal utility of L (and W) is independent of X, {/^ and hence the // for which cV^ = 0
arc independent of to, so this // is equal to //" for all co. Thus, in this case a labour
supply curve will remain right to the vertical line W = // for co > 0 (see Fig. 2.6a).
However, what will be its shape? In the same way as in the standard model the total
effect of a change in w or co on L, and hence on //, can be decomposed according to the
Slutsky equation (2.8). Again we then have a negative substitution effect and a total income
effect which is positive for positive W, if leisure is a normal good. To see when the latter
condition is fulfilled in the present case as compared with the standard case, we express the
substitution and total income effects in partial derivatives of the reduced utility function
l/(X,L) as well as the original utility function £?(X,L,W). Following Henderson and
Quandt (1958) (see also Hamermesh, 1974), such expressions can be derived in a simple
way by substituting the standard constraints X = wW + J^ and W + L = 7" into the
reduced utility function, where p = 1 for convenience. This yields what we call the co/i-
.srrai/iet/ u«7/ry /u/trft'on
£/*"(//;w.Ko.r) - l/(wW + Ko.7" - W). (2.14)
This utility function is maximized with respect to // for given »v and FQ. For an interior
maximum the first-order condition is
** In practice, however, people will at most be prepared lo make little costs like travel costs for
volunteering, since they would consider more costs as very unjust. This can be described by a strong
suppressing effect of a negative real wage income co// on the "psychic income" of W. making the
indifference curve in Figure 2.5 almost flat at the right of point fi for negative co. More generally,
"psychic income" of W is likely to depend heavily on co W and hence on co, since real wage income
is perceived as a measure of the social value and status of a person's labour (see also Sec. 8.2). The
resulting wage dependence of labour supply preferences is similar to price-dependence of consump-
tion preferences (sec. e.g., Lcibenstcin, 1950, and Pollak, 1977) and may lead to "conspicuous
earnings" in analogy to conspicuous consumption (Vcblcn. 1899).
™ Ehrenbcrg and Smith (1982) call pcrsoas who do so "workaholics", even when they work only
a few hours a week. This representation of "workaholics" does not seem very adequate. A more
dynamic model of the behaviour of "workaholics" is presented in Chapter 3.ic fA^ory 0/ favour 5upp/v 31
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Figure 2.6 Backward-bending labour supply curves of a work lover under a standard constraint
(solid bold curves and line) and under a negative income tax (also dashed bold line in
(a)) for (a) not fully satiating consumption and ffr) fully satiating consumption.
- {/^ = 0




Differentiating the first-order condition with respect to »v yields
(see Varian, 1984, p. 328) or, equivalently, since {/*//// = ~|t
(2.16),
Hw
* 0 by virtue of
(2.17)
where we substituted from (2.16). (Of course, all second-order derivatives have to be evalu-
ated at the optimal point.) Since differentiating the time constraint with respect to w yields
i^, = -//*., (2.17) implies an expression for the Slutsky equation (2.8).
Since, analogously Ly = -//y and
f/'
(2.18)
the second term in the numerator of (2.17) corresponds to the total income effect in (2.8),
and hence the first term in the numerator to the substitution effect. Usually, the substitution
effect on // is indeed positive in both the standard and extended model. Assuming t/^x < ^
(which is consistent with the second-order condition and the diminishing marginal rates of32 Cftaptf r 2
substitution in Figure 2.S), the total income effect on W is negative, or leisure is a normal
good, if £7^ > *^xx- '•*•• " leisure and consumption are not too strong (net) substitutes in
the Edgeworth sense. In the case of an additive utility function with t/^ = 0, for which
Figure 2.6 holds, this is automatically true, so then there is no difference between the
standard and extended models. More generally, the condition t/^ > *^xx seems plausible
for sufficiently high »v in the standard model", but also in the extended model, since the
condition is then equivalent to the condition cV^ - 17^ -* *^xx ^ ™^ original utility
function and since £7^ 's likely to be small in absolute value relative to vvt/^^ for suf-
ficiently high consumption (corporate time and consumption seem then rather independent in
the Edgeworth sense ). Therefore, the addition of "psychic income" of labour time to the
standard model does not really seem to enhance the likelihood of leisure being an inferior
good as suggested in certain literature (see, e.g., Wolfson, 1988, pp. 243-244). More impor-
tantly, just as the standard model, the extended model can describe a backward-bending
labour supply curve as indicated in Figure 2.6a. ( j
In the presence of a negative income tax this curve becomes slightly different (see also
Fig. 2.6a). For co or w rising from zero W remains equal to // until for co = fi)^ the
budget line becomes tangent to the indifference curve through £>' at a second interior point
on the no-transfer segment like £ in Figure 2.2. For (0 rising beyond fi),. the labour supply
jumps discontinuously to the labour supply curve without negative income tax, and follows
this curve for higher co. Thus, whereas for 0) < O,. the person prefers to work a limited
number of hours while retaining full or partial unemployment benefits, she prefers for
co > fi>, to work a higher number of hours without unemployment benefits. Note, however,
that in this model the person does not take into account possible disadvantages of unemploy-
ment benefits in the form of stigmatization effects (see Moffitt, 1983, and Sec. 8.2). Such
disadvantages would lower ct),..
Another interesting modification results when, just as the marginal utility of leisure, the
marginal utility of consumption is allowed to become negative for high levels of con-
sumption, describing oversatiation with respect to X (see also Miller, 1988). Then we may
have situations of fully satiating consumption with l/^ = 0 at the optimal point where the
income constraint is no longer binding. The consumption and labour supply decisions are
then unlinked, implying that the first-order condition for an interior optimum for // and Z. is
given by t7^ » 0. Thus, an interior optimum with fully satiating consumption also describes
fully satiating leisure and labour time. Such an interior "double bliss" optimum is impossible
in an extension of the standard model with t/^ < 0 for high X, but (7^ > 0 for all L. Then
an optimum with t/^ * 0 can occur only at a corner point for W =0, when the other
income KQ is so high as to allow fully satiating consumption without work, so when c7^( KQ ) < 0.
In such a case there is no incentive to do (paid) work, no matter how high the wage rate, so
the labour supply curve coincides with the vertical W = 0 axis. This may describe the
behaviour of a person living off his interest.
On the other hand, when we also allow l/^ < 0 for high L as in the extension of this
" Cf. Abbott and Ashcnfcltcr (1976).
" For low consumption levels this docs not seem to hold, since working is more pleasant with a
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section, there may be an interior "double bliss" optimum for high u> and hence high X.
Then the labour supply curve coincides with the t/^ =» 0 line or curve for (0 above a
certain w'', as in Figure 2.6b (see Sec. 4.5 for an example). This describes a fully satisfied
employee who does no longer change her consumption, leisure and labour time at a rise in
income, so both consumption and leisure have ceased to be normal goods, but without
becoming inferior! (See Scitovsky, 1952, pp. 87-88.)
Also in this case it is possible that the other income f^ is so high as to allow fully
satiating consumption without work, so ^(K^) < 0. Now, however, there is still an
incentive to do (paid) work which stems from the derived "psychic income". On the other
hand, there is no incentive to work more than the number of hours for which l/^ » 0, no
matter how high the wage rate, so the labour supply curve coincides with the t^ - 0 line
or curve. In the case of additive utility functions this is the vertical W « W^ line. This may
describe the behaviour of a millionaire who works for fun.
However, fully satiating consumption implies that the surplus of income will be saved,
and usually such savings will have some utility. This can be taken into account to u certain
extent (see below) by including savings as delayed consumption into X, but then full
satiation with respect to X becomes less plausible. This brings us back from the labour
supply curve of Figure 2.6b to that of Figure 2.6a. On the other hand, the former labour
supply curve may still serve as an "idealtypical" and interesting approximation of the latter
curve. Other implications of savings are that they raise the other income K^ in the next
period (e.g., interest income) and, if this is anticipated by the subject, that they act as ar-
guments of an intertemporal utility function with an intertemporal income constraint. How-
ever, as indicated in Subsection 2.2.1, an analysis of such intertemporal effects is beyond the
scope of this study. Moreover, I do not expect these effects to imply short-run labour supply
curves which are qualitatively different from those derived in this book.
2.2.6 Prefere/ic« vana/ions antf" dynamics o/sfate vana/>/es
A sixth extension of the standard model results from the observation that different in-
dividuals facing the same constraints may nevertheless exhibit different labour supply
behaviour and, moreover, that the same individual facing the same constraints may exhibit
different labour supply behaviour over time. So, labour supply curves could differ among
individuals and over time, even if, for each relevant exogenous wage rate, the constraints
and, in particular, the values of the other exogenous variables governing them (e.g., gross
other income and tax rates) are identical. These phenomena can only be explained by variaf-
io/u o/ /afeowr jwpp/y pr^/i?re/icej over ina'fWa'ua/.s and //wi*, respectively. Such preference
variations can be expressed by adding a discrete index / for individuals or groups of in-
dividuals and a discrete or continuous time index r as exogenous arguments to the utility
function. One or more parameters of the utility function may then be considered as deter-
ministic functions of i or f (e.g., a time trend, see Stone, 1964, p. 71). Alternatively, in so-
called second-generation studies of static labour supply models- -\ interpersonal preference
differences are accounted for by a stochastic and unobservable error term or "taste shifter"
See Killingsworth (1983. Ch. 4).34 C/iapter 2
e,. Of course, allowing for preference changes over time, this error term could also be made
dependent on f. However, such / or /-dependent "taste parameters" and "taste shifters" do
not explain which kind of factors the preference variations can be attributed to. Accordingly,
the ways they vary over i and/or f (including the distribution of e,<) are usually treated as
exogenous in the short as well as longer run. Therefore, primarily for consumption demand,
explanatory theories of preference variation across individuals and/or over time have been
developed, which could be interpreted as making the variations of the "taste parameters" and
"taste shifters", at least in the longer run, e«do#£/iouj. Such theories are often referred to as
'' theories of endogenous tastes or preferences'*'' or as //ivories o
Best known of the theories of preference formation are the theories of (individual) habit
formation and (behavioural) preference interdependence. In the habit formation approach
an individual's consumption demand and labour supply preferences depend on her own
consumption demand and labour supply behaviour in the past Preference interdependence
can be interpreted as meaning that the preferences mentioned depend on the corresponding
past behaviour of relevant others. In the present study extensions of these two preference
formation theories are applied to labour supply. Both theories imply that the arguments of
the utility function should be extended with a vector of state variables, which are exogenous
with respect to the labour supply and consumption demand decision in the short run, but
which are endogenous in the longer run. In general we denote such a vector of state vari-
ables by 5.
Many other kinds of state variables than those mentioned above can play a role in prefer-
ence variations. For example, in the second choice situation of Section 2.2.S the job quality
variables </„ are state variables. In this example a preference change as a result of the
longer-run choice of another job stems from a change in "psychic income" of labour time.
More generally, changes in labour supply preferences are associated with changes in the
marginal utilities of consumption, leisure and labour time. In particular, this holds for the
preference shifts of "emancipating" married women with respect to their participation in the
labour market as mentioned in Chapter 1. Therefore, this study considers utility functions
f?(X,L,W;j) (see Sec. 2.3 for more details). In terms of the short-run choice variables X, Z.
and W these utility functions can be regarded as co/irfifiona/ on (the values of) the state
variables s.'*
In the longer run the state variables may be endogenous. For example, in the habit
formation case mentioned above, one or more state variables representing an individual's
behaviour in the past are the result of a choice of the individual at that time. This implies a
lagged feedback from her choice behaviour to the state variable(s), which makes the state
variable(s) /<>££?</ fnJojtj<vioui or endogenous in the longer run with respect to the short-run
choice. This results in a (for the case of consumption demand) well-known dy/uvnir analysis
in terms of short-run and long-run demand or supply functions (see Chs. 3 and 4). However,
'* Cf. theories of endogenous technical change as opposed to exogenous technical change.
" Sec for surveys of both kind of theories in relation to each other Pollak (1978), Deaton and
Mucllbaucr (1980, pp. 373-377) and Kapteyn (1985. pp. 8-18).
** See Pollak (I976a.1977.1978) for the corresponding distinction between conditional and uncon-
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an important point to be noted here is that the dynamic character of this analysis is indepen-
dent of whether the planning horizon of the utility maximizing subject covers one or mul-
tiple periods." On the other hand, our assumption made in Subsection 2.2.1 of a planning
horizon of one period implies that the habit formation is supposed to be mw/wr, i.e., the
subject does not take into account the feedback of her present decision on future levels of
the state variable(s), and hence on her future preferences (see Sec. 1.1). Similar kinds of
reasonings can be held with regard to other types of preference formation, e.g., preference
interdependence. We will come back to these points in the next chapters. ,<» •.<•• .•.;-.•.,>
2.2.7 FamiTy /aAour supp/y c v i ; , . : , •.,,,,^ e , ,*ib
Particular kinds of constraint and preference interdependencies which have been neglected so
far, but which can play an important role in the behaviour of non-single labour suppliers, are
the constraint and preference interdependencies of family members. Killingsworth (1983,
Sec. 2.1) distinguishes three main kinds of models in the literature of the relation between
family membership and labour supply. The first and simplest one is what he calls the rm//f
c/iauWnm model. In this model the husband plans his labour supply without reference to his
wife's labour supply plans and, therefore, in the same way as in the standard model. On the
other hand, the labour supply plans of the wife deviate from the standard model in including
the exogenous total income of her husband in her other income K^ and in including the
consumption of the other family members in her consumption variable X. Thus, X now
represents the total family consumption. However, apart from these reintcrprctations of
the variables K^ and X, the analysis of the labour supply behaviour of the wife is the same
as in the standard model. r, J i.rtj?';i> writ.) ? .,:,-*!
The second kind of model, which is by far the most popular one, is the /ami'/y M/iV/ry-
/amiiy fo«/g£/ c<m$/raj>i/ model. Here the total utility of the /iwii/y is maximized as a func-
tion {/^(X,L, L,,) of total family consumption X and the leisure times of each of the
family members Z., L^. Furthermore, the total incomes of all the family members are
pooled into one total family income J^ **'/"i * ^0* where w, is the wage rate and W, the
labour time of the /th family member and where K^ is the total other than labour income of
the family. This results into one family (incomc-)budget constraint.
This model can be related to the standard model as follows. Suppose that all family
members' wage rates change by the same index w. Then, analogously to the procedures in
Section 2.1, the family members' leisure times /.] /,„ can be aggregated to a Hicks
composite leisure time L = J^. WQ,-L,-, where WQ, is a base period wage rate of the /th
family member. This L should be interpreted as the total "expenditure" of full income on
(that is, earnings forgone for) leisure times of the family members in constant prices of the
base period. Next, {/ (X,L| £„) may be maximized with respect to L| £.„ under the
constraint formed by the above definition of L for each relevant X and /.. This results in a
" This will clarify footnote 17.
This important necessary modification is not mentioned by Killingsworth. Moreover, it is
implicitly assumed that there are a husband and a wife in the family and that they are the only family
members who have an income.36
standard utility function £/(X,L), where the leisure budget L is supposed to be optimally
allocated to leisure times of the family members. In a second stage, f/(X,L) can then be
maximized under the family income-budget constraint pX + wL < w7"' + J^, where
T' = J\ »"Q,T,-. This constraint is of the same form as the constraint (2.7) in the standard
model, which makes the second stage maximization analogous to that model.
In general, however, the family members' wage rates will not change by the same index.
Then, there are not one but two kinds of substitution effect that are relevant to the labour
supply of any given family member i . First, we have the pas/rive ow« sufa/tru/io/i eyjecf on
i"s labour supply of an increase in /'s own wage. Second, there is also the m>5.s-5Mfaft7wH'0/i
effecf on fs labour supply of a (for the family) income-compensated rise in the wage of
some other family member y . This effect is positive or negative, depending on whether the
leisure times of / and y arc complements or substitutes, respectively. If, as is often done,
the cross-substitution effects are assumed to be zero, the only effect on j's labour supply of
a rise in y's wage is a pure income effect.'"'
Regardless of specific assumptions about the cross-substitution effects, the family utility-
family budget constraint model neglects effects on the total family utility of the distribution
of the family's total consumption among its different members. Moreover, it is silent as to
the process that actually generates the "household" preference structure determining the
lubour supplied by its members. Partly as a consequence of these considerations, a third
group of models has appeared, which emphasize the individual rather than the family as an
important decision maker in a family context. Leuthold (1968) introduced what might be
called the iWivJchfti/ wfi7iry-/a/m7y 6u</£fr cons/ra/zir model. In this model each individual
family member maximizes her or his own individual utility as a function of family con-
sumption and the individual's own leisure time subject to a family budget constraint In
doing so, the husband and wife will, analogously to duopolists, react to each other's plans
until a consistent and stable (long-run) equilibrium has been reached. A sufficient condition
for the existence of such a stable equilibrium is that the composite consumer good is a
normal good for both spouses. Outside equilibrium there are no cross-substitution effects, but
instead i;i</ir*cr JMCO/W qjfcctt on family member j's labour supply of a rise in family
member y's wage rate via a change in y's labour supply.^* If leisure is a normal good for
i , these indirect income effects are negative. However, when a stable equilibrium has been
reached, the model can be aggregated to a special case of the family utility-family budget
constraint model with neither complementarity nor subsatutability of the leisure times of the
different family members, in which model the indirect income effects have become zero
cross-substitution effects.
Ashworth and Ulph (1981) have extended the Leuthold model by allowing the individual
™ The statement of Killingsworth (1983, p. 33) that in this case the family utility-family budget
constraint model for a given individual i reduces, at least for graphical purposes, to the standard
model, is confusing, since another family member y's leisure time Ly remains dependent on I'S wage
rate M', via (he pure income effect. This implies that a change of w, has not only the substitution and
income effects on /., of the standard model, but also leads to a change of y's earnings, and hence of
i"s other income including it.
*" Sec Killingsworth (1983. p.36) for details.f/r«>ry 0/ /aftowr sup/>/y 37
utility functions to be conditional on the leisure times of the other family members.*' Then
there are not only indirect income effects, but also so-called />r«/e/r/icr qffivtt on family
member I'S labour supply of a rise in family member/s wage rate via a change in/s labour
supply. These preference effects can be positive, negative or zero. Also in this more general
model a consistent and stable equilibrium is possible, but, this equilibrium being reached, the
model can only be aggregated to a family utility-family budget constraint model under
stringent conditions.^ On the other hand, as a consequence of the behavioural preference
interdependence, no a priori restrictions are then imposed on the complementarity or
substitutability of the leisure times of the family members in the aggregated model.
A major difficulty with the equilibrium mentioned is that it is generally not Pareto
optimal.** As has been argued by, among others, Manser and Brown (1980), the family
members are then likely to "bargain" with each other in order to reach Pareto optimal
solutions for consumption and leisure times of the family members. This can be described by
bargaining models on the basis of cooperative game theory.^ Again there are indirect
income effects rather than cross-substitution effects, but in some bargaining models the total
incomes and consumptions of the family members are not pooled. Differences in the distrib-
ution by recipient (husband or wife) of a given total amount of property income may then
lead to different bargainings strengths of the two partners, and hence to differences in their
behaviour.^
As all these models suggest, marital status and family situation are major determinants of
labour supply. Therefore, these determinants will be taken into acccount in the labour supply
models of the following chapters. The next section will formulate the general structure and
the comparative statics of the short-run components of these models.
2.3 The short-run models in this study
After having given an overview of some important extensions of the standard model of
labour supply in the previous section, we arc now in the position to formulate the general
structure of the short-run components of the labour supply models which will be analysed in
the following chapters. We also introduce some modifications in the terminology and derive
the implied comparative statics of labour supply with respect to the state variables.
The utility functions are of the form l)(X,L,//;£), where I is a vector of state variables
*' This is a clear example of behavioural preference interdependence, but is rather a consequence
of complementarity or substitutability of the leisure times of the family members than of social con-
formity and distinction motives, which arc the usual sources of behavioural preference interdepen-
dence (see Subsec. 5.1.2).
" A sufficient condition is that the individual utility functions of the different family members are
identical (see Ashworth and Ulph. 1981. p. 121). See for the case of different individual preferences,
e.g., Samuelson (1956) and Brown and Chuang (1981).
" See. e.g., Manser and Brown (1980) and Kooreman (1986. Ch. 6).
" See Chiappori (1988), Kooreman (1986. Ch. 6. 1988) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1989). The
last three references also contain empirical applications.
" See Killingsworth (1983, p. 37).38 C/iapftrr 2
in the context of the preference formation theories which are applied (see Ch. 1). Instead of
the usual terms "leisure" and "labour time" for the choice variables L and W, this study
uses the terms "/lottse/io/d" rime" and "corporate f/W for the following reasons. "Leisure" is
an inadequate term for the time spent at home by a housewife and "labour time" is an
inadequate term for the time spent in a job, since both terms suggest that a housewife does
not work. Instead, the terms "unpaid time" and "paid labour time" may be used, but this
leads to an internal contradiction in the modelling of volunteer work as the interior optimal
point D' in Figure 2.5. According to this model a sufficiently high (net) "psychic income"
of paid labour time induces a person to do paid work even when it is not paid, i.e., to do
volunteer work. Of course, this is a contradictory description of volunteer work, but it can be
remedied by replacing the terms "unpaid time" and "paid labour time" by other terms. An
adequate choice seems to be "household time" and "corporate time". Household time is
defined as the total time devoted to activities in the private or informal sphere, i.e. to various
forms of household production and consumption. Most of these activities are unpaid, but in
the case of moonlighting they are paid. On the other hand, corporate time is the total time
spent on production and consumption activities in the public or formal sphere (see Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980, pp. 27 and 47). Mostly the corporate production activities are paid, but
not in the case of volunteer work. w*? *-•(,«*«.;.
In addition to these modifications in terminology, the choice variable L will represent
discretionary household time above a minimal necessary level. This exogenous minimal level
of household time is due to considerations of physical survival or the health of the labour
supplier or her (his) family (see Subsec. 2.2.4).^ It should be distinguished sharply from
the endogenous minimal required leisure as an increasing function of individual and/or
collective habit state variables in the threshold models of Phlips (1978), Johnson and Pen-
cavel (1984), and Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) (see the end of Subsec. 2.2.4). In the models
of the present study the individual and/or collective habit state variables are incorporated in
the utility function in a more general and less rigid way.
Given the predetermined state variables f, the labour supplier maximizes her utility
function ()(X,L,W;£) with respect to X, Z. and W under certain constraints. Besides the
minimal level constraint we will mostly assume the usual income and time constraints
X 5 wW + y^ and W + L • 7\ Here the aggregate consumption price has been equated
with 1, w is the exogenous (relative) hourly corporate wage rate. K^ is exogenous income
other than wage income of the labour supplier*", and 7" is the total available time of 24
hours a day minus the minimal necessary household time. When the labour supplier belongs
to a family, X is conceived as the total consumption of the family, whereas Z. and //
remain individual, and K^ contains the assumedly exogenous incomes of the other family
members. This amounts to a simplified individual utility-family budget constraint model (see
Subsec. 2.2.7) in which the endogeneity of wage incomes of other family members is
** In the literature also the terms "market time" and "non-market time" are used, but these terms
too may cause confusion in the cases of volunteer work and moonlighting.
" We do not similarly assume a minimal necessary level of consumption, since this creates
complications which we want to abstract from.
** Income from moonlighting is included into this other income.M/cro^ro/iom/r fteory 0/ /afto«r 5upp/v 39
neglected. For married women (and assuming no wage income of family members other than
the husband and wife), this model coincides with the male chauvinist model (sec Subset".
2.2.7), and especially for them the model may not be a bad approximation of reality. On the
other hand, the model allows inconsistencies of the individual labour supply decisions of the
family members. Yet, in the present theoretical context and since we treat the individual
cases as separate, this does not seem a major problem. Furthermore, both the other income
^0 and the total discretionary time 7" are assumed to be always positive.
Substituting W = 7" - L into the utility function (7(X,Z,,W;i) reduces it to a utility
function £/(X,Z-;£). However, as shown in Subsection 2.2.5, this is not a standard utility
function, but it allows the possibility of negative marginal utilities (ovcrsatiation) of (discret-
ionary) household time L for sufficiently high £.. This turned out to have interesting implic-
ations. Making simplifying assumptions on the state variables corresponding to household
time and corporate time, the following chapters make a similar reduction of the utility
function with respect to these state variables, yielding a reduced utility function t/(X,L;s).
Maximization of this utility function or the original utility function under the income and
time constraints yields the short-run consumption and household time demand functions
X(H>,yQ,r,j) and L(H\y0,7\,y), respectively, and hence the short-run labour supply
function //(w.y^ ,7,5). The effects of changes in w and K^ on L or W, and hence on X,
are given by the Slutsky equation (2.8) or (2.17) and the equation (2.18). Similarly to the
latter two equations, the effects of changes in the state variables 5 on the short-run demands
and labour supply can be derived in an easy way from the constrained utility function
This utility function is maximized with respect to W for given vt\ K^, 7" and .v in the usual
case where consumption is not fully satiating at the optimal point, so where the income
constraint holds with equality sign. For an interior maximum the first-order condition is
again given by t/^ = wt/^ - {/^ * 0. Differentiating this condition with respect to the
vector of state variables J yields t/^/^ + ^ ////^j " 0 (*ce Varian, 1984, p. 328), or
equivalently, since £/ ^ = - |f/ ^^| * 0 by virtue of the second-order condition (2.16),
tfj = Ll£_ = If *-* (2.20)
where we substituted from (2.16). This equation implies that the effect of a change in a state
variable s on the short-run labour supply W is positive, e.g., if f/^, (as well as w) is
positive and (/^ is non-positive, i.e., if an increase (decrease) in Sy induces a rise (fall) in
the marginal utility of consumption L^ and not a rise (fall) in the marginal utility of house-
hold time £/^ at the optimal point. Since differentiating the time and income constraints to 5
yields L^ = -//^ and X^ = w//^, the expressions for the effects of changes in the state
variables on the household time and consumption demand follow from (2.20). Note that
(2.20) and these expressions hold irrespectively of the nature of the state variables in the
utility function.
On the other hand, these comparative statics results only hold for the standard time and
income constraints, whereas in many labour supply situations endogenous social security40 C7»apft?r 2
benefits (see Subsec. 2.2.3) and/or institutional or demand side rationings of labour supply
(see Subsec. 2.2.4) play an important role. For such cases discontinuous short-run labour
supply schedules like those in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 hold, implying that the comparative statics
becomes essentially different. However, formal and general derivations of these comparative
statics and of the ensuing effects of collective habit formation are beyond the scope of this
study. Therefore, for these cases the following chapters will only give intuitive and short
analyses of simple subcases.
••?': Whereas this section has formulated the general structure and implications of the short-
run labour supply models to be used in the following chapters, those chapters will complem-
ent the short-run models with specifications of the endogenous long-run dynamics of state
variables in the context of preference formation. The long-run labour supply effects of non-
linear forms of this dynamics will then be analysed. •CHAPTER 3
Individual Habit Formation:
General Model
As pointed out by Clark and Summers (1982), persistence of employment status plays an
important role in labour supply dynamics. This means that previous (unemployment tends to
raise the probability of subsequent (un)employment. One of the mechanisms underlying this
phenomenon is individual habit formation (IHF) with respect to consumption and/or
household time (or leisure, see Sec. 2.3). Empirical studies by Phlips (1978), Johnson and
Pencavel (1984), Hotz et al. (1988), and Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) suggest that,
especially with respect to household time, IHF is rather strong. Still, the IHF is shown to be
mostly stable in the sense that the stability conditions for the long-run equilibrium are
fulfilled. A simple extension of such a model of stable IHF can explain how after taking a
part-time job a person can develop a strong orientation towards corporate work and may
even develop into a "workaholic". On the other hand, such a model cannot explain why
some long-term unemployed, although having lost their old job involuntarily, become little
motivated to get a new job (at the same values of the wage rate and other income).
Similarly, such a stable IHF model can give an explanation of the strong orientation of many
housewives to household work, but it may not adequately explain how in a process of
"emancipation" the same women can develop a strong orientation towards corporate work.
Such profound changes in preferences and behaviour can be modelled as the outcomes of
IHF which has an unstable long-run equilibrium between two stable long-run equilibria as in
the addictive consumption model of Becker and Murphy (1988). This leads to a
polarization in behaviour and habit state: on the one hand, when the initial corporate hours
are above the unstable equilibrium value, the IHF induces a rise in corporate hours towards
a stable equilibrium of relatively high corporate hours and ensuing accustomization. Such an
equilibrium may describe the behaviour and habits of an "emancipated" woman with a job or
a "workaholic" (when the number of corporate hours is very high). On the other hand, when
the initial corporate hours are below the unstable equilibrium value, the IHF causes falls in
' Becker and Murphy call IHF addiction, but it seems more appropriate to associate addiction with
a habit-dependent threshold for consumption or household time below which a person feels unable to
go (sec Schokkaert. 1982b, p. 64) and with flip-flops or chaotic reversals of preferences as in the
models of Winston (1980) and Day (1986).42
corporate hours towards a stable equilibrium of low or zero corporate hours and similarly
ensuing accustomization. The zero corporate hours equilibrium may then correspond to a
housewife or a "voluntarily long-term unemployed" person^. Since the initial corporate
hours depend on the time paths of exogenous variables like the wage rate or rationings in the
past, these time paths determine which of the two stable equilibria is actually approached.
This I call iVid/WJua/ >ry.rter?sis (see footnote 6 in Sec. 1.1). At certain values of exogenous
variables a transition may occur from one equilibrium to another, a point not recognized by
Becker and Murphy. Such a transition is referred to as an tW/v/dua/ ca/asrrop/i? in the sense
of Thorn (1975) (see footnote 7 in Sec. 1.1). Individual catastrophes in behaviour and habits
may have occurred (and still occur) in the "emancipation" process of individual married
women. In contrast to Becker and Murphy, I assume that the IHF is myopic, which seems
plausible (see Sec. 1.1), simplifies the analysis, and facilitates the introduction of more than
one habit state variable for consumption, household time and corporate time.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1 the general model is
presented. Section 3.2 contains a graphical analysis of the (in)stability of multiple long-run
equilibria and of individual hysteresis dependent on rationings. Section 3.3 presents
necessary and sufficient stability conditions in terms of second-order partial derivatives of an
arbitrary additive utility function and the wage rate. Next, Section 3.4 gives a general
analysis of the differences between short-run and long-run wage (rate) elasticities of labour
supply when the stability conditions are met, and Section 3.5 shows how in the case of
instability individual catastrophes and hysteresis of the long-run equilibria can occur.
Moreover, Section 3.5 compares hysteresis with a phenomenon that I call quasi-hysteresis.
Section 3.6 gives an analysis of the effects of IHF in cases of discontinuous short-run labour
supply schedules, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1 General model
Let the one-period preferences of a labour supplier be represented by a utility function
i?(X,L,//;j^,5^,5^), where X denotes aggregate consumption, L is discretionary house-
hold time above an exogenous minimal necessary level (see Sec. 2.3), W is corporate time,
and J^, Jj, and 5// stand for "psychological stocks" of habits with respect to X, L and W
(see Houthakker and Taylor, 1970). These habit stocks are defined as the solutions of the
following differential equations which constrain their time paths:
where /.," stands for the actual (discretionary) household time at time r, and analogous
equations for s^, and ty,. Here the positive parameter 5^ (8^, 5^) is similar to the
depreciation rate of a durable good and measures the speed by which habits wear off. These
differential equations describe continuous accumulation or reduction of the psychological
* Strictly spoken, a long-term unemployed who does no longer want to work and hence does not
search for a job. does no longer belong to the labour force, so is not unemployed any more according
to the prevailing definition in economics. Still, it is often convenient to refer to such a person as a
"voluntarily long-term unemployed" person./n<ft'vfrfna/ faifaf/onwarion: gg/igra/ mode/ 43
habit stocks. This seems a better approximation of reality than the discrete accumulation or
reduction in terms of the usual, rather long, empirical time periods as described by dif-
ference equations (see, e.g., Johnson and Pencavcl, 1984, and Kapteyn and Woitticz, 1990).
Given her (his) predetermined habit levels s^, 5^ and .?,,, the labour supplier maximizes
her utility function with respect to X, Z. and // under the usual income and time constraints
X 5 w// + KQ and // + Z, = 7". Here the aggregate consumption price has been equated
with 1, w is the exogenous (relative) hourly corporate wage rate, r^, is exogenous income
other than wage income of the labour supplier and 7" is the total available time of 24 hours
a day minus the minimal necessary household time. When the labour supplier belongs to a
family, X is conceived as the total consumption of the family, whereas Z, and // remain
individual, and K^ contains the assumedly exogenous incomes of the other family members.
Both the other income /Q and the total discretionary time 7" are assumed to be always
positive.
A further simplifying assumption is that the decay rates 8^ and 8/, of the household and
corporate time habits are equal to each other. As shown by Phlips (1978, eq. (26)), this
implies 5// = 778^ - j^. Substituting this expression and A/ = 7 - Z- into the utility
function, we obtain a reduced utility function t/(X,L;j^,j^). As shown in Subsection 2.2.5,
this utility function allows the possibility of negative marginal utilities (ovcrsatiation) of
household time Z, for sufficiently high L (see, e.g., Hamermesh, 1974). This may lead to
volunteer work and may especially happen in the case of a workaholic who is strongly used
and even addicted to a high corporate time W. Such a workaholic may even continue to
work a high W, when his (her) wage rate w falls to zero.''
Maximizing the original or reduced utility function under the income and time constraints
at time f yields the preferred household time L, and consumption X, as functions
£(H',,y0,,T,,Sx,,5£,) and X(w,,y^,,7",,5^,,.$£,). In a labour supply and consumption
demand regime these preferred Z., and X, are assumed to be immediately realized, so
Z,,° = L, and X" = X,.* Substituting the functions mentioned for L° and X," in equation
(3.1) and its analogue for fy,, respectively, leads to
* On the other hand, this may only hold in the short run, since in the long run the workaholic may
gradually diminish his corporate hours for tv - 0 until a few or zero hours and get used to that (sec
Sees. 3.4 and 3.5 for such processes). Furthermore, when being used to zero corporate hours, such a
person may not be prepared to work as a volunteer. This dynamic description of a workaholic seems
more adequate than the static representation by Ehrenberg and Smith (1982. pp. 170-171), which has
the implausible implication that every person who is prepared to volunteer for a few hours a week, is
a workaholic. However, a more complete modelling of workaholism than done here requires a model
of addictive behavior such as that of. e.g., Winston (1980), but is not needed in the present context.
This is a strong assumption, since even in a labour supply regime actual labour supply will only
adjust to preferred labour supply in a delayed and stepwisc fashion because of labour contracts,
commitments, terms of notice and application, search costs and time, and more generally, discon-
tinuous adjustment costs of behaviour (or transaction costs) and uncertainty (Heincr, 1983). These
factors form other causes of persistence and hysteresis of labour supply than IHF (cf. Clark and
Summers, 1982, Romme, 1990. and Homan, Hagenaars and Van Praag, 1988). However, a brief
analysis suggests that these complications do not have an essential effect on the long-run stability
properties of our model.44 Oiapteri
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By virtue of the definition of IHF, L, and X, increase with the habit stocks $£, and fy,,
respectively, so the partial derivatives L^ and X^ are both positive. This implies positive
or reinforcing feedbacks of the habit stocks on the behaviour. Moreover, in the usual case
where the income constraint is binding, these two equations are linked to each other by the
income and time constraints, and hence form a system of first-order differential equations in
*i, and jj,.
For constant w, = w, K^, = KQ and r, « 7"a long-run (stationary) equilibrium solution
j* •= (ijj.i^) is obtained by putting i^, • 0 in (3.2a) and i^, = 0 in (3.2b). The habit
stocks will move to such an equilibrium, if it is /oca//> (asymptotically) staftfe. The next two
sections will analyse the conditions under which this happens and when there are multiple
long-run equilibria. Then we will also consider the case that labour supply is rationed by
labour demand.
3.2 Multiple equilibria and hysteresis . .... ,.
For the sake of exposition we first regard IHF with respect to only household time L, (and
corporate time W,), so ignoring the effects of fy,. Moreover, following most literature, we
begin by assuming that HVV.KQ ,7",i^) is linear in s^ for 0 < Z- < 7" (omitting the time
indices of L, and s^,).
For constant w, VQ and 7" the development of a person into a workaholic may then be
described by the line of the demand function Z, *(w,y0 ,7",s^) as a function of s^ in Figure
3.1. The intersection /t of this line with the equilibrium line L = 5^J^ indicates a unique
(long-run) equilibrium. Since the line cuts the equilibrium line at A from above, it is easily
seen from (3.2a) that this equilibrium is stable. More formally, an equilibrium point s^ is
stable if and only if L* := Z.^ (w,y0,7\j^) < 5^ (see Appendix 3A for a formal deriva-
tion). This condition means that the IHF effect of j^ on L at s^ should be sufficiently
compensated by the speed 8^ by which the household time habits wear off.
Suppose the person is initially used to unemployment, i.e. s^ = 775^. Then he (or she)
prefers to have household time Z.° < 7", so he takes a job of 7" - Z.** hours. However, he
will start to get used to that household and corporate time, which, by virtue of (3.2a), is
described by an (infinitesiinally) small horizontal move from the Z. line at /- to the left.
As a consequence, he will prefer (infinitesimally) less household time and take a job of more
hours. This is described by a small vertical move back to the L * line. Again he starts to get
used to that and will consequently have less household time and more corporate time, and
this process will continue until he spends only L** hours as household time, so works
T -/,*•* hours of corporate time, and has got used to that (see also footnote 7 in the next
section). When the initial household time to which the person is used is even lower than
L** • 8J.J^ • the reverse will happen.
More generally, such a description applies to persons who get used to a certain numbers
of corporate hours like "emancipated" married women with a job. However, especially inf/ornia/wn: #?/i*ra/ 45
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Figure 3.1 Equilibria 4 S and C as intersections of the equilibrium line L - 8^ ^ and household
lime demand functions Z.\ L* and L^. The dashed lines with arrows indicate pos-
sible shifts in L of a temporarily involuntarily unemployed person with demand func-
tion £"*.
that case the household time L*^ may be much higher than in the case of a workaholic. In
a similar way and assuming the same constant w, K^, 7 and 8^, the situation of a person
who does not participate in the labour market (e.g., a housewife) may be described by the
intersection of the line L* and the equilibrium line in Figure 3.1. Now, however, the line
Z. exhibits a kink at the point where it reaches the boundary 7 of the feasible domain of
the household time /., and the stable equilibrium point B is a corner equilibrium for maxi-
mal household time or zero corporate time. Thus, when the household time is initially lower
than maximal, so when the corporate time is positive, the person will have no rest until she
(or he) is no longer employed and can spend all her time as household time.
Consider now the situation of a person at -4 who involuntarily loses his (or her) job. Then
his corporate time // is rationed at zero and he is forced to have actual household time /.,
equal to 7. However, as described by (3.1), his habit state s^, begins to increase from $£
to 7/8^, i.e., he moves along the L = 7 line in Figure 3.1 to the right and gets used to his
involuntary unemployment. (Note that L," is then no longer a function of 5^, as in (3.2a), so
the reinforcing feedback is broken, the differential equation (3.1) is always linear, and the
stability condition 8^ > 0 is always fulfilled.) Nevertheless, when after some time the
unemployed person can again work the number of corporate hours he prefers according to
his demand line L* (at the same w, K^ and 7), he shifts to this line and subsequently
moves back to his original equilibrium /4.46 CTiaptfr 3
Obviously, this does not describe the case that after some time the unemployed person
does no longer want to work, i.e., that his preferred Z. has risen to 7. In that case he has
turned into a "vo/w/i/an/y unemployed" person with demand function L* and equilibrium B.
This case can be explained by assuming that both demand functions L^ and L* are local
(piecewise-)linear approximations of one and the same m>/i-///i?ar sigmoid demand function L *•"
as indicated in Figure 3.1. In agreement with £.* and L*, L^ implies stable equilibria at
the points /\ and fl, but now there also exists an unstable intermediate equilibrium at point
C. This point acts as a watershed or barrier: below C the IHF dynamics leads the labour
supplier to the state of a motivated employee at point <4, whereas above C the dynamics
pushes him to a state of "voluntary unemployment" at point B.'
In the case where the demand function of the involuntarily unemployed person is given
by L^, his preferred household time rises to 7" near B as he moves along the Z- = 7" line,
implying that he does no longer want to work. (One could then say that his cognitive dis-
sonance between preferred and perceived actual hours of corporate work has been reduced to
zero.) More generally, when, having passed j^ on the Z, = 7" line, he can again work the
number of corporate hours he prefers according to his demand curve L^, he will move
along this curve towards the "voluntary unemployment" equilibrium B. Conversely, were he
forced to take a job with i, < L*^, he would get used to that after some time and may,
after relaxation of the enforcement, develop into a motivated employee at point -4 !*
These examples nicely illustrate that one and the same person under the same external
conditions (w, K^ and 7") may be going to exhibit either the one or the other behaviour,
depending on his initial situation (left below or right above C). In the examples this initial
situation is determined by a /fmporary rationing of his labour supply in the past (involuntary
unemployment or labour enforcement), which has a decisive and pirma/Mvi/ effect on the
behaviour chosen. As a result, the equilibrium which is approached depends on the time path
of an exogenous variable (in this case labour demand or forced labour supply) in the past.
Our model can also exhibit hysteresis dependent on other exogenous variables. The case of
the hourly wage rate w will be dealt with in Section 3.5.
At first sight the existence of an unstable intermediate equilibrium seems in contradiction
with the fact that in the empirical studies mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the
stability conditions are mostly fulfilled. However, these conditions probably apply to avera-
ges of stable equilibria like /t and B in Figure 3.1 over the persons to which the data
employed refer, implying that on average the stability conditions are met without excluding
the existence of an unstable intermediate equilibrium.
' Surprisingly, a similar situation in the context of supply and demand curves for goods has
already been observed by Marshall (1920. App. H. Sees. 2 and 3). but only scantily analysed. Such a
Keynesian trap situation is much akin to the corridor concept of Lcijonhufvud (1973) (sec Varian.
1979, p. 21). Chaos is impossible with differential equations of the form (3.2a) and (3.2b) (or (3.1)).
even when L * and X * were allowed to be negative for higher j^ and 5^ due to individual long-run
satiation as inShc difference equation (12) or (14) of Benhabib and Day (1981) (in these equations
fj_, » Z-,_,; sec also the end of Sec. 3.5).
* This suggests a rather right-wing policy recommendation, but other policy recommendations are
also possible. However, going into this is beyond the scope of this study.47
When IHF with respect to consumption is added to the analysis given above, nothing
essential changes, but the derivation of necessary and sufficient stability conditions becomes
more complicated. Household time demand Z., and hence labour supply W, arc now also
functions of the consumption habit state, and the equilibrium condition w(7"-L) + K^ = X =8_y*x
should be added. This is not elaborated here, but in Appendix 3A a formal equilibrium and
stability analysis is given. This results in a simple necessary and sufficient condition for
local stability of an equilibrium point 5 * which is given by
"57
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Note that X^ = 0 leads to the stability condition which has been established at the begin-
ning of this section.
3.3 Stability conditions •'" ' -, : ^,< -,
A subsequent question is how the stability condition (3.3) depends on parameters or general
properties of the underlying utility function and the wage rate. For interior L* and X* the
derivatives L* and X^* in (3.3) can be expressed in terms of second-order derivatives of
the utility function and the wage rate as
(3.4a)
Here the superscript • of the second-order derivatives of £/ denotes evaluation at (<7*;.v*)
with <7* := (X*,L*) = (S^^X'^L^L )• ^"^ '"' expression between modulus signs in the
denominators is negative by virtue of the second-order condition in static theory. (See Sec.
2.3 for a simple derivation of (3.4a) and (3.4b).)
To simplify the analysis I restrict it to utility functions which are adrf///v^/v jeparabte; in
the pairs (X,$x) and (Z-,5^), so with f/^ = {/^ = t/^ = 0 (see, e.g., the linear expen-
diture systems of Phlips, 1978, and Johnson and Pencavel, 1984). Positivity of L^ in (3.4a)
and of Xj in (3.4b) then implies that i/^j and i/^ should be positive, i.e., increases in
the habit stocks induce rises in the corresponding marginal utilities (at the equilibrium point).48 C/rapter j
This is the central mechanism which drives the process of IHF7 Substituting (3.4a) and
(3.4b) for additive utility functions into the stability condition (3.3), this condition becomes
"67 *-5T ; . (3.5)
Assuming t/^ < 0 and l/£^ < 0 (which are sufficient conditions for the second-order
condition with l/^ = 0 at (</*,.$*)). it follows that the denominator of (3.5) can be written
as w^ |f/^| + l^uJ. *® @.5) '* equivalent to
This condition holds for all w, if t/^ /8^ < |t/^| and l£ /8^ < |t/^J, i.e.
Thus, in the case of additive utility functions the conditions CA^ < 0, 1/^ < 0, (3.7a) and
(3.7b) are sufficient stability conditions for 5 *. They can be considered as generalizations of
the sufficient stability conditions in the additive quadratic model (AQM) of Houthakker and
Taylor (1970, Ch. 5, cq. (14)) for the case of two goods.* As formulated by these authors,
the conditions (3.7a) and (3.7b) say that "habit formation should not be so strong as to offset
the combined effect of diminishing marginal utility and the depreciation rate". I then call the
IHF CrWaf/vWv; w«iit ar s*. When (3.7a) or (3.7b) is not fulfilled, I say that the IHF is
' Assuming that f/^, is also positive at other than equilibrium points (^*,J*), it follows that
when the household time habit stock ^ declines, l/^(Z-;5^) decreases and hence, for high household
time L (so low f^(Z.;.t^)), may become negative for sufficiently low s^. This corresponds to the
development of a person into a workaholic, in which s^ declines as the person gets used to more
corporate time and less household time (see Sec. 3.2). Note that indifference curves like those in
Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1 then shift to indifference curves like that in Figure 2.5 in Subsection 2.2.5.
On the other hand, for w falling to low values, leading to less corporate time and ensuing
accustomization. the latter indifference curves may shift back to the former. Then, the person would
no longer be prepared to work as a volunteer for zero wage (see footnote 3).
* In deriving their conditions Houthakkcr and Taylor depart from the incorrect claim that the n-
dimensional generalization of the matrix (?, - D (with D being a diagonal matrix with 5^ and8^
on the diagonal) is symmetric: differentiating the income and time constraints to ^ and fy, it
follows that the off-diagonal elements of this matrix are X, = -H-L, and £., = -X, /»•. which
arc in general unequal to each other.
^ Houthakkcr and Taylor (p. 1%) call this addiction, but it seems more appropriate to use this term
in a different sense (see footnote I)./uiZ>iV/onnario/t.' #fn<ra/ 49
However, as demonstrated below, these sufficient stability conditions are not necessary.
Consequently, when one of them is not met (see. e.g., Taylor and Weiserbs, 1972, and
Phlips, 1978, for some consumption categories), it is unclear if the equilibrium is unstable
(like C in Fig. 3.1). Let us, therefore, take a closer look at the stability condition (3.6),
which is both sufficient and necessary, when the sufficient conditions lAjx < 0 and t/^*^ < 0
are fulfilled. Suppose that one of the other two sufficient conditions, say (3.7a), is met. Then
(3.6) can be rewritten as a condition for /^ as
M> I"*' XXI
(3.8)
In comparison with (3.7b) this condition contains an additional term between the square
brackets, which is explicitly proportional to w and positive. Hence the condition is weaker
than (3.7b) and there is an additional stabilizing force the strength of which explicitly
depends on w. This force can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that, as a consequence of
IHF with respect to household time L, L increases by an (infinitesimally) small amount </L
sufficiently near the long-run equilibrium point (<7*,j*). This leads not only to a decrease
|t/^|dL in the marginal utility of household time f/^, but also, as a consequence of the
time and income constraints, to a decrease wt/L in the wage income and hence in the level
of consumption X. This implies a rise |L/^^|w</L in the marginal utility of consumption
i/^. On the other hand, the subject gets used to the lower X, which decreases £7^ by
(f/^j /8^)w^L. By virtue of (3.7a) the total effect on (/^ is positive and pushes the
subject back to a higher X and hence, again as a result of the constraints, to a lower L.
Translating the force on X into a force on i. yields an additional factor w. A conclusion
from this interpretation is that the time and income constraints are responsible for the force.
Analogously, in the case where the other sufficient condition (3.7b) is fulfilled, assuming
positive w and dividing (3.6) by w^, it can be reformulated as a condition for £/^ as
l^x'xl * A 'LZ.I
(3.9)
Again there is an additional stabilizing force which works through the time and income
constraints, but now its strength explicitly depends on 1/w, being the relative price of
consumption.'° When tv = 0 (or 1/w = <*>), (3.6) boils down to (3.7b). In the case where
neither of the sufficient conditions (3.7a) and (3.7b) is met, (3.6) docs not hold for any value
of H-. The forces of the constraints in (3.8) and (3.9) are then destabilizing.
When the second-order derivatives of f/ at (<7*,5*) are independent of w as in the
AQM, the conditions (3.8) and (3.9) can easily be reformulated as explicit conditions on w
or 1/w (see Sec. 4.3), but generally this is not possible. Yet we can formulate:
10'This stabilizing role of the constraints is overlooked by Houthakker and Taylor (1970), Weiserbs
(1974) and Phlips (1974).50 C/iapr<?r J
3./ //i /ne case o////F WJ/H respec/ to fto//i consumption and noi«e>w/d //me
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Thus, in situations other than these three the interior equilibrium point s* is unstable.
This leads to cases as in Figure 3.1 around C However, what happens with such a situation
when the hourly wage rate w changes? This is analysed in Section 3.5.
3.4 Short and long-run wage elasticities 'M-: - ' - i ' • ^ ' J*< »S"»'' •:-'•"-•>•,f ••
As a necessary background for the analysis in Section 3.5, this section discusses the relations
and differences between short-run and long-run effects on labour supply of changes in the
wage rate w when starting from a stable long-run equilibrium. This means that slopes of
short-run labour supply curves /Y(w; K^ ,7",s') for fixed other income J^ and total discre-
tionary time r and fixed equilibrium values s* of the habit states are compared with slopes
at the same w of the long-run labour supply curve //*(W;KQ ,7") := W(M';KQ .T.s*^;^ ,7"))
for fixed K^ and 7". The latter curve describes the total effect of a change in w on a per-
son's labour supply, when she (or he) has had the time to fully adjust her habits and behav-
iour to the new long-run equilibrium. '
Suppose that the starting equilibrium describes labour supply //* on a forward-sloping
(part of the) short-run labour supply curve. Then not too large a rise in w will induce an
increase in W, and hence an increase in consumption X and a decrease in household time Z,.
The person gets used to all these changes, so s^ rises and s^_ declines, and this leads her to
further increase X and decrease L, so to increase W. Again she gets used to that, implying
a further increase in W, etc., until a new and higher equilibrium W* is reached. When H'
declines, the reverse story holds, and in general we can conclude that on a forward-sloping
short-run labour supply curve the long-run effects on W of a change in w are larger than the
short-run effects. The long-run labour supply curve would then be flatter than the short-run
labour supply curves for fixed s *.
However, for an W* on a backward-sloping short-run labour supply curve matters are
different. Then a rise in «' will induce a decrease in //. and hence an increase in L. On the
other hand, X will also increase, provided total consumption X is a normal good, which isAaM/ormtMio/t: ge/iwa/ mode/ SI
very plausible. The person gets used to both increases, so both .v^ and s^ increase, but
the former increase leads to a further decline in W, whereas the latter increase induces a rise
in W. The sign of the total result of this rise and decline is ambiguous and, as a conse-
quence, it is uncertain whether the long-run labour supply curve is flatter or steeper than the
short-run curve and even whether its slope is backward or forward (see also Phlips, 1978,
pp. 1026-1027, and Johnson and Pencavel, 1984, pp. 367 and 379).
More insight in the relations and differences between these short-run and long-run effects
can be obtained by differentiating W*(H;K0 ,7") := W(M;K^ ,7",.V*(M; K^ ,7')) to w and
elaborating it for non-zero W* to the following relation of long-run wage elasticities of
labour supply E^, and short-run wage elasticities £ at 5 • 5*(w,)'Q,r):
*w * 7 T (3.10)
1 -
(see App. 3B). Here the denominator is positive, since the stability condition (3.3) is
assumed to hold. Moreover it is smaller than one, making the multiplier larger than one.
Then one easily derives: •;•*<•;
52 /« f/i£ coif 0/ /oca//y j/aWe /WF wi7/i rcsp^tf (p co/uwnpr/on
(0 £„, is poj/fiw i/ and o«/y i/ £ ,. is /areer rnan -X, /8y
w * // //
(H^ £„, 15 /ar^er /now £ i/ana on/>i // £ . « /ari;£r f/ia/i
Surprisingly, the condition under (1) does not depend on the strength L^* /8^ of the IHF
with respect to household time. When it is fulfilled, the stability condition (3.3) implies that
the condition under (//) is also fulfilled. When the condition under (<) is not fulfilled, so
when both the short-run and long-run labour supply curves are backward-sloping, it depends
on the relative strengths of the IHFs with respect to consumption and household time
whether the long-run curve is steeper or flatter than the short-run curve. Moreover, when
Xj = 0, both conditions are fulfilled only if the short-run labour supply curve is forward-
sloping, and the reinforcement by the household time IHF makes the long-run labour supply
curve always flatter than the short-run curve. On the other hand, when L^ =0, the lower
limit in the condition under QT) is equal to - 1, and assuming that consumption is a normal
good, it is easily shown that the condition is always fulfilled. This means that the con-
sumption IHF reinforces the short-run effect on // of a change in H< at a point where the
" The derivative dX/dw can be decomposed into a positive cross-substitution effect and an
income effect which is positive if X is a normal good.52
short-run labour supply curve slopes forward and counteracts the short-run effect on W at a
point where the short-run labour supply curve slopes backward. If the IHF is sufficiently
strong so as to satisfy the condition under (0. the counteraction may even lead to a forward-
sloping long-run labour supply curve. ^
3.5 Catastrophes, hysteresis and quasi-hysteresis
A crucial assumption implicit in the analysis of the previous section is that the relevant
equilibrium of the state variables and labour supply remains (locally) stable and existing
during a change in w. In a case of multiple equilibria as in Figure 3.1, however, this does
not necessarily hold. Consider, for example. Figure 3.2 and assume that a rise in w can take
place on a forward-sloping (part of a) short-run labour supply curve for the whole range of
the household time habit J^ with household time L < 7" (so labour supply W > 0). Such a
rise leads to an increase in //, and hence to a downward movement of the curve of L(w, K^ ,7",^)
as a function of 5^. Then the unstable equilibrium C moves towards the stable equilibrium
fl. When w keeps rising, C may, at a certain w*' coincide with B into one unstable
equilibrium and subsequently for w > H-*' disappear. Then only the stable equilibrium A at
low /, is left. Consequently, when the person finds her or himself in or near B in the
original situation of Figure 3.2 (so when the person is, for instance, a housewife or a "volun-
tarily unemployed" person), an infinitesimally small rise in »v beyond tv* will drive the
person in stages (sec the previous section) to the equilibrium A (so turning her/him into, for
instance, a job-oriented woman or a workaholic). This large shift in s^, Z. and W as a
consequence of an infinitesimally small change in w can be called an //id/v/dua/ cafosfropAe
in the sense of the catastrophe theory of Thorn (1975).
A similar story can be told for declining w on a forward-sloping short-run labour supply
curve for the whole range of ^ with L < 7". Then C and -4 move towards each other, may,
at a certain w*^, coincide into one unstable equilibrium, and subsequently for H' < w*
disappear. This leaves only one stable equilibrium B and causes a catastrophic transition
from the unstable equilibrium /\ = C (e.g., job-oriented woman or workaholic) to B (e.g.,
housewife or "voluntarily unemployed" person)." Both this and the above transition in j^
could be regarded as major changes in mentality. Note that by virtue of (3.2a) the vertical
distances of the demand curves of W for w = M*' and w = w* to the equilibrium line
L • 8^j£ determine the speeds of these mentality shifts. In the present analysis the men-
tality shifts are triggered by changes in the wage rate, but they can also be induced by
'* For W* • 0 the wage elasticities E^ and £„, are not defined, but then we can consider the
short-run and long-run wage derivatives 3W/3»|* and dW/dn'. respectively. Sec App. 3B.
" Note that this catastrophe goes together with the curve of LOv.)^ .7".^) becoming tangential
at M-** to the long-run equilibrium line L = 8^. Then the denominator between brackets in (3.10)
for X/ - 0 becomes zero, making the long-run wage elasticities of labour supply infinitely large (cf.
Becker and Murphy, 1988, Sec. V). However, in the case of the catastrophe at rising w, such a
tangency situation docs not occur, but Z.^* at B changes discontinuously from 0 for >»• < H*' to a
certain positive value larger than 5^ for *• « w*'. As a result of this discontinuity the marginal
analysis for X^' « 0 and // * « 0 breaks down.on: £<VOT<I/ 53
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changes in other exogenous variables like other income K^ and the rationings considered in
Section 3.2 and even by changes in endogenous variables (see the end of this section). Such
individual mentality shifts may have occurred (and still occur) in the "emancipation" process
of individual married women from being a housewife towards being a job-oriented woman.
Comparing the two cases for rising and declining w, we sec that in the latter case the
catastrophe occurs at a wage H»*^ which is lower than the wage w*' at which the catastro-
phe in the former case occurs. This leads to a discontinuous forward-sloping part of the
long-run labour supply curve as in Figure 3.3. This figure indicates that a person will enter
the labour market at a relatively high reservation wage »v*', since she is used to much
discretionary household time (high J^), whereas she will leave employment at a lower wage
w* , since she is used to no discretionary household time and much corporate time
(fy = 0). Thus, Figure 3.3 implies that, in the long run, for the same value of w between
w* and w*' a person can either prefer not to participate in the labour market or prefer to
be employed (two stable equilibria), and that the alternative which is actually preferred
depends on her (or his) history of previous household and corporate time experience. This is
an example of //utivu/ua/ /lyrterem (cf. Sec. 3.2). In particular, it implies that a









Figure 3.3. Backward-bending long-run labour supply curve with individual catastrophes and
hysteresis. The doited curves indicate the loci of the unstable equilibrium for W.
/wrman*?/!/ labour market participation.''' Moreover, whereas one side of the individual
hysteresis coin is /w.si.sr<vic<> of non-participation and employment for H> < H>*' and w > H**,
respectively (see Clark and Summers, 1982), the other side is catastrophic transitions be-
tween non-participation and employment beyond these ranges. More generally, the latter side
does not seem to be recognized by the bulk of the recent (macro-economic) literature on
14 We do not make a distinction between labour market (or labour force) participation and em-
ployment because of our assumption of immediate realization of preferred labour supply (see Sec
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hysteresis in unemployment with its linear models (see, e.g., Blanchard and Summers, 1987,
and Franz, 1990, Sees. 2 and 4.2). Note that individual hysteresis entails discontinuities in
the long-run labour supply curve, even when, as in the present case, the short-run labour
supply curves are continuous.
In a similar way as described above for the case of a forward-sloping short-run labour
supply curve, hysteresis also seems possible at changes in w in a backward-sloping short-run
labour supply curve (see, e.g., the upper half of Fig. 3.3). Then a rising w leads to an
upward movement of the curve of /-(w.K^.r.s^) in Figure 3.2 and may, at a certain wage
w , induce a catastrophic transition from more to less corporate work. Conversely, at a
certain wage w lower than w , a catastrophic transition from less to more corporate
work may occur. Such individual catastrophes are likely to be smaller than individual
catastrophes in the forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve, since in the former case
a similar change in labour supply implies a relatively higher change in wage income and
hence in consumption due to a higher wage rate. When extended to the social level (see Chs.
6 and 7), catastrophes of the former kind might happen in the now inelastic and persistent
labour supply of men in the coming decades (e.g., from five to four days a week).
When IHF with respect to consumption is added to the picture, this reinforces the effect
of the household time IHF in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve, but counter-
acts it in a backward-sloping part (see the preceding section). Consequently, in the former
case the same individual hysteresis phenomena may occur as in the lower half of Figure 3.3,
so being used to more or less consumption is then an additional cause of individual
hysteresis in labour supply. On the other hand, in the latter case individual hysteresis seems
only possible, when the steepening effect on the labour supply curve of the consumption IHF
is weaker than the flattening effect of the household time IHF. If the former effect is
stronger, it may even deprive the long-run labour supply curve of its backward-sloping part
(see Prop. 3.2 and App. 3B).
In this section it has been assumed implicitly, that when w keeps changing, the person
has the time to (almost) fully adjust to the new values of w. In that case successive changes
in H' occur at moments when the person is (in sufficiently good approximation) in a moving
stable long-run equilibrium. In reality, however, w may substantially change in nearly every
period and the adjustment within one period could be very partial. Then the (cetcris paribus)
actual path of labour supply can deviate considerably from the long-run labour supply
curve. For instance, also in the absence of hysteresis in the long-run curve, a cyclical
" The discontinuities in the long-run W" and hence in L* and X* as functions of w should be
distinguished sharply from the discontinuity in short-run consumption as a function of the habit state
variable as found by Becker and Murphy (1988, Sec. VII) for very strong IHF. This voluntary "cold
turkey" phenomenon does not seem to entail hysteresis and cannot occur in our myopic IHF model,
since voluntary cold turkey requires the person to be forward-looking (technically speaking: complex
roots of the differential equation(s) for the state variable(s), which are responsible for the phenomen-
on, cannot occur in the case of (3.2a) and (3.2b). see App. 3.1). However, enforced cold turkey like
the temporary rationings considered in Section 3.2 is certainly possible in our model. On the other
hand, individual catastrophes and hysteresis as found in this section can also appear in the rational
IHF model of Becker and Murphy, but are not recognized by them.
'*See Vendrik (1985,1986) for an analysis of similar deviations in the context of a dynamic model
of adjustment costs and interrelated factor demands.56 C/iap/gr i
variation in w will cause actual labour supply to develop along a loop "around" the long-run
curve, which looks like a hysteresis loop (cf. macroeconomic cycles in a Phillips curve as in
Hansen (1970)). This phenomenon is, however, essentially different from hysteresis, since
hysteresis is a property of the evolution of wiwWp/f long-run e<7uz7i6ria, whereas we have
here a dise<7M//7/wiM/w phenomenon arising from a combination of short-run adjustment
towards owe long-run equilibrium and changes in an exogenous variable. Such a phenomenon
could be called par/i-d<?p£/i£tenc£ 0/ ad/ktfme/j/ or <7uas/'-/j>'5/eresi.s. It has already been
observed by Marshall (1920, app. H, Sec. 3) and can, in contrast to hysteresis, be described
by linear IHF models.'^ Since, on a macro level, many models of hysteresis in unemploy-
ment describe a similar linear dynamics, they seem capable of explaining quasi-hysteresis,
but not genuine hysteresis.
To make matters even more complex, quasi-hysteresis may go together with (individual)
hysteresis. This results in a hysteresis figure like that of the ferromagnet in physics (Fig. 1 in
Franz, 1990) in which the discontinuities in the long-run labour supply curve of Figure 3.3
have been "smoothed out".'* As a consequence, empirical discrimination of hysteresis as
path dependence of equilibria from quasi-hysteresis as path dependence of adjustment seems
difficult (but nevertheless important).
Finally, I remark that in the very long run catastrophic mentality shifts as found above
dependent on the wage rate may be triggered by an endogenous long-run tendency to
satiation with respect to household time and corporate time. This long-run satiation could be
described by another and more slowly varying state variable than the habit state variables as
in the ovcrcating-dieting models of Bordley (1986) and Becker and Murphy (1988, Sec.
VII). For a housewife or a "long-term unemployed" person accumulation of satiation with
her/his large amount of household time may eventually lower her/his entry wage w'' (see
Fig. 3.3) under the prevailing market wage and induce her/him to enter the labour market.
On the other hand, for an employee accumulation of satiation with working hard may in the
end (of his/her life) raise his (her) exit wage w*^ above his market wage and impel him to
retire from the labour market. *
3.6 Discontinuous short-run labour supply schedules and hysteresis
Although the model developed in the previous sections yields interesting theoretical insights,
it can only be considered as a first step towards more realistic models. An important flaw of
the model is its neglect of institutional or demand side rationings of labour supply other than
" Gcorgcscu-Rocgcn (1971. Sec. 5.3) discusses hysteresis in general and speaks of the hysteresis
effect upon the saving ratio as found by Ducscnbcrry and Modigliani. However, in my view this
effect is rather related to quasi-hysteresis.
'* Other, but related kinds of disequilibrium paths of consumption in the presence of multiple
equilibria arc considered by Becker and Murphy. 1988. Sec. VI.
" Connected in series such catastrophic transitions could even lead to a kind of psychological long
cycle of behaviour and mentality shirts. The mechanism would then be similar to that of the Kaldor
business cycle of Varian (1979) and George (1981) with the habit and satiation state variables and the
behaviour variables corresponding to national income, the capital stock and net investment, respec-
tively, in the latter model.Mvirfaa/ /mfaf/o/Twaft'o/i: ggnmi/ /n<xfe/57
the involuntary unemployment or labour enforcement considered in Section 3.2. Another
shortcoming is that endogenous social security benefits are not taken into account. As shown
in Subsections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, both complications lead to discontinuous £/rorr-ru*i labour
supply schedules like those in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. In terms of our terminology, these short-
run schedules display individual catastrophes, but not individual hysteresis. This means that
in the short run the entry catastrophe occurs at the same value of the wage rate (and of other
exogenous variables) as the exit catastrophe. On the other hand, in the long run this property
changes as IHF comes into play. In the following I give an analysis for the case of only
household time IHF, an additive utility function and a two-points rationing at W • 0 and
// = W as in Figure 2.4. Successively we consider the subcases without and with an
endogenous social security benefit.
The additivity of the utility function (/(X,L;A^) implies that it can be written as the sum
of a utility of consumption t/'(X) and a utility of household time t/^(L;s^). The reser-
vation wage H', is then that value of the wage rate for which the positive difference in
consumption utility between having a job and staying at home C/'(w//" + y'Q)-l/'(KQ) just
compensates for the negative difference in household time utility l/*(7*-W *;$£_) -l/^(T;5^).
The latter difference in household time utility is equal to the integral of the marginal house-
hold time utility 1/ ^(L;5^) over household time Z, from 7"-//" to 7". This implies that,
since 1/ ^(L;J^) is an increasing function of the household time habit stock .9^, the dif-
ference in household time utility is more negative as ,v^ is larger. In the long run the house-
hold time habit stock of a person who stays at home is equal to 778^, since she (or he) is
then fully used to her maximal household time. On the other hand, when the same person
works W* corporate hours, her household time habit stock is, in the long run, equal to
5^ = (7"-// )/5^ as she is fully used to her limited household time. Thus, when the person
stays at home, the long-run household time habit stock is larger, and hence the long-run
difference in household time utility between having a job and staying at home is more
negative than when she has a job. Therefore, the compensating difference in consumption
utility which determines the long-run reservation wage should be larger in the situation of
non-participation, and this implies that the long-run reservation wage is higher in that
situation. In other words, the long-run entry wage tv*' is higher than the long-run exit wage
#* . Thus, we obtain a discontinuous /on^-run labour supply schedule which resembles the
lower half of Figure 3.3 and which describes individual hysteresis and separate individual
entry and exit catastrophes.
The same reasoning applies in the subcase of an endogenous social security benefit (see
Fig. 2.4), in which the difference in consumption utility between having a job and staying at
home is given by t/'(H-//*+KgQ)-{/'(K^). More generally, the same result can be deriv-
ed, when consumption IHF is added to the analysis and the utility function is non-additive,
and in the non-rationing case of an endogenous social security benefit (see Fig. 2.3). How-
ever, the derivations are then much more complex and are not given here. In all cases we
obtain a discontinuous /on^-run labour supply schedule like (the lower half of) Figure 3.3,
but describing individual hysteresis even if the consumption and household time IHFs are
only weak. Then the combination of discontinuous rationing or social security benefit and
weak IHF(s) has the same kind of inertial effect on labour supply as strong IHF(s). More-
over, such a combination may be a more plausible explanation of individual hysteresis than
strong IHF(s).58
3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has shown that, under certain conditions in terms of the strengths of IHFs with
respect to consumption and household time (and corporate time), individual hysteresis and
catastrophes dependent on rationings and the wage rate may occur. Moreover, it has been
established that the consumption and household time IHFs have both reinforcing effects on
a forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve, but reinforcing and counteracting effects,
respectively, on a backward-sloping part. To obtain these results a general model has been
analysed with consumption and household time demand functions time being non-linear in
the habit state variables. Finally, a two-points labour supply rationing and an endogenous
social security benefit have been shown to reinforce the effects of the IHFs.
In general, individual hysteresis and catastrophes presuppose the existence of an unstable
interior long-run equilibrium for some range of the relevant exogenous variable such as the
wage rate. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we have discussed stability conditions which determine
when an interior equilibrium is unstable, but we did not consider conditions in terms of the
underlying utility function and constraints under which an interior equilibrium exists. The
analysis in Section 3.4 and 3.5 implies that such emfe/ire co/id/ft'o/u may be fulfilled only
for values of the wage rate above a long-run reservation wage or exit wage (w*^ in Fig.
3.3). On the other hand, in situation (ii) of Proposition 3.1 in Section 3.3 such values may be
so high as to stabilize the interior equilibrium and hence to exclude instability. Therefore, we
should determine whether and, if so, when both existence and instability conditions for an
interior equilibrium can be fulfilled. ^-ffl: ,K,.;
However, even this combination of conditions is not sufficient for individual hysteresis
and catastrophes as in Figure 3.3 to occur. In order to derive these phenomena we assumed
in Section 3.S that a rise in w can take place on a forward-sloping (part of the) short-run
labour supply curve for the whole range of the household time habit stock for which the
household time demand is less than maximal. This implied a downward movement of the
curve of the household time demand function in Figure 3.2. More importantly, we implicitly
assumed that this continues to hold when w keeps rising, allowing the stable equilibrium £
in Figure 3.2 successively to coincide with the unstable equilibrium C for w = w and to
disappear for w > w *'. This has been shown to imply an entry catastrophe. However, it is
also possible that before this can happen, the short-run labour supply curve for low values of
the habit stock becomes backward-sloping. Then, for these habit stock values the household
time demand function starts to move upwards at rising H\ and in that situation the stable
equilibrium /\ in Figure 3.2 may successively coincide with the unstable equilibrium C for w = w
and disappear for tv > w /x>/<)r<' the equilibrium 8 can coincide with C and disappear. In
that peculiar case there can occur an exit catastrophe at w = w from positive to zero
corporate hours (cf. Fig. 3.3), but the equilibrium B remains stable and an entry catastrophe
does not occur (sec Sec. 4.4 and App. 4B for details).
Conditions that exclude such cases as well as existence conditions for an interior e-
quilibrium can be derived only for particular specifications of the utility function. An eligible
candidate is the additive quadratic utility function of Houthakker and Taylor (1970). There-
fore, the implications of this specification will be analysed in the next chapter. Necessary
and sufficient conditions for individual hysteresis and catastrophes like those in Figure 3.3/tfl6»/oi7no/io«: gf/ifra/ modf/ 59
will be derived, and the additive quadratic specification will also be used to investigate
aggregation problems.
Besides incorporating rationings and social security benefits, extensions to make the IHF
models of this chapter and the next more realistic are adding intertemporal effects of savings
(see, e.g., Becker and Murphy, 1988) and/or behavioural preference interdependence. The
latter preference formation will be modelled in Chapter 5 and combined with the IHF models
in Chapters 6 and 7.
Appendix 3A Formal equilibrium and stability analysis
The system of differential equations (3.2a) and (3.2b) can be written in matrix form as
i, = <7(w,,y0,.:r,.s,) - D*,. (3A.D
where J := (fy.s^), <? := (X,L), and D is a diagonal matrix with 5^ and 8^ on the
diagonal. For constant w, = H\ VQ, = K^ and 7", * 7" a long-run stationary solution .?* is
obtained from the system of algebraic equations (7(H-,K(j,r,j*) • Ds'.When ^(u'.K^.r.j*)
is linear in 5, this system has generically, i.e. in all but accidental cases, at most one solu-
tion in the feasible domain, but when ^(W.KQ ,7,5*) is piecewise-linear or otherwise non-
linear in i, the system may generically have more than one solution. <*4«- «•.,•
Linearizing (3A.1) around such a 5* in the latter case, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for local stability of 5* is that the eigenvalues of the matrix QJ(H\KQ,7\A'*) - D
have negative real parts. Denoting this matrix as M := C?/ - Z>, its eigenvalues follow from
the equation
det(/4 - XV) • X? - (a,j + 022)^ + "11 "22 " "12^21 * 0- (3A.2)
We can write this as X? - ftX. + c = 0 with , H .,
> 6 - a,, * <*22
c = fl,,fl22 " 0
In the usual case where the income constraint is binding, differentiating the income and time
constraints to fy and ty, yields X^ = -wL^ and X^ • -wL, . This implies that the term
-X*L* in (3A.4) is equal to -X*L* so c = -8,X* - 5yL* + 8y 6/. The solution!
for the eigenvalues can then be written as X, j = -!i» ± 1^ " ^^ • Substituting (3A.3)
and (3A.4), it can easily be derived that the discriminant fc^-4c is equal to (a,, -"22^*^/^/ •
The former term at the right-hand side is non-negative and the latter term is equal to 4X^* L^
(see above), and hence positive. Therefore, the discriminant is positive, implying that both
the eigenvalues X., and X^ are real. Then the stability condition says that X, and X^ must
be negative. As easily seen, this holds if and only if A < 0 and c > 0.60 Cftaptfr i
Substituting (3A.4) into the latter condition, dividing it by the positive 8^ 8^ and rearran-
ging terms, the condition becomes inequality (3.3). This stability condition is not only
necessary, but also sufficient, since it implies the condition ft < 0 as follows. First, suppose
8^ £ 8^. Multiplying (3.3) by 8^ we get Xj" + (8^/8^)Z.^* < 8^. This implies
Xj" + LJ" < 8^ +8^, and hence ft < 0 (see (3A.3)). When 8^ < 8^, we should multiply
(3.3) by 8^ and get the same result. Putting X^* * 0 leads to the stability condition Z, j* < 8^.
As a generalization of Figure 3.1, stable and/or unstable equilibria can be described as
intersections of an equilibrium line in the (5^,5^,L) space and a two-dimensional surface of
the function L(^,5^). The equilibrium line is determined by the equilibrium conditions
Z, • 8^5^ and w(r - L) + KQ « X = 8^5^. Along this line we may then have a same
kind of situation as in Figure 3.1 with two stable polar equilibria A and fl and one unstable
intermediate equilibrium C.
Appendix 3B Derivation of relations between short and long-run wage effects








means that the "short-run derivatives" of //(n-.y^.r.i) are evaluated at
.r). Substituting 3j^/d>v = 0X*/dw)/8^ = (»vd//Vdw + W)/8^,
* =: X^, and





For positive W * we can multiply the right and left-hand sides of (3B.2) by WW * yielding
(3.10).
When W* » 0. the second term of the numerator on the right-hand side of (3B.2) is zero.
If u- is below the short-run reservation wage *•,., the short-run wage effect dW/d>vi* is also
zero, implying that the long-run wage effect aW/a*' is zero as well. If H> is equal to **>,.,
the short-run effect is positive. Since the multiplier in (B3.2) is positive and larger than one,
it then follows that the long-run effect is also positive (so the long-run reservation wage is
equal to the short-run reservation wage) and larger than the short-run effectCHAPTER 4
Individual Habit Formation: Additive
Quadratic Model and Aggregation
"Ewryfto/ig J/UJWM te ma^ as i/mp/e <u /»H,H7)/I, 6M/ nor si/np/er."
Tn this chapter the general analysis which has been given in the preceding chapter is special-
ized to the particular case of the additive quadratic model (AQM) of Houthakker and Taylor
(1970). This specification serves three purposes. First, it provides an illustration of the
general analysis. Second and more importantly, it allows a derivation of necessary and
sufficient conditions for individual hysteresis and catastrophes like those in Figure 3.3 to
occur. These conditions consist not only of conditions for instability of an interior long-run
equilibrium, but also of conditions for existence of such an equilibrium as well as another
condition, which excludes certain cases (see Sec. 3.7). Thirdly, the specification is used to
analyse aggregation problems. The AQM is chosen despite its less favourable performance
than the linear expenditure system (LES) in the empirical consumption studies of Taylor and
Weiserbs (1972) and Weiserbs (1974), since it allows in contrast to the LES a backward-
bending labour supply curve and the, in my view, plausible possibilities of negative marginal
utilities of large amounts of household time and consumption.'
This chapter is organized as follows. First, Sections 4.1 - 4.4 analyse the short and long-
run effects on individual labour supply of individual habit formation (IHF) with respect to
consumption and household time. Section 4.1 derives possible short-run labour supply
curves. Section 4.2 explains how, in the long run, individual hysteresis and catastrophes in a
forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve like those in Figure 3.3 can arise in the
AQM. In preparation to deriving necessary and sufficient conditions for such phenomena,
Section 4.3 considers the standard case of an always stable unique long-run equilibrium and
derives for that case long-run labour supply curves of the same type as corresponding short-
run curves. However, cases of stable as well as unstable multiple equilibria are also possible
and are analysed in Section 4.4, which classifies all possible cases. On the basis of this
classification we can then formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for individual
' Such an AQM specification is also used by Becker and Murphy (1988) in the context of rational
habit formation with respect to consumption.62
hysteresis and catastrophes like those in Figure 3.3. Moreover, as boundary cases of these
conditions the existence and properties of so-called bifurcation points are demonstrated.
Section 4.5 adds IHF with respect to corporate time to the short and long-run models. It is
shown that this IHF can describe a weak and strong variant of "workaholism" as well as
related cases. Section 4.6 shows that the general long-run behaviour can be rationalized as
the result of the constrained maximization of an additive quadratic "long-run utility func-
tion". However, it is demonstrated that in the case of two (or more) stable long-run e-
quilibria this "long-run utility function" is not globally, but /oca//y maximized. This property
is crucial for the existence of hysteresis, but is not recognized in the usual long-run utility
function approach (see, e.g., Anderson and Blundell, 1982).
In order to trace the macro-economic implications of the short and long-run individual
labour supply behaviours thus derived, these behaviours should be aggregated over
individuals. This is done in Sections 4.7 and 4.8 under various assumptions regarding the
individual variation in utility function parameters, exogenous variables and habit stocks. In
the case of long-run labour supply, hysteresis and catastrophes in individual labour supply
tum out to imply hysteresis, but no catastrophes in average (i.e. per capita) labour supply.
Moreover, the aggregation leads to a continuum of possible long-run equilibria within the
hysteresis loop. Again, the equilibrium which is reached depends on the development of
exogenous variables like the wage rate in the past. Finally, Section 4.9 concludes. ,. ,_
4.1 Short-run labour supply ;,-^«.-.,H ;,•:,?-.; ,:;,,-,.. -,.-;* „•;<•.:;•:)..-,,.,•, n • -•,,•:;.,
In terms of aggregate consumption X and discretionary household time Z. the AQM assumes
a quadratic specification of the utility function (/(X,L;^,£^) which is additive(ly separa-
ble) in X and the consumption habit stock s^ on the one hand and Z. and the household
time habit stock .v> on the other hand:
(4.1)
In the usual case of not fully satiating consumption at the optimal point, in which the
income constraint is binding, a specification of the shon-run labour supply function W(H',y^,5^,5^)
can be derived from the first-order condition wl^ - l/^ * 0 (see (2.15)). Therefore we
differentiate (4.1) to X and L, yielding the linear expressions
x) - «x * «xx*
Thus, as a consequence of the additive separability of (4.1), £7^ does not depend on L and
.v^, and t/^ does not depend on X and s^. Moreover, note that the P-parameters in (4.1)
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function. Accordingly, for each pair of fixed values of 5^ and s^, the P -terms in the utility
function (4.1) of X and Z. can be transformed away by an order-preserving translation of
this function.^ This leaves us with a utility function with six parameters only.
These parameters have the following meanings and signs. According to (4.2a) the para-
meter ct^ is equal to (/^(0;0), i.e. the marginal consumption utility at zero levels of
consumption X and consumption habits s^. This marginal utility will be positive, and the
parameter a^ is called the ro/u«wpf/on /as/e. Analogously, the parameter o^ • (/^(0;0) in
(4.2b), i.e. the marginal household time utility at zero levels of discretionary household time L
and household time habits Jj_, will be positive and is called the AoiueWc/ f/'wif fa.w. The
parameters a^ and a^ are equal to the second-order derivatives t/^ and l/^, respec-
tively, and are assumed to be negative (see Sec. 3.3). This implies diminishing marginal
utilities of consumption and (discretionary) household time (see footnote 48 in Ch. 2).
Finally, the parameters Yxx * (7^ and Y/./. » (/^ are positive (see Sec. 3.3) and in-
dicate the extents to which the marginal utilities of consumption and household time arc
raised by increases in the corresponding habit stocks.' They are called the <WI.VM«J/J/IV>/I
/tol>f7 5e/uiftVi/y and /loure/to/d fiW /uiMr ttvuif/vify.
In order to solve the short-run labour supply W from the first-order condition, we substi-
tute the standard constraints into L/^(X;5^) and (/^(L;5^) so that the first-order condition
becomes
V.sjr) " *W " ";*!.) - 0. (4.3)
Next, it can easily be derived from (4.2a) and (4.2b) that
and
t/^(T - //;5^) - 1/^(7;*!,) - o^//. (4.4b)
Substituting (4.4a) and (4.4b) into (4.3), a straightforward derivation yields
" - -2^1*.. (4.5)
where
^ See Taylor (1974). However, this equivalence translation does not hold for rational IHF, since
then the state variables are also choice variables. In that case the p -terms determine together with the
Y -terms whether the IHF's are beneficial or harmful (positive or negative {/, and {/, , see Becker
and Murphy, 1988, p. 684), and affect the behaviour. In connection with this, the equivalence
translation can also not be applied in the context of welfare comparisons over time or between
persons when the habit stocks at different points in time or of different persons have different values.
' When the state variables % and s^ would represent the effects of individual long-run satiation
as considered at the end of Section 3.5, the parameters Yxx *"d Yu. *°uld be negative.64
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(see (4.2a) and (4.2b)), c := -otxx *"d ^ •" ~<*z.L- Thus, the "parameter" a represents the
marginal utility of consumption at given habit stock, when one is not employed (X = K^).
Analogously, the "parameter" ft denotes the marginal utility of household time at given habit
stock, when one is not employed (Z. = 7").* The denominator civ + d in (4.5) is positive
for all w, since both diminishing marginal utility parameters c = -ot^ and d = -oc^ are
positive.' Furthermore, (4.5) should, of course, satisfy the restrictions 0 £ W £ 7", so holds
provided 0 i ow - ft S 7"(cw^ + d).
What can we say on the signs of a and ft? Since the left-hand side of (4.4a) is positive
for any optimal W by virtue of the above assumption of not fully satiating consumption at
the optimal point, and since the second term on the right-hand side of (4.4a) is non-positive,
a :• £/x(^0"*x) should be positive. This imposes restrictions on (4.6a) in the sense that
the positive first and third terms on the right-hand side of (4.6a) should dominate the neg-
ative second term (the feasible domain of s^ '* defined by i^ ^ ^o^*x > 0). Usually this
holds, but the reverse can also be true and then we have a non-positive a. To that case we
will come back below.
In the present case of a positive a the restriction aw - ft £ 0 mentioned above implies
w 2 ft/a. This lower limit of w represents the reservation wage w,.. Usually the marginal
household time utility ft := {7^(7;*^) is positive, implying a positive reservation wage
H*,. « ft/a. However, analogously to the case of a positive a, this imposes non-trivial
restrictions on (4.6b) in the sense that the positive first and third terms should dominate the
negative second term. Usually this holds, but the reverse can also be true, implying a non-
positive ft and hence a non-positive reservation wage H^ = ft/a. Then the marginal house-
hold time utility at a maximal level of household time ft is non-positive. This seems rather
exceptional, but when "psychic income" of corporate time is added to the AQM as done in
Section 4.5, it becomes more plausible. This case of a non-positive ft will be analysed in
Section 4.5.
Thus, we are left here with the case that r, d, a and ft are all positive. In this case the
above-mentioned restriction WiTon (4.5) can be shown to be not binding for any (non-
negative) w, when r is larger than or equal to a certain positive value c^ (which depends
on other quantities, but not on d), so when the marginal utility of consumption diminishes
sufficiently fast (relative to other quantities).'' This subcase represents an example of the
standard model as described in Section 2.1 and leads to a backward-bending labour supply
curve: for sufficiently low H- > w'" • ft/a the numerator in (4.5) dominates, whereas for
* Note that a H> - 6 • 0 represents the first-order condition for W =0.
' Positivity of cw* + d represents the second-order condition (2.16) with {/^ » 0.
* Proofs of this and following results for short-run labour supply are straightforward and analogous
to proofs of similar results for long-run labour supply, which arc given in Section 4.3 and Appendix
4A. The latter results are formulated in Section 4.3 in a more explicit way than the former results in
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higher H' the denominator dominates (and. for *• going to infinity, drives // to zero without
ever reaching it).
However, when c is smaller than c^,, so when the person is relatively little satiable in her
(or his) consumption, the restriction W S 7" on (4.5) is binding for u- between certain
positive u>_ and H» (cf. Sec. 4.3). For these vr we have comer solutions W » T leading to
a backward-bending labour supply curve with an inelastic segment for // » 7".
In contrast, in the case of a non-positive a (4.4a) implies that consumption is satiating at
any optimal W. Again ft may be either positive or non-positive and the latter case will be
considered in Section 4.5. The case of a non-positive a and a positive ft is an example of
the more general case of fully satiating consumption and not fully satiating household time
as analysed in Subsection 2.2.5. There it has been shown that the labour supply curve then
coincides with the vertical W = 0 axis. This is consistent with the fact that in this example
the first-order condition (/^ = 0 for an interior labour supply optimum leads, by virtue of
(4.4b), to Z, = ft/a^ = -ft/d, which is smaller than 0. , y
4.2 Catastrophes and hysteresis • * ;
In order to analyse the long-run labour supply behaviour which is implied by the AQM we
consider the short-run labour supply function (4.5) as a function of the habit stocks .v^ and
5^. Since the "parameters" a and ft in (4.5), as given by (4.6a) and (4.6b), are linear in .v^
and J^, respectively, labour supply // and hence household time demand Z. and con-
sumption demand X are also linear in 5^ and s^ for 0 < W < 7".' As a consequence, X
and L as functions of fy and s^ can represent linear or piecewise-linear demand functions
like L* and L* in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2 for the case of individual habit formation
(IHF) with respect to household time only. However, they cannot represent non-(piccewise-)
linear demand functions like Z.^ in Figure 3.1 and can at best serve as picccwise-linear
approximations of such functions. Such an approximation is depicted in Figure 3.2 in Section
3.5 as Z. for the case of household time IHF only. This Z. is also represented as the
middle household time demand function in Figure 4.1.
Just as Z. , its approximation Z. describes an unstable intermediate equilibrium at C,
c' r'
since the slope L ^ of the middle linear piece of Z, is larger than 5^. Using L » 7" - //,
(4.5) and (4.6b), this sufficient condition for instability can be expressed in terms of the
AQM parameters and the wage rate as
/-- (4.7)
This condition says that the household time habit sensitivity y^ should be sufficiently
strong to offset the stabilizing effects of the diminishing marginal utilities and the wage rate
as well as of the depreciation rate. The condition is equivalent to the negation of the stability
' This also holds for the specifications used by Phelps (1978). Johnson and Pencavel (1984). and
Kapteyn and Woituez (1990).66
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Figure 4.1 Picccwisc-lincar household time demand functions in the AQM for various wage rates.
At w*' an entry catastrophe occurs and at w'^ an exit catastrophe.
condition (3.5) in Section 3.3 for the present AQM case with t/^ = 0 (except for an
equality sign in (4.7)).
Furthermore, just as the non-linear L^, the piecewise-linear L^ also describes two
stable polar equilibria (V and fl), but now these equilibria are both comer equilibria. For
many corporate workers the corner equilibrium <4 with L* = 0 and W* = T can be a good
approximation, but for less single-minded job holders like married women with a part-time
job this may not hold (see Sec. 3.2), implying that /t' is not a good approximation in those
cases." Analogously to the analysis in Section 3.2, the middle situation in Figure 4.1 can be
shown to lead to individual hysteresis with W * = 0 or W =7" as a result of a temporary
rationing of labour supply in the past (involuntary unemployment or labour enforcement).
Moreover, in a similar way as in the non-linear model of Section 3.5 changes in the wage
rate w may lead to individual hysteresis and individual entry and exit catastrophes in a
forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve. This can be explained by considering Figure
4.1.
Assume that a rise in w can take place on a forward-sloping (part of a) short-run labour
supply curve for the whole range of the household time habit stock s^ for which the house-
hold time demand Z. is less than maximal (so for which the labour supply W is positive).
Such a rise leads to an increase in W. and hence to a downward movement of the middle
* Note, however, that the total discretionary time 7 does not generally coincide with the standard
full-time working week, but may be larger or smaller. In the latter case W* = T corresponds to a
part-time job. but such a case in which a married woman spends all her discretionary time in a part-
time job. seems in general implausible.omiario/i. a<ftfirivg gMadro/ic moaW aw/ aggrgganVwi67
segment of the household time demand function L^ in Figure 4.1.' Then the unstable
equilibrium C moves towards the stable comer equilibrium B. When H- keeps rising, C
may, at a certain »v*', coincide with B into one unstable comer equilibrium, and subse-
quently for w > w*' disappear outside the feasible domain. Then only the stable corner
equilibrium /»' with L* = 0 and W* = 7" is left. Consequently, when the person finds him
or herself in or near B in the original situation of Figure 4.1 (so when the person is, for
instance, "voluntarily unemployed"), an infinitesimally small rise in H- beyond H-*' will
drive the person in stages to the long-run equilibrium V. This represents an jm/ivu/u<i/ «wry
carom-op/if from L* = 7" and W* = 0 to L* = 0 and W* » 7" at w • w*\ which de-
scribes how an unemployed person takes a job, gets used to that, works more corporate
hours, gets used to that, etc., and finally develops into a motivated employee working
maximal corporate hours (cf. Sees. 3.4 and 3.5).
An analogous story can be told for declining H- on a forward-sloping short-run labour
supply curve for the whole range of the household time habit stock ^ for which the house-
hold time demand L is less than maximal. Then the middle segment of the household time
demand function L in Figure 4.1 moves upwards, so that the unstable equilibrium C
moves towards the stable corner equilibrium -4'. When H' keeps declining, C may, at a
certain w* , coincide with ,4 into one unstable comer equilibrium, and subsequently for
H> < w** disappear outside the feasible domain. This leaves only one stable comer e-
quilibrium B and induces an imftvitfua/ erif rafcurrnp/tf from the unstable corner
equilibrium A' = C with //* = 7" to B with W* = 0, describing how an employee wor-
king maximal corporate hours starts to work fewer and fewer hours and finally develops into
a "voluntarily unemployed" person.
Comparing the two cases we see that the exit catastrophe occurs at an exit wage H»**
which is lower than the entry wage w*' at which the entry catastrophe occurs. This leads to
a discontinuous forward-sloping part of the long-run labour supply curve as in Figure 4.2. In
the long run we then have a situation in which for the same value of w between w*^ and
w* a person can either prefer to be non-participating or prefer to be employed (two stable
equilibria) and in which the alternative which is actually preferred depends on his/her history
of previous household and corporate time experience. This is an example of ;W<V/</ua/
/Otfteres/s (see Sec. 3.5). In a similar way as described above for the case of a forward-
sloping short-run labour supply curve, individual hysteresis and catastrophes also seem
possible at changes in w in a backward-sloping short-run labour supply curve. However,
Section 4.4 will derive that the AQM excludes this possibility, i.e., a backward-sloping part
of a long-run labour supply curve is always continuous as in Figure 4.2.
When consumption IHF is added to the picture, this reinforces the effect of household
time IHF in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve, but counteracts it in a back-
ward-sloping part (see Sec. 3.4). Consequently, in the former case the same individual
hysteresis and entry and exit catastrophes may occur as in Figure 4.2, so being used to more
or less consumption then is an additional cause of these phenomena. On the other hand, the
exclusion of such phenomena in a backward-sloping part of the labour supply curve by the
AQM is only corroborated by the addition of the consumption IHF. Moreover, as shown in
' The slope of the segment as given by the left-hand side of (4.7) then also declines.68 Chapter 4
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Figure 4.2 Long-run labour supply schedule with individual hysteresis and catastrophes in the
AQM. The dotted curve indicates the loci of the unstable equilibrium for //.
Section 4.4, a strong consumption IHF (see Sec. 3.3) even deprives the long-run labour
supply curve of its backward-sloping part (see Prop. 3.2 in Sec. 3.4).
The rather intuitive analysis of individual hysteresis and individual entry and exit cata-
strophes in this section leaves us with the question what are necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for such phenomena to occur in the AQM case of IHF with respect to both household
time and consumption. This question will be answered in Section 4.4.
4.3 Always stable long-run case
As u necessary basis for the analysis in Section 4.4, this section considers the standard case
that the unique interior long-run equilibrium for labour supply is stable (like the equilibrium
A as described by the linear demand function L* in Fig. 3.1 in Sec. 3.2). When con-
sumption is not (fully) satiating at any optimal point, a specification of the long-run labour
supply function //*(w,K^) := //(M'.KQ.J"^'./^)) is then obtained by substituting W* for
W, XV8* - (uW* + for 5* and for in
the first-order condition (4.3). Next, analogously to (4.4a) and (4.4b), it can easily derived
from (4.2a) and (4.2b) thatfaiM/bmtflfto/r a<ftfift\r owKfra/ic mod?/ and aggregation 69
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(4.8b)
The expressions in (4.8a) and (4.8b) are of the same form as those in (4.4a) and (4.4b),
respectively. Therefore, substituting (4.8a) and (4.8b) into the first-order condition (4.3)
yields analogously
//• = °*^"**.. ;••=•*•• (49)




Thus, the "parameter" a* represents the marginal utility of consumption, when one is not
employed and has got used to the corresponding consumption level K^. Analogously, the
"parameter" ft* denotes the marginal utility of household time, when one is not employed
and has got used to the corresponding amount of household time 7.
Positivity of the denominator in (4.9), i.e.
is equivalent to the stability condition (3.6) for the present case of the AQM. It is also
equivalent to the negation of the instability condition (4.7) without equality sign. Condition
(4.11) holds for all *\ if both c* and rf* arc positive. These parameter restrictions arc e-
quivalent to the sufficient stability conditions (3.7a) and (3.7b), respectively, for the AQM as70
derived by Houthakker and Taylor (1970, Ch. 5, eq. (14)).'° Hence, these restrictions
define (relatively) weak IHF with respect to consumption and household time, respectively.
However, as demonstrated in Section 3.3, these sufficient conditions are not necessary for
stability to occur. The various situations in which (4.11) and hence stability are fulfilled are
summarized in Table 4.1. When r* > 0 and d* < 0, so when the consumption IHF is
weak, but the household time IHF is strong, (4.11) is equivalent to H- > y-d'/c* . This
condition is a reformulation of (3.8) for the AQM. It says that w should be so high as to
compensate the strong hoasehold time IHF (case (ii) of Proposition 3.1). Analogously, when d * > 0
and r* £ 0, so when the household time and consumption IHF's are weak and strong,
respectively, (4.11) is, for w > 0, equivalent to 1/w > y-c*/d* , which is a reformulation
of (3.9). For w « 0 (or 1/H> = «•) (4.11) boils down to d* > 0. These conditions say that 1/w
should be so high as to compensate the strong consumption IHF, including the subcase that
w « 0 or 1/w = « (case (iii) of Proposition 3.1). When, in addition, r* < 0, the con-
ditions can also be written as a condition on H\ namely w < y -d*/c* , whereas for d* > 0
and c* - 0 they are fulfilled for any (non-negative) H\ However, when f'SO and </' SO,
so when both the consumption and household time IHF's are strong, (4.11) does not hold for




















Table 4.1 All situations in which the stability condition (4.10) is fulfilled, w is non-negative.
In addition to these conditions, (4.9) should again satisfy the restrictions 0 < //* £ 7", so
holds provided OSa'w-li'S 7"(c*R»* + O. In order to establish when these restric-
tions arc fulfilled, we first examine the signs of a* and ft* as given by (4.10a) and (4.10b).
From (4.10a) it follows that the marginal consumption utility a* is positive when r* < 0
(strong consumption IHF) or, if c* > 0, when the consumption taste a^ is sufficiently high
and Kfl and c* are not too large. More precisely, a* is positive if and only if r* < %/KQ .
Thus, when c* £ a^/K^, a* is non-positive. Analogously, (4.10b) implies that the mar-
ginal household time utility 6* is positive when d* £ 0 (strong household time IHF) or, if
rf* > 0, when the household time taste o^ is sufficiently high and d* is not too large.
More precisely, ft* is positive if and only if d* < a^/7". Thus, when d* £ a^/7", ft* is
non-positive. Again, the two cases with ft*£0anda*>0anda*£0, respectively, are
10 Sec footnote 8 in Section 3.3./iaM /orwafto/i: aaVfiftve anaara/ic moaW a/ia" aggregation 71
relegated to Section 4.S. This leaves us with the two cases with 6 * > 0 and a * > 0 and
a* 5 0, respectively.
Moreover, this section restricts to an analysis of the always stable standard Case 1 in
Table 4.1 with c* > 0 and a"* > 0, so with weak (or no) IHF with respect to both con-
sumption and household time. An analysis of the other three stable situations of Table 4.1 is
postponed to the next section. Consider first the case with a* > 0 and />* > 0, so with
0 < f * < «x^O *"d 0 < a" < a^/7", i.e., both the consumption and household time
IHFs are weak, but not very weak. Then the restriction a*w-fe*£0is fulfilled if and
only if H' S ft */a *. Just as in the corresponding short-run case of the previous section, this
lower limit of w represents a positive long-run reservation wage w,.. The restriction
a*w - 6* £ 7"(c*»v^ + a"*) is more complicated. Substituting (4.10b) into this restriction,
it can be rewritten as . . •. -;
- a'w + ct^ 2> 0. > J (4.12)
Note that this restriction is independent of a**, so independent of the household time habit
sensitivity Y/./,-" Moreover, note that the left-hand side of (4.12) is a quadratic form in
w. Since c* is positive, it describes a "valley parabola".
Hence, when the discriminant D = a* - 47Y*a^ of the quadratic form is non-positive,
implying no or one root of (4.12) with equality sign, the restriction (4.12) is fulfilled for all
H\ Substituting (4.10a) into the discrimant formula, it is easily derived that D is non-posi-
tive if and only if f * is larger than or equal to a certain positive value r^ between 0 and
ax/?0, which depends on O^, KQ, a^ and 7", but not on a" (see App. 4A for this and
following results). Then the restriction W* £ 7" is not binding for any w and the long-run
labour supply curve has a usual backward-bending shape with a positive reservation wage
w* = />7a* (like the corresponding short-run labour supply curve described in the previous
section). Moreover, in the subcase with c* > c*. //* is always smaller than 7", whereas for
c* = c* and hence D = 0, W* attains 7" for w equal to the unique root w* * yttf,/(7"c")
of (4.12) with equality sign. This H>* is independent of a", since (4.12) is independent of
a"*. Thus, we have obtained two subcases with moderately weak consumption IHF and not
very weak household time IHF, which are represented in Table 4.2 as the Subcases 1" and
1".
In Subcase 1' of Table 4.2 with 0 < c* < c*, so when the consumption IHF is weak,
but not too weak, we again have a positive reservation wage w* » />*/a*, but now the
discriminant mentioned above is positive. This implies two roots *v_ and »v^ of (4.12) with
equality sign, which are given by
" The reason of this independence is that (4.12) with equality sign is fulfilled for the values of w
for which the first-order condition (4.3) with // = //*, J^ » 5jJ and J^ » $^ yields //* » 7". Due
to the additive separability of the utility function, this condition can depend on </' only via the
marginal household time utility (/{.(7° - W*;J^), and for W* = T this marginal utility is equal to







































Stability requires c*w2 + d > 0
Table 4.2 Subcases of strong and weak consumption IHF (c") and household time IHF (</*).r moaW 73
a* ± ya*'' - 4a^7c*
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(4.13)
Then the restriction (4.12) is not fulfilled for w between w_ and H^ , so the restriction
//* ^ 7" is binding in that range. Note that w* and H>* arc independent of a"*, so indepen-
dent of the household time habit sensitivity Y/./,. since (4.12) is independent of a". Thus,
we obtain a backward-bending long-run labour supply curve with an inelastic segment for
// = 7\
For these three subcases w^ * fc*/a* implies that ' ,
.«/* (4.14)
ay - «x "
Consequently, when (the positive) a" becomes smaller, so when the (weak) household time
IHF becomes stronger, the reservation wage H-^. rises. In contrast, when the consumption
IHF gets stronger (c* smaller), w^* declines. This is in agreement with intuition. Moreover,
as shown in (4.14), w^. can be written as a linear function of a"* < ot^/7" for given positive
c* < a^/y^j. The negative slope of this function becomes more negative when r * falls.
For Subcase 1' the function is indicated in Figure 4.3. This figure also displays tv* and H>*
as constant functions of a** and indicates regimes of interior and corner solutions for //*.
0 < H* < T
w
H*= T
0 < H* < T
H*= 0
0 Subcase OL/T Subcase 1« d*
Figure 4J Graphs of H-^", W* and w* as functions of positive d* for 0 < c* < c^ (not loo weak
consumption IHF). Regimes of an interior or comer equilibrium //'are indicated.
In Subcase 1<* of Table 4.2 with c* £ O^/KQ and 0 < d" < a^/7" the consumption IHF
is very weak and/or the marginal consumption utility diminishes very fast (relative to av/K/i).74 C/iap/gr 4
and the household time IHF is not very weak. This results in a non-positive a* and a
positive 6'. Since £/j = a* - c'wtf* by virtue of (4.8a), (4.10a) and (4.10c), it then
follows that {/j £ 0 for any //". Appendix 4A proves that this long-run case of (fully)
satiating consumption and non-satiating household time leads, in analogy to the short-run
case at the end of Section 4.1, to a long-run labour supply curve which coincides with the
vertical //* • 0 axis.
In all these subcases of Case 1 in Table 4.1, the stability condition (4.11) is fulfilled for
all w. Hence, in a range of w for which the long-run labour supply function (4.9) satisfies
the restrictions OS//' £ 7", this function describes a moving equilibrium which is stable.
Yet, in the Cases 2, 4, 5 and 6 of combinations of c' and </* in Table 4.1 such an
equilibrium may be unstable for at least a range of w. The previous section has explained
that this may lead to a long-run labour supply schedule with individual hysteresis and
individual entry and exit catastrophes. In which situations will this occur? This question will
be answered in the next section.
4.4* Unstable long-run cases "
This section will derive necessary and sufficient conditions for individual hysteresis and
individual entry and exit catastrophes to occur in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply
curve as in Figure 4.2 in the AQM case of IHF with respect to both household time and
consumption. These conditions consist not only of conditions for instability of an interior
equilibrium, but also of conditions for existence of such an equilibrium as well as another
condition which excludes certain cases (see Sec. 3.7). The conditions are derived as the
result of subsequent analyses of the Cases 2, 5, 6 and 4 of combinations of c* and d* in
Table 4.1, where the instability conditions for an interior equilibrium, if it exists, are fulfilled
for at least a range of w. As boundary cases of these conditions the existence and properties
of so-called bifurcation points arc demonstrated.
First, Case 2 of weak consumption IHF (c* > 0) and strong household time IHF (d* £ 0)
is discussed rather extensively, since it seems to represent the most plausible unstable case.
This is suggested by the empirical literature on stable IHF in labour supply, which typically
finds a considerable strength of the household time IHF at the stable equilibrium, that
moreover, in the studies of Phlips (1978) and Johnson and Pencavel (1984), is larger than
the strength of the consumption IHF at the equilibrium. This suggests that the household
time IHF has a higher chance to be strong (in our sense) at another, unstable equilibrium
than the consumption IHF. For which persons this holds may be a matter of personal charac-
ter or age. The next plausible unstable cases seem to be given by, successively. Case 5 of
strong consumption IHF (c* < 0) and weak household time IHF (d* > 0), and Case 6 of
strong consumption IHF (r* < 0) and strong household time IHF (d* 5 0). These cases are
discussed together after and more concisely than Case 2. The least plausible unstable case is
the accidental transition case 4 of just strong consumption IHF (c* =0) and strong
household time IHF (d* 5 0). This case closely resembles the Cases 5 and 6./laftiV/ormario/i: add/mr auadrw/r mode/ a/id a&gr^gaft'ow 75
Case 2. c* > 0 and d* S 0
In this case of weak consumption IHF and strong household time IHF the equilibrium W* as
given by (4.9) is stable if and only if C*H> + d* > 0, or equivalently, H' > y-d*/c* (see
Table 4.1). Conversely, W* as given by (4.8) forms a unique unstable equilibrium //*" if
and only if c*w^ + d* < 0, or w < y-d*/c* .'* Accordingly, the latter upperbound for
w is denoted as w*". As a function of non-positive d* for given positive c* it is repre-
sented in Figures 4.4a-c.
However, in order to define an unstable equilibrium //*" in the feasible domain, (4.9)
should also satisfy the restrictions 0 £ //*" £ 7". Since the denominator r*»v^ + d* in
(4.9) should now be negative, these restrictions are now equivalent to 7(c*w •d*)Sa*H>-6S0.
Note that the latter restrictions differ from the corresponding restrictions in the stable case as
formulated under Table 4.1 in the previous section. There it has also been established that
the present restriction d* 5 0 implies that the marginal household time utility ft* is posit-
ive, and that the marginal consumption utility fl* is also positive if and only if r* < a^/KQ.
In the latter case the restriction a*H' - ft* £0 is fulfilled if and only if w £ ft*/a*.
Now the last positive upperbound is not the long-run reservation wage w^ as in the stable
case of the previous section, but will turn out to have another meaning. On the other hand,
since the expression is the same, the upperbound can be considered as the continuation of
H>* into the unstable domain. As a function of non-positive d* for given positive c* it is
represented in Figures 4.4a-c.
The restriction 7"(c*w* + d*) £ o*w - ft* is more complicated. Substituting (4.10b)
into this restriction, it can be rewritten as (4.12) with the £ sign replaced by the £ sign.
Since c* is positive, the left-hand side of this expression again describes a "valley parabola"
in w. However, when now the discriminant D = a* - 47Y*a^ of the quadratic form is
negative, implying no root of (4.12) with equality sign, the restriction is fulfilled for no w.
This means that W*" as defined by (4.9) is larger than T, and hence falls outside the
feasible domain for any w. For all w we then have a situation as in Figure 4.1 for >v < w*^
in the special case of household time IHF only. '•* In this situation we have £.*"=»7"-W*"<0,
and consequently only one stable corner equilibrium for L* =7" and //* - 0. According to
the elaboration of the discriminant formula as mentioned in the previous section, this situa-
tion occurs if and only if c* is larger than a certain positive value cj between 0 and
When c* is also smaller than a^/K^, we have Subcase 2* in Table 4.2 of moderately
weak consumption IHF and strong household time IHF. To this subcase Figure 4.4a applies.
Since the restriction 7"(c*w*+d*)£fl*M'-6* is never fulfilled, it follows that all
points on the w* line as given by a*w - ft* = 0 satisfy c*w + d* > 0, so are located
in the stable domain. Therefore, the w* line lies entirely above the tv*" curve and describes
a long-run reservation wage for all d*. Hence, above the w*" curve we have the same kind
'* When w = y-d'/c* . or c'w* + d* = 0. (4.9) is not defined and the first-order condition
(4.3) rums out to have either no solutions or all feasible W as solutions. Such cases are discussed
below.
'* No consumption IHF can be considered as a special case of weak consumption IHF.76



























(c) 0 < c' < cj (not too weak consumption IHF)
Figure 4.4 Graphs of tv,*, H>*. »»', w* and w'" as functions of non-positive d*. Domains of
stable equilibria//' are indicated. . .
of situation as in the always stable Subcase 1*. Under the w*" curve there is only one stable
corner equilibrium for W* =0, as established above. Finally, on the w*" curve, so when
c*»v +rf* =0, (4.9) is not defined and the first-order condition (4.3) has no solutions
provided a*»v - 6* * 0, i.e., w is not on the w* line (see App. 4B for this and following
results). In the present subcase this holds for all w on the H>*" curve. This corresponds to a
situation in which the household time demand line in Figure 4.1 for w < w *^ has become
parallel to the equilibrium line while remaining above it. This implies one stable corner
solution W* =0. As a result of all this, the instability for w £ w*" of the equilibrium
given by (4.9) does not have any effect on the long-run labour supply curve. This curve has,
for all non-positive d* 5 0, a backward-bending shape similar to that in Subcase 1*. only
having a higher long-run reservation wage and being more bowed due to the stronger house-
hold time IHF.
However, for r* = cj (Subcase 2*" in Table 4.2) and 0 < c* < c* (Subcase 2^) matters
are different. In the former subcase the discriminant mentioned above is zero, implying one
root of (4.12) with equality sign. This root is given by the same *v* as in Subcase 1^. Only
for this K<0 the restriction //'"iT is just fulfilled with equality sign, whereas for all other w
it is not fulfilled. For w = wj we then have a situation as in Figure 4.1 for w » w with
£*" = 7"-//*"=0 and consequently only one stable corner equilibrium for L* = 7 and
W* = 0. Thus, whereas //* = T for H> = H^ in the stable domain, //* « 0 for H> * w^
in the unstable domain. Still, we can consider one horizontal w* line in the stable as well
unstable domain as indicated in Figure 4.4b. This line goes over from the stable into the78
unstable domain by crossing the >v*" curve at a /^ , which fulfils eg tv^ d^ = 0 and is
therefore equal to -^vf^ = -c^a^/(7"c^) = -a^/7". It then follows that for non-
positive </* * </„ the long-run labour supply curve has the same backward-bending shape as
in Subcase 2*, but now it attains //* = 7" at w = w^ for <^ < d* < 0 in the same way as
for </* > 0.
On the other hand, for d* *
ferent. Then we have for
and, since the restriction 7"(C*H^ + c/*) £ a*w - /?* is just fulfilled with equality sign,
d* the long-run labour supply curve is qualitatively dif-
w* the accidental situation that both the denominator c*w^ + d*
the numerator fl*w - ft* of (4.9) are zero. This implies that M^
line, the w*" curve and the w,. line all meet each other at the same
*" = = w^., so the w^
). Moreover,
this point is the only meeting point, and hence a tangency point of the w*" curve and the
tv, line. In that special point all feasible W are unstable long-run equilibria. In the context
of Figure 4.1 the demand line then coincides with the equilibrium line. As a result we obtain
a long-run schedule as in Figure 4.5 with catastrophic transitions at »v = w* from W* = 0
to W * • 7" as well as reversely.
W* i W*. W*
H"
Figure 4.5 Long-run labour supply schedule with entry and exit catastrophe at the same tv^ or H>*
for c* » c^ > 0 and </' - ^ < 0 or for 0 < c* < c* and d* = d' < 0 (not too
weak consumption IHF and moderately strong household time IHF).
Subcase 2' in Table 4.2 of not too weak consumption IHF and strong household time IHF
is represented by Figure 4.4c. Then the discriminant mentioned above is positive, implying
two roots of (4.12) with equality sign. These roots are given by the same H* and w* in
(4.13) as in Subcase 1'. The restriction W" £ 7" is then fulfilled for »v* £ w <; w* only.
When, moreover, W *" £ 0 or M' £ w *, we then have situations as in Figure 4.1 for tv = w **,
and M'*', where w**
** the middle situation in Figure 4.1 for w** < H>
* and H*' = w*. provided w* < >v*. In
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quilibrium C in addition to two stable corner equilibria -4' and /?. From Figure 4.4c we can
see for which range of the household time IHF parameter d* this situation can occur.
In this figure a horizontal H>* line and a horizontal w* line cross the *>*" curve at points
(<^,w_) and (<f_.H\). respectively, where d* and d* are equal to -C*M>* and-r'w* ,
respectively, and hence depend on f*, a^, a^, KQ and 7 in a complicated way. Moreover,
just as the point (^J.H'*) '" F'gurc 4.4b. these points are also meeting points of the *•*"
curve and the w,. line, but now these curve and line cross each other. Thus, when coming
from Subcase 2* in Figure 4.4a, c * declines to rJ and beyond it, the >v *" curve in Figure
4.4a turns upwards around the origin and the R* line turns downwards around the point
(<**,*-) = (0^/7,0) (see (4.14)) until they touch for r* » r* (Fig. 4.4b) and intersect for
c* < c^ (Fig. 4.4c). Since a situation like the middle situation in Figure 4.1 requires M* < *•*"
(unstable domain), w < w* (//*" > 0) and H>* < u> < w* (W*" < 7), the configuration in
Figure 4.4c implies that such a situation with two stable corner equilibria W* » 0 and
//* = 7 can occur only for d* < d*, so for sufficiently strong household time IHF.
Section 4.2 has shown that, starting from the middle situation in Figure 4.1, changes in
the wage rate H- may lead to individual hysteresis and individual entry and exit catastrophes
between the corner equilibria when w rises beyond w*' or declines beyond w*^. Can this
occur in the present case and, if so, under which conditions? Therefore, we should first
analyse what happens for H- for which an unstable interior equilibrium docs not exist. For
(d*,H>) below the w_ line and above the w^ line we have the same kind of situation as in
Figure 4.4a, implying //* * 0 for w S w* and 0 < W* < 7 for w > w*. For (rf*,w) in
the band between the »v_ and H^ lines which lie above the w*" curve, W* as given by
(4.9) is stable and larger than 7. This implies a stable corner solution //* * 7. On the other
hand, for (d*,w) in the band which lie under the H*" curve, W* as given by (4.9) is
unstable and smaller than 7". Moreover, when such a (d\w) lies above the w* line, the
unstable //*" is also smaller than 0. Then we are in a situation as in Figure 4.1 for w > w*',
implying a unique stable comer equilibrium for L* = 0 and W* = 7. When a (</*,w) in
the band lies on the w*" curve, so above the w* line, W* as given by (4.9) docs not exist.
Then the demand line in Figure 4.1 for w > w*' is parallel to the Z. • 8/,J£ line while
remaining below it, again implying one stable comer equilibrium for W * = 7.
Now we can see what happens for */* < rf* when w rises from below »v* or declines
from above »v^ or w^. First, we consider the (sub-)subcasc with </_ < </* < </,, i.e. with
moderately strong household time IHF. To the unstable domain with w < w*" Figure 4.1
then applies with w* = H>* and w = »v*. From this figure we see that when w rises
from below w*^, a person will stay in the stable comer equilibrium /? for L* • 7 and
W* = 0 until this equilibrium becomes unstable for w » w*' and disappears outside the
feasible domain for w > w*'. This induces an individual entry catastrophe from L* • 7
and W* = 0 to Z-* = 0 and W = 7 at w - w*', as described in Section 4.2. Analogous-
ly, when w declines from above w*' (but below w*), a person will stay in the stable
comer equilibrium A for L* = 0 and //* = 7 until this equilibrium becomes unstable for
H> = H>* and disappears for w < w . This induces an individual exit catastrophe from
W*=7to//*=0atH' = H'*, as described in Section 4.2. As a result, we obtain a long-
run labour supply schedule as in Figure 4.2 with individual hysteresis and indvidual entry80
and exit catastrophes between //* = 0 and W* = 7" in a "forward-sloping" part and a
continuous backward-sloping curve for w above H^ . In Figure 4.2 the loci of the unstable
equilibrium //*" in the feasible domain are also indicated.
However, for d* < d_, so for very strong household time IHF, matters are different
Then, to the unstable domain with w < w*" Figure 4.1 only partially applies. For w rising
from below w*. a new equilibrium /t' with //* = 7 emerges at w = w*^ = »v*, but at a
certain w between w*^ and w*' the short-run labour supply curve becomes backward-
sloping for the habit stock value J^ (see App. 4B for a derivation). This implies that, for
w rising beyond this point, a left part of the demand line including C starts to move up-
wards instead of downwards. For w rising further this leads, at w = w* and beyond, back
to situations like those in Figure 4.1 for w = w*^ and >v < w*^, respectively.''* As a
result, the corner equilibrium fl with //* = 0 remains stable for all H> in the unstable
domain, so an entry catastrophe does not occur and the person enters the labour market only
beyond the high long-run reservation wage w,. in the stable domain (since she is very
strongly used to non-participation). In this stable domain the long-run labour supply curve
has a continuous and rather pronounced backward-bending shape. On the other hand, forw<
between w_ and iv, in the unstable domain, W* = T is a second stable equilibrium in
addition to W* • 0, implying individual hysteresis. When the person happens to occupy this
equilibrium and when w declines below w_ or rises above H<, , the equilibrium becomes
unstable and disappears, inducing in both cases an individual exit catastrophe to W* =0.
Thus, in this peculiar subcase we have no individual entry catastrophe, but two individual
exit catastrophes instead. The resulting labour supply schedule is presented in Appendix 4B,
which also provides some more details.
As a transition case between the last and preceding subcase, we have, for </* = d_, a
long-run labour supply schedule with a coinciding individual entry and exit catastrophe
between W* * 0 and W* = T at w* = w* as in Figure 4.5, but also with an individual
exit catastrophe at H>_ and individual hysteresis as in Figure 4.2. For d* = d^ we have a
schedule as given in Figure 4.5, and for </* > d* we obtain a same kind of continuous
backward-bending labour supply curve as in Subcase 1^ in Figure 4.3 with a positive reser-
vation wage and an inelastic segment for W * = 7.
Consider now in Figure 4.4c a simultaneous change of d* and w from a point to the
right of </, through the point (</, ,»••_) towards a point in the domain of multiple equilibria
to the left of </,. Such a change may occur as a person gets older and less flexible and
hence more susceptible to habit formation, implying a rising household time habit sensitivity
Y, >, so a declining </* (see (4.10d)). In passing (d*w*), a unique stable equilibrium then
bifurcates into two stable comer equilibria. Therefore the point (d^ ,>v_) can be considered
as a piecewise-linear model approximation of a so-called fti/wca/jo/i /rain/, which plays a
'* For d* i/ too, points of the demand line for low habit stock values will start to move
upwards at certain values of »»• between *•* and tv* as the short-run labour supply curve becomes
backward-sloping for these stock values. Then, however. 5^ is not included into these stock values,
so thai the demand line continues to move downwards at C, and hence this equilibrium continues to
move upwards towards 0, at rising tv.a/id aj?,gr<7>afio/i81
key role in the non-linear catastrophe theory.'*' When only u' changes at given d* » d*.
there occurs also a catastrophe at this variant of a bifurcation point, as indicated in Figure
4.5.'* For d* becoming more negative than d*. this catastrophe splits into a separate
entry catastrophe and a separate exit catastrophe as in Figure 4.2. When (d*,w) changes
from the unique interior equilibrium domain for d* > d* and w* < H- < w* towards the
multiple equilibria domain for d* < d* through a point slightly below the bifurcation point,
the person retires from the labour market (e.g., early retirement). On the other hand, a
similar change of (d'.w) through a point slightly above the bifurcation point, so at a
slightly higher w, renders the person a motivated employee working maximal corporate
hours. Thus, a small difference in the historical time path of (d*,w) near the bifurcation
point can lead to a large difference in the equilibrium which is reached. This hysteresis
property of a bifurcation point is called dnw#<>/ir«» in catastrophe theory. It can describe a
polarization within a rather homogeneous group of persons as the result of passing a
bifurcation point at different sides. In the present context a special bifurcation point is given
by the point (c'.dj,*'*) in Figure 4.4b. At a suitable simultaneous change in r*. d* andw
a unique stable equilibrium for c* > cj (Fig. 4.4a) bifurcates at this point into two stable
corner equilibria for r * < rj (Fig. 4.4c).
Finally, we have to deal with Subcase 2** in Table 4.2. Then the consumption IHF is very
weak and/or the marginal consumption utility diminishes very fast (relative to a^/K^) and
the household time IHF is strong. Just as in Subcase 1*" this results in a non-positive a*, a
positive />*, and (/^ £ 0 for any //*. Appendix 4B proves that also this long-run case of
satiating consumption and non-satiating household time leads to a long-run labour supply
curve which coincides with the vertical // * = 0 axis.
C<w« 5 a/id 6: c* < 0 and d* > 0 or d* £ 0
These cases of strong consumption IHF and weak or strong household time IHF arc repre-
sented by the right and left quadrant of Figure 4.6, respectively. The parameter a * is always
positive, whereas 6* and hence w* * b*/a* are positive if and only if d* < ot^/iT (Sub-
case 5* and Case 6). Again the subcase with d* > a^/7" is relegated to the next section. In
comparison with (the combination of) Figures 4.3 and 4.4c, the w,. and w* lines in Figure
4.6 are lower and intersect for a positive instead of a negative d*, the *v* line has disap-
peared into the region of negative w, and the w*" curve is now located in the right instead
of the left quadrant (see Tab. 4.1 and see App. 4C for this and following results). Moreover,
the equilibrium //'as given by (4.9) is now stable if and only if (d*,»v) lies below instead
of above this w*" = y-d*/c* curve. Then we have the same kind of situation as in Figure
4.3 under the *-* line. For (d'.w) above and left to the w*" curve, so when c*w* • d* < 0,
the equilibrium //* as given by (4.9) is an unstable //*". Then the situation is similar to
that in Figure 4.4c for d * between d * and d * and for w under the »v *" curve. Finally, on
" See, e.g., Zeeman (1977). Piecewise-linear model approximations of the curves of the so-called
cusp in catastrophe theory are given by the w" and tv* lines for / <</'S</'. See also
Subsection 5.5.3.
'* This does not hold for the non-linear bifurcation point in catastrophe theory.82
the w*" curve, so when
in Figure 4.4c for J * >
0, we are in a similar position as on the »v*" curve
_—- w*™
Case 6 Subcase 5*
a,/T ^ d*
Subcase 5°
Figure 4.6 Graphs of *-*. w' and H>'" as functions of d* for c* < 0 (strong consumption IHF).
For </* < rf* < ot^/7" all this results in a continuous long-run labour supply curve with
1 forward-sloping, but no backward-sloping part, since the strong consumption IHF keeps
labour supply on its maximal hours 7 for »v above w* (cf. Sec. 3.4). For d* < d* we
obtain a similar long-run labour supply schedule as in Figure 4.2 with individual hysteresis
and individual entry and exit catastrophes between W* = 0 and W* = 7" in a "forward-
sloping part", but without a backward-sloping part. Finally, in the transition case d* = d«.
we have for w = »••*" = w,. = w_ the accidental situation that all feasible W are unstable
long-run equilibria. This results, for d* = d^, in a long-run labour supply schedule with
coinciding entry and exit catastrophes as in Figure 4.5, but without a backward-sloping part
Again (<T,w ) is a bifurcation point.
Case 3 with c* « 0 and d* > 0 and Case 4 with c* = 0 and d* £ 0 are transition cases
describing just strong consumption IHF. The w*" curve then coincides with the d* = 0
axis (see Table 4.1) as a transition case between the w*" curves in Figures 4.4a-c (c* > 0)
and the right quadrant of Figure 4.6 (r* < 0). Right to the d* =0 axis we then have the
always stable Case 3 of weak household time IHF, and left to and including the rf* =0
axis, the always unstable Case 4 of strong household time IHF. Apart from this configuration
these cases do not yield new situations as compared to the Cases 5 and 6, and are therefore
not further discussed here.
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In these situations the consumption and household time IHFs at an interior point are 0) not
too weak and moderately strong, respectively (subcase of Subcase 1^), or f/0 strong and not
too weak, respectively (subcase of Subcase 5*), or (7/0 both strong (Cases 4 and 6). In the
last two situations the strong consumption IHF keeps labour supply on its maximal hours 7
for higher w. / <•.
This section has considered the effects on long-run labour supply //'of variations in the
exogenous variable w and the parameters r* and d*. According to (4.l()c) and (4.lOd)
these parameters cover the influence of the diminishing marginal utility parameters a^^ and a^
and the habit sensitivities 7^^ and Yz.z. '" '"^ utility function (4.1). This leaves the effects
of two relevant parameters, namely the consumption and household time taste a^ and a^,
undiscussed. However, these parameters affect only a * and /> *, respectively, but not r * and
d*. As a consequence, a change in a^ or a^ does not lead to a change in the position of
the H*" curve in the pertinent situations, but has only effects on the tv* line and other
lines. Therefore, the effect of such a change on W* can easily be analysed. Here we will not
elaborate on that, but in Sections 4.7 and 4.8 and in Section 9.11 we will consider situations
in which the household time taste a^ varies over individuals and over time, respectively.
The latter variation will be modelled as the endogenous outcome of satiation with respect to
household time in the very long run. By affecting the entry wage »v^ » ft */a * or the exit
wage w* as given by (4.13), such an endogenous variation over time can trigger individual
catastrophes and could even lead to a kind of psychological long cycle of behaviour and
mentality shifts as explained at the end of Section 3.5.
4.5 Workaholism
This section adds individual habit formation (IHF) with respect to corporate time // to the
AQM which has been analysed in the previous sections. This extension has interesting
implications. In particular, the dependence of utility on corporate time makes cases of ni/
(fully) satiating household time more plausible (see Subsec. 2.2.S).
Consider a utility function f7(X,L,//;j^,j^,j^) which is additive(ly separable) in
tY,5^), {£,,5^} and (//,s^). Transforming away terms which are independent of the choice
variables X, L and // (see Sec. 4.1), this additive specification can be written as84
(4.15)
with &x > 0. &xx < 0, f^ t 0, &£ > 0, &^ < 0, y^ i 0, &„ > 0, &/y/y < 0 and
t//// fc 0. Assuming equal decay rates 5^ and 5^ of the household time and corporate
time habits, this utility function can be reduced to a utility function (/(X.L;^^,^) by
substituting // = 7" - Z. and s,, = 778^ - s^ (see Sec. 3.1). This yields a specification of
the same form as (4.1) without the [3-terms, where a^ = &^, a^ = &xx
Equation (4.16a) can be interpreted as follows. The "net" household time taste a^ is equal
to t//_(0;0) - tf^(0;0) - tf,,(7";778^). i.e. the difference between the marginal utilities
of the first (discretionary) household time unit and the last corporate time unit when being
used to zero household time and maximal corporate time. The former marginal utility
represents the "pure" household time taste ft^, and, since i)// ("•*//) "&//*&//// "*?//«•*«•
the latter marginal utility can be written as A// - <?//7\ Here &/, = $/y(0;0) is the "pure"
corporate time taste, and the parameter a^ is analogous to the IHF parameter d* as defined
by (4.10d) in Section 4.3 and measures minus the relative strength of the corporate time
IHF. When &y, is positive and </*, is negative, i.e., when the corporate time IHF is (relative-
ly) strong, the "net" household time taste a^ is smaller than the "pure" household time taste &^
and may even be negative. Especially the latter possibility has interesting implications for
the long-run labour supply (see below).
In the usual situation of non-satiating consumption at the optimal point, 5/iorf-rnn labour
supply is again given by (4.5) in Section 4.1 with the same definitions of the "parameters".
Now, however, the "parameter" ft :* (/^(7;5^) may more easily be negative, since it is
equal to ^(T;5^) - t?/y(0;5^), i.e. the difference between the marginal utilities of the
last possible household time unit and the first corporate time unit at given habit levels, and
since the latter marginal utility may be positive. This stronger tendency of ft to negativity
also follows from (4.2b) for L = 7", since the "net" household time taste ot^ may be smaller
than the "pure" household time taste 6^ and even be negative (see above). This implies that/wMr/brniarion; add/mr ^uadrarir m<x/W ant/ aggrrga/io/t 85
the net marginal utility of household time as given by (4.2b) may more easily become
negative for high Z. and low s^. This corresponds to the development of a person into a
"wontaWic", in which the household time habit stock s^ declines as the person gets used to
more corporate time and less household time (see footnote 7 in Sec. 3.3). In particular,
/> := £7^(7"-.i^) then becomes negative and, by virtue of (4.5). this implies that the
corporate time // has the positive value -ft/d for zero wage rate w. This describes volun-
teer work.
In the subcase where the parameter a := {^(J^;^) is positive, we then get, for tv
rising from zero, a backward-bending short-run labour supply curve. The restriction HST
can be shown to be not binding for any non-negative w if and only if -/>/d is smaller than T
(or <x^ + YtL^i. '* positive) and r := |t/xxl '* '^"gcr than or equal to a certain positive
value c^ (see Sec. 4.1). Then a short-run labour supply curve will look as indicated in
Figure 2.6b in Subsection 2.2.5. Since the expression in (4.5) approaches zero for w> going
to infinity, there is a w** at which the expression becomes equal to W^ • -ft/d with
t/^ = 0. At this point (/^ is also zero by virtue of the first-order condition l/^ • f^/iv
for an interior optimum, implying a "double bliss" optimum of a fully satisfied corporate
worker. For H- rising above w this worker will not reduce her (or his) corporate time as
described by (4.5) and as implied by (4.3), but stick to the same corporate time, household
time and consumption, since she does not want her marginal utilities of household time and
consumption to become negative as implied by (4.3) (which assumes a binding income
constraint).
In the subcase where both the parameters a := 1/^(KQ;J^) and fo are negative, we arc in
the situation of a millionaire who works for fun, as described in Subsection 2.2.5. Then the
short-run labour supply curve coincides with the vertical W = -/>/*/ line. The subcases
where a or ft is zero are straightforward transition cases between positive or negative a or
6.
Long-ru/i /afc?ur swpp/y
In the usual situation of non-satiating consumption at the optimal point, /««jij-rw/i labour
supply can be derived as follows. First, consider the case where the unique interior e-
quilibrium is stable. Long-run labour supply is then again given by (4.9) in Section 4.3 with
the same definitions of the parameters, but now the parameter ft* : = (/^(7";7/8^) «a^ -</*T
may more easily be negative, since it is equal to f/^(r;7"/8^) - #//(0;0), i.e. the dif-
ference between the marginal utilities of the last household time unit and the first corporate
time unit when being used to maximal household time and zero corporate time, and since the
latter "pure" corporate time taste may be positive. This stronger tendency of /> * to negativity
is also implied by the possibilities that the "net" household time taste a^ is smaller than the
"pure" household time taste ft^ and that it is even negative (see above).
The IHF parameter d* := |t/^tl ~ ^LJ ^L '" ^* above formula for 6* is equal to the
sum of the separate IHF parameters^ := |{7^| - 0^ /5^ and </,* :• |#////| - $//, /5y,,
so measures minus the total (relative) strength of the household and corporate time IHFs.
Substituting this relation and (4.16a) into 6* = a^ - </*7\ it follows that />*»&£-<!„- J^T
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corporate time taste &//, but is independent of the strength -d^y of the corporate time IHF.
Just as the independence of the w^ in (4.13) in Section 4.3 of the strength -<^ of the
household time IHF, this is implied by the particular feature of the AQM that zero values of
a behaviour variable and the corresponding habit stock have no effect on the labour supply.
In contrast, the w* at which the restriction W* £ 7" becomes binding, are affected by the
corporate time taste &//, but also by the strength -dyy of the corporate time IHF.
These features have some interesting implications for diagrams like those in Figures 4.3,
4.4a-c and 4.6 in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Assume a positive &/, and first consider only
changes in d* • <}£ «• d^ at constant d,*,. Then modifications in Figures 4.3, 4.4a-c and
4.6 are a lower, but parallel position of the w,. line and, for non-negative ct^, of the »v_
line and a higher, but parallel position of the K\ line. As a result, the value c/* = oc^/r for
which the H»^ line meets the w « 0 axis in Figures 4.3 and 4.6, is lower and the width of
the band in which there is a long-run equilibrium for W* = 7" is larger. The former result
makes the case of a negative ft*, describing volunteer work in the long run, more likely. For
positive a* in Table 4.2 in Section 4.3, we then obtain a backward-bending long-run labour
supply curve as in Figure 2.6a (Subsec. 2.2.S) in Subcases 1' and 1 , and a similar labour
supply curve with an inelastic piece for W* = 7 in Subcase 1* (see Fig. 4.3), and a for-
ward-sloping labour supply curve with an inelastic piece for W* = 7" and higher w in the
Subcases 3** and 5^ (see Fig. 4.6). When a* is non-positive (Subcase 1*"), we are in the
situation of a millionaire who works for fun, as described in Subsection 2.2.5. Then the
long-run labour supply curve coincides with the vertical W = -ft*/d* line.
For a^ < 0 or A^ < ft# + (-dj*,)T (see (4.16a)), i.e., when the "pure" household time
taste is lower than the "pure" corporate time taste plus the net marginal utility effect of
corporate time IHF and short-run satiation tendency, there arc some additional and drastic
modifications. Since a^ • t/^(0;0), the net marginal utility of the first household time unit
when being used to zero household time, is then negative, and this implies that, for a person
who is used to maximal corporate time and zero household time, there is no incentive to
work less than maximal corporate hours, no matter how low or high the wage rate w. In all
situations this implies the existence of a stable long-run equilibrium W* = 7" for any u>. In
Figures 4.3, 4.4c and 4.6 the H* line has then disappeared to negative H> and the w* line
has become irrelevant, because it holds only for the case of a binding income constraint for
W - 7 and hence a positive o^ = L^(0;0) - v^'t^^r + K,,;(w*r + Ko)/5^)
(see (4.3)). Moreover, the value rf* = ot^/7", for which the w,. line meets the w = 0 axis,
has become negative. This eliminates the H^ line in Figure 4.3, leaving only a region with
W* • T, and it leaves us in Figures 4.4a-c and 4.6 with only a region with W* = 7" above
the u'j. line and a region with W * = 0 or W' =7" under this line.
Thus, when the net household time taste ot^ is negative, all long-run labour supply
schedules describe that for tv » 0 the subject prefers to volunteer for the maximal corporate
time and that for positive H' he (or she) prefers to keep his labour supply on the same
maximal level. So, even when the consumption IHF is only weak (c* > 0), the labour
supply schedule is not backward-bending. However, for d* < ot^/7", so when the household
time and corporate time IHF is rather strong, the preference for volunteering holds only
when the subject has been used to maximal corporate time. Then there is for sufficiently low w
also another long-run equilibrium //' = 0. describing that the person is strongly used to/iafa7/ormarit>/i: fl«adra»'r wioaW and 87
zero corporate hours and maximal household time, and hence prefers to remain non-par-
ticipating (see Figure 4.7). Only beyond a certain positive entry wage H> .1 will
enter the labour market and develop into a person who works maximal corporate time and is
strongly used to that. When w then falls below w *', he will not reduce his corporate time,
even when w falls to zero.
Figure 4.7 Long-run labour supply schedule for negative net household time taste ot^ and strong
household time and corporate time IHF with d* < a^/7".
Thus, in this case as well as for a" £ cx^/7 there is no positive long-run exit wage.
Therefore, both cases seem to model strong forms of "worta/w/rwi" in which there is not
only no positive short-run exit wage, but also no positive long-run exit wage (see the de-
scription of a "workaholic" in Sec. 3.2) and, for a" £ a^/7, no positive long-run entry
wage. So, when w is reduced to zero, this workaholic will continue to work the maximal
corporate time in the short as well as long run. However, workaholism suggests a not too
weak corporate time IHF (so a not too positive a",*,), whereas, a^ < 0 being equivalent to
^L < fy/ ~ ^//^ (sec above), both cases can also occur for very weak or no corporate time
IHF (a high a",,), provided the "pure" corporate time taste fy, is sufficiently larger than the
"pure" household time taste r\ and, for the case of </* • d£ • a"// < 0^/7". provided the
household time IHF is sufficiently strong (a^ < a^/7" - <J^). These subcases of a strong
exogenous attachment to corporate work relative to household time" could be seen as
alternative explanations of the described long-run labour supply behaviour besides workahol-
17 Note that this can even hold for unhappy persons with a negative corporate time taste and a
sufficiently more negative (discretionary) household time taste.88
ism involving not too weak endogenous corporate time IHF.'* An example of any of these
subcases may be given by retired professors, entrepreneurs and the like who continue to
work maximal or almost maximal corporate hours after their formal retirement
In discussing the modifications of Figures 4.3, 4.4a-c and 4.6 only the effects of changes
in the total IHF parameter d* ~ ^t + ^// at a constant value of the IHF parameter dyy for
corporate time have been considered. However, it seems more appropriate to analyse the
effects of simultaneous changes in ^ and d^. To obtain again two-dimensional diagrams,
we could assume that these IHF parameters vary in a fixed positive proportion, i.e., as a
person is more (less) sensitive to household time IHF, he (or she) is also more (less) sen-
sitive to corporate time IHF. Then the separate IHF parameters d^ and c/j/ are fixed posi-
tive fractions of the total IHF parameter </* and we get additional modifications in Figures
4.3, 4.4a-c and 4.6. We mention the most important ones only and do not fully elaborate
them.
First, the slope of the w* line is smaller, since w^ does not depend on the corporate
time parameter d^. On the other hand, the w_ line becomes a positively sloping curve and
the iv, line a negatively sloping curve, since w_ depends positively and H\ depends
negatively on </,*,. This implies that the H-* and w* curves meet together for a certain value
of </*, so that right to this point, i.e. for sufficiently weak or not too strong household and
corporate time IHF, the restriction W * £ 7" is not binding for any w. More importantly, the w_
curve meets the w • 0 axis for a value 6?* of d* which is negatively proportional to the
difference &^ - fy, between the "pure" household time and "pure" corporate time taste. For
**L - A// > 0 and d* S j' <0 we then obtain a long-run labour supply schedule as in
Figure 4.7 and for &j_ - &^ < 0 and d* ^ c? > 0 we obtain the same schedule for suf-
ficiently negative rf* and a schedule with merely W* = 7 for higher d*. Thus, just as
found above, a schedule as in Figure 4.7 requires sufficiently strong total IHF with respect to
household and corporate time, but because of the assumed fixed positive proportions and
hence equal signs of <}£ and (J^, this implies now also sufficiently strong corporate time
IHF and hence workaholism. Moreover, rf^ and <?,*, having the same sign is also responsible
for the finding that a schedule with merely W* = T can occur only for 6^ - &^ < 0, i.e.,
when the "pure" corporate time taste is higher than the "pure" household time taste.
However, although both cases of a negative net household time taste ct^ may occur in
reality, they arc rather extreme. For all other cases we can conclude that Proposition 4.1 as
formulated in the previous section continues to hold for the combination of household and
corporate time IHF instead of pure household time IHF.
'* 1 do not simply associate workaholism with strong corporate lime IHF, since I consider work-
aholism as a kind of addiction and associate addiction with a habit-dependent threshold rather than
with strong IHF as defined here (sec footnote 1 in Ch. 3). In fact, the model of workaholism in
Section 3.2 presupposes stable household and corporate time IHF, which can be weak.
" Then also Uie pension should be taken into account in the income constraint, but this does not
make a difference for the labour supply behavior. In the case of a professor like the economist
Tinbcrgcn I would not speak of workaholism. but rather of a vocation. Still, such a vocation may
have strongly been reinforced by one's lifetime experience with corporate work.ornia/uwi: add/riv? guarfrarir mode/ and a^^re^afion 89
4.6 Long-run utility functions
In the always stable long-run case as analysed in Section 4.3. the fact that the form of the
long-run labour supply function (4.9) is similar to the form of the short-run labour supply
function (4.S) in Section 4.1, implies that the former function can be rationalized as the
result of the constrained maximization of an additive quadratic "/o/ig-ru/t u/i/iry /M/IC/IVMT.
The specification of this utility function is . • .•:. •
C/*(XX) = c^X • a^X* • a^L + a^L*. • - . (4.17)
where a^ := -r* := a^
Table 4.1 with positive c* and rf* this describes "mountain parabolas" in consumption X
and household time L like the short-run utility function (4.1). More generally, Schokkacrt
(1982, pp. 79-80) proves that such a rationalization is possible if and only if the short-run
utility function is additive. In the seventies there has been a debate on the (welfare-theoreti-
cal) meaning of the "long-run utility function" (see, e.g., Von Weizsa'cker, 1971, and Pollak,
1976b). The conclusion of this debate, as formulated by Pollak (1976b, Sees. 5 and 6) (sec
also Schokkaert, 1982, pp. 81-83), seems to be that the "long-run utility function" does not
reflect "long-run preferences", since in the present case of myopic preference formation the
long-run evolution of the relevant state variable(s) is not an object of choice. Therefore the
"long-run utility function" has no welfare-theoretical meaning, but can merely serve as an
indicator of long-run behaviour. To obtain long-run levels of cardinal utility indicating
individual welfare for various given X and L, we should add the p-terms in (4.1) with
s^ = X/8x and i^ = Z-/8^ (describing full habitation) to (4.17) (sec footnote 2). The
resulting long-run utility function can be written in the same form as (4.17), but the parame-
ters are then generally different.
In the present context the meaning of the "long-run utility function" (4.17) can be clari-
fied as follows. First, we remark that the rationalization of the long-run labour supply
function (4.9) by the "long-run utility function" (4.17) also holds for the three stable situat-
ions other than Case 1 in Table 4.1. Then either c* or </* is non-positive, but, along the
standard budget line X = w(7 - L) + K^ in the (X,L) plane, (4.17) again describes a
mountain parabola. This can be seen by substituting the standard constraints into (4.17) (cf.
(4.8a) and (4.8b)), yielding the co/i5/ra//»ed "/ong-rK/i u/i/i/y/u/ic/io/i"
tf**(//;w\K0,7-) = (a'w - ft*)// - i(cV^ + a")//*. (4.18)
When c*w* + d* is positive, i.e., when the stability condition (4.11) is fulfilled, this
function describes a mountain parabola in corporate time // (which can be regarded as
parametrizing the budget line in the (XX) plane). Applying the first-order condition l/"^*0
is then easily seen to yield the long-run labour supply function (4.9).
When c*w^ + d* is negative, so when (4.9) stands for an unstable long-run equilibrium
//*", the constrained "long-run utility function" (4.18) describes a "valley parabola" in //.
Then (4.9) minimizes (4.18) and, when it describes an interior//*", so when w < H> < w
in Figure 4.2, we have for w near w** (w>w*^)a graph of the constrained "long-run90
utility function" (4.18) as indicated by the lowest curve in Figure 4.8. (Recall that a*H'-6*<0
for w < w*' • fc*/a*.) According to this graph the two stable long-run equilibria //* = 0
and W* * 7 are /oca/ comer maximum points of the "long-run utility function". Whereas
only the equilibrium //* » 0 is also a global maximum point, both equilibria can be real-
ized dependent on the historical time paths of exogenous variables (see Sec. 4.2). Thus, this
hysteresis of multiple long-run equilibria is described by local and not global maximization
of the "long-run utility function". This local maximization is equivalent to local minimization
of a Lyapunov function which is defined as minus the constrained "long-run utility function"
and which is similar to the potential functions considered in applications of catastrophe
theory (see below). On the other hand, a global maximization or minimization model like the
short-run utility maximizing model can describe catastrophes, but no hysteresis (see Sec. 3.6
and see Vendrik, 1979a and b, for the corresponding variant of catastrophe theory). In
particular, this holds for the usual "long-run utility" maximizing model (see, e.g., Anderson
and Blundell, 1982). Moreover, I find this behaviour model implausible, since it cannnot
give a proper account of a decrease in long-run utility or welfare of a person who myopical-
ly gets used or even addicted to a harmful behaviour like smoking (see Pollak, 1976b, Sec.




Figure 4.8 Graphs of constrained "long-run utility function" with unstable equilibrium //*" for
various values of the wage rate.liafaf/omiflrion: adtflfiVg <yi<adraHr iwoaW
In order to gain more insight into the working and interpretation of the local "long-run
utility" maximizing model, we consider the effects of a rising wage rate and suppose that at
H> > w*^ in Figure 4.8 the person is non-participating (W* = 0). As the wage rate rises, the
"long-run utility" for positive corporate hours W increases because of the consumption gains,
so for H- approaching the long-run entry wage H»*'(iv<w*')the graph of the constrained
"long-run utility function" looks as indicated in Figure 4.8. This graph suggests that, in the
long run, the utility of high corporate hours is then higher than the utility of non-
participation. This, however, does not need to hold, since for such a global utility or welfare
comparison the (J-terms in (4.1) with i^=X/8^ = (u'W + y^ )/8^ and .9^«L/8^»(r-/y )/8^
should be added to (4.18) (sec above). When the consumption IHF and the corporate time
IHF are more harmful or less beneficial than the household time IHF (see footnote 2), the
long-run utility of high corporate hours may then still be lower than the utility of non-
participation. On the other hand, the "long-run utility function" (4.18) for u- < *•*' merely
describes that (in the long run) the person prefers to stay at home, since she (or he) is
strongly used to that and hence would lose utility I/I fto s>iorf rww when she would enter the
labour market (remember that the person is myopic).
However, the unstable equilibrium A/*" approaches the stable non-participation
equilibrium and will for w = >v *' coincide with it, making it unstable, and subsequently for w > w *'
disappear (see Sec. 4.2). Accordingly, W* = 0 becomes a local minimum point of the
"long-run utility function" for w £ w*' with a positive marginal "long-run utility" for
w > w*' (see Fig. 4.8). This describes that for w £ w*' the person prefers to enter the
labour market, since she can gain utility in the short run by doing so. Moreover, the positive
marginal "long-run utility" of all corporate hours describes that when the person has got used
to a part-time job, she wants to work more corporate hours, etc. until she works maximal
corporate hours (//* = 7). The person engages into this entry catastrophe irrespectively of
whether her genuine long-run utility as given by the welfare extension of (4.18) rises or falls
by working an increasingly number of corporate hours. This holds, since the person is
myopic and hence does not take into account the long-run utility costs or benefits of harmful
or beneficial IHF in her short-run labour supply decisions.
When the wage rate again declines, the person working maximal corporate hours will
engage into an exit catastrophe only beyond a long-run exit wage »v*^, which is lower than
the long-run entry wage w*'. In Figure 4.8 the local maximum at W* = 7" has then turned
into a local minimum and the result is individual hysteresis. Individual hysteresis also occurs
when the person has become aware of the long-run utility costs or benefits of harmful or
beneficial IHF and takes them more or less into account in her labour supply decisions. A
simplified picture of this more or less rational IHF (see Sec. 1.1) is provided by the as-
sumption that the person will then consider her genuine long-run utility as given by the
welfare extension of (4.18). The graphs of this constrained long-run utility function of
corporate time W can be similar to those in Figure 4.8, but the corresponding values of the
wage rate are generally different Moreover, a non-participating person will already enter in
a situation like that for w < w*' in Figure 4.8, when the long-run utility gains of working
a high number of corporate hours compensate for the short-run adjustment costs of going
through a "valley of habituation". Similarly, a person working maximal corporate hours will
already start to work less corporate hours in a situation like that for H> > w*^ in Figure 4.8.
Nevertheless, again this results in individual entry and exit catastrophes as well as individual92 C/mpter 4
hysteresis. Furthermore, the long-run entry wage in this case of rational IHF will be lower or
higher than the long-run entry wage w*' in the case of myopic IHF dependent on whether
the anticipated formation and/or erosion of habits is more or less beneficial or harmful. For
the long-run exit wages in the two cases an analogous relation holds. When the anticipated
formation and/or erosion of habits is very harmful, a long-run entry or exit wage may even
not exist in the rational IHF case. A severe shortcoming of this rational IHF model is the
implicit assumption that the short-run adjustment process towards a new long-run e-
quilibrium is assumed to be "quasi-static", i.e., the adjustment of the corporate hours is
assumed to be so slow as to allow approximately full adjustment in the short run of the
habits to the changing corporate hours. Thus, the model does not describe the possible
advantages of going "cold turkey", i.e., for a non-participant, of starting to work the maximal
corporate hours at once. This requires a full-blown intertemporal utility maximizing model
like that of Becker and Murphy (1988) (see also Frank, 1989). As already suggested by
Pollak (1976b, p. 296), such a model may also provide more appropriate and dynamic
indicators of welfare.
Finally, we remark that non-linear demand functions like L ^ in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2
are obtained by adding fourth-order terms in the behaviour and habit variables to the long-
run utility function (4.17), and hence to (4.18) (cf. Becker and Murphy, 1988, p. 683). One
or more of the local maxima describing stable equilibria then become interior. Similar
potential functions with fourth or even higher order terms, implying two or more, merely
interior, stable equilibria, are considered and classified in catastrophe theory (see, e.g..
Thorn, 197S, and Zeeman, 1977). In cases of more than two interior stable equilibria, related,
but more complicated configurations of catastrophes and hysteresis than found above are
derived.
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4>7 Aggregation: short run -•,• ,-;<•
So far we have analysed individual labour supply behaviour. However, in order to trace the
macro-economic implications of this behaviour we should aggregate it over individuals. The
most simple procedure is to assume that in the social group or population under con-
sideration the individual preferences and constraints are identical. Thus, in a "continuous"
labour supply regime everyone faces the same wage rate w and has the same other income KQ
and habit stocks s^ &"d 5^, and the individual short and long-run labour supply functions
//(w.KQ.r.Jjf.jj,) and W*(H\K0,7") are identical over individuals. As a consequence,
tfwra,^ (or per capita) short and long-run labour supply functions are exact replicas of the
corresponding individual functions.
Unfortunately, reality shows that these assumptions are much too simple: individuals face
widely diverging w and V^ and have different preferences. As a result, individual labour
supply functions are not identical and average short and long-run labour supply in the social
group can generally be considered as functions of the distributions over individuals of w,
KQ, 7", and state variables and taste parameters in the utility function. Since, at least at the
kink of an individual labour supply curve at the reservation wage, an individual labour
supply function is non-linear in these variables and parameters, an exact analysis is complic-
ated. Therefore, our discussion of the aggregation issue will focus on a particular specifica-faiftif /ofwiafton: adaVft'vg <yi<adra/ir moaW and aggrggariow 93
tion of the general model, namely the AQM, and next try to generalize its conclusions to
other specifications. Aggregation of short-run labour supply curves is discussed in the
present section and aggregation of long-run labour supply schedules in the next section.
First, consider individual variation in only the "parameters" a := t/x^o-^x) *"d
ft := t/^(7";5^) of formula (4.5) for the short-run labour supply curve for 0 < W < T in
the standard case of r, a", a and ft all being positive. The "parameters" a and ft are chosen
since they appear in (4.S) in a linear way. According to (4.6a) and (4.6b) and assuming no
variations in the utility function parameters ct^ * -f. Yxx* "/./. " "^ *"<* Y/.L' '"^
variations in a and ft may be due to individual differences in a^, K^, .v^, a^, T and s^.
At first sight average short-run labour supply W is given by^
1 £ «,w - *,- a-w - ft ^, ^
However, this neglects the fact that different individuals have different positive reservation
wages iv,.; = *,•/",•. which are in general unequal to ft/a. In the subcase where r is larger
than or equal to c<,,- for all individuals^', the correct expression for // is
„ 1 r^
2 7' (4.20)
(Note that for »v^, S w, W^ = 0.) For 0 $ H' ^ min H^, * min ft,7a,, W is zero, but when w
rises beyond this interval, W will rise with H- as more persons enter the labour market (see
Figure 4.9). ^ •"'"• '' ^ *««
Using (4.19) we can write (4.20) as
/; aw - ft _ 1 y, "/^ " */
" 2 ^ 7v "^ 2 7" (4.21)
Since the terms under the summation sign are negative, it follows that A/ is larger than the
first term on the right-hand side. However, when w rises to high values, the "correction"
terms under the summation sign go to zero as less persons stay at home, implying that W
approaches the first term. When the number of individuals A/ is large and the simultaneous
distribution of a,- and ft,- can be approximated by a continuous and unimodal density func-
™ Note that we aggregate the individual labour supply functions directly, i.e.. we do not first
aggregate the individual utility functions or the individual household time demand functions of the
habit stocks and next apply schemes of consistent aggregation (see, however, the next section and
Sees. 6.1 and 6.2).
^' See Section 4.1. When c is smaller than <:„, for a number of individuals, (4.19) also neglects
the fact that these individuals have different w_, and tv., between which the restriction //, £ 7, is
binding. For that case a similar average labor supply curve can be derived as for the case where
c £ c<,,< for all individuals, but the analysis is more complicated (see also Subsec. 5.5.1).Oiap/er 4
Figure 4.9 Average and representative short-run labour supply curve in the AQM, indicated by
solid and dotted bold curve, respectively.
tion, this can be shown usually to result into a smooth average labour supply curve such as
in Figure 4.9.**
The first term in (4.21) can be interpreted as describing for aw - 6 S 0, or w S ft/a, a
representative labour supply curve. This curve is indicated as a dotted bold curve in Figure
4.9. The average labour supply curve as indicated by a solid curve inFigure 4.9 deviates
from this representative curve, but approaches it for high w. For H> £ fe/a the deviation is
given by the "correction" terms CT in (4.21), but for w < ft/J the deviation is smaller than
CT by the negative first term in (4.21). t
What happens if also the parameters r and rf of the short-run labour supply curve (4.5)
and the wage rate w vary over individuals? Expression (4.5) is not linear in these parameters
and variable, implying that averaging (4.5) over individuals does not result in a simple
formula like that in (4.19). Not only the averages of the distributions of c,-, d, and u>, will
play a role, but also (co)variances and higher-order (co)moments of these distributions as
well as covariances and higher-order comoments of the distributions of c,, </, and w, with
the distributions of a, and 6,. Nevertheless, when r,, d, and w, do not vary too much, we
could, as a first-order approximation, neglect these (co)variances and higher-order (co)mom-
ents and replace r,-, </, and w,- in (4.5) by their averages c\ d and w\ Then we are in the
same situation as above with r, J and iv instead of c, d and w in (4.19)-(4.21). This
" "Smooth" means that W(M) is twice continuously diffcrentiablc. The shape of the average
labour supply curve in Figure 4.1 follows from laborious standard derivations of d/7/dw and
d*W/dw> , implying that both derivatives arc positive for sufficiently low tv such that the negative
income effects of the denominator r>v* • d in (4.17) are small relative to the level of the simul-
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implies representative and average short-run labour supply curves as functions of «• which
are of the same shape as the curves described by (4.19) for H> £ ft/a and (4.21), respec-
tively, in Figure 4.9. For other than AQM specifications of continuous individual labour
supply curves with varying positive reservation wages w,, one can make a similar analysis,
implying that the kinks at >*•„• in the individual curves are "smoothed out" by "correction
terms" like those in (4.21) in the average curve.^
Finally, as discussed in Section 4.5, the parameters ft,- and/or o, may be negative for
some individuals. This yields additional complications. For example, when ft,- is negative
and a,- is positive, the individual short-run labour supply curves may be given by Figure
2.6b in Subsection 2.2.5 with a non-positive reservation wage and a kink at w, . Ag-
gregating such labour supply curves to an average labour supply curve, we obtain a curve
which is similar to that in Figure 2.6a, but which has a vertical piece for w above max w,- .
Combining this curve with the average labour supply curve of the other "standard" labour
suppliers results in an overall average short-run labour supply curve according to which W
is already equal to a positive value W(O) for w • 0, which is less backward-sloping for
higher iv than the curve in Figure 4.9, and which approaches W(0) for w going to infinity.
4.8 Aggregation: long run t '
For individual long-run labour supply curves of the form (4.9) (Sec. 4.3) with c*, a"*, a*
and ft* all being positive, aggregation is analogous to that for the corresponding short-run
curves of the form (4.5). However, for individual long-run labour supply schedules with
hysteresis and catastrophes as in Figure 4.2, matters become different. We again assume
positive a* and ft* and first consider individual variation in only the household time taste
component cc^ of the "parameter" ft* and strong consumption IHF for all persons (f * £ 0).
The last assumption implies that the individual long-run labour supplies W, remain equal to
T for higher H\ Moreover, we assume that all ct^, are positive.
What happens with the average long-run labour supply //*, when the wage rate w is
rising from zero? Since ft *, a * and a^, are positive and c * is negative, it follows that both
the long-run entry wages w,- = H^.,- : = ft,, /a* and the long-run exit wages w,- « w_,. as
given by (4.13) in Section 4.3 are positive. This implies that at w = 0 all persons in the
social group are in the long run always non-participating and used to that. Then W* is zero,
and, for H- rising from zero, this will remain so for w £ min w* = (min ft,*)/a*, which is
the long-run entry wage w * of the person(s) with the lowest household time taste a^,. For w
rising beyond w, , first persons with low household time tastes and next persons with
higher household time tastes will enter and work in the long run the maximal feasible
number of corporate hours 7". This leads to an average long-run labour supply which is
given by
One should then treat and/or approximate the parameters and variables in the individual labour
supply functions analogously to those in the AQM specification above.96
//* = -L V 7".
(4.22)
For large /V we can consider <x^, and hence ft* as continuous variables a^ and 6*, and
define e :=a^ - a^ = ft* -6* with density function /(e). Substituting from this defini-
tion into w*' « ft*/a* < »v, (4.22) can be approximated as
,.,..., ., oV-ft* ._. it •
V w* - J r/(e)</c -rF(fl** - ft*). (4.23)
where f is the (cumulative) distribution function of e. (Note that /(e) = 0 for ft* SO or
e £ -ft*.) When/(e) is continuously differentiable and unimodal, thecurveof F(a*w - ft*)
and hence of W* as a function of w can easily be shown to have a smooth sigmoid shape.




Figure 4.10 Average and representative long-run labour supply schedule with collective hysteresis
and catastrophes in the AQM with strong consumption IHF. indicated by solid curve
and dashed bold line, respectively.
For sufficiently high w all persons in the social group will have entered the labour
market.^ This implies a long-run situation in which all group members are employed at
the maximal number of hours 7 and are used to that. When in such a situation w starts to
decline, the group members will leave the labour market in the long run only at an exit wage
^* Note that the number of persons N being finite implies that the distribution of a^, and hence
the distribution of the entry wages «•*'. are bounded.Aaftir/ormario/i: add/fur ouadVan'r mod?/ and aggregation 97
w* = »v*,- as given by (4.13) which is lower than the entry wage w* . In (4.22) this entry
wage should therefore be replaced by the exit wage, which varies with the parameter a^,-. In
the continuous approximation for large A/ with e := a^ - a^ this can be derived to lead
to a formula like (4.23) (see App. 4D), but now the argument of the distribution function F
depends on w in a quadratic way. Nevertheless, when /(e) is continuously differentiable
and unimodal, we usually obtain again a smooth sigmoid average long-run labour supply
curve. This is represented by the lower curve in Figure 4.10, and we call such a curve the
exi'f curve. It reaches // * * 0 for min v^ • Wj of the person(s) with the lowest house-
hold time taste a^,. Together with the entry curve the exit curve describes hysteresis, which
we refer to as ro/tecriw /lysfcrps/j. On the other hand, the entry and exit curve do not
describe catastrophes, since the discontinuities in the individual long-run labour supply
curves have been "smoothed out" in the average curve by the individual variation. This
implies a substantial deviation of the average curve from the representative long-run labour
supply curve for ft* = ft*. The latter curve has the same shape as the individual curves
given by Figure 4.2 in Section 4.2 without backward-bending part, and it has discontinuities
between 0 and 7" at the average entry wage »v *' = ft */a * and the exit wage »v * * » w * * /or o^ - 5^.
This is indicated in Figure 4.10 by dashed bold lines for lower M\
When the consumption IHF is weak (r* > 0), but the household time IHF is strong
(a** £ 0), the individual long-run labour supply schedules may again display individual
hysteresis and catastrophes, but are also backward-bending as in Figure 4.2. This makes a
derivation of an average long-run labour supply schedule more complicated. If we assume
that Figure 4.2 holds for all persons, an average long-run labour supply schedule as represen-
ted in Figure 4.11 can be derived. On the one hand, the lower half of this schedule is
analogous to that of Figure 4.10, displaying a collective hysteresis loop, but no catastrophes.
On the other hand, the schedule in Figure 4.11 has a backward-sloping part for w above
H^. This w^ is the H>^ in Figure 4.2 of the last entrant N at rising w, who has the
highest household time taste a^. Since *\, as given by (4.13) in Section 4.3 declines with
increasing a^,, this last entrant is the first to reach the backward-sloping part of his (or her)
long-run labour supply schedule for w rising towards high levels.^" Moreover, as more
persons reach the backward-sloping part of their long-run labour supply schedule, the ave-
rage long-run labour supply approaches the backward-sloping part of the representative long-
run labour supply schedule for ft* « ft* (dotted curve for w above »v, * H>^ /or a^ • a^_
in Fig. 4.11).
" The shape of the hysteresis figure is similar to that of the fcrromagnct in physics (sec Fig. I in
Franz. 1990). Note that in this case discontinuities in the individual labour supply curves arc
"smoothed out", whereas in the case of continuous individual labour supply curves kinks are
"smoothed out".
*' For the last entrant the conditions in situation (i) of Proposition 4.1 in Section 4.4 for Figure 4.2
to hold are the strongest. This can be seen from the diagram in Figure 4.4c. Because the w,. line in
Figure 4.4c moves upwards for increasing a^,, whereas the •*>*" curve remains fixed for given c*,
the under limit d* and the upper limit d' in the condition d"* < d* < </', as determined by the
intersections of this line and curve, move towards each other for increasing a^,. This implies that the
conditions are the strongest for the last entrant at rising n\ who has the highest household time taste98
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Figure 4.11 Average long-run labour supply schedule in the AQM with strong household time IHF
and weak consumption IHF. The entry and exit curve are indicated by solid lines and
curves, the trajectories within the collective hysteresis loop by dashed bold lines and
dotted curves, and the backward-sloping part of the representative long-run labour
supply schedule by a dolled bold curve. .,,,, ^ ^
In deriving the entry curve in Figure 4.10 or 4.11 it has been assumed that w rises from
zero to a sufficiently high level so as to make all group members employed before it will
start to decline. In reality, however, this will often not be the case. Consider, for instance, in
Figure 4.11 a rise in H> from zero till H^ and, after the long-run equilibrium /7° being
established, adecline in H\ What will happen then? At W° a majority of the population has
switched from zero to the maximal number of corporate hours, but the remaining minority is
still not participating. The employed have got accustomed to their employment, so when w
declines, they will switch back to non-participation only at their relatively low exit wages
w,- . The first to switch back is the last person who switched to employment when n»
reached w , since she (or he) has not only the highest entry wage w* and hence the
highest ct^, of the employed, but also the highest exit wage vt^- . This exit wage lies on the
lower curve at the same participation rate or average labour supply tf*\ since, in the above-
mentioned descent of the lower curve for declining »v, it is then the turn of the person to
leave the labour market. For w declining from w", this implies that the average long-run
labour supply will be (perfectly) inelastic (as indicated by a vertical dashed line) before the
lower curve is reached, and that it will follow this curve afterwards.
However, in reality w will not decline to zero before it will again start to rise. Suppose
M* starts to rise from a long-run equilibrium at, say. M-' on the lower curve. Then the long-o/i.' adWriv? oMadVanr mode/ and aggregation 99
run average labour supply will again follow a vertical inelastic line below the upper curve.
In general, average long-run labour supply is inelastic within the collective hysteresis loop.
This implies that when H' changes_within the hysteresis loop between time f - <// and time
/, W * = W,*_d, ^ *"y initial W,*_^,. Adding a stochastic disturbance term e,o"f with
£e, = 0, we then have the continuous version of a random walk process^, so in the
presence of such stochastic disturbances the average long-run labour supply will follow a
random walk within the hysteresis loop. On the other hand, when the wage rate reaches one
of the borders of the loop, the average long-run labour supply suddenly becomes highly
elastic. More generally, by missing the latter very important feature the existing (macroeco-
nomic) random walk models of hysteresis in unemployment seem at most adequate as local
approximations within hysteresis loops (see also the end of Sec. 10.3).
The inelastic long-run labour supply within the hysteresis loop implies, for every given
H' in a wide range of wage rates (e.g., w in Figure 4.11), a (WimiMiwi of possible long-run
equilibria between the entry and exit curve (e.g., between fl and /I for w * w ). Moreover,
the equilibrium which is reached depends on the development of the wage rate in the past. It
is interesting to compare these features of the average long-run labour supply schedule with
those of the individual long-run labour supply schedule in Figure 4.2 in Section 4.2, of
which the average labour supply schedule in Figure 4.11 is an aggregate. For every given w
between w*^ and w*', the individual schedule describes two stable long-run equilibria at
W* = 0 and W* = 7" and one unstable long-run equilibrium at an interior W*. Moreover,
the stable equilibrium which is reached, again depends on the development of the wage rate
in the past.
In the case of household time IHF only, the three equilibria correspond to the equilibria
B, /t' and C, respectively, in Figure 4.1 in Section 4.2, which are implied by the pieccwise-
linear individual s/wrY-rw/? demand function Z. of the individual habit stock .?^. Then the
question arises whether in a similar way the continuum of equilibria between B and ,4 in
the average labour supply schedule of Figure 4.11 can be described by a graph of the
average short-run household time demand £ as a function of the average habit stock J^ for
given w, K^ and 7~. In order to answer this question we aggregate the differential equations
(3.2a) for s^, without s^, (omitting the time index /), so in particular the individual house-
hold time demand functions. From (4.21), (4.6b), and ft * 5^ • a^T • YLL^L '• follows
that the average short-run household time demand L is a function not only of w, KQ, T and
the average habit stock s^ (mainly the first term of the right-hand side of (4.21)). but also of
the degree of variation of the individual habit stocks s^, around F^ ( the "correction terms"
in (4.21)). Assuming no individual variation in the depreciation rate 8^, the differential
equations (3.2a) can then exactly be aggregated to
" Writing the random walk equation as W," - W,*.^, » e,</r. dividing both sides by <// and
taking the limit for dr -»0, we obtain the stochastic differential equation /^* - e,. However, when
the stochastic disturbance in the average long-run labour supply is derived from a stochastic distur-
bance with zero expectation in the individual short-run labour supply, the former disturbance can be
shown to be strongly positively biased for (/7,*.^,,w) near the entry curve and strongly negatively
biased for (W,'_J,,H>) near the exit curve. In that case a random walk specification is not a good ap-
proximation near the entry and exit curve.100
j^ - L(H-,y0,7\.j/.,4) - 8^. (4.24)
where 5' = (J^|,...,5^^_| ). The Nth habit stock is omitted, since it is determined by the
A/ - 1 other habit stocks and the average habit stock. The differential equation (4.24) for
the average habit stock is linked to the differential equations (3.2a) for the individual habit
stocks. Thus, in general aggregation yields a system of A/ differential equations which
cannot be reduced to one equation and which describes a complex dynamics of the average
habit stock.
However, for w and W within the hysteresis loop of Figure 4.11 matters become much
simpler. Consider, for example, the decline in w from a long-run equilibrium on the entry
curve at w®. In the initial situation all individual habit stocks are in a long-run equilibrium
with L, * St^r For the majority that works maximal corporate hours, we have s^, = 0
and for the remaining non-participating minority s^, = 778^. When w remains inside the
hysteresis loop, so when w remains above the exit wages of all employed persons, these
individual equilibria continue to exist and to be stable. As a result, the £,, do not change.
For w = w we then have L « 8^_ 7^ . More generally, this holds for all L between B and /I
in Figure 4.11, so in this range the average short-run household time L is a simple linear
function of the initial average habit stock 7^ which coincides with the long-run equilibrium
line (see (4.24) for 7^ « 0). This is indicated in Figure 4.12. We then have a continuum of
long-run equilibria between <4 and fl. , 15!?,-..< f;->4^->- *-£ sfv<t-< -: ;<;:.•., J; .-•
Figure 4.12 Short-run average household time demand L as a function of the average habit stocks
i^' and J^ for given M' = H'* and Ky and conditional on initial long-run equilibrium
distributions on the entry and exit curve in Fig. 4.11. indicated by solid line and curves.Aaftir/omiafto/t." adtfifhr ^Kadra/ir motfW and a##r«»gari7>/i 101
In contrast, for w and W outside the hysteresis loop of Figure 4.11 matters arc different
Suppose, for instance, that the initial situation is given by a long-run equilibrium point D on
the entry curve for w = w' and // = 0. Then everybody is non-participating and used to
that, so 5*£ = 7"/8^ > j^ . When w rises to w , some individual non-participation
equilibria for L, = 7" become unstable and disappear (see Fig. 4.1 in Sec. 4.2 for »v = w*'
and w > w*'). As a result, these individuals will reduce their household time and enter the
labour market. This leads to an adjustment of the habit stocks of these persons from 778^
to 0, and hence to an adjustment of the average habit stock from 778^ to 5^ . The resulting
adjustment path is indicated in Figure 4.12 (sec App. 4E).
Suppose now that the initial situation is given by a long-run equilibrium point E on the
entry curve for w < H>* and W > 0. Then the initial s^' lies between 7^ and 778^, and
for w rising to w we obtain a similar adjustment path of 7^ from its initial value to s^ as
above. However, as indicated in Figure 4.12, this adjustment path does not form a part of the
adjustment path from 7^ = 778^, but lies slightly higher (as a result of different distribut-
ions of the individual habit stocks in the adjustment process, see App. 4E). Thus, in general
the position of an adjustment path of 7^ to 7^ depends on the initial value of 7^. When the
initial situation is given by a long-run equilibrium point F on the exit curve above M with
7^ = 0 < 7j_ and when w declines to w , we have a similar dynamics. Some individual
employment equilibria become unstable and disappear, implying increases in household time
and moves towards non-participation (equilibrium B in Fig. 4.1). This leads to an adjustment
path of the average habit stock from 0 to 7^ as indicated in Figure 4.12. The position of
this path again depends on the initial s^ = 0.
Comparing the aggregated Figure 4.12 with the individual piecewise-linear demand
function L^ in Figure 4.1, we see that the three equilibria V, B and C in the latter figure
have been replaced by a continuum of equilibria between M and fl in the former figure. We
may then say that the barrier between A and fl in the individual case is completely
"smoothed out" by individual variation in the aggregated case. Moreover, in contrast with
-4'in Figure 4.1, ,4 in Figure 4.12 is an interior equilibrium and we do not have single ad-
justment paths to the left of /t and to the right of fl. These differences are typical conse-
quences of aggregation of individual catastrophes and hysteresis in the presence of individual
variation.
However, when, in long-run catastrophic labour supply, not only individual variation in
the household time taste a^, but also variations in 7", a^, K^, c*, J* are allowed, the
story becomes more complex. If only w varies, the same kind of results as above can be
derived with w instead of w, but if one or more of the other variables and parameters vary,
the order in which the members of the social group leave the labour market at declining w,
may not be the reverse of the order in which they enter at rising w. This may especially
** Note that Figure 4.12 is conditional on the initial distributions of the individual habit stocks
being long-run equilibrium distributions on the forward-sloping part of the entry or exit curve. These
distributions are of the form £^ = (0 0,7/8^ 778/.) in order of entry. Under such a condition
the initial average habit stock uniquely determines the distribution of the individual habit stocks (so
is a sufficient statistic). This implies unique adjustment paths of the average habit stock from given
initial values 7^.102
happen when, in addition to <x^, the (relative) strength -rf* of the household time IHF
varies. A larger - d * increases the entry wage u-* , but does not affect the exit wage tv * .
Therefore, when the variation in -d,- is so strong as to overrule the variation in a^, in
determining the order of the entry wages, the order of the exit wages as determined by the
variation in a^, may not be its reverse. Then it can be shown that, when w rises from w
after a decline as in Figure 4.11, persons who are less subject to habit formation than on
average and who therefore have a lower entry wage, may enter the labour market before the
higher curve is reached. This implies a deviation from the straigth vertical line and may, at
subsequent rises and declines in w, lead to a complex trajectory of circling small collective
hysteresis loops within the large collective hysteresis loop, as indicated in Figure 4.11.
However, a precise analysis of this interesting complication is beyond the scope of this
study."
Further complications arise when the parameters ft*, a* and/or ct^, arc negative for
some individuals (see Sec. 4.5). For example, when a^, is negative, ft * and a * are positive
and <i, is negative, the individual long-run labour supply schedules are given by Figure 4.7
with no positive exit wage and no backward-sloping part. Aggregating such labour supply
curves together with those according to Figure 4.2, we obtain an average long-run labour
supply schedule which is similar to that in Figure 4.12, but in which the exit curve reaches
the w • 0 axis at a positive W* and which has a less backward-sloping part for higher w\
An additional complication results when, together with the net household time taste a^, and
the strength -d^ of the household time IHF, the strength -d^ of the corporate time IHF
varies over the individuals in a fixed positive proportion to -a^ (cf. the end of Sec. 4.5).
As a counterpart of the effects of a larger -<i£ (see above), a larger -d^ decreases the exit
wage u>- , but does not affect the entry wage w, . As a consequence, the combination of
a larger -<?£ and a larger -d^ tends to lead to a later entry at rising H\ but also to a later
exit at declining w. This reinforces the complex hysteresis pattern as described in the
preceding paragraph.
For other than AQM specifications of individual labour supply curves (including cases of
discontinuous short-run labour supply schedules), similar stories hold, except that then also
hysteretic patterns in the backward-sloping part of the average long-run labour supply
schedule seem possible. In general, catastrophes and barriers in individual short-run and
long-run labour supply schedules are "smoothed out" in the aggregated schedule by in-
dividual variation, whereas the hysteresis property carries over to more complex hysteretic
patterns in the aggregated schedule.
** See for an analysis of a similar case in travel mode choice Goodwin (1976), especially Figure 5.
It is intriguing that a pattern of circling loops is also found in the empirical developments of the
Phillips curve over the last three decades in several OECD countries (see, e.g.. McCracken et al.,
1978. Charts IS and 16. and Hall and Taylor. 1991, Ch. 17)./iafti7/orwia/ion: addVrivr ^Madraf/r mod?/ and aggrega/uwi 103
4.9 Concluding remarks
This chapter has derived for the AQM of Houthakker and Taylor necessary and sufficient
conditions for individual hysteresis and catastrophes as in Figure 4.2 to occur. First only
household time and consumption IHF were considered, but later corporate time 1HF was
added to the model. This IHF was shown to describe a weak or strong variant of workahol-
ism, if it is sufficiently strong. Moreover, it was demonstrated that individual hysteresis and
catastrophes can be rationalized as the result of local and not global maximization of an
additive quadratic "long-run utility function". Next, short and long-run individual labour
supply schedules were aggregated to average schedules under various assumptions regarding
the individual variation in utility function parameters, exogenous variables and habit stocks.
Aggregation of hysteresis and catastrophes in individual long-run labour supply schedules
turned out to imply hysteresis and complex trajectories within the hysteresis loop, but no
catastrophes in average long-run schedules. Whereas the former individual schedules de-
scribe two stable equilibria and one intermediate unstable equilibrium, the latter average
schedules were established to imply a continuum of "stable" equilibria within the collective
hysteresis loop.
However, as already noted at the end of the previous chapter, both our general and our
specific IHF model have a number of shortcomings. An important one is the implicit as-
sumption that individual labour suppliers do not influence each other's preferences. Yet, in
reality individual labour supply preferences are affected not only by one's own past behav-
iour leading to habits, but also by the behaviours of relevant others. Therefore, the resulting
behavioural preference interdependence in labour supply is modelled in the next chapter and
combined with IHF into integrated models in the subsequent two chapters. *
Appendix 4A Derivation of results for Case 1 in Section 4.3
Substituting (4.9a) into the discriminant D = a* - 47c*a^ of the quadratic form (4.12),
we obtain
D = Ko^** - (2a*Po + 4^ /
This quadratic form in r* describes a "valley parabola". Consequently, D is negative if and
only if c* lies between the two roots of the equation D = 0, which are given by
Since all parameters and variables in this expression are assumed to be positive, it easily
follows that both roots are positive. Moreover, the higher root e\ is larger than O^/KQ, SO
lies outside the considered domain for c* for which a* is positive. Furthermore, denoting
the lower root as c * and elaborating it as104
Ox^o • 2a^7 - 2 Jo, 7'
it is easily seen that c^ is smaller than a^/K^. Thus, Subcase 1* in Table 4.2 is obtained.
In Subcase I*' with r* ° c^ and hence D = 0, (4.12) with equality sign has a unique root
(4A.4)
In Subcase 1** the (full) satiation with respect to consumption at the long-run equilibrium
points implies that the labour supply decisions at these points are unlinked from the con-
sumption decisions (see Subsection 2.2.5). As a consequence, the former decisions are
affected by the household time IHF only, and then it is easily seen that a necessary and suf-
ficient stability condition is given by d* > 0. In the present case this condition is fulfilled,
and in analogy to the short-run case, the stable long-run solution of the first-order condition
{/£•**+ </*W* = 0 (see (4.8b)) is given by -67d* < 0. This implies for all w a
unique stable corner solution W* = 0, so the long-run labour supply curve coincides with
the vertical W* • 0 axis.
Appendix 4B Derivation of results for Case 2 in Section 4.4 .-, , , .,-.
Substituting (4.8a) and (4.8b) into the first-order condition (4.3), this condition can be
written as (r*w^ + <tf*)//* « a*w - ft*. When r*w^ + d* = 0, this equation has no
solutions for W* ifo'w - ft* # 0, and it has all feasible W as solutions ifa*w-ft*=0
In the latter case all feasible A/ are long-run equilibria which are unstable in the sense that
when a small shock pushes the person away from a long-run equilibrium, she is not pulled
back to this equilibrium (as in a random walk).
For c/* < d_ in Figure 4.4c we have w^. > w*" and w^ < w*". The former inequality
implies that in the unstable domain below the H>*" curve the restriction W*" S 0,or Z,*" £ 7,
is always fulfilled, so we can never have situations as in Figure 4.1 for »v = w*' and
H> > w . On the other hand, the inequality w* < »••*" implies that the restriction //*" £ 7,
or L*" 2 0, is fulfilled for w_ £ H> £ vt^ , so for both H> = »v_ and >v = >v^ the restriction
is just fulfilled, as in Figure 4.1 for w = w*^. Consequently, the unstable //*" for w* < H- < »v*
are located as in Figure 4B, and the household time demand functions like those in Figure
4.1 move, for w rising from below *•_, such as described in Section 4.4. The resulting
labour supply schedule in Figure 4B is also described in Section 4.4. In particular, when for
w* < *> < w* the labour supply of the person happens to be larger than the unstable
"watershed" //*". for instance by coercion or as a consequence of a different preceding
regime, and when he (or she) has got sufficiently used to that, the person will adjust his
labour supply to the stable maximal hours 7. In that case he will be very strongly used
(negative </*) to a minimum level of household time, while being weakly used (positive, but
not too large r *) to a relatively high level of consumption. However, when w declines
below w* or rises above H*. W* = 7 becomes unstable and disappears, inducing in both
cases an individual exit catastrophe to W* = 0. On the other hand, and this is very remark-adcftrnv am/ 105
able, when the person does not participate and has got sufficiently used to that, he (or she)
will not engage into an individual entry catastrophe for any w as a result of the very strong
household time IHF. . ,
w
w
Figure 4B Long-run labour supply schedule with exit catastrophes at w* and H>* and no entry
catastrophe for 0 < c* < c," and d' < d* < 0 (not too weak consumption IHF and
.;- very strong household time IHF). The dotted curve indicates the loci of the unstable
equilibrium //'".
In Subcase 2^ in Table 4.2, the necessary and sufficient stability condition rf* > 0 (see
the end of the previous appendix) is not satisfied, and for d* < 0, the unstable long-run
solution //*" = -ft*/d* of the first-order condition f/^ =fe* +d*//* »0 is positive.
From & = a^ + d*T > rfT it follows that //*" is also larger than 7". Then we are in a
situation with L*" < 0 as in Figure 4.1 for w < w*^, implying one stable corner
equilibrium L* = 7, or W* = 0, for all H\ When d* • 0, the first-order condition has no
solutions, since ft* * 0. Then the demand line in Figure 4.1 for tv < w*^ is parallel to the
£ = 5^5^ line while remaining above it. Again this implies one stable corner equilibrium
//* = 0 for all w. As a result, the instability of the long-run solution of the first-order con-
dition does not affect the long-run labour supply curve: just as for 0 < </* < a^/K^, this
curve coincides with the w-axis for all rf* S 0. Analogously to the situation in Figure 4.4a,
this insensitivity to instability is a consequence of the fact that the unstable domain in the
(w,O space for i/'SO falls outside the region for d* > ot^/r > 0, where W > 0.
Appendix 4C Derivation of results for Cases 5 and 6 in Section 4.4
In the stable domain of Figure 4.6 the restriction W* £ 0 on (4.9) is again fulfilled for
H- £ »v* = &*/a*. The restriction //* < 7" on (4.9) is then again equivalent to (4.12), but106
due to the negativity of c*, the quadratic form in w in (4.12) now describes a "mountain
parabola" and its discriminant D « a* - 47r*a^ is now always positive. This implies
that (4.12) is not fulfilled for w higher than the higher root or lower than the lower root.
These roots are again given by (4.13), but now w* is negative and hence lower than the
positive »v*. Thus, (4.12) is not fulfilled for non-negative w > u>* only (see Fig. 4.6).
In the unstable domain of Figure 4.6 the restriction //'"SO is again fulfilled for
w £ ft*/a* »: w^.. The restriction //*" £ 7" is then again equivalent to (4.12) with the >
sign replaced by the £ sign. This restriction is now fulfilled for non-negative w > w , so
for w < w < w,. there is one unstable interior equilibrium W*" alongside two stable
corner equilibria W* = 0 and W* = T (see Fig. 4.6). The w* line and w*" curve now
intersect for positive </* = C*H-* , and again (d*,»v*) is also an intersection point for the W*
line. According to Figure 4.6 H>* is then smaller than the intercept ct^/a* of the w* line,
which is smaller than the corresponding intercept in Figures 4.3 and 4.4c. Since, in its turn,
the latter intercept is smaller than w_ in the figures mentioned, it follows that the w_ line
in Figure 4.6 is lower than the w* line in Figures 4.3 and 4.4c. •
Appendix 4D Derivation of exit curve for c* SO
In the unstable domain for c* £ 0 (see Fig. 4.6 and the previous appendix), the condition
for the exit wage w- « w_,. < »v in the analogue of (4.22) holds if and only if the value of
the "mountain parabola" Ic'iv - a*w + a^, is negative. In the continuous approximation
for large N with e := a^ - a^ this is equivalent to c < 7 |c*|w^ + a*w - a^. An-
alogously to (4.23), it then follows that
«• - rF^c'l* + a'w - aj,
where F is the (cumulative) distribution function of c. (Note that/(e) = 0 for a^ £ 0. or
e £ -&£_.) In comparison with (4.23) the argument of F has now an additional quadratic
term in w. In order to deduce the shape of the exit curve, when /(e) is continuously dif-
ferentiable and unimodal (so quasi-concave), we derive
V + a'). (4D.2)
(4D.3)
For H' between the lowest exit wage H>* and the highest exit wage »v^ , the first-order
derivative is positive. The second-order derivative is then non-negative for >v to the left of
the unique maximum of the density function /, and for H- rising beyond this maximum, the
first term between brackets tends to become increasingly negative, whereas the second term
becomes less positive for r* < 0 and is zero for r* =0. As a result, the second-order
derivative will usually be non-negative for w lower than a value to the right of the maxi-7/ttffvirfua/ ftaftir/omiariow: aaVflfivf ^i^j^rafir moaW and aggregation 107
mum (for c* < 0) and non-positive for w higher than this value. This implies a smooth
sigmoid shape of the exit curve. Note that for c* = 0 we have the same kind of linear
argument of F in (4D.1) as in (4.23) and hence a shape of the exit curve which is identical
to the shape of the entry curve.
Appendix 4E Derivation of adjustment paths of the average habit stock in Figure 4.12
The adjustment paths in Figure 4.12 result from aggregation of the individual household time
demand functions in Figure 4.1 for w > w*' and w < w*^, respectively. The kinks in these
functions are then "smoothed out". Along the adjustment path from equilibrium D to e-
quilibrium B. a number of persons adjust their household time habit stocks from T/5^ to
0. At the intermediate s^ = s^ these persons have partially adjusted their habit stocks. On
the other hand, when the adjustment to B starts from equilibrium E, some of the same
persons have already zero habit stocks, whereas the others of the same persons just start the
adjustment of their habit stocks from T/8^. For the latter persons the difference in house-
hold time with the situation of partial adjustment is larger than for the former persons as a
consequence of the non-linear convex shape of the individual household time demand
function in Figure 4.1 for »v > w*'. As a result, the average household time along the
adjustment path from equilibrium E is higher than for the same average habit stocks along
the adjustment path from equilibrium D.
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Behavioural Preference Interdependence
.f v>-!,?
Whereas the previous two chapters have analysed the short-run and long-run effects on
labour supply preferences of one's own behaviour in the past, this chapter will investigate
the short and long-run effects on labour supply preferences of the behaviour of relevant
others. Provided the latter behaviour is at least partly determined by preferences of the
relevant others, we then have a particular kind of interdependence of preferences, which we
call to/iav/oura/ /wv/iTwire i/ttentepemfenr? fBP/) to distinguish it from other kinds of
preference interdependence (see below). Underlying BPI in labour supply are various
processes of mutual social influencing. These social influence processes can be interpreted as
different kinds of social interaction, provided the term "interaction" is conceived in a broader
sense than usual in sociology. Here the term "interaction" refers not only to direct
influencing among agents, but also to indirect influencing via other agents or institutions.'
Interactions among agents in this general sense have been a major concern of economics
from its very beginning. Since Adam Smith the focus has been on exchange processes and
the struggle for market opportunities, but until the beginning of the twentieth century a good
deal of attention was also paid to interactions of a more social nature. Examples in case are
the benevolence concept of Smith (1759), the recognition of social wants by Bentham
(1789), the class struggle according to Marx (1867), and the strong emphasis on the
behaviour motive of distinction by Marshall (1920).^ However, in connection with the
completion of the separation of economics and sociology at the beginning of our century and
the econometric revolution in the thirties with its need for formalization and measurement,
social interactions, i.e. interactions of a more social nature, got out of sight in mainstream
economics.
Economists like Duesenberry (1949). Leibenstein (1950), Becker (1974), Pollak (1976a),
Hirsch (1976), Kapteyn (1977), Sen (1983) and Frank (1985) have tried to reverse this trend,
but nowadays most economists still seem to feel that social interactions belong to the realm
of sociology and social psychology and not to that of economics. Nevertheless, in contrast to
the division of labour in social science, social reality is not separated in disjunctive
fragments. Social interactions play an important role in economic life and should therefore
' Also the lemi "indirect" here has another meaning than usual in sociology: when agent A
influences agent B and agent B influences agent C, we say that agent A indirectly influences agent C.
^ Sw alsn Re<-W>r flQ7<n Sec also Becker (1974).ifrf/icf f/i/grtfrpf mft»HCf109
be included in its study. An important starting point of such an undertaking, which tends to
be neglected by economists working in the field, should be a simple classification of
different kinds of social interaction in economic life. In the context of consumer (and labour
supply) behaviour attempts to make such a classification have been made by Leibenstein
(1950), Becker (1974), Schokkaert (1982) and Baxter (1988). Partly based on these attempts,
but adapted to the labour supply context of our study, a possible classification is proposed in
Section 5.1.
This classification tries to distinguish social interactions from "economic" or market
interactions and primarily focuses on the various kinds of social interaction underlying BPI
in labour supply. However, it considers also other important forms of preference interdepen-
dence in labour supply as well as social interactions affecting constraints. In Section 5.2 the
social interactions underlying BPI in labour supply are summarized in a general model of
BPI with respect to both the average (i.e. per capita) consumption and average (discretion-
ary) household time in a social group (as formulated by Iannacone (1989) for consumption
only). This model is derived from the most general model of BPI with respect to both
individual consumption and household time by ten successive simplifying assumptions.
Moreover, it is extended so as to include BPI with respect to average corporate time. An
attractive feature of the resulting model is that it is analogous in structure to the general
individual habit formation (IHF) model which has been developed in Chapter 3 (sec also
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, pp. 374-375). As a consequence, the model has analogous
properties like multiple equilibria exhibiting collective hysteresis and catastrophes dependent
on rationings and the wage rate. Similarly to the unstable IHF model, such a model of
unstable BPI can explain why members of certain subcultures of long-term unemployed,
although having lost their old job involuntarily, become little motivated to get a new job.
Furthermore, collective catastrophes within social groups may have played (and still play) a
role in the strong rise of the labour force participation of married women in many OECD
countries since World War II. All this is discussed in the Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Notwithstanding the analogy in structure of the IHF and BPI models, it should be noted
that, whereas the IHF model holds for individual behaviour, the BPI model is formulated on
the level of average behaviour in a social group. This implies an additional complication in
the BPI model as compared to the IHF model, namely that of individual variation within the
social group. The stabilizing effects of this individual variation are illustrated for an additive
quadratic specification of the utility function in Section 5.5. For this specification necessary
and sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis can then be derived.
Finally, Section 5.6 makes a comparison between the different effects on average labour
supply of unstable BPI and unstable IHF.
5.1 Classification of social interactions
J././
This section presents a simple classification of social interactions in the context of labour
supply and consumption demand behaviour along the lines of Figure 5.1. These social
interactions are distinguished from (usual) market interactions on a labour or consumption110
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Figure S.I. Classiflcation of social interactions in context of labour supply and consumption dem-
and behaviour.
good market in order to be able to associate social interactions with external effects in
welfare theory.' Quite generally, we define a social interaction between labour suppliers or
consumers as a process, in which a certain aspect of a person / at time r depends on one or
more pjrffivfd or «yrp«7«/ aspects of one or more other persons y at the same, past or
future points in time, and which is not a (usual) market interaction on a labour or
* See, e.g., lannacone (1989. Sec. 4), and see Frank (1989. Sec. IV) for proposals to internalize
such external effects in income taxes. Social interactions are considered as social exchange processes
by Becker (1974, 1976) and, more generally, the Chicago School. This seems the main reason why
Becker (1974) does not distinguish social interactions from market interactions. However, because of
the association of social interactions with external effects. I make a distinction.111
consumption good market (cf. Becker, 1974). Examples of aspects are behaviour, income,
preferences, well-being, perceptions, expectations and beliefs.
Our classification starts from social dependencies of a pr?/<?rr«>d fcAaviour X, of person
/ on aspects Jy of other persons 7 and follows Figure 5.1. In the present context X, stands
for consumption demand, household time demand or labour supply. Such a preferred behav-
iour is supposed to be the result of person / maximizing a utility function under certain
constraints. This implies two kinds of sources of a dependence of X, on aspects 5 of others
> : (/) dependence of the ro/wrrainfs of 1 on 5y and (//) dependence of the utility function or
p/r/ir<>«res of 1 on Jy. Examples of (1) are the Leuthold model of family labour supply with 5,-
being the labour supply of another family member (see Sec. 2.2.7) and exchange of infor-
mation and social influences on expectations with respect to state variables in constraints
(e.g., labour demand). A well-known example of (11) is the dependence of the preferences
of i on the arrwa/ ft^/iav/owr X • of others 7 as perceived or expected by 1 . Usually this is
called preference interdependence, since the preferences of 1 are assumed to depend on the
preferences of 7 via/s actual behaviour X". This holds, provided this actual behaviour is
at least partly determined by y's preferences with respect to the behaviour, so provided /s
actual behaviour is not fully determined by rationings. (See for the case of consumption,
e.g., Gaertner, 1974, Pollak, 1976a, Kapteyn, 1977. 1985, and Kapteyn and Wansbcek, 1985,
and see for the case of household time or labour supply Kapteyn and Woittiez, 1990 '),
However, preferences of different persons can also depend on each other in another way
than via their actual behaviour. For instance, beliefs in norms and values may be transmitted
as a result of direct interpersonal communication without reference to one's own actual
behaviour (see Schokkaert, 1982b, Sec. V.B.III, and see Subsec. 5.1.4). Therefore, it seems
appropriate to define prtf/mvice /n/<vd<?p<'fl*/«'flr<' more generally as a phenomenon in which
a person's preferences or an inner determinant of them like a belief or expectation depend on
another person's preferences or an inner determinant of them via any kind of social interac-
tion. We note, however, that the distinction between constraints and preferences, and hence
that between the above-mentioned categories (/) and (11) of dependence of constraints and
dependence of preferences, is not absolute, but depends on the particular model formulation
or interpretation (see Stigler and Becker, 1977, Schokkaert, 1982a, Lindenberg, 199(), and
Vendrik, 1988).
5.7.2 Source o/B/7
Several kinds of preference interdependence can be distinguished. The best-known, already
referred to in the previous subsection, is the dependence of a person 1"s preferences at time
f on expected or perceived actual behaviour X of other persons y at the same or past
points in time. To distinguish it from other types of preference interdependence (to be
discussed in Subsec. 5.1.4) we call it te/iaWoura/ pre/i»r£nc* i/i/mfepfufe/ir? fB/'/). In a
* Note that competitive market interactions on consumption good markets make the prices in these
constraints - at least in the long run - dependent on the behaviours or average costs of others y . We
distinguish such competitive market interactions from social interactions, and hence exclude them
from our classification.
Remarkably, this is the only reference on PI in labour supply that I know.112
general linear case (see the next section), the influence of all relevant X°'s on I'S preferen-
ces at time / can be summarized by the influence of a weighted average 5^, of the X • 's
over persons y and over the same and past points of time. This can lead to one of two kinds
of effect of .Sy,- (omitting the time index) on preferred X,, namely a "ftamftvago/i ejfecf"
with a positive correlation between X, and J^/ and a "reverse ftandwa/jofl e#i?c7" (or "snob
effect") with a negative correlation (see Leibenstein, 1950, for the case of consumption).
Note that similar effects could result from the influence of a weighted average J^M of
relevant X 's in constraints, but the terms of bandwagon and reverse bandwagon effect are
usually reserved for influences of an s^, in (usual) preferences.
Both kinds of effect can have prarr/ra/ as well as stfria/-pjyr/w/0g/ca/ causes (see, e.g.,
Hirsch, 1976, Sen, 1983, 1987, Granovetter and Soong, 1986, and Frank, 1989, for the
consumption case). In the context of labour supply an example of a practical cause is the
complementarity or substitutability of the household times of family members, as modelled
by Ashworth and Ulph (1981) (see Subsec. 2.2.7). Complementarity implies a bandwagon
effect, whereas substitutability causes a reverse bandwagon effect. Another example of a
practical bandwagon effect is that married women might be induced to look for a job when
her friends have one, since she cannot drink coffee or sherry with them during the daytime.
In the case of social-psychological causes of (reverse) bandwagon effects the preferences
of a person are influenced by the behaviour of persons in her/his Cvoda/) re/erenre group
(Hyman, 1942). Such a group can be defined as a group "to which the individual relates
himself as a part or to which he aspires to relate himself psychologically" (Sherif, 1953).
This definition implies that the reference group of person i may consist of persons of a
/m'Mi/w.v/i//> #r»M/) of i , i.e. a group to which i feels she (or he) belongs, but that it may
also consist of persons of other social groups to which / aspires to relate herself in some
manner. In the literature usually three kinds of reference group are distinguished, namely the
(a) <7MM/>ardfm\ (b) mirrmimr and (c) i/i/ormariomi/ reference group (see, e.g.. Park and
Lcssig. 1977, and, Baxter, 1988, Sec. 2.6.1).
cwnparaon
Social comparison with persons in the comparative reference group enables someone to
evaluate her status in society and to enhance or support her self-concept (Hyman, 1942). The
comparative reference group may consist of persons of a membership group of similar status
as well as of persons of groups of higher or lower status. On the one hand, the person wants
to cwi/orm her behaviour to the behaviour of persons in her membership group or in a
higher status group (imitation), but on the other hand, she wants to rf/jfi/tgutfA her behaviour
in a status-enhancing way from that of persons in her membership group or in a lower status
group (differentiation).'' Thus, with respect to the membership group both a conformity and
* Cf. (he uniformity and discrimination tendency in the case of capacities according to the social
comparison theory of Festinger (1954). Sec also Thierry and Koopman-lwcma (1984. Sec. 2.3.2),
Baxter (1988. Sec. 2.6.3) and Schokkacrt (1982b, Ch. 5). My interpretation of the concepts of com-
parative reference group and membership group is broader than the interpretation by, for example,
Runciman (1966). since this is more appropriate to the general use I want to make of the concept of
reference gmup in the next sections and chapters. Moreover, my interpretation seems to fit in well
with (he interpretations by economists like Kaplcyn. Van Praag and Van Herwaarden (1978).fig>Mv/owa/ prgfergfici /wfgragpgmfe/icg 113
distinction tendency may be active, whereas with respect to the higher status group a confor-
mity tendency and with respect to the lower status group a distinction tendency may be at
work.
The distinction tendency can express itself either as "more of the same behaviour" (e.g.,
more consumption of the same good) or as "less of the same behaviour and more of a
different behaviour" (e.g., less consumption of the same good and more of another good).'
We call the former distinction tendency e/nu/cwo/i and the latter /lon-ro/i/omtum. Emulation
can be considered as a transition case between conformism and non-conformism: it is
conformistic with regard to the it/'/id of behaviour, but non-conformistic with regard to the
/eve/ of behaviour (e.g., consumption). florA con/orm/sm a/io" cmu/an'o/t rouse a tomftfcixo/t
ejjfcrf, M'terras /lo/i-co/i/brmrim tmp//ro a mrrre fra«a'H'a£<™ qjfipe/. Within a membership
group a combination of emulation and conformism may lead to the phenomenon that people
want to surpass others jurt a //rr/i (cf. Festinger, 1954). This implies a satiation point for
emulation, which is usually neglected in economic models of social interaction with their
one-sided emphasis on emulation (see, e.g., Becker, 1974, Frank, 1984, 1989, and Kapteyn
and Wansbeek, 1985)." In the context of labour supply and consumption demand behaviour
this point should be taken into account in the choice of a specification of the utility function,
but it can be shown not to affect the bandwagon effect. Another point is that conformism
and/or emulation may produce bandwagon effects for relatively low levels of the average
behaviour 5^-- in the comparative reference group, but turn into non-conformism and hence
a reverse bandwagon effect for high .v^. It is also possible that, analogously to the time
hierarchy of individual habit formation and long-run satiation postulated in Section 3.5, a
bandwagon effect works in a shorter run, whereas a reverse bandwagon effect becomes
manifest in a longer run (see Sec. 9.11 for an example).
(ft) Soc/a/ rtornis ol
A second social-psychological cause of a (reverse) bandwagon effect is the adoption of
(beliefs in) social norms from a normative reference group (Newcomb, 1947), in as far as
the process of this adoption or the social norm beliefs which are transmitted are determined
(in the long run) by the behaviour of others. In the context of labour supply an example is
the adoption of work ethics norms from other labour suppliers. These labour suppliers may
belong to the same membership group (e.g., the same family, age or sex), but they may also
belong to another social group (e.g., other families, ages or sex; cf. Kapteyn and Woittiez,
1990). The actual behaviour of such relevant others can induce the adoption of social norms
as follows. When a social norm is actually obeyed by a majority of the relevant others, this
may act as a signal that this majority also believes in the social norm, and hence make
adoption of the social norm, i.e. the development of one's own belief in the norm, attractive.
Alternatively, the social norm may be adopted as a result of direct interpersonal com-
munication on the social norm without reference to actual behaviour (see Schokkaert, 1982b,
' This important distinction may not be recognized in the literature on social comparison.
* A related remark on the neglect of the effect of conformity in the economic tradition is made by
Schokkaert (1982b. p. 166) in connection with the formation of life style groups. A striking example
of the neglect is the implicit assumption of Frank (1989. p. 84) that living as a rich person in a poor
neighborhood has no social price of a lack of belonging.114
Sec. V.B.III), but in the long run the social norm beliefs of the relevant others may be
determined by the extent to which the norm is actually obeyed by the relevant others them-
selves, by the generation of their parents, or by members of the membership group to which
the norm applies (e.g., the wives, when the relevant others are husbands). Such a long-run
determination of social norm beliefs by the actual norm behaviour is elaborated in Section
8.5. Another variant of the resulting normative BPI is obtained, when adoption of a social
norm as a result of direct interpersonal communication is affected by the actual norm behav-
iour of trendsetters (see Sec. 10.3).
Another kind of normative preference interdependence is a dependence of person /'s
preferences on the opinion of i held by person 7 (Becker, 1974) or /'s repMfa/ion with
person 7 (Akcrlof, 1980). This opinion or reputation /?^ depends on I'S behaviour as well as
on norm beliefs n. of y , which are outside /'s control (in the short run). As elaborated in
Section 8.1, this provides a motive for 1 to conform her behaviour to the norm beliefs of y
(see the conformity concept of "it-is dangerous-not-to-conform" of Asch, 1952, the com-
pliance process of Kelman. 1961, and Jahoda, 1972). The persons y whose norm beliefs are
relevant for 1 can be said to form a normative reference group of 1 , but this reference
group does not necessarily coincide with the normative reference gToup from which 1 a<foptt
norms as considered above (sec Sec. 8.5 for the distinction). Again the reference group may
consist of members of the same membership group to which the norm(s) applies (apply), but
also of persons of other social groups (e.g., the husband when the membership group con-
sists only of women). Although the social norm beliefs of these relevant others are exogen-
ous state variables in the short run, in the long run they are likely to be determined or
affected by the actual norm behaviour of themselves or others as a result of the mechanisms
described above. This makes the normative preference interdependence behavioural in the
long run.
Usually the normative BPI's as described above lead to a conformity tendency, but when
the social norms prescribe emulous behaviour (e.g., scoring high in a publication competition
of research economists) or non-conformist behaviour (e.g., in protest movements), it may
induce also such behaviour. On the other hand, norms of non-conformism may mainly apply
with respect to people outside the membership group, and hence induce a reverse bandwagon
effect only with respect to these "outsiders" (e.g., revolutionaries vis-a-vis the bourgeois).
WWIHI ;/I«' ffu'Mi/x'rrW/) j?roH/j normative interactions can then generally be assumed to lead
to confonnism and/or emulation and hence to bandwagon effects.
Bandwagon effects may also occur because the behaviour of other persons is used as an
"informational reference source" (Ofshe, 1972) on the quality of the behaviour (e.g., con-
sumption good). One then relies on others' experiences as a screening device (see Nelson's
(1970) distinction between "search" and "experience" goods). A labour supply example is the
exchange of information on experiences with jobs by married women. When these experien-
ces are favourable, a bandwagon effect will result, but when the experiences are less favour-
able, a reverse bandwagon effect may occur.
A kind of preference interdependence (PI) which is very similar to BPI, is a dependence
of the preferences of person 1 on perceived or expected incomes Ky of others y . In the caseH5
of not fully satiating consumption and zero savings, in which X, coincides with the total
consumption of ; , this PI is even identical to a BPI. More generally, this PI leads to a
dependence of the preferred behaviour X, on re/amr income and has the same kind of
bandwagon and reverse bandwagon effects as BPI (see, e.g., Duesenberry, 1949, Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980, Sec. 12.2, Baxter, 1988, Sec. 3.1, and Frank, 1989, Sec. II).
5.7 _? Endogenous dywaw/cj o/BP/ •••••"•-
In the previous subsections we have discussed only the comparative statics of (reverse)
bandwagon effects of the actual behaviours X ? of persons 7 in reference groups of person
1 on Fs preferred behaviour X,-.' However, each actual X ° is assumed to be at least partly
determined by /s preferences with respect to that behaviour. In their turn, when 1 belongs
to a reference group of 7 , y"s preferences are influenced by Fs actual behaviour X,- and
hence, assumedly, by Fs preferences with respect to that behaviour. Thus we have a positive
feedback of Fs preferences on X , making the dynamics of this aspect of y <"nc/o#pfltfMj.
Usually it is assumed that this feedback dynamics is lagged (see. e.g., Pollak, 1976a, and the
next section). This implies that 7 's actual behaviour X " is predetermined for I'S preferen-
ces, and hence is a state vanaWe. More generally, we can assume that the average behaviour s^,-
in the reference group(s) of 1 is a state variable which is exogenous with respect to i's
preferences in the short run, but endogenous with respect to Fs preferences in the longer run.
In the next and subsequent sections of this chapter the endogenous long-run dynamics of the
state variable s^, will be analysed.
However, it is also possible that the person 1 anticipates in her choice of behaviour the
feedback of that behaviour on her social environment and takes this feedback into account in
her decision. Analogously to rational habit formation, this involves endogenous (rational)
expectations with respect to the future behaviours of others and could be called rational
behavioural preference interdependence. However, since the behaviours of others may be the
result of similar rational choices, rational BPI will in general become very complicated and
may not have a unique solution, as suggested by game theory. More importantly, the feed-
back of Fs behaviour on the average behaviour of a reference group as a whole may be
negligible (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 375, and the next section), and/or the high
degree of Fs awareness of that feedback which is required for rational BPI seems in general
implausible. An exception may the BPI of family members. Then cooperative rational
decisions taking into account the BPI can lead to a Pareto-optimal solution (see, e.g., Chiap-
pori, 1988, Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1989, and Subsec. 2.2.7). Nevertheless, this study
abstracts from such effects. Another factor which makes the relevant behaviour of others
endogenous and which is neglected here, is the selection of reference groups by the person
herself (see, e.g., Baxter, 1988, pp. 104-106, and Frank, 1989. p. 84). In line with practically
all economic research on BPI, reference groups are supposed to be exogenously given.
' For convenience we also speak of reference groups to denote groups of persons ; whose actual
behaviours affect the preferred behaviour of person 1 by virtue of practical causes of (reverse)
bandwagon effects.116
5.7.4 (Mer/o/mi
In Subsection 5.1.2 we have considered the adoption of a social norm as a result of direct
interpersonal communication on the social norm without reference to one's own actual
behaviour. Such direct interpersonal communication can also play an important role in social
comparison and in exchange of information and expectations (see Schokkaert, 1982a, Sec.
V.B.III). In all cases we may then speak of a direct influence preference interdependence
(PI), in which the preferences of person / or an inner determinant of them like a belief or
expectation depend directly on the preferences or an inner determinant of them of (an)other
person(s) y at past points in time (influencing takes time). In the normative case of Subsec-
tion 5.1.2 this direct influence PI has been argued to be a part of broader BPI processes.
This holds even for a case like that of highschool girls influencing each other's opinions on
future labour force participation when they will be married. This direct influence PI cannot
be based on own experiences with participation, but it is likely to be strongly affected by
participation experiences of mothers, older sisters, etc.. Thus, the direct influence PI is
embedded in a broader BPI. More generally, this embeddedness seems to be pervasive in
normative as well as other cases of direct influence PI as mentioned above (see Sec. 10.3 for
a normative case).'" ^mrti•*- mf s?; v> /;; ;.. KJ;
A kind of PI which seems more separate from BPI is a dependence of i's preferences on
the well-being or preferences f/-' of another person y at the samf point in time as perceived
or expected by i . This describes altruism or envy (see the extensive altruism literature and,
in particular, Tomes, 1983). In order to imply PI the perceived or expected well-being of
person y should at least partially be determined by (revealed) preferences of y or an inner
determinant of them like one or more needs. Mostly this will hold. Analogously to the
reputation case in Subsection 5.1.2, the perceived or expected well-being or preferences L/-'
may depend on i's behaviour as well as on a degree of dependence d/ of t/-' on /, which
is outside i's control in the short run (Becker, 1974). The latter degree of dependence can
then be considered as a state variable.
Besides all these kinds of PI there are dependencies of preferences on aspects Jy of other
persons y which are not forms of PI. An example is given by a dependence of the labour
supply preferences of a person i on the zero arrua/ labour supply of an involuntarily
unemployed person y . In the latter case the zero actual labour supply of y is fully deter-
mined by a rationing by labour demand and does not reflect y's labour supply preferences.
However, as argued in Section 3.2, y may turn into a "voluntarily unemployed" person in
the long run, i.e.. his (or her) zero labour supply gets supported by his labour supply prefer-
ences. In that case the influence of y's zero labour supply on i's labour supply preferences
may become stronger than before and we can again speak of a PI between the persons i and
'" This makes the sharp distinction between BPI and direct PI which is made by Schokkaert
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5.2 General model < . • • • .
In this section and subsequent ones a general model of behavioural preference interdepen-
dence (BPI) in labour supply is constructed and analysed. This model summarizes the
various BPI processes which have been discussed in the previous section. Its structure is
analogous to the structure of the general individual habit formation model developed in
Chapter 3. It can be considered as a kind of canonical model in the same spirit as the market
model of perfect competition: the basic assumptions are simple and perhaps too unrealistic
for certain purposes, but it describes important mechanisms in a transparent way and can
serve as a basis for more realistic, but less transparent extensions. For the case of BPI with
respect to one consumption good the model is formulated by Iannaconc (1989). Here we
assume BPI with respect to aggregate consumption X, as well as discretionary household
time Z., (see Sec. 2.3 for definitions of these variables). At the end of this section we shall
extend the model so as to include BPI with respect to corporate time."
This section demonstrates how the canonical model can be obtained from the most
general model of BPI with respect to X, and L, by successive simplifying assumptions. In
the latter model the one-period preferences of a labour supplier i arc represented by a utility
function
t7'[X,,X,,;<x;.,,L;.,/ye/?G,,.,,xtO),r1, (5.1)
where X,"-x and ^,°_x are the actual consumption and the actual household time, respec-
tively, of the members y of I'S total reference group #G/,-t at time f-x (as perceived or
expected by ;'). The total reference group /?G,,_x is defined as the union of all reference
groups for consumption as well as household time with respect to the relevant BPI proces-
ses, as discussed in the previous section. The time delays in the BPI can have various
causes such as (/) delays in diffusion and recognition of information on X , and £. ,, while
expected values of these variables are based on extrapolations of this information (see, e.g.,
Pollak, 1976a, Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 330), (ii) dependence of (7' on permanent
rather than transitory changes in X" and L° (sec, e.g., Iannacone, 1989, Sec. 3), (»/) delays
in adjustment of £/' to perceived or expected X , and Z. , because of cognitive-affective
reasons (see, e.g., Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 1985, Sec. 5), (iv) delays in adjustment of norm
" A related model of both BPI and individual habit formation (IHF) with respect to only house-
hold time or corporate time of husband and wife is elaborated and estimated by Kapteyn and Woit-
ticz (1990). This model is more detailed and more directly aimed at empirical realism than our
combined BPI/IHF model (see Chs. 6 and 7), but it neglects BPI and IHF with respect to con-
sumption and it is less transparent. Moreover, it is less general in the sense that it employs a par-
ticular specification of the labour supply equations, it docs not analyse the effects of multiple e-
quilibria. and it does not consider aggregation problems.
The union of two sets is the set which consists of all elements of the two sets. In general /'s
total reference group for consumption does not necessarily coincide with /'s total reference group for
household time. The effects of some reference variables in (S.I) are then zero.118 Cftqpftr 5
beliefs to X? and /.,? (see Sec. 8.5). These delays imply that the x£__ and /./!_, arc
predetermined for the choice variables X,<, and L,<,, and hence are state variables.
As simplifying /455M/np//o/i /, we assume that £?' docs not explicitly depend on time f and
that the reference group /?C,-,_^ does not change with r-x. This implies that the consump-
tion and household time preferences of person / change with time only via the actual con-
sumptions *."-t and household times L".^ in ;'s total reference group. When one of the
(implicit) parameters of (5.1) is a //«^ar function of the X? and one other parameter is a
linear function of the ^-.,.^ (e.g., committed consumption and household time, see Pollak,
1976a), the influence of these state variables on £?' can be summarized by the influence of
two weighted averages J^ and s^, of •K.,^ and ^.^x* respectively, overy and x. This
also holds when more than one parameter of (5.1) is a linear function of the •X\,_t or the
L<'.^ in a proportional way and in the case of an additive quadratic specification of (5.1)
(sec Sec. 5.5). The state variables 5^ and s^, represent the relevant soc/a/ e/iv/ron/nentt of
person i and arc referred to as .wri'a/ .sra/p var/aA/es.
Usually averages like Sjf., and S£,, are expressed in terms of discrete time periods, but,
analogously to the case of individual habit formation (see Sec. 3.1), social influence proces-
ses like those mentioned above look more like ron//m/<i;« processes than like discrete
processes in terms of the usual empirical time periods. Therefore, we consider x as a
continuous time variable and express sr, as
with •*^*"'
on
r *£ </T «i (5.3)
for all /' = 1 ,...,/V, where /V is the number of individuals in the population. An analogous
formula holds for J^,. This leaves us as simplifying /455Mwprion // with a utility function
t/'(X,,,L,-,;s,f,pj£,,) and means that the distributions of the ^,°_^ and the L^_^ over the
reference group and current and past points in time only affect (7' via weighted averages of
these distributions.''*
A5.VMwprifln /// brings a separability structure into the weights X^ and X^ by assuming
that they can be written as K^ p^ and re^ p^, respectively, where p^ and p^ are x-
independent reference weights assigned by person j to person y, and where JI^ and 7t^ are
./-independent memory weights. These weights satisfy
" This can also be assumed for T = 0 as representing delays within a discrete time period or an
infinitcsimally small delay in the case of continuous lime.
'* When a parameter of (5.1) is a non-linear function of X^"., and/or L^_,, also weighted
(co)varianccs and other higher-order moments of the distributions will play a role (cf. Kapteyn, 1977,
and Kapteyn and Wansbeck. 1985. eq. (II)).figZiavfowa/ prffgrenfg i>ifgr<fepg;t<fenrg 119
(5.4)
(5-5)
and analogous adding-up conditions for p^ and n^ for all /. This separation of the weights
implies that (5.2) can be formulated as
(5.6)
where L°.', is the weighted average of L"_^ over /'s reference group at time f-x . Again an
analogous formula holds for s^,,."
Atfumprio/t /V equates the memory weights n^ and Jt^ with exponentially declining
weights 8^,-f *•' and 8^e *' • respectively."* The positive parameters 8^ and 5^.
measure the influence of recent average reference group behaviours relative to the more
distant past. Substituting r-x = 5 and x = r-j into (5.6) and differentiating to r, this
assumption turns out to be equivalent to the following first-order differential equations for
- ^, = 8,-,(x7' -*-„). .3-. ,,_i:?4 - ,,J3^ • ,:• (5.7b)
These equations describe how at each time r the social state variables are adapted to new
realizations of average reference group behaviours (cf. the adaptive expectations specification
(6) of Iannacone (1989)). In a labour supply regime the actual household time and con-
sumption demands L° and X° of personsy in /"s reference group, of which L,"' and X,"'
are weighted averages, are assumed to be equal to y's p/r/w«/ household time and con-
sumption L-, and X-,, respectively, at the same time r (4j5M/np//o/i V, sec Sec. 3.1). In
their tum (see Subsec. 5.1.3), these L,-, and X , may be influenced by the preferred L,, and X,,
of person i, and hence by /'s social state variables .V£,, and 5^,,. Besides that, the Z. , and
Xy, will be influenced by the L./, and X./^ of other persons ./'*<', and hence by their social
state variables -fr,/, and ^./,- Since these state variables do not generally coincide with
.*£•,, and 5^,, we obtain in general a system of 2/V linked differential equations (5.7a) and
(5.7b) for s£j, and s^,,. ' = 1,...,/V.
Without further simplifications such a huge dynamic system of 2yV interacting social
environments is very difficult to be analyzed. A first simplification is to assume that the
" See Kapleyn (1977) and Kapteyn and Wansbeck (1985) for foundations of this structure by a
theory of preference formation.
" Cf. Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1985. Sec. 7.3) and Iannacone (1989, eq. (6)).120 C/rap/gr 5
population can be partitioned into a limited number A" of sona/ #ro«pj (e.g., status groups
or age cohorts) such that s^, and 5jf,, are independent of 1 wiW/i each social group, i.e.,
are the same for each member of such a group. (Such a group may be interpreted as a
membership group.) This reduces the differential system to a system of 2Af equations. In the
realistic case that Z. ,.^ and Xy,_^ vary with y and /-x within each social group, it then
follows from (5.6), its analogue for s^-,, and Assumptions IV and V that the adjustment
speeds 6^, and 5^,, the reference group flG, and the reference weights pj/ and p^ should
all be independent of 1 within each social group. „, ,
A further reduction of the differential system can be achieved by neglecting the social
interactions /jffvtre/i the social groups (AvsMm/jf/o/i V7). This leaves us with only two inter-
linked differential equations (5.7a) and (5.7b) for each social group, thereby allowing a
separate analysis of the BPI in each group. Consider social group 5G, with individuals
/ • 1 W|. j4jsumpf<7>/i V// then states that 8^ = 8^ and 8^ = Sj^ for all / (see above).
Moreover, /t.S5Mmpf/V>/i V7// equates the reference group /?G, of person / with the social
group SG| minus the person 1 herself and assumes a/uiva/i/tf w/g/ifcor //i/irarft'o/u. This
means that every person 1 assigns the same reference weights p^ and p^ to every other
person 7 in the social group. In combination with the adding-up condition (5.4), it im- p gp
plies that P^ • Px " 1/(^1 " ') ^r all 1 and y in 5Gp The reference weights are then
independent of 1 as required above, but the reference group /?G, = 5G, - (/") still depends
on 1, Therefore, /4.v.vum/>/i7>si /X says that A/, is so large_as to make the contribution of I'S
actions to the average social group demands L,.^ and X,.^ negligible. This implies that in
(5.6) (omitting the superscript 0)
A/,
/V, - 1 y.i /V, y,, - •
which is indeed independent of /. Analogously, we obtain X,'_^ = ^/-x- "*"'^-P-' *' '
Given all the assumptions made so far, the canonical BPI model describes individuals 1
each maximizing a utility function t/'(X,-,.£,-,;*xr*L») with respect to X,-, and L,, at
predetermined values of .v^, and .vyj, under the usual budget constraint X,,*»v,,(7",,-Z-,,)+y0,,.
Here >»»,•, is the exogenous (relative) hourly corporate wage rate prevailing for individual 1 at
time f, 7",, is her total discretionary time, and K^,, is exogenous income other than her own
wage income (see Sec. 2.3). This implies household time and consumption demand functions
*i(w'ir*'oir''«r*L/'*;T/) *"<* M^ir^Oir^ir^fr^Xf)' respectively. Note that these funct-
ions vary in general with / due to individual variation in parameters of the utility function
(/' and in the exogenous constraint variables w,,, 7,, and K^,,, whereas s/j, and 5^-, arc
assumed to be the same for all 1. Thus the canonical model describes individual variation in
'^ 1 adopt the temi of equivalent neighbor interactions (END from statistical physics, in which it is
used 10 denote uniform interactions between atoms or molecules in a solid or liquid. These interac-
tions can serve as a foundation of the so-called mean-field approximation (see, e.g.. Vendrik, 1979a).
The present canonical model is similar to thai approximation. In line with this approximation the ENI
can also be postulated with respect to the whole population, but 1 prefer to restrict the ENI to a social
group within this population, since this offers a more adequate basis for adding interactions between
social groups to the model (sec Sec. 9.5).BfAavioura/ prf/i»r?nce /Vifertfrpendtvic? 121
behaviour, while assuming no individual variation in the social environments of the in-
dividuals. In particular, the same social environment may have different impacts on different
individuals (see Sec. 5.5 for details). . ,
According to (5.6). its analogue for Sjf, and subsequent assumptions.jhese social environ-
ments are determined by the average social group demands L,_^ and X,_^. However, since
at least at the kinks of the individual labour supply curves at reservation wages, the in-
dividual demand functions are non-linear in the exogenous constraint variables, these in-
dividual functions cannot be exactly aggregated to average demand functions
L(w,,fo,,f,,^-,s^) and X(iv,,KQ,,f,,5^,,^,), when H>,,, V^,, and/or 7,, vary with i
(see Sec. 5.5 for the case of an additive quadratic specification of the utility function and cf.
Sec. 4.7). Then the average demands depend on the entire vectors of the /-dependent exogen-
ous variables like (w,, u-^,).'* These vectors can be completely characterized by the
averages of their elements and by vectors of absolute deviations of the elements from these
averages like (H>J,-H',,...,w^.,,-»v,) or vectors of relative deviations like
((wj,-H',)/W,,...,(IV^_I,-H',)/H>,). Assumpft'oR X assumes that the latter absolute or
relative deviation vectors are constants. Changes in individual values of the exogenous
variables are then completely determined by changes in their averages, implying average
demand functions as mentioned.
As a result of this and preceding assumptions, we can rewrite the differential equations
(5.7a) and (5.7b) for social group SG, as :.^,^.*^i: ,V-;*$.«#-. ^
*£•, - 8£[L<*,.y,,,.r,.J£.Jf,) - ,£,], (5.9a)
[ff ] --^K" e ' - ^ - - ^ (5.9b)
When the partial derivative L^_ or X^_ is positive, we have a (net) bandwagon effect, and
when it is negative, a (net) reverse bandwagon effect is active. An interesting feature of this
differential system is that, up to scaling factors 5^ and 5^ of s^, and s^, *", it has the
same structure as the differential system (3.2a) and (3.2b) for individual habit formation. In
the next section we will see that this implies that social bandwagon effects in the canonical
BPI model display analogous kinds of dynamics as individual habit formation in the model
of Chapter 3. Note, however, the important difference that the present BPI model is
formulated in terms of average demands, whereas the model of Chapter 3 describes in-
" Cf. lannacone (1989, p. 441).
Note that Assumption X implies that the (co)varianccs and/or higher-order (co)momcnts of the
distributions of the /'-dependent exogenous variables and the covarianccs and/or higher-order como-
ments of these distributions with the distributions of the /'-dependent utility function parameters, are
constants, which are in general not zero (in contrast to the approximation for an AQM specification
at the end of Sec. 4.7).
Choosing units for 5£, and s^, which are l/8£- and 1/8^-. respectively, as high as the original
units, j£-j and Sjf, in (5.9a) and (5.9b) should be multiplied by 8^ and 8^, respectively. Then
dividing both sides of (5.9a) and (5.9b) by 8^ and 8^, respectively, yields equations of the same
form as (3.2a) and (3.2b).
*' See also Deaton and Mucllbauer (1980. pp. 374-375).122 CTiapter 5
dividual demands. Another interesting point is that, just like the prices in the perfect com-
petition model, the social environments as represented by the social state variables j£, and5^
arc exo#?«rti« with respect to the i/uftv/rfua/ behaviours in the s/»<?rt rw«, but g/ido^nottf
with respect to the a##re#a/es of the individual behaviours in the /o/i# run. Furthermore,
like the prices in the perfect competition model, the social environments are assumed to be
the same for all individuals within a social group. In the above derivation this assumption
has been made to keep the model manageable as well as transparant. Moreover, it may not
be a bad approximation of reality.
Analogously to the procedure in Section 3.2, the canonical BPI model as derived in this
section can be extended so as to include BPI with respect to corporate time. A generalization
of the derivation in this section which includes this BPI, leads to individual utility functions
# (X,,,L,p//,,;5;f,,.$£•,,J,7,), where //,-, denotes the corporate time of individual i at timer
and where J,y,, analogously to s^, and J^,. represents the social corporate time environment
at time /. Making the simplifying assumption that the adjustment rate 6,y of this social
environment (see (5.9)) is (approximately) equal to the adjustment rate 5^ of the social
household time environment .$£•,, it easily follows that jyy, = 7" - j^. Substituting this
expression and //,, • 7",, - L,<, into the utility functions, we obtain reduced utility functions
l/'(X^,Z-,,; jy,,5£,). Their marginal utilities 1/'^ are again related to the marginal utilities
{? ^ and (7 ^ of the original utility functions as f/'^ • t)^ - (?'^ and may therefore be
negative for sufficiently high Z,,, and hence sufficiently low W,-,. This may lead to volunteer
work and may especially happen in the case of a social group of "collective workaholics"
who are addicted to a high W as a consequence of social control by the group. Such "collec-
tive workaholics" may even continue to work a high W, when their wage rate tv falls to
zero."
Maximizing the original or reduced utility functions under the usual budget constraints
again yields the individual and average demand functions given above and leads to the
differential equations (5.9a) and (5.9b). In the usual case where the budget constraint is
binding, these equations are linked to each other, and hence form a sy_stem of ^wo first-order
differential equations in $£•, and s^/- For constant H>, = w, K^, = KQ and 7", = T a long-
run stationary equilibrium solution 5* := (s^.s^-) is obtained by putting 5£, = 0 in (5.9a)
and A^ » 0 in (5.9b). The next two sections will analyse the conditions under which such
an equilibrium is locally (asymptotically) stable and when there are multiple equilibria.
^ Note, however, that in the canonical BPI model the average relative wage rate w is exogenous
in both the short and long run. This implies that the effects of competitive market interactions on
prices in labour and consumption good markets are neglected. See Granovetter and Soong (1986) for
the addition of market effects on consumption good prices to a BPI model. In a similar way market
effects on wage rales could be incorporated. Sec also Section 10.3.
*' On the other hand, this may only hold in the short run, since in the long run the "collective
workaholics" may collectively and gradually diminish their corporate hours for H> = 0 until a few or
zero hours and adapt their expectation of the average corporate time in their social group to that (sec
Sec. 5.4 for such processes). Thus, such persons whose long-run corporate hours for w » 0 are zero,
would, in the long run. no longer be prepared to work as volunteers. Again, a more complete model-
ling of "collective workaholism" requires a model of addictive behaviour such as that of, e.g.,
Wiaston (1980), but is not needed in the present context./teAflvioMra/ preference //iff rtfgpf mtencg 123
5.3 Multiple equilibria, hysteresis and stability conditions
Analogously to Section 3.2, we first regard _behaviourai preference interdependence (BPI)
with respect to only average household time L, (and average corporate time W,), so ignoring
the effects of s^,. Moreover, we begin by assuming that the individual household time
demand functions LjCi*',-.}^.?*,-.^) are linear in the social household time environment S£
for L, in the interior of its feasible domain, i.e. for 0 < L, < 7", (omitting the time indices
of L,, and j£,).*
For a social group of persons with sufficiently low (net) tastes for household time, the last
inequality may hold at the prevailing w,, J^, and 7", for all values of ££- and all group
members i^This leads to average household time demand functions L(H\V0,7\J£") with
0 < Z, < 7" which are also linear in SJJ. An example for the case of a (net) bandwagon
effect (/Tj_ > 0) is given by the average demand z7* as a function of $£• in Figure 5.2. The
intersection i4 of the line of this function with the equilibrium line L • J£ (see (5.9a) for
i£-j = 0) indicates a unique long-run (stationary) equilibrium. Analogously to Section 3.2,
this equilibrium is stable, since the necessary and sufficient stability condition
z7j*_ := Z7J_(M\K0,7\S-) < 1 is fulfilled. This condition means that the preference inter-
dependence effect of the expected or perceived social environment s^ on the average house-
hold time demand L at the long-run equilibrium is smaller than one. Note that in this
moving average case (see (5.6)) as opposed to the psychological stock case of Section 3.2,
the stability condition is independent of the speed of adjustment of the social environment to
the average household time demand 5£- (which corresponds to the depreciation rate in the
psychological stock case). In the case of a bandwagon effect the stability condition may not
always be fulfilled, but in the case of a reverse bandwagon effect, which is described by a
negative slope of the demand line, it always holds.*'
Consider again the example of the average demand function Z?* in Figure 5.2 of the
social group of persons with sufficiently low household time tastes. These persons can
develop into motivated corporate workers or even "collective workaholics" in the following
way. Suppose that all the group members are initially unemployed and the expectations (or
perceptions) of the average group behaviour have been fully adapted to that, i.e. J£ • 7".
Then the group members prefer on average a household time of L < 7" hours, so they take
jobs of, on average, 7" - Z." hours. However, they will start to adapt their expectations J£
** Examples of such linear household time demand functions follow from the specification of the
labour supply equations of Kapteyn and Woiiticz (1990) and from the additive quadratic model as
formulated in Section 5.5.
" This excludes the possibility of chaos in contrast with the case where the dynamics of j£ is
described by a cft/fere/icf equation instead of the differential equation (5.9a). For the case of con-
sumption Granovetter and Soong (1986) show that a combination of a bandwagon effect for relatively
low levels of the average consumption Sjf, = X,_, of others and a reverse bandwagon effects for high j^,
may, under certain conditions, lead to a chaotic behaviour pattern. On the other hand, lannacone
(1989) argues that, in the presence of an unstable behaviour pattern, an adaptive expectatioas specifi-
cation of 5^, is more plausible than the myopic expectations specification of Granovetter and Soong
and demonstrates for the former specification that a chaotic consumption pattern becomes less likely
as the weights of recent points of time in SJ-, decline.124





Figure 5.2 Equilibria -4 0 and C as intcrscclions_of the equilibrium line £•-•*£" and average
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of the average household time to that, which, by virtue of (5.9a), is described by an (in-
finitesimally) small horizontal move from the Z? line at ZT° to the left. As a consequence,
the group members will on average prefer (infinitesimally) less householdjime and take jobs
of more hours. This is described by a small vertical move back to the Z. * line. Again the
group starts to adapt its expectation of the average household time to that and will conse-
quently have less average household time and more average corporate time, and this process
will continue_until the group spends (on average) only Z,* hours as household time, so
works 7* - L * hours of corporate time, and has adapted its expectation of the average
household time to that. If T - Z, * is high, so Z. * small, the group may have developed
into a group of "collective workaholics". When the initial expectation of the average house-
hold time is even lower than L * , a reverse process towards Z. * hours will take placed
In a similar way and assuming the same constant w, V^ and 7", the situation of a social
group of persons who do not participate to the labour market (e.g., housewives) may be
described by the long-run corner equilibrium fi in Figure S.2. Now, however, the individual
household time demand functions display a kink at the point where they reach the boundary
7",- of the feasible domain of /-,. Since this point varies in general with i. we have a same
kind of situation as in the case of an (-dependent reservation wage of individual labour
supply curves. Analogously to the average labour supply curve in Figure 4.9, this can be
^* Note that, for the sake of brevity, the reasoning given switched from speaking in terms of the
group members to speaking in terms of the group. We can even go beyond that and consider the
average behaviour of the group members a; i/it is the behaviour of one average labour supplier who
is subject to individual habit formation.gf/igvkwrg/ prf/i? re we f fnfettfcpgna<viff125
shown to lead to a non-linear average household time demand function Z. * of *£• in which
the individual kinks have been "smoothed out".^ The intersection of the curve of z7* and
the equilibrium line thenforms the stable equilibrium B for Z? = 7\ This implies that when z7
is initially lower than 7", so when at least some group members are employed, the social
influence of the group will lead to a situation in which all members are non-participating
and spend all their time as household time.
Consider now the situation of a social group of corporate workers at A who involuntarily
lose their jobs. Then their average corporate time W_is rationed at zero and they arc forced
to have averageactual household time Z.," equal to 7". This is described by a vertical switch
from /I to the Z. = 7" line. Analogously to Section 3.2, they will adapt their expectation jr.
of the average household time to that, so move to the right along the zT = f line. However,
when after some time they can again work the average number of corporate hours they
prefer according to their average household time demand line Z.* (at the same u\ K~f> and
7"), they shift to this line and subsequently move back to their original long-run equilibrium
i4. However, it is also possible that after some time unemployed persons do not want to do
corporate work any more, i.e., their average preferred household time Z. has risen to 7*.^
This is described by a non-linear sigmoid demand function z/ as indicated in Figure 5.2.
Again this demand function implies stable equilibria at the points /t and fl, but also an
unstable intermediate equilibrium at C, acting as a watershed or barrier.
Analogously to Section 3.2, the average demand function zT' can also explain how
labour supply enforcement of a social group of non-participants at equilibrium 6 may turn
them into a group_of motivated employees at equilibrium /I. More in general, the average
demand function L explains how a ftvnporary rationing of the average labour supply of a
social group in the past (involuntary unemployment or labour enforcement) can have a
pmna/ien/ effect on the average labour supply of the group in the future. This holds, since
the long-run equilibrium which is approached depends on the time path of the rationing in
the past, i.e., we have hysteresis of average labour supply dependent on rationings. We call
Adding behavioural preference interdependence (BPI) with respect to consumption to the
analysis does not essentially change it and results in a simple necessary and sufficient
stability condition which is given by
£• •£•*<!. (5.10)
" One should then treat and/or approximate the parameters and variables in specifications of the
individual household time demand functions of J£ analogously to those in the AQM .specification of
the individual labour supply functions of H' in Section 4.7. See Subsection 5.5.2 for the case of an
AQM specification of the individual household lime demand functions of j£.
One could then say that the cognitive dissonance of the group members between preferred and
perceived actual hours of corporate work has been reduced to zero by the mutual influencing among
the group members. This mechanism should be distinguished from the reduction of cognitive dis-
sonance by individual habit formation as modelled in Section 3.2. More generally, the //trr/pOTo/ia/
mechanism of BPI is essentially different from the i/i/ra/wjo/ia/ mechanism of individual habit
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In the usual case where the budget constraint is binding, this stability condition can be
expressed in terms of second-order derivatives of the individual utility functions and the
wage rate(s) as follows. First,
(V •*,•
Next, analogously to the comparative statics formulas (3.4a) and (3.4b) in Section 3.3, for
L* and X* for which the restrictions //, fc 0 and W, * 7", are not binding, the summands
in (5.11) are equal to the corresponding /-specific right-hand sides of (3.4a) and (3.4b) with s^
and J^ replaced by .(£ and J^\ respectively. For L,- and X,- for which one of the restric-
tions W, t 0 and W, i 7", is binding and which are therefore corner points in flat pieces of
the individual demand functions of the social environments (e.g., the non-participants men-
tioned above), the summands in (5.11) are zero. Thus we have a similar aggregation problem
as in Section 4.7. For individual utility functions which are arfc/if/vi in the pairs (Z.,,5^) and
(X,,.fg), we therefore first allow only individual variations in parameters and exogenous
variables which do not affect (5.11), and in the second-order derivatives £//*,_ and i^*,.,
which appear in the analogues of (3.4a) and (3.4b) for the present case in a linear way.
For additive utility functions the stability condition then becomes
(5.12)
where /V"* denotes the long-run equilibrium number of unrestricted group members, i.e. the
group members for which the restrictions 0 i W, i 7", are not binding. Indices i have been
omitted in (5.12) to indicate averages or independence of i and the superscripts u* of the
averages indicate averaging over the long-run unrestricted group members. Furthermore, we
—;—«• —;—u»
note that for additive utility functions positivity of £^j- or t/^j- implies a net band-
L A
wagon effect, whereas negativity of l/^_ or t/^^. leads to a net reverse bandwagon
effect.
Up to the factor /V"*//V, the stability condition (5.12) has the same form as the condition
(3.5) in Section 3.3 for 8^ = 8^ = 1. Therefore, when the factor W*/N equals one, i.e.,
when in long-run equilibrium all group members are unrestricted such as the motivated
corporate workers at equilibrium A in Figure 5.2, an ensuing analysis can be made which is
fully analogous to that in Section 3.3. In particular, we can distinguish (relatively) weak and
strong BPI with respect to household (and corporate) time and consumption at the long-run
equilibrium, and we can formulate a proposition analogous to Proposition 3.1.
However, due to individual variation, often some group members are restricted in e-
quilibrium (e.g., non-participants), whereas others arc not. Then the factor N"*//V is smaller
than one (but positive), implying that the stability condition (5.12) is more easily fulfilled.
This stabilizing effect is a consequence of the impossibility for the non-participants to work
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more than maximal corporate hours. When binding, these restrictions make the labour supply
behaviours of non-participants and "collective workaholics" insensitive to small changes in
the average labour supply in the social group to which they belong. This suppresses the
average sensitivity to such changes in the social group, and hence makes the average labour
supply dynamics more easily stable.
In this case we say that the BPI with respect to household (and corporate) time or con-
sumption is (VWaf/veAy) weajt at a long-run equilibrium, when
or an analogous inequality for consumption, respectively. When (S.I3) or its analogue for
consumption is not fulfilled, we call the BPI (VWamWy) .vrtwijj at the long-run equilibrium.
Thus, the strength of the destabilizing force of BPI is compared not only to the strength of
the stabilizing force of diminishing marginal utility, but also to that of individual variation.
Apart from this modification the analysis is then again analogous to that in Section 3.3. In
Subsection 5.5.2 we give an elaboration for an additive quadratic specification of the utility
function.
When there are also individual variations in the second-order derivatives t/^ ^ and
£/x*x- *"d in the wage rate w,, an exact analysis becomes much more complicated, but, us
a first approximation, we could replace f//*^. t/x*X *™* ^ '" ** stability condition by
their averages. In such an approximation the analysis is then also analogous to that in
Section 3.3. Thus, the present section has shown many analogies between the analysis of
BPI and the analysis of individual habit formation (IHF) in Chapter 3. These analogies,
however, do not alter the fact that the /'nte/persona/ mechanism of BPI and the i/irraptfrsona/
mechanism of IHF are essentially different and have different effects in a non-linear model
(as opposed to a linear model like that of Pollak (1976a)). Whereas the differential system
(3.2a) and (3.2b) for IHF models the dynamics of individual labour supply, the analogous
differential system (5.9a) and (5.9b) for BPI models the dynamics of the average labour
supply in a social group. Consequently, when we want to compare the effects of IHF and
BPI, the effects of IHF on individual labour supply should first be aggregated to effects on
the average labour supply in a social group. This has been done in the Sections 4.7 and 4.8
and it has been demonstrated there that individual variation in parameters and variables
makes the average labour supply essentially different from a representative labour supply. As
will be shown at the end of this chapter this leads to essentially different effects of locally
unstable IHF and locally unstable BPI on average labour supply. Moreover, in contrast with
the case of IHF, the individual variation forms an additional stabilizing force in the case of
BPI (see (5.12)).
5.4 Wage elasticities, catastrophes and hysteresis
First we consider the relations and differences between short-run and long-run effects on
average labour supply of changes in the average wage rate when starting from a long-run
equilibrium. We then compare slopes of short-run average labour supply curves W(W;KQ,5*)128 Oiapter 5
with slopes of the long-run average labour supply curve W*(IV;KQ) := //(w^KQ.i"^;^))
at the same w, where 5* now denotes the vector of long-run equilibrium values s^ and J^
of the social environments. When the members of the social group face diverging wage
rates, the income constraint is, in line with Assumption X in Section 5.2, approximately
aggregated to X • wW + K^. Then the reasoning is fully analogous to that in Section 3.4.
In particular, we can derive for non-zero // * a relation between long-run and short-run wage
elasticities of average labour supply which is of the same form as (3.10) with 8^ = 8^ = 1.
This implies a proposition which is analogous to Proposition 3.2. A difference with Section
3.4 is that here W* is already non-zero when only one member of the group has entered the
labour market. In the case where the relevant long-run equilibrium of the social environ-
ments and labour supply remains (locally) stable and existing during a change in H\ this
leads to a long-run average labour supply curve which may have the same shape as the
short-run curve in Figure 4.9 in Section 4.7, but which is flatter in its forward-sloping part
and flatter or steeper in its backward-sloping part. If the BPI with respect to consumption is
sufficiently strong, it may even deprive the long-run curve of its backward-sloping part.
However, in a similar way as in Section 3.S, a stable long-run equilibrium like /I or B in
Figure 5.2 (for the case of BPI with respect to only household time) may become unstable
and subsequently disappear, when vT rises beyond a certain vv or falls below a certain
w . This causes catastrophic transitions in the average labour supply of the social group
between an equilibrium fl in which all group members are non-participants and an
equilibrium /I in which they are motivated corporate workers. These ro/fer/iw
form discontinuities in the forward-sloping part of the long-run average labour curve which
are similar to the discontinuities in the forward-sloping part of the individual curve in Figure
3.3. A slight modification may be that in equilibrium B most, but not all group members are
non-participating (see the end of the previous section). Then B is an interior equilibrium
with a positive average labour supply, and the long-run average labour supply curve has a
forward-sloping part as indicated in Figure 5.3. According to this figure most group mem-
bers will collectively enter the labour market at a relatively high entry wage **', since they
are discouraged from doing so at lower wages by the high average household time in the
group (high j£). Such collective entries within social groups may have played (and still
play) a role in the strong rise of the labour force participation of married women in many
OECD countries since World War II. On the other hand, most group members will collec-
tively leave employment at an exit wage w** which is lower than w*', since they are kept
from doing so at higher wages by the low average household time in the group (low $£•).
This is an example of roMmiw MWMIJ. Further note that Figure 5.3 assumes that after
the collective exit still some group members are employed. At w declining further, these
group members leave the labour market at long-run reservation wages at which they also
enter at rising H\*'
" Figure 5.3 also assumes that the lowest individual reservation wage M^, and hence the collec-
tive exit wage M'*' and the collective entry wage H'*'. are all positive. However, M^ can also be
non-positive when one or more group members have such strong corporate time tastes that they
would volunteer for M- « 0 despite the social influence of a majority who would stay at home.
Moreover, in a similar way as in the two cases at the end of Section 4.5, it can be shown that w**
and even >••*' can be non-positive, when a majority of the social group has strong corporate time<?renre 129
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Figure 5.3 Backward-bending long-run average labour supply schedule with collective catastrophes
and hysteresis. The dotted curves indicate the loci of the unstable equilibrium for W.
In a similar way collective hysteresis and catastrophes seem also possible in a backward-
sloping part of the average labour supply curve. This is also indicated in Figure S.3. When
BPI with respect to consumption is added to the picture, this is easily seen to create an
additional cause of collective hysteresis in a forward-sloping part of the average labour
supply curve. On the other hand, it diminishes the probability of collective hysteresis in a
backward-sloping part (which part may even not exist, see above).
In general, necessary and sufficient conditions for collective hysteresis and catastrophes as
in Figure 5.3 to occur consist not only of conditions for instability of an interior long-run
equilibrium, but also of other conditions. The latter conditions can be investigated only for
particular specifications of the utility function. Just as in the case of individual habit for-
mation (see Ch. 4), an eligible candidate is an additive quadratic specification of the utility
function. Therefore and for the purpose of illustration of the general analysis given above,
the implications of this specification will be analysed in the next two sections.
tastes and/or displays a strong form of "collective workaholism" (see also the end of the next sec-
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5.5 Additive quadratic model
5,5./
Analogously to the additive quadratic model (AQM) of Chapter 4, this section and the next
consider a quadratic specification of the individual utility functions which is additive(ly
separable) in individual consumption X, and the social consumption environment J^ on the
one hand and individual household time L, and the social household time environment S£
on the other hand. Again the main purpose is to derive necessary and sufficient conditions
for hysteresis and catastrophes as in Figure 5.3 to occur. As a preparation to that as well as
for its own sake, this subsection derives and aggregates individual short-run labour supply
functions and the next subsection analyses the stabilizing effects on long-run labour supply
of individual variation in utility function parameters and exogenous variables. Subsection
5.5.3 then derives the intended conditions. First the effects of BPI with respect to corporate
time will be neglected, but at the end of the section they will be included into the present
AQM.
I?! Transforming away terms which arc independent of the choice variables X,- and L,- (see
Sec. 4.1), the additive quadratic specification of the individual utility functions can be
written as
with a^, > 0, otxx, < 0, Yxxi fc 0, a^,- > 0, a^, < 0 and y^-, fc 0. Analogously to
the derivation in Section 4.1, maximization of these individual utility functions under the
budget constraints leads to individual short-run labour supply functions
a.H', - ft,
"i " -4 -• (5.15)
where
^'xx " ""xxi > 0, (5.16c) xx " ""xxi
Of course, (5.15) should satisfy the restrictions 0 j H| i 7",-, so holds providedfig/iav/OMra/ prefere/ic g intfr<fcpenaWicf 131
0 i a,w, - 6, i 7",(c,W; + d,-). The parameters YxxV *"^ ^i-Li '" (5.16a) and (5.16b)
are equal to the second-order derivatives £/j_ ^_ and 1/ ^ ^., respectively, so describe the
extents to which the marginal utilities of consumption and household time are affected by
changes in the corresponding social environments. We call the parameters Yxx~i ""^ ^/.u
the 5«scep/JM/ir<>5 to socio/ in/frnnre of the preferences of person i with respect to con-
sumption and household time, respectively. Note that individual variations in these suscep-
tibilities imply different impacts of the same social environments J^- and j£ on the labour
supplies //,- of different individuals.
To be able to aggregate the interior labour supply functions (5.15) exactly in terms of
averages of utility function parameters and exogenous variables, we now assume only
individual variation in the parameters a^-, Yxxi' a^, and Y/,£, ""<* '"' variables r^,, and
7",-. Moreover, we assume that the parameter c is smaller than c^,, for a number of group
members, implying that the restriction //,• i 7", is binding for these individuals for w
between tv_, and w\, (see Sec. 4.1). As an extension of (4.21) in Section 4.7, the average
labour supply function can then be written as • :<..,. .^, _.,...,
« ^-r,
The terms under the summation signs are negative and positive "correction terms" CT that
are due to the /-dependent restrictions W, £ 0 and W, * 7",, respectively. When f is larger
than or equal to c^, for all group members, the second kind of C7" in (5.17) are absent as in
(4.21). Moreover, the average "parameters" <7 and fr are given by
(5.18b)
The first term at the right-hand side of (5.17) again describes a representative short-run
labour supply curve and, in a similar way as in Figure 4.9, the CT lead to a "smoothing out"
of kinks in this curve at w = 6/a (W = 0) and at w = w. and w = w^ for a * a and
<x^ = a^ (W = f).
In order to analyse the long-run labour supply behaviour which is implied by our AQM, we
can consider the average labour supply function in (5.17) as a function of the social environ-
ments i^ and j£\ Since the average "parameters" a and 6 in (5.17) as given by (5.18a) and
(5.18b) are linear in 5^~ and 5£, the first term at the right-hand side of (5.17), and hence the
corresponding representative consumption demand and household time demand, are also
linear in Sjf and s^ for 0 < // < 7". For the case of BPI with respect to average household
time only a graph of the latter representative household time demand function for given w, Kg132 CVwp/er 5
and 7 = 7" 30 may look like the pieccwise-linear graph of Z, in Figure 5.4 (dashed bold
line). Note that Z.^ is equal to 7 - (aw - fe)/(cw^ + d) for interior Z-. This represen-
tative describes an unstable long-run equilibrium at C , since the slope of Z. at C is
larger than one (see the stability condition (5.10) with X^*_ = 0). Moreover, L describes
two stable corner equilibria /t' and B for L = 0 and Z. - 7, respectively.
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L Figure 5.4 Average household time demand functions L ^ and L as aggregates of distributions of
individual demand functions around the representative demand function L .
However, this representative household ^ime demand function L deviates from the
average household time demand function/.^ by virtue of the "correction _terms" CT in
(5.17), since Z?^ is given by 7" - (Jw - /> )/(cw^ + rf) + CT for interior JL. What are the
effects of the CT on this average household time demand function and on the positions and
(in)stabilities of the long-run equilibria in Figure 5.4? To answer these questions we consider
for the sake of simplicity the special case where only the household time taste parameter
a^,-, and hence only the "parameter" ft, in (5.15), vary over the group members. The in-
dividual household time demand functions of the social household time environment have
then all the same slope, but have different levels for group members with different house-
hold time tastes. As a result, these individual demand functions as indicated by dashed lines
in Figure 5.4 are "distributed" around the representative demand function and display dif-
ferent values of the social environment (or perceived average household time) 5£ for which
the restrictions W, £ 0, or L, £ 7\ and W, * 7, or L, £ 0, become binding. For a given J£
(e.g. s,-), there may then be some group members for which the restriction Z., ^ 7 is
* For the sake of simplicity 7 is assumed to be the same for all group members.BeAovioura/ pr</(?r?nr<> inrfrcfrpe/MfrflCY 133
binding, whereas the restriction Z., £ 0 may be binding for other group members. The
former binding restriction gives rise to the first kind of CT in (5.17), whereas the latter
binding restriction accounts for the second kind of CT in (5.17). As 5£\ and hence Z.,-, are
higher, the restriction Z., S T is binding for more group members and the restriction Z., i 0
is binding for fewer group members. Therefore, for higher 5£ the first kind of CT dominate
the second kind of CT, so the total CT is negative. Moreover, this CT becomes more
negative as S£ rises (see Fig. 5.4). On the other hand, for lower .$£• the reverse holds, so the
total CT is positive and becomes more positive as .$£• declines.
When the number of group members N is large, we can consider the household time taste
Ctj_, and hence the "parameter" ft, as continuous variables a^_ and ft, and define e:«a^-a^«ft-fr
with density function /(e) and zero mean. Assuming that this density function is continuous
and unimodal, the average household time demand function zT can be derived to have a
smooth sigmoid shape like, for instance, that in Figure 5.4/ . Thus, the kinks in the graph
of the representative household time demand function have been "smoothed out" by the CT
in the graph of the average demand function (cf. Fig. 4.9).
In Figure 5.4 it has been assumed that the individual variation in the household time taste
is sufficiently weak, and hence the CT are sufficiently small, so as to preserve the existence
of the three long-run equilibria (see below). However, the positions of the equilibria for the
average demand function are generally different from the positions of their representative
counterparts. The intermediate equilibrium C may deviate only slightly from its represen-
tative counterpart C' because of relatively small CT, but the other two equilibria d and fl
may differ substantially from the corner equilibria /4' and /)'. Both equilibria can be interior
(as in Fig. 5.3 for w between tv** and w*'), since the average household time demand can
be positive for zero social environment and less than maximal for maximal social environ- *
ment. As indicated in Figure 5.4, this is due to group members who prefer to have more
than zero (discretionary) household hours even when the perceived average household hours
in the group are zero, or who prefer to have less than maximal household hours even when
the perceived average household hours are maximal.
Just as the equilibrium C', the equilibrium C is unstable in Figure 5.4, since the slope of
the average household time demand function zT at C is assumed to be larger than one.
However, it is smaller than the slope of the representative demand function Z/ at C', since
at J£- = 5- some group members are bound by the restriction Z., £ T or the restriction
L, £ 0, and hence do not contribute to the slope of the average demand function. More
" The shape of zT*" follows from the signs of the first and second-order derivatives dL/d^j and
*Z./35- . The former slope of L^ is given by the positive left-hand side of (5.20) wit slope of L^ is given by the positive left-hand side of (5.20) with y^ » 0
(sec below), where the slope-depressing factor /V"7# is given by an expression analogous to (5.19).
Since only this factor depends on 5£ and since dft/djjj « y^ according to (5.18b), the second-
order derivative is positively proportional to the difference in density function value
/(aw - ft - T(CH'* • d)) - /(an' - ft ). For sufficiently low values of s£ and hence of A, the
argument atv - ft will be so much higher than the maximum point of the unimodal density function
as to make the corresponding density function value lower than the other one and hence the second-
order derivative positive. On the other hand, for sufficiently high values of j£ and hence of ft, the
reverse holds. Together, this implies a sigmoid shape of z7*\ This shape is also smooth because of
the continuity of the density function and hence of the second-order derivative.134
specifically, the slope of L at C is A/"* /A/ times the_i'-independent slope of the individ-
ual demand functions, or N"**7A' times the slope of L*^ at C', where A/"*^"/A/ denotes
the long-run equilibrium proportion of "unbounded" group members at C (see (5.12)). This
slope-depressing factor A/"*^/A/ is equal to the proportion of group members for which
e • ft - ft (see above) is such that the labour supply function (5.15) with Yxx< ~ 0 in





where ft *^ is the long-run equilibrium value of ft at C and F denotes the (cumulative)
distribution function of e. In the situation of Figure 5.4, in which the equilibrium C lies
vertically above the middle positively-sloping part of the representative demand line, the
lower and upper limit of e in the proportion can easily be shown to be negative and posit-
ive, respectively. Then, as the individual variation in the household time taste ct^, and hence
the variance of e is larger (smaller), the range 7"^^ + d) of c in the proportion being
fixed, the proportion can be expected to be smaller (larger) due to thicker (thinner) tails of
the density function /(e). This is in agreement with intuition on the basis of Figure 5.4.
However, when the individual variation in a^ is sufficiently strong, the slope-depressing
effect may be so strong as to make the equilibria C and A or C and B disappear. Then we
are left with an average demand function like L in Figure 5.4 or L in Figure 5.2 describ-
ing one stable equilibrium B or -4, respectively. At this equilibrium the stability condition
(5.12) is fulfilled, which in the present case of variation in a^ only can be expressed in
terms of the utility function parameters and exogenous variables as
Hereby A/"*/N is given by an expression analogous to that for A/"* /N in (5.19) and
is zero in the present case of BPI with respect to household time only. A sufficient condition
for (5.20) to be fulfilled is given by
i.e. (5.13) for the present case of variation in a^ only. This defines (relatively) weak house-
hold time BPI at the equilibrium. Conversely, in the absence of consumption BPI, the nega-
tion of (5.21), or strong household time BPI, is necessary, but not sufficient for making the
equilibrium C in Figure 5.4 unstable. A necessary as well as sufficient condition for instab-
ility is given by the negation of (5.20) with Yxx ~ "• *"""'* '"stability condition implies that
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vercome not only the stabilizing forces of diminishing marginal utilities and the wage rate,
ut also that of individual variation.
Fulfilment of such an instability condition for a range of the wage rate w is a necessary
condition for collective catastrophes and hysteresis as in Figure 5.3 to occur. To be able to
establish for which values of utility function parameters (and exogenous variables) this
condition can be met, we should derive parameter conditions under which the negation of
(5.20) has solutions for w (cf. Table 4.1). However, even in the simplest case of only
individual variation in the household time taste and only household time BPI, the expression
of the factor /V"*//V in terms of w as given by (5.19) depends on the specific distribution of
the household time taste and tends to be complex for the usual distribution functions F.
Therefore, a derivation of precise parameter conditions like those in Table 4.1 is bound to be
restricted to very particular cases as well as laborious. In addition, instability of an interior
equilibrium for a range of the wage rate w is not a sufficient condition for collective cata-
strophes and hysteresis as in Figure 5.3, so other conditions should also be derived.
All this makes a derivation of precise parameter conditions rather unattractive.
Fortunately, however, more qualitative, but also more general parameter conditions can be
obtained by following an alternative and less cumbersome approach. This approach is
explained in the next section.
5JJ Com/iV/ons/or
This subsection will derive necessary and sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes and
hysteresis as in Figure 5.3 to occur. These conditions are rather qualitative, but also rather
general in the sense of allowing individual variation in the parameters o^,-,
""<* '" '"^ variables K^, and 7",.
Following a so-called perturbation method as often used in physics, we consider the case
of individual variation in which the slope-depressing factor /V"*//V in (5.20) is smaller than
one (TV case), as a perturbation of or deviation from the case of no individual variation with W " * //V • 1
(NIV case). In the NIV case all group members behave identically in the short and long run,
so average short and long-run labour supply functions are exact replicas of the corresponding
individual functions (the "correction terms" in (5.17) are zero). Substituting (5.16a) and
(5.16b) into the individual short-run labour supply functions (5.15), the social environments JJT
and 5£ appear in the same way as the individual habit stocks v^ and 5^, respectively, in
(4.5) in Section 4.1, when substituting (4.6a) and (4.6b) into it. Moreover, the social environ-
ments are adjusted to the same average or individual demands according to (5.9a) and (5.9b)
in Section 5.2 as the individual habit stocks according to (3.2a) and (3.2b) in Section 3.1,
and up to scaling factors 8^ and 8^ of 5£ and 5^ ^, the former equations describe the
same kind of adjustment paths as the latter equations. Therefore, in spite of the essentially
different mechanisms of individual habit formation (IHF) and BPI, their effects on individual
and average labour supply in the NIV case are the same for identical values of y^ and
L- of 8^ and 8^, and of the corresponding parameters for consumption.
See footnote 20.136 C/iaptf r 5
The short and long-run labour supply schedules for the additive quadratic model (AQM)
with BPI have the same shape as corresponding labour supply schedules for the AQM with
IHF as derived in Sections 4.1 - 4.4. In particular, we may have a long-run labour supply
schedule as in Figure 4.2 with collective and individual catastrophes between zero and
maximal corporate hours in which all group members are involved. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for collective and individual catastrophes and hysteresis to occur are fully analog-
ous to those for individual catastrophes and hysteresis in the case of IHF as formulated in
Proposition 4.1 at the end of Section 4.4. We should only replace the IHF parameters
and Y/_£ by ihe BPI parameters Y^;f and Y^^r. respectively, so r" and d* by c* := |otxx I ~
and c/* :• |ot{,/J - Y/,^' respectively. Accordingly, the parameters d* and </*, which
depend on ?*, take the place of the parameters c/* and d*.
For the sake of exposition we consider BPI with respect to average household time only,
to which Figure 5.4 applies (so y^ * 0). In particular, the representative agent graph of
L holds for the analogue of situation (i) in Proposition 4.1 for the NIV case, so for
0 < c"* < c * < aj/Kfl and J* < J* < J*. and for vv** < w < vv*', where c* * |a^^|
and where w> and H> indicate the entry and exit wage in the NIV case, respectively.
The former conditions mean that the short-run satiation tendency of consumption is not too
strong and that the household time IHF is moderately strong. At the entry and exit wages we
have constellations such as in Figure 4.1 for w • w*' and w » H> , respectively, implying
collective catastrophes beyond the entry and exit wages such as in Figure 4.1 for w > »v*
and M' < w , respectively.
What happens with these constellations when individual variations come into play and
increase from zero? The representative agent graph of /> is then transformed into a graph
like that of L in Figure 5.4, and for such a graph and for sufficiently strong individual
variation, collective catastrophes will occur J)eyond an entry wage vv*' and an exit wage
vv** (see Fig. 5.3) at which the curve of L^ is tangent to the equilibrium line (like the
curve of L ' in Figure 3.2 for w = w ). The left-hand side of the stability condition (5.20)
is then equal to one. As indicated at the end of the previous section, it is generally difficult
to solve this equation for w, but from the positioned the curve of L vis-a-vis the line of_L^
it is easily seen that, at rising w and declining L^ and L^ , a tangency situation for L is
reached sooner than a situation as in Figure 4.1 for L^ at w = w*'.Thus, the entry wage w*'
in the IV case is lower than the entry wage »v in the NIV case. Analogously, the exit
wage M*^ in the IV case is higher than the exit wage iv*^ in the NIV case.
As functions of </* :• |a^| - Y^^ for given values of a^ and the other parameters
and variables, these entry and exit wages are represented in Figure 5.5. The graphs for the
" Note that the adjustment parameters 5^ and 6^ do not appear in Ihe definitions of c"* and d'
because of the moving average instead of psychological stock specifications of the social environ-
ments in (5.6) in Section 5.2.
** Note that the bars in c"*, d*. d* and d* do not indicate averages of the corresponding IHF
parameters. The parameter c^ in Proposition 4.1 does not have to be replaced by a parameter c^ .
since c<, depends only on a^, a^. V^, and 7".
" Again these entry and exit wages arc here not averages of the entry and exit wages in the IHF
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NIV case are analogous to those for the IHF Subcase 2^ in Figure 4.4c. The entry wages
w*' arc given by the part of the w^* line between its intersections with the w^* line and the w_*
line (and below the iv*" curve), so for d* between </_ and d^ (solid in Fig. 5.5), The
corresponding exit wages_tv*^_are described by the part of the iv* line in the same interval
for </*. Thus, only for d_ < d* < d^, i.e. for a sufficiently, but not too strong (average)
susceptibility to social influence Y^£\ the NIV case allows collective catastrophes and
hysteresis in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve such as in Figure 4.2.
Figure 5.5 Graphs of entry and exit wages as functions of d' :- |a^| - Y^£ for given [a^J
and 0 < F* := |a^^| - y^x < f* < c^ in the IV as compared to the NIV case. The
hatched surface indicates the instability region in the IV case and the cross-hatched part
of it corresponds to Figure 5.3.
Similarly,_in the IV case the entry wage vv and the corresponding exit wage iv as
functions of J * are described by a w *' curve and the part of a H- * * curve, respectively, for J *
between d* and <i*. The w curve also holds for d* £ </* for which we have two exit
wages w** and w*^ like w* and »v* in Figure 4B in Appendix 4B. In contrast to the NIV
case, the vv*' curve is not a part of a vv* curve, the vv*^ curve is not a pan of a w* curve
and the vv*' curve is not a part of a w* curve, but together the three former curves consti-
tute the frontier of "threshold wages" w*" for the existence of an unstable intermediate
equilibrium within this frontier (cf. Case 2 in Sec. 4.4). The instability region within the
frontier is indicated by the hatched surface in Figure 5.5. The part of that region which
yields a labour supply schedule like that in Figure 5.3 is cross-hatched.
^ The iv'* branch of this frontier corresponds to the branch of unfeasible negative threshold
wages iv*" = -y-d'/c"* in the NIV case. Note that in the present IV case the entry wage *"',
at which most group members collectively enter, is higher than the "aggregate reservation wage"_pr
lowest individual reservation wage H^", beyond which the average long-run labour supply W'
becomes positive at rising ic (see Fig. 5.3).138 C7iap/er 5
As a consequence of the relative positions of the w*' curve and_the w** curve vis-a-vis
the corresponding lines in the NIV case, d. is more negative than d,. Thus, with individual
variation the average susceptibility to social influence y^ should be stronger than without
individual variation in order to allow collective catastrophes and hysteresis in a forward-
sloping part of the labour supply curve as in Figure 5.3. On the other hand, since in a
similar way as above the H> curve can be shown to be located below the H- line in the
NIV case, it is ambiguous whether d* at the meeting point of the iv curve and the w>
curve is more or less negative than d_.
An important difference between the NIV and IV case is the following. In analogy to the
IHF case of Section 4.4, the NIV case excludes collective catastrophes and hysteresis in a
backward-sloping part of the labour supply curve as in Figure S.3. On the other hand, the IV
case seems to allow such collective catastrophes and hysteresis provided it deviates suf-
ficiently from the NIV case, i.e. for sufficiently strong individual variation. This, however, is
a complex problem which is not elaborated here.
i, When BPI with respect to consumption is added to the picture, this creates an additional
cause of collective catastrophes and hysteresis in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply
curve, but diminishes the probability of such phenomena in a backward-sloping part. For the
former case reasonings similar to those above can be given, but it is difficult to derive
precise results. Still, for the case of ?* :- |<*xxl - y^x > 0 we can, similarly to situation
(i) in Proposition 4.1, formulate
5./ /« a fi/Mario/i o/«o/ /w> sfro/ig i/K#vitfua/ variafiYwi rotfective catas/rop/ies
ny.vfc>re.si.v in a /orwwd-.i/oping ^>ar/ o//ne /a/wur si/pp/y curve 5MC/I a5 //I F/gwre 5J
r/wr 0 < c~* < r^ a«c/ d_ < d* < d^ < 0, wnere c^, d_ a«J d., are ro/np/ex a«d
wnitnown/unctions o/f/ie dis/nTw/ions o/ o^,>, a^,-,
a/id o^^, tfjrccpr r/io/ r"* do« w«f rfepewJ o/i y^^- and y^^, a/id <i* am/ flf^ no/ on r
Moreover, c"* w jrwa//er f«an r * in /ne N/V case and d* « more negative rnan d* in rne
A//V raje.
The restriction F* * l^xxl " ^xx > 0 is equivalent to the average susceptibility to social
influence y^£ being smaller than the short-run tendency to satiation |%xl- Tr»* imp''**
(A/"7AO7xjf"* < l«xxl- *'"" /V'/W times the average susceptibility to social influence
of the unrestricted group members Y^f"* can easily be shown to be smaller than the
average susceptibility of all group members Y^^- According to the analogue of (5.13) in
Section 5.3 for consumption, this defines (relatively) weak BPI with respect to consumption
at the intermediate equilibrium. Together with the stability condition (5.12) (cf. (5.20)), this
implies that in order to allow collective catastrophes and hysteresis, the BPI with respect to
household time should then be strong at the intermediate equilibrium, i.e.flg/tav/owa/ preference iwrfrdfpf/idfnrg 139
X"* ^ I«LLI" According to Proposition 5.1 this holds in an interval of w
l"zxl * 1^*1- *"d '" addition we should have y^£ < |a^^| + |d*|. On the
other hand, as c~* increases, so as y^x declines or |ot^^| rises, the interval for d* narrows
and the entry and exit wage curves in Figure S.S approach each other until the interval
vanishes and the two curves coincide into one point for the value c^ of c"*. The cross-
hatched surface in Figure 5.S has then shrunk to zero. However, when the individual varia-
tion is too strong, we have for all positive F* a situation in which a graph like that of zT
in Figure 5.4 is transformed into a graph like that of z7 , describing a stable equilibrium. In
that case the surface in Figure 5.5 is already zero for a non-positive c^. Therefore, Proposi-
tion 5.1 holds only for not too strong individual variation.
Analogously to the situations (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 4.1 at the end of Section 4.4,
collective catastrophes and hysteresis in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply curve as
in Figure 5.3 can also occur when the BPI's with respect to consumption and household time
are strong and weak, respectively, or both strong at an intermediate equilibrium. However,
precise conditions for these situations are more complicated than those in Proposition 5.1.
Likewise, statements on the absence of backward-bendedness of the long-run labour supply
curve in these situations are difficult. i ,
In the case of BPI with respect to household and corporate time only or consumption
only, the short-run average demand functions like Z, ^ and z7 in Figure 5.4 can be rational-
ized as the result of the constrained maximization of an additive short-run aggregate utility
function. Catastrophe theory then implies an additional property under the weak condition
that an average household time or consumption demand function of the corresponding social
environment like Z. in Figure 5.4 is three times continuously differentiable (C ). This
property is formulated in the following proposition for the case of household time BPI, but
an analogous proposition holds for consumption BPI.
52 Cowj/rf^r /ne c/a55 o/ C^ av£ra#? nowse/io/d rime
s^ wnicn /lave a s/j?mo/d j/iape j/mi'/ar to //jar o/ Z, /n Fi#«r<> 5.4,
/or tv/i/c/j f/ie co//ec/ive f/i/ry and exiV catasfropto i/ivo/ve i/iter/or M/t^ncy o/f/ie curv« o/
f/iese dewiand /M/icft'ons to f/i£ ft/ui/ilv/um ///i«. For 0// rf<"/na«d /wncv/o/u 1/1 f/»'$ cVais //
/10W5 //ia/, in //ri/ approjrimafto/i /or a* * near one/ /^/ to j^, ln^ Jijjtrcncf frfrH"ffn fn«
en/ry and ejrif tva^« ii proporrionci/ to |d* - d^ | ~ (Y^t " Y/x*' ^"'
to joc/a/ 1/1-
rna/ correjponaj to
" This can be seen by rewriting the stability condition (5.12) for the present AQM case, analog-
ously to (4.11) in Section 4.3, as cV* • d* > 0. where c* := |a^| - (\"'/W)Y^J"' and
^* '* l°ttl " (^"*/Af)Y7r"*- Instability of the intermediate equilibrium then requires that
C'H'* + d* £ 0, or d* ^ - c*w*, so when the coasumption BPI is weak at the intermediate
equilibrium, or c* > 0, we should have d" £ 0, or strong household time BPI at the intermediate
equilibrium.140
The power 3/2 is a so-called invariant, i.e., it holds for all demand functions in the class
mentioned (see Vendrik, 1979b, p. 520). Note that the corresponding power in the linear
NIV case is 1. For BPI with respect to both household time and consumption an analogous
proposition can be expected to hold, but this is not implied by catastrophe theory, since the
short-run average demand functions can then not be rationalized by an additive short-run
aggregate utility function as a consequence of the factor /V"//V depending on both social
environments (cf. Sec. 4.6). Therefore, an investigation of this case is beyond the scope of
this study. •
When BPI with respect to corporate time // is added to the analysis in this section, not
much changes. Analogously to Section 4.5, we consider a quadratic specification of the
individual utility functions ^'(X^,/L^,W,;.v^-,5£-,5yy) which is additivefly separable) in
{X^,.YJ-), (^..s/;) and fW,,5^). Assuming equal adjustment rates 5^ and 5^y of the social
household and corporate time environments, this specification can be reduced to a specifica-
tion of the individual utility functions £/'(X,,L,;J^,S£) by substituting //• = 7", - L, and
jjj • T - J£ (sec Sec. 5.2). Assuming 7", = 7", this yields a specification of the same form
as (5.14). where a*, - &*;• a^, - &^,. y^-, - fxx; and
0' : , (5.22b)
(5.22c)
The parameter ^ in (5.22a) measures minus the (relative) strength of the corporate time
BPI for individual i. When the "pure" corporate time taste &#, is positive and d^. is
negative, i.e., when the corporate time BPI is (relatively) strong for /, the "net" household
time taste a^,- is smaller than the "pure" household time taste 6:^, and may even be negat-
ive. These possibilities imply interesting modifications of individual and average short and
long-run labour supply schedules and of diagrams like Figure 5.5. These modifications are
similar to those discussed in Sections 4.5, 4.7 and 4.8 and are not elaborated here. I mention
only one of them.
When a^, < 0, or 6^, < ft,/, + (-<fe )7" (see (5.22a)), for all individuals, i.e., when the
"pure" household time taste of each individual is lower than his (or her) "pure" corporate
time taste plus the net marginal utility effect of his corporate time BPI and satiation tenden-
cy, maximal average employment (W = 7") is a stable long-run equilibrium for any w (cf.
Fig. 4.7). In such a situation of a strong exogenous attachment to corporate work relative to
household time and/or strong endogenous "collective workaholism", there is not only no
positive short-run exit wage, but also no positive individual or collective long-run exit wage
(see the description of "collective workaholics" at the end of Sec. 5.2), and, when
d* :• |ct££,| - Y^£-, > otj.,77" for all individuals, no positive individual or collective long-
run entry wage. However, apart from such rather extreme cases. Propositions 5.1 and 5.2
continue to hold for the combination of household and corporate time BPI instead of pure
household time BPI.flftoviowa/ preferf/ire i/ifgrdfpgndf/irg141
5.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has derived and analysed a general model of BPI with respect to both con-
sumption and household and corporate time in labour supply. This model turned out to be, in
part, analogous to the general individual habit formation model which was developed in
Chapter 3. As a consequence, the model has analogous properties like multiple equilibria
exhibiting collective hysteresis and catastrophes dependent on rationings and the wage rate.
An additional complication, however, is formed by the stabilizing force of individual varia-
tion in parameters and exogenous variables. As elaborated in the previous section for an
additive quadratic (AQM) specification of the utility function, this makes parameter con-
ditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis stronger. Moreover, it implies relations
between collective entry and exit wages on the one hand and BPI parameters on the other
hand which differ from those without individual variation.
A more important implication of individual variation in parameters and exogenous varia-
bles is that it makes the effects on average labour supply of locally unstable individual habit
formation (IHF) essentially different from those of locally unstable BPI (see the end of Sec.
5.3). In order to see this, we should compare the average labour supply graphs for BPI as
derived in this chapter for an AQM to corresponding aggregated labour supply graphs for
IHF in Section 4.8. Comparing Figure 4.11 and Figure 5.3, we see that collective hysteresis
can occur in both the IHF and BPI cases, but, whereas in the former case catastrophes in the
individual long-run labour supply curve arc "smoothed out" in the aggregated long-run curve
by individual variation, we have in the latter case collective catastrophes in the aggregated
long-run curve. This means that when members of a social group strongly influence each
other's preferences, the labour market entries of most members are "synchronized" and the
individual variation in the reservation wages of these members in the absence of this social
influence is reduced to zero. Another important difference between the IHF and BPI cases is
that whereas locally unstable IHF leads to a continuum of possible equilibria (Fig. 4.12), and
hence to movements within the collective hysteresis loop (Fig. 4.11), locally unstable BPI
polarizes the long-run expectations and behaviours into two distinct stable equilibria (Fig.
5.4) and consequently precludes a continuum of equilibria, and hence long-run trajectories
within the collective hysteresis loop (Fig. 5.3). We can then summarize the differences
between the effects of locally unstable IHF and those of locally unstable BPI in Table 5.1.
On the one hand, locally unstable BPI leads to collective hysteresis and catastrophes and, as
a consequence, to individual hysteresis and catastrophes. On the other hand, locally unstable
IHF implies individual catastrophes, but, as a result of individual variation, never collective
catastrophes.
However, the last difference holds only for the long-run curve, so when the group mem-
bers are in a state of long-run equilibrium. As argued in Section 3.5, in a world of ever
changing wage rates labour suppliers will be outside long-run equilibrium most of the time.
In particular, a cyclical variation in w will lead to a quasi-hysteresis phenomenon and
collective catastrophes in the long-run average labour supply curve arc "smoothed out" in an
"actual" average labour supply curve. Then the last mentioned difference between the effects
of locally unstable BPI and those of locally unstable IHF is not so clear any more, but still






















Table 5.1 Hysteresis and catastrophe phenomena at locally unstable IHF as compared to locally
unstable BPI.
A subsequent question is what a combination of the effects of (locally unstable) BPI and
those of (locally unstable) IHF may look like. This will be dealt with in the next two chap-
ters.CHAPTER 6
Collective Habit Formation:
BPI and Stable IHF
This chapter and the next analyse labour supply models which combine the effects of
(bandwagon) behavioural preference interdependence (BPI) with those of individual habit
formation (IHF). For consumption demand, integrations of a BPI model and a IHF model
have been made by Pollak (1976a) and Alessie and Kapteyn (1991). For labour supply, such
an integration has only been carried out by Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) (sec footnote 11 in
Sec. 5.2). For the sake of brevity, we refer to these integrated models as models of ro//?rr/v«
ZiaWr/orwaf/o/j (C7/F).' All the CHF models mentioned imply or are estimated to have a
unique stable long-run equilibrium for the combined IHF/BPI process. However, just as the
separate stable IHF or stable BPI models, such a stable CHF model cannot explain why
members of certain subcultures of long-term unemployed, although having lost their old job
involuntarily, become little motivated to get a new job. Similarly, such a stable CHF model
may not adequately explain how, in a collective process of "emancipation", social groups of
former housewives can develop a strong orientation towards paid work. To model such
profound changes in labour supply preferences in a more complete way than the IHF models
of Chapters 3 and 4 and the BPI models of Chapter 5, we integrate these two kinds of
models into (unstable) CHF models.
First, Section 6.1 gives a general stability analysis for the case of BPI and stable IHF
with respect to household time only. For two moderately general (sub)cases which can occur
when the individual household time demand functions arc linear or piecewise-linear in the
individual habit states, simple necessary and sufficient (in)stability conditions are derived.
However, these conditions turn out not to be the relevant (in)stability conditions in the case
of BPI and separately unstable IHF. For that case a modified relevant (in)stability condition
is derived in Chapter 7. Accordingly, Section 6.2 and subsequent sections of the present
chapter are restricted to the case of BPI and separately 5faWe IHF, whereas Chapter 7
analyses the case of BPI and separately M/iiraW^ IHF.
In order to investigate the labour supply dynamics implied by the stability conditions in
Section 6.1, Section 6.2 considers an additive quadratic specification of the CHF model
' This term has been inspired by the connection between IHF and BPI as shown by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980. pp. 374-375).144 Ctoptf r 6
(AQM). It is shown that, in the presence of exogenous individual variation, the IHF not only
reinforces the destabilizing effect of BPI, but also counteracts it by amplifying the stabilizing
individual variation (a point not recognized by Kapteyn and Woittiez). Moreover, it is
demonstrated that, as a generalization of the case of unstable BPI and no IHF as treated in
the previous chapter, collective catastrophes and hysteresis may occur for changing values of
the wage rate. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of such phenomena are
formulated. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 add BPI and stable IHF with respect to consumption and
corporate time to the models, and Section 6.3 concludes.
6.1 Stability conditions
r)././
Consider individuals i » 1 /V maximizing a utility function t/'(X,,L.;s^,5^) with
respect to consumption X, and household time L, at predetermined levels of their individual
habit state .s^, and social environment .v£ under the usual budget constraint X,-iw,-(7",--L,-)*l''o,--
This implies individual consumption demand functions X,-(H>,-,^0,.7",.*/,,••*£") and individual
household time demand functions £,•(**•,•.K0,-.7",-iJ£,-i*£). In a labour supply regime the
individual labour supplies, and hence the individual household time demands, are assumed to
be immediately realized. Next, thus realized, the individual household time demands are
assumed to affect, in the long run, the individual habit states according to the differential
Since these equations are to be combined with a differential equation for the social environ-
ment like (5.9a) in Section 5.2, they are specified in an analogous way and model the
individual habit states as moving averages of current and past individual behaviour. These
specifications differ from the psychological stock specifications (3.2a) in Section 3.1 by
scaling factors 8^, of the state variables (see footnote 20 in Sec. 5.2) and by the demand
functions having the social environment 5£ as additional arguments.
To be able to specify the differential equation for the social environment, we should
aggregate the individual household time demand functions to an average demand function.
Since, at least at kinks at the reservation wage, these individual demand functions are non-
linear, they can. in general, be exactly aggregated only to an average demand function
zT(w.J^ ,T|,£, ,J£) which depends on the entire vectors H\ X.., 7 and £, of the individual
variables for i * 1 /V. In a labour supply regime this average demand affects the long-
run evolution of the (expected or perceived) social environment J£ as modelled by the
differential equation
This equation is linked to the A/ individual habit equations (6.1), and the latter equations are
linked to each other via the former equation. Thus, we have a huge system of A/ + 1 differen-Co//fcm-g tofa'r/prwta/to/i: fl/V a/id jra&fe /W 145
tial equations in the individual habit states s^,. i = 1 .....A/, and the social environment J£\
For constant w;, £ and 7 a long-run sutionary equilibrium (jT.j-) of this system is given
by the equations MH-,-,>O,-,7,-.*£,•,*£) - */*,. ' * ' ^, »"«• ^(ii^Io'Li^/;) = */;•
However, in general it is very difficult to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
stability of such an equilibrium like the stability conditions (3.3) and (3.5) in the case of IHF
and (5.10) and (5.12) in the case of BPI (see App. 6A). For that purpose the system has to
be simplified.
First, we can make the same assumption as Assumption X in Section 5.2, namely that the
vectors of absolute_or relative deviations of the exogenous variables u^-, V^ and 7",- from
their averages »v, K^ and 7 are constant. Then the vectors w. V and 7 in the average
demand function in (6.2) can be replaced by w, K^ and 7. However, an analogous as-
sumption for the endogenous habit state vector s is dubious, since the individual habit state
equations (6.1) generally imply not only an endogenous dynamics of the average habit state
*£, but also an endogenous dynamics of the absolute or relative deviations of the individual
habit states from this average habit state. As a result, these deviations do not generally
remain constant at changes in the average exogenous variables. Therefore, the individual
household_time_demand functions can not generally be aggregated to an average demand
function {.(IV.KQ ,7,i^,S£), so the differential system can not generally be simplified in this
way.
Nevertheless, there are at least two moderately general cases in which a derivation of a
simple necessary and sufficient stability condition is still possible. These cases are dealt with
in the next two subsections.
6.72 Caj« o/o/ie u
Consider the case where the slopes Z, •* of the individual demands as functions of the
individual habit states at a long-run equilibrium point are the same for all members of the
social group. At varying values of the exogenous variables this can hold for /war or pi>re-
H>«e-/iwar individual demand functions like L, , /_• and L, in Figure 6.1, provided either
all individual equilibria L* = s^ remain points in positively sloping segments of the
demand functions, like the interior equilibria /I, and C,, or all individual equilibria remain
corner points in flat segments of the demand functions, like B and /4'. (These demand
functions and equilibria are also indicated in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2.) In the former subcase all
individual equilibria describe situations in which the restrictions 0 4 //, * 7, are not
binding and the slopes of the individual demand functions have the same positive valued
On the other hand, in the latter subcase all individual equilibria are restricted to zero or
maximal corporate hours and the slopes of the individual demand functions are zero (so we
Note that, in a limiting situation of this subcase, some individual equilibria may be comer points
of positively sloping segments of the individual demand functions (sec Fig. 4.1 in Sec. 4.2 for
>f = tv*' and tv « R-'*). The restrictions 0 * //, * 7, are then just not binding.146
may have a combination of individual equilibria at zero corporate hours and individual
equilibria at maximal corporate hours).^
B
•u
Figure 6.1 Linear and picccwisc-lincar individual household time demand functions of the
individual habit stale £,,< . L, and Z.,- , implying individual long-run equilibria -4,, B, C,-
and V (at given long-run equilibrium values of the social environment). >";*•
Examples of these subcases follow from the specification of the labour supply equations
of Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) and from the additive quadratic model (AQM) as analysed
in the next section. For the case of disaggregated consumption demands, examples of the
former subcase with only interior solutions are implied by the models of Gaeitner (1974) and
Pollute (1976a). Such subcases hold only for ranges of the exogenous variables w, VQ and
7" for which the individual long-run equilibria under consideration are either all points in
positively sloping segments of the individual demand functions or all corner points in flat
segments. For values of the vector (5, ,5£-) in a sufficiently small neighborhood of the
overall long-run equilibrium (5* ,v-), all group members are then in the same linear seg-
ment of their (piecewise-)linear demand functions with either all the same positive slope or
all the same zero slope.'* Consequently, in these ranges of the exogenous variables and in
this neighborhood of endogenous variables, the individual demand functions can be exactly
aggregated to an average demand function /-(H'.KQ ,7",F^,5^) which is linear in the average
• Note thai the restrictions do not prevent the individuals from working positive or less than
maximal corporate hours, but exclude negative or higher than maximal corporate hours.
* A deviation of an individual habit state 5^, from its long-run equilibrium value 5^, implies a
shift ri/onj? the individual demand line of person i (sec Fig. 6.1). whereas a deviation of the social
environment $£ from its long-run equilibrium value 5^ causes a shift 0/ i's individual demand line.
When both deviations arc sufficiently small, the individual habit state s^, can be seen to remain in
the same linear segment of i's individual demand line as its long-run equilibrium 5^*, at the long-run
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habit state i^ with the same slope as the individual demand functions of s^,. The differen-
tial equation (6.2) for the social environment j^ can then /<wa//y be simplified to
' . (6.3)
This equation has the same form as (5.9a) in Section 5.2 with the average habit state J^
instead of the social environment s^ as an argument of the average demand function.
The local evolution of the average habit state 7^ follows from local aggregation of
equation (6.1). Neglecting the effects of (co)variation in the individual adjustment parameter
5^,, we obtain
j ... (6.4)
This equation is similar in form to (4.24) in Section 4.8 with the social environment J£
instead of the individual habit vector 5' (and apart from a moving average instead of a
psychological stock specification).'' According to (6.3) and (6.4) both the social environ-
ment 5^ and the average_habit state i^ are adapted to the same average demand /„ with
adjustment speeds 8^ and 8^, respectively, which will generally differ. Thus, the system of /V + 1
differential equations has locally been reduced to a system of two differential equations for
one social environment and one average habit state with respect to household time.
Chapter 8 will analyse a piecewise-linear model in which the concepts of social environ-
ment and average habit state coincide. Then the equations (6.3) and (6.4) are automatically
identical with identical adjustment speeds 8^ and 8^.^ This reduces the system of two
differential equations to only one differential equation, which is similar in form to equation
(5.9a) in Section 5.2 without 5^ for pure BPI as well as to equation (4.24) in Section 4.8
without 5' for pure IHF. This suggests that, under certain conditions, the dynamics of
j£ = J^ may be described by average household time demand functions of s^ » i"^ which
resemble those in Figure 5.2 or those in Figure 4.12 or combinations of those functions. In
general, however, social environments and average habit states arc different entities with
different adjustment speeds. Figure 5.2 should then be extended to a three-dimensional
picture in the (5£\j^,L) space in which the stable and unstable equilibria are described as
intersections of an equilibrium line L = 5£ = 5^ and a two-dimensional surface of the
average demand function /.(s^.i^). Along the equilibrium line we may then have the same
kind of situations as in (combinations of) Figures 5.2 and 4.12.
Similarly to the derivation of a necessary and sufficient stability condition for IHF with
respect to both household time and consumption in Appendix 3A, it is easily shown that, for
' The individual habit vector docs not show up in (6.4), since (6.4) holds only for ranges of
exogenous and endogenous variables in which all group members arc in the same segment of their
(piccewise-)linear demand functions. This implies that kinks, and hence correction terms as in (4.21)
in Section 4.7, do not play a role in the aggregation.
Identity of the social environment and average habit state also follows from the disaggregated
linear difference equation models of Pollak (1976a) for consumption goods and of Kapteyn and
Woittiez (1990) for labour supply. In particular, (approximately) aggregating the latter model implies
.*£•, • i^, • L,_| with §£• = 8^ = 1 for both males and females.148 Cftaptf r 6
the present special case of IHF and BPI with respect to household time only, a necessary
and sufficient stability condition is given by
£J * £J < 1 (6.5)
(see also App. 6A). The "average slope" £./ is equal to the uniform individual slope L, * .
In the subcase where all individual long-run_ equilibria are not bound by the restrictions
0 i Wj i 7",, both this slope and the slope LJ". with respect to the social environment are
supposed to be positive. Then the IHF and the BPI reinforce each other's effect.
Accordingly, fulfilment of the stability condition (6.5) implies fulfilment of the stability
condition L, * » Lj < 1 for IHF a/ jj/vm /rwjtf-ru/i r^ui/ifrrium va/w* s^ o/ /to soda/
«iv/ro/wn«if as well as fulfilment of the stability condition L^_ < 1 for BPI af
run tf^Ki/ifrrium va/ui 5^ o/ /to avcra^f /ia/>i7 j/a/?. Consequently, in the present case
separate (conditional local) stability of IHF and BPI are necessary, but not sufficient con-
ditions for stability of their combination. For the sub-subcase where the last stability holds,
the mutual reinforcement of the effects of IHF and BPI is also found in the linear models of
Pollak (1976a) and Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990).
When the combined effect of IHF and BPI is sufficiently strong to make the left-hand
side of (6.5) larger than one and hence to violate (6.5), the equilibrium is unstable (like C in
Fig. 5.2). This can happen for IHF and BPI which may be separately unstable as well as
separately stable. Whatever be the case, the social environment and average habit state may
then move to another equilibrium like /I and B in Figure 5.2. However, when the social
environment and average habit state move to a comer equilibrium like B jn Figure 5.2, the
individual habit states all move to an individual comer equilibrium (L* = 7" implies Z., = 7",
for all 0- In all but accidental situations this can happen only when the individual demand
functions of the individual habit states move towards a piecewise-linear function like L^ or Ly
in Figure 6.1 due to the changing social environment. Thus, we end up in the subcase where
all individual equilibria describe non-participation or employment at maximal hours in flat
segments of the individual demand functions. All individual slopes L,* , and hence the
-• *"
"average slope" Lj as well as the other slope in (6.5), are then zero, implying that (6.5) is
always fulfilled. Thus, in this rather trivial subcase the long-run equilibrium of individual
habit states and social environment is always stable.
On the other hand, when the average habit state and social environment move towards an
interior equilibrium like <4 in Figure 5.2, some individual habit states may move towards an
interior individual equilibrium, but others may develop towards a corner individual e-
quilibrium at maximal corporate hours in a flat segment of the individual demand function.
Similarly, we may have an interior equilibrium B at which most, but not all group members
arc non-participating in a flat segment of the individual demand function (see Fig. 5.4 in
Subsec. 5.5.2). When the individual variation is not very weak or the BPI is not very strong,
such a "mixed" equilibrium in which a part of the social group is restricted to zero corporate
' Since the given long-run equilibrium values of the social environment and the average habit state
can be considered as exogenous, they do not affect the forms of the subility conditions for separate
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hours and another part is not bound by the restrictions 0 -t W,- s 7",-, is likely to exist for a
broad range of the exogenous variables (e.g.. for M^* < vT < *•*' in Fig. 5.3 in Sec. 5.4). In
this case the zero slopes of the individual demand functions of the former subgroup are
unequal to the positive slopes of the demand functions of the latter subgroup, so the above
derivation of the stability condition (6.6) does not hold for this case. Nevertheless, if we
make some simplifying assumptions, still a stability condition similar to (6.5) can be derived.
This is shown in the next subsection. ...._.--•••
6./-? Care o/fvw wm/orm/raft//s/o/vs ' • '• •
Consider a mixed equilibrium in which a part of the social group is restricted to zero cor-
porate hours and another part is not bound by the restrictions 0 4 //,< 4 7",-. Assume for the
unrestricted subgroup a uniform habit slope of the individual demand functions and a uni-
form habit adjustment parameter 5^. Appendix 6A proves that in this case a necessary and
sufficient stability condition is given by
where the first term denotes the uniform individual habit slope L, * in the unrestricted
subgroup. The second term, indicating the overall average social environment slope, is equal
to (A/"*/A/)Lj_ , where /V"* denotes the long-run equilibrium number of unrestricted
group members and L*. stands for the average positive social environment slope in the
unrestricted subgroup in long-run equilibrium (see Sec. 5.3). Thus, in contrast with the habit
slope, the social environment slope in (6.6) is suppressed by the factor A/"*//V. This is due
to the stabilizing effect on the dynamics of the social environment of the impossibility for
the non-participants to work less than zero hours, whereas the stable adjustment of the
individual habit states of the restricted non-participants to their fixed long-run equilibrium
household times 7",- does not affect the stability of the overall system. In the limiting case
that the factor A/"*//V is equal to one, i.e., all group members are unrestricted with the same
positive habit slope, we have one of the two subcases which have been analysed above, and
the stability condition (6.6) reduces to (6.5)." More generally, we may have a mixed
equilibrium in which one part of the social group is restricted to zero corporate hours,
another part is not bound by the restrictions 0 4 //,< 4 7,-, and the remaining part is restric-
ted to maximal corporate hours (see, e.g.. Sec. 5.5). The necessary and sufficient stability
condition (6.6) as derived in Appendix 6.2 applies to this case too.
In both cases the IHF and BPI reinforce each other's effect, but in Section 6.2 we will
see that the IHF also counteracts the effect of the BPI by making the factor /V"'//V smaller
as the IHF becomes stronger. Analogously to the case of (6.5), separate (conditional local)
stability of the IHF of the unrestricted group members and separate stability of the BPI are
* In the stability analysis in Appendix 10E of Kapteyn and Woiltiez (1990) it is implicitly assumed
that all individuals are unrestricted. This is in contradiction with the data employed as described in
Table I0F.2, according to which more than half of the females is non-employed. On the other hand,
Kapteyn and Woittiez need only a sufficient stability condition and the condition (6.6) with /V"*//V « 1
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necessary, but not sufficient conditions for stability of their combination.' Again the com-
bined effect of IHF and BPI may be so strong as to make the left-hand side of (6.6) larger
than one, and hence to violate (6.6), implying that the equilibrium is unstable. This can
happen for the following combinations of separately unstable or separately stable IHF and
BPI. .rai:v,.,/ .™.:. „•: .....
.... First, the unrestricted habit slope £.*" may be smaller than one, implying separately stable
IHP. The social environment slope /./_ should then be larger than 1 - /.*", which is
smaller than one. Hence, it is sufficient that the social environment slope is larger than one,
implying separately unstable BPI. This, however, is not necessary: the social environment
slope may also be smaller than one, so the BPI may be separately stable, provided it is
sufficiently strong. As a generalization of the subcase of no IHF and unstable BPI, it can be
argued that in both subcases of separately stable IHF and separately unstable or sufficiently
strong BPI, the social environment and average habit state may move to one of two other
equilibria like -4 and 0 in Figure 5.2 in Section 5.3. Section 6.2 gives an argumentation for
an additive quadratic specification of the combined IHF/BPI model. Section 6.2 also demon-
strates that for changing values of the exogenous variables collective catastrophes and
hysteresis may occur as in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.4 and that collective catastrophes go
together with the left-hand side of (6.6) becoming equal to one in the case of an internal
unstable equilibrium as in Figure 5.3 and larger than (or equal to) one in the case of a comer
unstable equilibrium. Moreover, the collective catastrophes and hysteresis imply individual
catastrophes and hysteresis.
The left-hand side of the stability condition (6.6) is also larger than one, when the un-
restricted habit slope L^ is larger than one, implying separately unstable IHF. This holds
for separately stable as well as unstable BPI. As a generalization of the subcase of unstable
IHF and no BPI, it can be shown that in the subcase of separately unstable IHF and separa-
tely stable BPI examples are given by equilibria like -4 and fl in Figure 4.12 in Section 4.8.
Then all individual habit states are polarized into one of two long-run comer equilibria 0
and 7*,, but one or more of these individual equilibria are unstable as in Figure 4.1 in
Section 4.2 for w • vt'*' and w = w**. The latter equilibria are not bound by the restric-
tions 0 i W,- i 7", and the corresponding unrestricted habit slope L^ is larger than one. At
a slight change in an exogenous variable the unstable individual equilibria may disappear as
in Figure 4.1 for w > w and w < w , implying individual catastrophes from maximal to
zero household hours or the reverse. This happens for H- rising along the entry curve or
declining along the exit curve in Figure 4.11 in Section 4.8 for the subcase of no BPI. Then
the equilibrium on the entry or exit curve like /I or B in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 moves
inwards. More generally, this holds in the presence of BPI. In fact, for large A/ the factor
A/"*/A/ is very small, so the social environment slope Z,^_, which is equal to (A/"*/A/ )L^_ ,
is negligible. This implies that the BPI is separately "very stable", and it turns out to be a
' Note that the IHF's of the persons who are restricted to zero or maximal corporate hours arc
always separately stable, since these persons are in tlat pieces of their individual demand functions
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consequence of the counteracting effect of the strong IHF in combination with individual
variation.
In Section 5.6 we concluded from Figure 4.11 that in the AQM without BPI unstable IHF
implies individual catastrophes, but, as a consequence of individual variation, never collec-
tive catastrophes, no matter how strong the IHF. Combined with the implication of separa-
tely "very stable" BPI, this suggests that collective catastrophes are unlikely in the presence
of separately unstable IHF. However, Chapter 7 will demonstrate that under sufficiently
strong social influencing the individual catastrophes can trigger subsequent individual cata-
strophes to such an extent that collective catastrophes arise. This is not reflected in the social
environment slope in (6.6), since this slope holds for given long-run equilibrium values of
the individual habit states, and hence does not take into account the discontinuous shifts in
these values as a result of the individual catastrophes. The social environment slope can be
adjusted for this effect and then a collective catastrophe turns out to go together with the
adjusted slope becoming equal to one.
Finally, analogously to the cases of IHF only and BPI only, the stability conditions (6.S)
and (6.6) can be expressed in terms of second-order derivatives of the individual utility
functions, the wage rate and other parameters and exogenous variables (cf. (3.5) in Sec. 3.3
and (5.12) in Sec. 5.3). Moreover, propositions which are analogous to Proposition 3.1 in
Section 3.3 can be derived. This, however, is not elaborated here, but only some elements of
it are used in the additive quadratic model of the next section.
6.2 Additive quadratic model
- • - - - - !, T
<5.2./ 5/iorr-rwn/aftowr jwpp/y
This section analyses the combined effects of BPI and (separately) stable IHF with respect to
household time for an additive quadratic specification of the individual utility functions.
Thus, we assume that these utility functions are additive(ly separable) in individual con-
sumption X, on the one hand and individual household time L,, individual (household time)
habits 5^, and social (household time) environment J£ on the other hand. This subsection
derives and aggregates individual short-run labour supply functions. The next two subsec-
tions analyse the two uniform habit slope cases which have been considered in the previous
section. In the second case an interesting interaction between the exogenous individual
variation and the IHF is investigated. Finally, Subsection 6.2.4 derives necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur.
Transforming away terms which are independent of the choice variables X, and L, (see
Sec. 4.1), the additive quadratic utility functions can be specified as
'° However, this tangency condition should not be confused with the "degenerated" tangency
situation between ;4 and S in Figure 4.12.152
(6.7)
with a^, > 0, a^, < 0, a^, > 0, a^, < 0, y^, t 0 and y^ t 0. Analogously to
the derivation in Section 4.1, maximization of these utility functions under the budget
constraints leads to individual short-run labour supply functions .
«, - -^ L •'"• --^ • • (6.8)
where ... .' . 1 1 , 1, . ; <
c. :- -l/^ - -a^x, > 0. • '"^ (6.9c)
<j, :- -i/' , . -a,,, > 0. (6.9d)
Of course, (6.8) should satisfy the constraints 0 * W, * 7,, so holds provided 0 * a,w, - 6, i
For the purpose of exact aggregation of the interior labour supply functions (6.8), we
assume, just like in Subsection 5.5.1, individual variation in only the parameters a^,, ct^,-
and y^£- and the variables K^, and 7,-. Analogously to (4.19) in Section 4.7 and (5.17), the
average labour supply function can then again be written as
W - *"" " * • C7, (6.10)
where C7 denotes a sum of correction tenns due to the /-dependent restrictions 0 * W, 3 7,.
Moreover, the average parameters iF and fc are given by
Since the individual parameters />,, and hence the individual household time demands
L, • 7", - W; are linear in s^, according to (6.9b) and (6.8), and since, moreover, the slopes
Y^^/(cw^ • d) arc the same for all group members, this model can describe the two cases
of linear or piecewise-linear individual household time demand functions of the individual
habit states as considered in the previous section. The next subsection will analyse the first
case and the subsequent subsection the second case.tofa'f/orma/io/i: fl/V aw/ sfqft/t» ///F153
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In this case either all individual long-run equilibria Z-* = ^ describe situations in which
the restrictions 0 4 //,. 4 7", are not binding and the individual demand functions have the
same positive slope, or all individual long-run equilibria arc restricted to zero or maximal
corporate hours and the individual demand functions have a zero slope. In the former
subcase the sum of correction terms CT in (6.10) is zero. Therefore, since the parameter />
is linear in the average habit state i^ and the social environment ££\ the average short-run
labour supply and hence the average short-run household time demand L • f - tf are
linear functions of s^ and 5£\ which functions do not depend on the absolute or relative
deviations of the individual habit states from s^. For the special case in which .F^ and .vy-
coincide, examples of such linear average household time demand functions of .v^ s \j- are
given by L with slope smaller than one and the interior segment of Z. with slope larger
than one in Figure 5.2 in Section 5.3. The slope being smaller or larger than one determines
whether the interior equilibrium is stable or unstable, respectively, and is equal to the sum of
the two slopes in the stability condition (6.5). ^.^i •>,;;.. vi ui? .•*; hn«r-: i-.ii.to ,rfi ni •,
More generally, this stability condition holds for the case in which the average habit state
and the social environment are different entities. In the present subcase, substituting (6.1 la),
(6.1 lb), (6.9c) and (6.9d) into the right-hand side of (6.10) with CT = 0 and differentiating
this to .F^ and S£\ the stability condition for the interior equilibrium becomes
This condition implies a perfect mutual reinforcement of the effects of IHF and BPI. In fact,
despite the essentially different mechanisms of IHF and BPI. their a##rp#u/p effects arc
completely interchangeable in the present linear model in the sense that, for given values of y^
or y^£- in (6.11b) and of the adjustment parameter 8^ or 8^ in (6.4) or (6.3), it does not
make any difference for the short-run and long-run average labour supplies whether these
supplies are determined by the dynamics of an average habit state ,v^ or by that of a social
environment .$£•. Thus, the reinforcing effect on average labour supply of the household time
habit formation of individual labour suppliers is qualitatively the same as the reinforcing
effect on average labour supply of the mutual influencing of each other's household time
preferences."
However, this conclusion holds only for the two subcases of either all individual long-run
labour supplies being unrestricted or all individual long-run labour supplies being restricted
to zero or maximal corporate hours, and these subcases apply only if there is no individual
variation (NIV) in parameters and exogenous variables or, in the case of individual variation
(IV), for certain intervals of the wage rate (and the other exogenous variables). In the NIV
(sub)case all individual labour suppliers behave identically in the short and long run, so
average short and long-run labour supply functions are exact replicas of the corresponding
' Such a result is also found in the linear consumption model of Pollak (1976a). However, it docs
not hold for the individual supplies or demands, since the individual habii states generally vary over
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individual functions. Now not only the aggregate effects of IHF and BPI on average labour
supply, but also their effects on the individual labour supplies as being identical to the
average labour supply are completely interchangeable. As a consequence, the short and long-
run labour supply schedules have the same shape as corresponding labour supply schedules
for the AQM with IHF only as derived in Sections 4.1-4.4. In particular, we may have a
long-run labour supply schedule as in Figure 4.2 with individual and collective catastrophes
between zero and maximal corporate hours in which all group members are involved. Just as
in the NIV case in Subsection 5.5.3, necessary and sufficient conditions for individual and
collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur are fully analogous to those for individual
catastrophes and hysteresis in the case of IHF with respect to household time only as
formulated under situation (i) in Proposition 4.1 in Section 4.4. We should only put y^ = 0
and replace the IHF parameter y^ by the sum of IHF and BPI parameters y^ + y^£, so
replace r* and rf* by c* :• lot^xl and <** :• I"t/J " 7/.Z. ~ Y^/J. respectively.'*
Accordingly, the parameters J* and <7*. which depend on r"*, take the place of the param-
eters rf* and d*."
On the other hand, in the IV case matters are much more complicated. Then different
individuals will generally have different long-run reservation wages or different entry and
exit wages. This implies that the subcase in which all individual long-run labour supplies are
unrestricted, can exist only for levels of the wage rate which are higher than or equal to the
highest long-run reservation, entry and/or exit wage of all individuals. Similarly, the subcase
in which all individual long-run labour supplies are restricted to zero or maximal corporate
hours may hold only for wage rates which are lower than the lowest individual long-run
reservation wage, entry and/or exit wage (when the restriction W- < 7"- is not binding for any
group member and any u\ as in Figure 4.9 in Section 4.7 and, possibly, in Figure 5.3 in
Section 5.4). Only for such ranges of the wage rate average labour supply schedules coincide
with representative ones, and the Figures 4.9 and 4.11 suggest that these ranges may be very
limited. More importantly, we are interested in what happens around reservation, entry and
exit wages such as individual and collective catastrophes, and this brings us to the second
case of mixed equilibria which has been analysed in the previous section.
6.2 J * Casf o/rwo M
In this case a part of the social group is unrestricted with a uniform positive habit slope and
another part is restricted to zero or maximal corporate hours with a uniform zero habit slope.
Then the sum of correction terms CT in (6.10) as describing the effects of the individual
variation in the kinks of the individual demand functions, becomes non-zero and should be
taken into account. As a consequence, the average short-run labour supply as expressed by
(6.10), and hence the average short-run household time demand, is a function not only of the
average variables K^, T and s^, but also, via the non-zero C7", of the vectors of absolute or
relative deviations of the individual variables Kg,, 7", and J^, from their averages. As
'* Note that the adjustment parameters 8^ and 8^ do not appear in the definition of d* because
of the moving average instead of psychological stock specifications of the habit states and social
environment according to (6.1) and (6.2).
" Note that we use the same symbols as in the case of BPI only in Subsection 5.5.3.Co/fecrivg /reftif /ormaftwi: fl/V and* .sfaftfe /tfF 155
argued in the previous section, the deviation vectors of the exogenous variables Ky, and 7",
can be assumed to be constant, but an analogous assumption for the deviation vector of the
endogenous habit states J^, is dubious. Therefore, we are in a more complex situation than
above to which stability condition (6.6) applies. In the present case this condition becomes
A/"' r«.
~*"- „ , .... (6.13)
This condition differs from the simpler condition (6.12) by the replacement of the overall
average susceptibility to social influence y^£ by the factor A/"*/A/ times the average sus-
ceptibility in the unrestricted subgroup Yj,£""*- Note that the habit slope term does not have
changed. The condition (6.14) can be rewritten as ' ' "' "'"'• •
This condition says that the combined destabilizing effect of IHF and BPI as expressed by
the habit rigidity y^ and the average susceptibility to social influence y^"*, should be
not so strong as to offset the stabilizing effects of diminishing marginal utilities and the
wage rate as well as of the individual variation as expressed by the depressing factor A/"*/A/
(cf. the condition (3.6) or (3.8) in Sec. 3.3 with f/^ = 0 and 8^ = 1). A sufficient
condition for (6.14) to be fulfilled is given by
As a generalization of weak IHF and weak BPI with respect to household time (see Sees. 3.3
and 5.3), this defines a (fWafiw/y) vwai comfe/naft'o/i o//WF and fl/7 with respect to house-
hold time, taking into account the stabilizing effects of individual variation. Conversely,
when the condition (6.15) does not hold, we have a f/Waf/VWyJ s/ra«j> romfti/Mtrio/i »/ ///F
am/ fl/7. Yet, from (6.14) it will be clear that this strong combination of IHF and BPI is not
generally sufficient to make the equilibrium unstable, since then also the stabilizing effect
w |<Xxx| of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption should be compensated.
To obtain more insight in the stabilizing effects of individual variation, we should, just as
in Subsection 5.5.2, express the factor /V"*/A/ in the stability condition (6.14) in terms of
the density function(s) of the /-dependent parameters and exogenous variables. For the sake
of simplicity we again consider the special case where only the household time taste param-
eter a^, varies over the group members. Now, however, this exogenous individual variation
induces also an endogenous individual variation in the individual habit states f^,, since the
variation in a^ leads to a variation in the individual household time demands, and hence to
a variation in the individual habit states as they are adapted to these demands. Again only
the parameter ft; varies in (6.8). Considering a^,, s^,, and hence ft,, for a large N as
continuous variables a^, j^ and ft, and defining e :« ft - ft with density function/(e)
and zero mean, it follows from (6.9b) and (6.11b) that e = (a^ - a^) + y^(s^ - j^).
The factor #"*/# is then given by (5.19) in Subsection 5.5.2 except that the definitions of a156 CTiopter 6
and &* are now different and e should be replaced by its long-run equilibrium value e*^,
since e is now endogenous via 5^. Moreover, the distribution function of e"" is then also
endogenous and is denoted as F*^. Furthermore, (5.19) has been formulated for the inter-
mediate long-run equilibrium C in Figure 5.4, but, mutatis mutandis, the same expression
holds for any long-run equilibrium. For the case of an intermediate equilibrium the present
expression has the same kind of properties as those explained under (5.19).
On the other hand, now the variation in the long-run equilibrium values of the individual
habit states s^ amplifies the variance of e which is due to merely the variation in the
household time taste a^, since the former variation is positively correlated to the latter
variation. This can be seen as follows. A higher household time taste a^ implies, according
to (6.9b), a higher fc, and hence, by virtue of (6.8), a higher short-run reservation wage 6/a
and above this reservation wage a lower labour supply //, so a higher household time
demand /.. In the longer run a higher Z, leads to a higher value of the habit state s^ as this
is adapted to the higher L, and the higher habit state feeds, according to (6.9b) and (6.8),
back on a lower A/, so a higher L, etc.. Thus, we can conclude that in a long equilibrium
persons with a higher household time taste will have a higher value of their habit state (i.e.,
be used to more household hours) above or at their long-run reservation wage, or at least
have an equal value (7") of their habit state below their long-run reservation wage. This
implies a positive correlation of the household time taste a^ and the long-run equilibrium
habit state .v^ , and hence a variance of c*^ = (ct^ - 5^) + Y/.z.(^ - i^,) which is
larger than the variance of a^ by a long-run multiplier effect.
If the intermediate equilibrium C does not deviate too much from the intermediate
representative agent equilibrium (like C' in Fig. 5.4), it then follows that the IHF will
further depress the slope of the average short-run household time demand function. More-
over, the variance of e is larger, and hence the slope-depressing effect is stronger, as the
habit sensitivity Y/./. is higher. This has two reasons. First, in the short run a rise in Y/.Z.
implies an enlargement of the variance of e • (a^ - a^) + Y/.L^L ~ */.)• since the
second term in the last expression is directly proportional to Yzx- Secondly, this enlar-
gement of the variance of e leads to a larger variance of the individual household time
demands, and hence in the longer run to an enlargement of the variance of the individual
habit states .v^, as they are adapted to these demands. In its turn, the last enlargement feeds
back on the variance of c, implying a long-run multiplier effect on the variance of e .
Thus, both a rise in the variance of the household time taste oc^ and a rise in the level of
the habit sensitivity Y^i. h"ve a positive long-run multiplier effect on the variance of
e = (ot^ - a^) + Y/./.(-*Z ~ •*/,)• and hence on the variance of the long-run individual
household time demand, via the variance of the long-run individual habit state s^ . More-
over, either rise reinforces the multiplier effect of the other. In this way the IHF weakens the
effect of BPI by amplifying the counteracting effect of individual variation. The intuition of
this amplification is that, when persons start to behave differently from each other due to
differences in personal characteristics, they tend to behave more "extremely", and hence
more differently, as they get used to their behaviour.
On the other hand, the habit sensitivity Yf.t directly raises the slope of the average
household time demand function via the first term of the numerator on the left-hand side of
(6.13). This implies a reinforcement of the effect of the BPI. Thus, in the presence of
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BPI. In general, the net result of these two effects is ambiguous. However, this ambiguity
disappears, when the individual variation in household time taste and/or the IHF are suf-
ficiently weak to make the variance of the long-run individual household time demands, and
hence the variance of the long-run individual habit states (which are equal to the demands),
small. Then the individual variation enlarging effect of IHF will be small and be dominated
by the reinforcing effect of IHF.
Whatever be the case, in order to imply an unstable overall equilibrium the combined
effect of the BPI and stable IHF should be so strong as to make the left-hand side of (6.13)
larger than or equal to one. This necessary and sufficient condition for instability is c-
quivalent to the negation of (6.14). Fulfilment of this instability condition for an interior
long-run equilibrium for a range of the wage rate w is again a necessary condition for
collective hysteresis and catastrophes like those in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.4 to occur. To be
able to establish for which values of utility function parameters (and exogenous variables)
this condition can be met, we should derive parameter conditions under which the negation
of (6.14) has solutions for w (cf. Table 4.1 in Sec. 4.3). However, as a consequence of the
individual variation and in contrast to the conditions (3.7a) and (3.7b) defining weak IHF,
(6.14) depends, in general, not only on u' via the factor H' on the right-hand side of (6.14),
but also via the factor /V"7/V and the averaging of y^£ over the unrestricted subgroup on
the left-hand side of (6.14). Therefore, to determine when precisely the negation of this
condition has solutions for u\ we should express the factor A/"*/A/ and the average
in w. However, even in the simplest case of exogenous individual variation in the household
time taste only, the expression of the factor A/"*/A/ in terms of w as given by the modified
(5.19), depends on the specific exogenous distribution of the household time taste and tends
to be complex for usual specifications of the endogenous distribution function F . Conse-
quently, just as in Subsection 5.5.2, a derivation of precise parameter conditions like those in
Table 4.1 is bound to be restricted to very particular cases as well as laborious. In addition,
instability of an interior equilibrium for a range of the wage rate w is not a sufficient
condition for collective hysteresis and catastrophes like those in Figure 5.3, so other con-
ditions should also be derived.
All this makes a derivation of precise parameter conditions rather unattractive. For-
tunately, however, more qualitative, but also more general parameter conditions can again be
obtained by following an alternative and less cumbersome approach. This approach is
explained in the next subsection.
This subsection will derive necessary and sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes and
hysteresis like those in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.4 to occur. These conditions are rather
qualitative, but also rather general in the sense of allowing individual variation in the param-
eters a^,, a^, and y^- and in the exogenous variables KQ, and 7",.
Just as in Subsection 5.5.3, we can consider the IV case of individual variation in which
the slope-depressing factor A/"*/A/ in (6.13) is smaller than one, as a perturbation of or
deviation from the NTV case of no individual variation with Af "*/A/ • 1, which case has
been discussed in the previous subsection. In the NIV case we have a simultaneous dynam-
ics of only the average habit state i^ and the social environment J£, and for the sake of
exposition we consider the special case in which 5^ and 5£ coincide. The dynamics of158 C/iapfgr 6
fy • S£ is then described by (6.3) = (6.4) with average household time demand functions of
5^ B ££- like the linear L in Figure 5.2 in Section 3.3 or the piecewise-linear L in
Figure 5.4. ^'-" '^--^--«^ --- -;-;,.-• , -.- • ,.- -. -
On the other hand, the TV case implies a simultaneous dynamics of J^ a .!£• and a vector
rf :• (i/,|-Ji, -*L/V-I "*/.) °f absolute deviations of the individual habit states from
their average (cf. eq. (4.24) in Sec. 4.8). Such a dynamics can be described by the following N
differential equations as straightforwardly derived from the system of first-order differential
equations (6.1) and (6.2): -,„-„>;,- *..<- ,
w.ro.f.Jj,.^) - ii.]. ." (6.16a)
Here f/, denotes a vector (Z.,-L i.^.|-L) of absolute deviations of the individual
household time demands from their average. Thus, the dynamics of fy_ • S£- and rf is
determined by the combination of an average household time demand function and A/ -1
individual household time deviation functions of both i^ and flf . This implies a 2A/-
dimensional configuration, which is hard to visualize._
However, there is a way out. Given K\ KQ and 7\ the first-order differential equations
(6.16a) and (6.16b) imply, for each given vector of initial values (F^ ,d^), a unique ad-
justment path in the (.^,rf •^•^,) space towards a long-run equilibrium. As the given
vector of initial values we could consider an infinitesimally small deviation from an unstable
long-run equilibrium. The system will then follow a unique adjustment path to another
equilibrium.''* We now consider the projection of such an adjustment path from the 2/V-
dimensional (fy.*/ ,£,</,) space onto the two-dimensional (T,£) space. For sufficiently
weak exogenous individual variation (EIV) in parameters and variables and/or for suf-
ficiently weak IHF '\ examples of such a projection could be given by the two segments
of the curve of Z?^ in Figure 5.4 between C and B and between C and /t, as being pertur-
bations of the corresponding segments of Z.' in the NIV case. We can then say that the
average habit state or social environment moves from its unstable equilibrium C towards
one of two other equilibria <4 and B. More generally, such a situation can hold when the
average habit state and social environment do not coincide.
'•* Note lhat if the vector of initial values would exactly coincide with the uastable equilibrium, the
system would stay in lhat equilibrium. The unique adjustment path would then be a point.
" Following Assumption X in Section 5.2. the vectors of absolute or relative deviauons of the
exogenous variables y,,,- and 7", a* from their averages have been assumed to be constant. These
deviations arc therefore implicitly incorporated in the average household time demand function and
the individual household time deviation functions. In general, the individual variation enlarging effect
of IHF, which has been demonstrated in the previous subsection for the case of EIV in household
time taste only, holds also for EIV in other parameters and variables.Co/7ecfive /mfa'f/orrnariow: B/V and sfaft/e ///F 159
Nevertheless, there are two important differences with the IV case of BPI only and no
IHF as analysed in Chapter 5. First, analogously to the adjustment paths from D and £ to
£ in Figure 4.12 in Section 4.8 for the IV case of IHF only and no BPI, projected ad-
justment paths from initial points between C and B to B and from initial points between C
and A to -4 in Figure 5.4 do not generally form a part of the corresponding projected
adjustment paths from (infinitesimally small deviations of) C on the curve of L , but lie
higher or lower. The positions of the former adjustment paths depend on the initial values
a" of the individual habit deviations.
-*i - -c
Secondly, the projection of adjustment paths from the (fy,,d X.d.) space onto L
implies that the deviation vector cf in the original average household time demand function
in (6.16a) becomes an implicit function of 5^ = .*^. Thus, L is a function of s^ = .?£ not
only directly, but also indirectly via d . This implies that the slope of L at C is, in
general, not simply obtained by multiplying the NIV slope in (6.12) by the depressing factor /V"*//V
as in (5.20). Moreover, due to the projection, the slope is generally neither equal to the value
of the left-hand side of the IV stability condition (6.13) at C. On the other hand, what is
preserved by the projection, is instability with slope larger than one, i.e., the slope of L at C
is larger than one if and only if the left-hand side of (6.13) at C is larger than one.
This equivalence is especially useful when we consider what happens with the curve of
ZT in Figure 5.4 when the wage rate changes. Analogously to the IV case of BPI only, the
curve may then rise or fall until it becomes tangent to the equilibrium line at a certain vv
or »v*^ and next loses contact with this line for w beyond vv*' or >v** (as in Fig. 3.2 in
Sec. 3.5 for w = w*^). This induces collective catastrophes from B « C to /I or from
J4 = C to B, and hence collective hysteresis as in Figure 5.3. In the tangcncy situation the
slope of z7^ at C = B or C = /I is equal to one and, as a consequence of the equivalence
mentioned above and a continuity argument, this will go together with the left-hand side of
(6.13) being equal to one. In the case of weak EIV and/or weak IHF, and hence a small
deviation of L from Z- , it is also possible that the collective catastrophe from B » C to ^
occurs when B is still a corner equilibrium (as in Fig. 3.2 for w = w* ). Then a same kind
of reasoning as above implies that this will go together with the left-hand side of (6.13)
being larger than one.
Analogously to Subsection 5.5.3, we can now construct a figure similar to Figure 5.5 and
formulate a proposition like Proposition 5.1 on necessary and sufficient conditions for
collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur. Define c"*: = |%xl *™* ^*-~ l**ixl "
Then
Proposition 6./ /n a Jj7narion o/ jw/9?rienf/y wea* £/V anaVor sM/Jur/enf/y w«j* /7/F, co/7ec-
five cafasfropnes a/ia" /lyjferej/j in a/orwara"-j/oping parr o///ie /aftowr supp/y rurw JMC/I as
in Figure 5J occur/or 0 < c~* < c * ana" d* < J* < flf* < 0, vvter* c^, <i_ ana" a\ are
and wn/tnown /wncf/onj o/fne aVi/r/purio/u o/ o^,, a^,. Y^,. J^; a/ia" 7", ana" o/
" on a^x ana" Y^£, ana" d. ana" a\ nof
on Y^£-. Woreover. £* I"J 5ma//er fnan cj in fne WV case ana" a"* w more ne^faf/ve f/ian160 Omprer 6
J* m rte AW cas<?.
In this case of no IHF and BPI with respect to consumption the stability condition (6.14)
implies that in order to allow collective catastrophes and hysteresis, the combination of IHF
and BPI with respect to household time should be strong at the intermediate equilibrium, i.e.
^l<*f,tl* According to Proposition 6.1 this holds in an interval of tv
for Yt/7 * l**ttl "YLJ.* l<d< »"d '" addition we should have y^£ <I<*Z.LI -YLZ.+ 1^1- On
the other hand, as the short-run tendency to consumption satiation r"*:= la^xl increases, the
interval for d* narrows and the entry and exit wage line in Figure 5.5 approach each other
until the interval vanishes and the two lines coincide into a point for the value c^ of c"*.
The cross-hatched surface in Figure 5.5 has then shrunk to zero. However, when at given
sufficiently weak IHF, the EIV is not sufficiently weak, we have for all positive c"* a
situation in which a graph like that of L in Figure 5.4 is transformed into a graph like that
of L , describing a stable equilibrium. In that case the surface in Figure 5.5 is already zero
for a non-positive ("„.
On the other hand, when at given sufficiently weak EIV, the IHF is not sufficiently weak,
the individual variation enlarging effect of IHF becomes important alongside the reinforcing
effect of IIII-'. In particular, when the IHF is separately unstable at an intermediate e-
quilibrium, all individual habit states can be shown to be polarized into one of two long-run
corner equilibria 0 and 7*,- (see the next chapter). At most some of these individual e-
quilibria are not bound by the restrictions 0 * W, i 7", as in Figure 4.1 in Section 4.2 for
w • w and u> = w* . For large /V this makes the slope-depressing factor /V"*//v\ and
hence the second term in the stability condition (6.14), negligibly small. As a consequence,
this case deviates too much from the NIV case with A/"*/W = 1 for Proposition 6.1 to apply
to it, so the IHF in Proposition 6.1 should at least be separately stable. According to Section
3.3 a vv-independent sufficient condition for stability demands that the separate IHF is
(relatively) weak, i.e. YJX " I"/./. I < 0 '*• but, dependent on the EIV, a sufficient con-
dition on the IHF for Proposition 6.1 to apply may still be stronger. The resulting sufficient
conditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur are given under Case II in
Table 6.1, where d* depends on the EIV in an unknown way, but is expected to decline
with increasing EIV and usually to be negative. Table 6.1 displays four relevant cases of
combinations of, on the one hand, weak or strong (separate) IHF and, on the other hand,
weaker or stronger BPI relative to EIV. Case I will be discussed below and Cases III and IV
will be considered in Chapter 7.
" See footnote 7 and Section 4.3. The relative strength Y^ - |a^| of the IHF increases by a
rise in ihc habit sensitivity y^ as well as by a decline in the short-run tendency to household time
satiation |otj_J. In the lattcrca.se the range 7"(cn^ + </) • 7"( |O^|H•*• |otj_jj) of e*^ in the
proportion of the analogue of (5.19) for the present case decreases, while the variance of c*^
remains the same. Again this is likely to imply a decrease in the proportion, i.e. in the slope-depres-









iv ••**'• -—-••: - ••
0 < lotvvl < £"„(&/*')
• A A < O 4*
Table 6.1 Four cases of combinations of, on the one hand, weak or slmng IHF and. on Ihc other
hand, weaker or stronger BPI relative to exogenous individual variation (EIV). In the
Cases III and IV there is EIV in the household time taste a^ only. •
In the present Case II a collective catastrophe again induces individual catastrophes and
hysteresis, but in this case of separately stable IHF, a number of individual catastrophes will
occur not between individual corner equilibria for zero and maximal corporate hours, but
between zero hours and an interior equibrium for less than maximal corporate hours, or
between two interior equilibria. Moreover, in contrast to the case of unstable IHF, there arc
no long-run trajectories within the collective hysteresis loop. The hysteresis and catastrophe
phenomena in this Case II are summarized in Table 6.2, which summarizes also the hyste-
resis and catastrophe phenomena in the other three cases of Table 6.1 (sec below). Analog-
ously to Proposition 5.2, an additional property is suggested by catastrophe theory, but, just
as in the case of BPI with respect to both household time and consumption, it is not implied
by this theory, since the short-run average household time demand functions of the in-
dividual habit states and the social environment cannot be rationalized by an additive short-
run aggregate utility function as a consequence of the factor /V "/yV depending on both the
individual habit states and the social environment (cf. Sec. 4.6). Therefore, an investigation































Table 6.2. Hysteresis and catastrophe phenomena in a forward-sloping part of the labour supply
curve in the four cases of Table 6.1. : ' *
As a counterpart of Case II, Case I in Table 6.1 represents a sufficient condition for neither
collective nor individual catastrophes and hysteresis to occur. This condition implies the
sufficient stability condition (6.15), which defines a weak combination of IHF and BPI,
taking into account the effects of EIV. By excluding instability of an intermediate e-
quilibrium the latter condition also excludes collective catastrophes. Moreover, the condition
in Table 6.1 implies Y/,/, ~ I<*£./J < 0. so weak separate IHF, and this excludes instability
of intermediate individual equilibria, and hence individual catastrophes. As a result, we then
have neither individual nor collective hysteresis, and hence no long-run trajectories within a
collective hysteresis loop. All this is summarized in Table 6.2. This Case I corresponds to
the labour supply model of Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) and the consumption demand
models of Gaertner (1974) and Pollak (1976a) (who, however, use linear specifications other
than the AQM).
Both Case I and Case II hold for separately stable IHF. What happens for separately
unstable IHF? Above we have seen that then, for large /V, the second term in the stability
condition (6.14) is negligibly small. However, the remaining inequality represents a neces-
sary and sufficient stability condition for the separate IHF at unrestricted individual e-
quilibria and is therefore violated in the case of separately unstable IHF. In particular, the
few unrestricted individual corner equilibria as in Figure 4.1 in Section 4.2 for w = H>*' and
H' * w are unstable, since the (uniform) unrestricted slope of the individual demand
functions of the individual habit states is larger than one. At a slight change in an exogenous
variable these unstable individual corner equilibria may disappear, as in Figure 4.1 for
H> > M'*' and H* < H**, implying individual catastrophes from maximal to zero household
hours or the reverse. This implies individual and collective hysteresis, but generally no
collective catastrophe. However, the next chapter demonstrates that, for sufficiently high
values of the susceptibilities to social influence Y^/~, the individual catastrophes can trigger
subsequent individual catastrophes to such an extent that collective catastrophes arise.Co/fecm-e Jiafar/orwario/i: fi/V a/»rf srafr/f ///F 163
63 BPI and stable IHF in consumption
When the general model of BPI and stable IHF with respect to household time as analysed
in Section 6.1 is extended with BPI and stable IHF with respect to consumption, the system
of A/+1 differential equations (6.1) and (6.2) is augmented to a system of 2W + 2 differential
equations in the individual habit states ty,, fy,, i = 1 A/, and the social environments
s^y and s^ for household time and consumption, respectively. Again, there are two modera-
tely general cases in which a simple necessary and sufficient condition for stability of a
long-run equilibrium of this system seems to exist. These cases can occur when the in-
dividual demand functions for household time and consumption are linear or piecewise-linear
in the corresponding individual habit states.
In the first case the slopes /., * and X,' of these individual demand functions at an
overall long-run equilibrium are the same for all members of the social group. Then the
system of 2/V + 2 differential equations can locally be simplified to a system of four dif-
ferential equations which is an augmentation of (6.3) and (6.4). However, this system seems
still to big to allow a straightforward derivation of a simple necessary and sufficient stability
condition like (6.5). Therefore, we assume identical adjustment speeds 8^ = 5^_ and 8^- = 8^ .
Then j^-s^ and 5^- = i^, so the system of four differential equations is reduced to a
system of two differential equations of the same form as (5.9) in Section 5.2. This leads to
a necessary and sufficient stability condition of the form (5.10) in Section 5.3. Splitting the
terms in (5.10) into the effects of the social environments and those of the average habit
states, the stability condition becomes ,
This condition can be considered as an extension of stability condition (6.5), which has been
derived for the general case that the social environment and average habit state with respect
to household time are different entities with different adjustment speeds. A plausible conjec-
ture then seems to be that (6.17) is a necessary and sufficient stability condition also in the
general case that the social environments and average habit states with respect to household
time as well as consumption are different entities with different adjustment speeds. This,
however, seems hard to be proven. Anyhow, an ensuing analysis which is analogous to that
following (6.5) can be given.
This analysis leads to the second case in which a simple necessary and sufficient stability
condition seems to exist. In this case we have an unrestricted subgroup with uniform positive
habit slopes Z. * and X * alongside a restricted subgroup with zero habit slopes. Then,
even when we assume identical adjustment speeds of the social environments and the cor-
responding average habit states, a derivation of a necessary and sufficient stability condition
seems very difficult. Again, however, we can make a plausible conjecture, namely that the
stability condition is a straightforward extension of (6.6) analogous to the extension (6.17) of
(6.5), which is given by164 C/tapter 6
Here the first and third terms denote the uniform individual habit slopes in the unrestricted
subgroup. Moreover, analogously to the second term, the fourth term, indicating the overall
average social environment slope with respect to consumption, is equal to (A/"*/W)X^. ,
where A/"* denotes the long-run equilibrium number of unrestricted group members and
X,. stands for the average positive social consumption environment slope in the un-
restricted subgroup in long-run equilibrium. Again, taking for granted that (6.18) is indeed
correct, an ensuing analysis which is analogous to that following (6.6) can be given.
(5J.2
In order to obtain more insight in the implied dynamics of the social environments and
average habit states, we can, just as in Section 6.2, resort to an additive quadratic specifica-
tion of the individual utility functions. Thus, we assume that the utility functions
(/'(X^,LJ;*^,,J;^,,.?^,.V^-) arc quadratic as well as additive(ly separable) in {X,,s^,,5^-} and
{Ly.ty ,-.*£•). In comparison with the specification (6.7) in Section 6.2 this implies two
additional terms, namely YxXi'Xi^i * Yxxi^x^/" Again, maximization of these utility
functions under the budget constraints leads to individual utility functions of the form (6.8),
but now a,- is analogous to /?, in (6.9b). Next an analysis can be given which is analogous
to that following (6.9d).
In the case of separately .vtoW<» IHF with respect to both household time and consumption
and individual variation in the parameters a^,, a^,, Yxx/ ^"^ Yf.£",- and the variables K^,-
and 7*,-, this analysis leads to the necessary and sufficient stability condition
(Yxx
This condition can be considered as an extension of the stability condition (5.20) in Subsec-
tion 5.5.2 as well as of the stability condition (6.13) in Subsection 6.2.3. Sufficient con-
ditions for (6.19) to be fulfilled are given by (relatively) weak combinations of IHF and BPI
with respect to household time and consumption, where the latter combination is defined
analogously to the former according to (6.15) in Subsection 6.2.3.
On the one hand, by adding terms in (6.19) as compared with (6.13), the addition of
collective habit formation with respect to consumption makes the system more easily unsta-
ble. On the other hand, this extension creates an additional suppressing effect on the factor
WV/V by endogenous individual variation in the individual consumption habit states along-
side that in the individual household time habit states. The implications of these additional
destabilizing and stabilizing effects are not elaborated here, but we can expect similar results
as in the case of collective habit formation with respect to household time only. In par-
ticular, we can construct a similar figure as Figure 5.5 in Subsection 5.5.3 and formulate a
proposition like Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 6.1 on necessary and sufficient conditions
for collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur. Differences with Proposition 6.1 are thatCo//gffiVf /iflfaV/orwoftbn: fl/V and s/afr/f MF 165
now c"* := |a^^| - Yxx ~ ?xx *™* *"at *"e parameters r*, <i* and d* also depend on r,
distribution of YxxV ^"is leads to a case like Case II in Table 6.1 with prob-
ably weak separate IHF with respect to household time as well as consumption, displaying
the same hysteresis and catastrophe phenomena in a forward-sloping part of the labour
supply curve as summarized in Table 6.2. As a counterpart we then have Case I with the
additional condition Yxx * Yxx ~ l*xxl * ^. ^is condition implies a sufficient stability
condition like (6.15), defining a weak combination of IHF and BPI with respect to con-
sumption, taking into account the effects of individual variation. As a result, we then have
neither individual nor collective hysteresis and catastrophe phenomena in a forward-sloping
part of the labour supply curve, as summarized in Table 6.2.
Thus, adding BPI and stable IHF with respect to consumption leads to similar results as
without this addition. On the other hand, analogously to the situations (ii) and (iii) in Propo-
sition 4.1 in Section 4.4, collective catastrophes and hysteresis in a forward-sloping part of
the labour supply curve as in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.4 seem also possible when the com-
binations of IHF and BPI with respect to consumption and household time are strong and
weak, respectively, or both strong at an intermediate equilibrium. Moreover, the long-run
labour supply curve is likely to be not backward-bending in these situations. However, a
derivation of precise conditions for these situations is beyond the scope of this study.
6.4 BPI and stable IHF in corporate time
Hi if bts,
BPI and stable IHF with respect to corporate time A/ can be added to the analysis by com-
bining the procedures in Section 3.2 and at the end of Section 5.2. Consider individual utility
functions t?'(X,-,L,-,W,;5^,-,5^,-,5//,-,^,5^,^y), where ty, is the corporate time habit state
of individual / and 5yj represents the social corporate time environment. Again making the
simplifying assumptions that the adjustment rates 8;/, and 8,7 of this habit state and this
social environment are (approximately) equal to the adjustment rates 8^, and 8^ of the
household time habit state 5^,- and the social household time environment S£\ respectively,
it easily follows that fy, = 7,- - 5^, and s,y = 7" - 5£\ Substituting these expressions and
W, = 7", - /., into the utility functions, we obtain reduced utility functions
l/'(X,-,L,-;5jf,-,j£,-,jjr,J£). Their marginal utilities t/ ^ are again related to the marginal
utilities $', and $',, of the original utility functions as 1/', « t?', - I?',, , and may
therefore be negative for sufficiently high L, and hence sufficiently low //,-. This may lead
to volunteer work and may especially happen in the case of a social group of "collective
workaholics" who are addicted to a high W as a consequence of corporate time IHF as well
as social control by the group. Such "collective workaholics" may even continue to work a
high W, when their wage rate w falls to zero (see footnotes 3 in Sec. 3.1 and 23 in Sec.
5.2).
A more detailed view of this extension can be obtained by considering a quadratic specif-
ication of the original utility functions fy'(X,,L,,W,;5^,,^,,j/y,,j^,j^,5/j) which is ad-
ditive(ly separable) in {X-,i^,,jjf), {L,,^,,s^) and <W,,J^,,5^). Along the above lines and
assuming 7", = 7", this specification can be reduced to a specification of the same form as
the extension of (6.7) with the two consumption terms (see the previous section), where166
r <*XXi * *XX«
- <*L, - A,/, * <^T wir* dl. = |<i,,,,,| - ?„„, - t,,^ (6.20a)
°- (6.20d)
The parameter dy in (6.20a) measures minus the (relative) strength of the combination of
corporate time IHF and BPI for individual i. When the "pure" corporate time taste A//,- is
positive and <^ is negative, i.e., when the combined corporate time IHF and BPI are
(relatively) strong for i, the "net" household time taste ot^,- is smaller than the "pure" house-
hold time taste <5^ ^ and may even be negative. These possibilities imply interesting modific-
ations of individual and average short and long-run labour supply schedules and of diagrams
like Figure S.5 in Subsection S.S.3. These modifications are similar to those discussed in
Sections 4.5, 4.7 and 4.8 and at the end of Section 5.5. and are not elaborated here.
However, apart from rather extreme cases like those mentioned at the end of Section 5.5,
Proposition 6.1 and Cases I and II in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 as well as their extensions for
consumption IHF and BPI continue to hold for the combinations of household and corporate
time IHF and BPI instead of pure household time IHF and BPI.
6.5 Concluding remarks .< . \
This chapter has analysed labour supply models which combine the effects of BPI with those
of separately stable IHF. As a preparation to that, a general stability analysis for the case of
BPI and IHF with respect to household time only was given. For two moderately general
subcases of this case simple necessary and sufficient (in)stability conditions were derived. It
was argued that these conditions are the relevant ones only for the case of BPI and separa-
tely stable IHF. For that case, the implications of these stability conditions for the labour
supply dynamics were investigated for an additive quadratic specification of the combined
IHF/BPI (or CHF) model. It was shown that, in the presence of exogenous individual varia-
tion (E1V), the IHF not only reinforces the destabilizing effect of BPI, but also counteracts
it by amplifying the stabilizing individual variation. Moreover, it was demonstrated that,
when the net result of this complicated interaction between BPI, IHF and EIV implies
instability of an interior long-run equilibrium, collective catastrophes and hysteresis may
occur for changing values of the wage rate (as a generalization of the case of unstable BPI
and no IHF as treated in the previous chapter). Necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of such phenomena were formulated. Finally, the results were extended so as to
account for the additional effects of BPI and separately stable IHF with respect to con-
sumption as well as corporate time.
However, the interesting cases of BPI and separately wn.stoft/p IHF are not covered by the
analysis in this chapter. The reason is that, although these cases can also display collectiveCo/Zecf/ve AaM//or/nari(m: B/V /W 167
catastrophes and hysteresis, the mechanism underlying these phenomena is different. This
implies a modification of the (in)stability conditions and another kind of analysis than in this
chapter. This analysis is presented in the next chapter.
Appendix 6A Derivation of stability condition (6.6)
Consider the system of N+l differential equations (6.1) and (6.2) in the individual habit
states .y^,, i = 1 A/, and the social environment S£\ Linearizing this system around a
long-run equilibrium (J^J s^^.j-), we obtain the system :.. ' •.'•-"••
£(Z7--1) 5£-L,* . ... 8^L/
O/I£SI Or 1 (Li ~l) 0 ... 0
• -1) 0 . . 0
,r*t. .if-.
W U . . 0 Oi»i(L^ -1)
where we have reversed the order of (6.1) and (6.2) for convenience's sake and where we
have omitted a constant vector term. A necessary and sufficient condition for local stability
of the long-run equilibrium (s^*,,...,5^,5^) is that the eigenvalues of the matrix in (6A.1)
have negative real parts. Denoting this matrix as M, its eigenvalues follow from the equation
det(A -X/) =f8^-(Z:;.-l)-^ n
0,
where we have substituted T, (1//V)L,* , / 1 N. Rewriting the factors168 Oiaptf r 6
in front of the last A/ multiple products as 8^,-(/.,•* - 1)-X*8jr_,+X and rearranging terms,




However, in general it seems still very difficult to derive necessary and sufficient stability
conditions from this equation. For that purpose the linearized system (6A.I), and hence the
original system (6.1) and (6.2), have to be simplified as in Subsections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3. Since
the case of the former subsection is a limiting case of the case of the latter subsection, we
can confine ourselves to the latter "mixed" case. Assume without loss of generality that the
group members i • 1,...,N"* are unrestricted and that the remaining group members are
bound by the restrictions 0 < W, < 7",. Under the assumptions of Subsection 6.1.3 we then
have Z.,* - L*" > 0 and L, * > 0 for / = 1 /V"\ L,' = 0 and L, * = 0 for
/ • /V"* + l W and
obtain the equation
^, 8^ for all i. Substituting these identities into (6A.3), we
The left-hand side of this equation consists of three factors, so the equation holds if and only
if one of these three factors is zero.
The first factor being zero is equivalent to the equation X^ - 6X + c = 0 with
£/_ - 1), (6A.5)
(6A.6)
The solutions for the eigenvalues can then be written as Xj 2 = —ft ± — yft - 4c . The
discriminant ft - 4r can be positive, but can be also non-positive for positive c. In the
former case the eigenvalues X, and X2 are both real and must be negative in order to fulfil
the stability condition. It is easily seen that this holds if and only if ft < 0 and c > 0. In
the case of a non-positive discriminant for c > 0, the eigenvalues are both complex (imply-Co//gcftVg /lafaf/orffianon: fl/Y a/ia" staft/e ///F169
ing oscillations!) with the same real part —6. The stability condition says that this real part
must be negative, so we end up with the same conditions ft < 0 and r > 0 as in the case of
a positive discriminant.
Since the adjustment parameters 8£- and 5^ arc positive, these conditions arc equivalent
to Lj*_ < 1 and L *" + L^*. < 1, respectively. The former condition is implied by the latter,
and the latter condition is the condition (6.6). In order to establish that this stability con-
dition is not only necessary, but also sufficient, we should consider also the other eigen-
values of the matrix /I in (6A.1) as given by the second and third factor in (6A.4). The
second factor being zero defines the real eigenvalue X.3 = 8^(L^ - 1), and this eigen-
value is negative if and only if L^ < 1. This condition is again implied by (6.6). The third
term in (6A.4) being zero defines the real eigenvalue A. 4 = -8^ and this eigenvalue is
always negative. Thus, stability condition (6.6) is indeed not only necessary, but also suf-
ficient.
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Collective Habit Formation:
BPI and Unstable IHF
This chapter investigates what happens in the additive quadratic model (AQM) of the
previous chapter in the case of BPI and (separately) unstable IHF. This case is considered as
an extension of the AQM case of unstable IHF only and no BPI as analysed in Chapter 4. In
the former just as in the latter case, the unstable IHF polarizes the individual habits into two
long-run corner equilibria at zero and maximal corporate hours or into one of these
equilibria (see Fig. 4.1 and footnote 8 in Sec. 4.2). This makes the situation resemblant to,
but still essentially different from that in cases of BPI and dichotomous short-run decisions
(see, e.g., Iannacone, 1989, App., for the case of BPI in dichotomous consumption demand).
For our more complex model, this chapter will demonstrate that, at changing values of
exogenous variables, collective catastrophes and hysteresis can arise as results of a sort of
"rvw-.vtatff /wvt«7". In the first stage the unstable IHF induces individual catastrophes of
some group members from zero to maximal corporate hours or the reverse. The second stage
fires when, due to a sufficiently strong BPI, these individual catastrophes trigger subsequent
individual catastrophes of other group members to such an extent that collective catastrophes
arise. Then, for instance, a rocketing number of group members start to work a rocketing
number of corporate hours.
Such collective catastrophes, however, are not described by the (in)stability conditions
derived in Section 6.1. but by a modified (in)stability condition, which is derived in Section
7.1. The implied labour supply dynamics is analysed in the next sections. First considering
unstable IHF and BPI with respect to household time only, two subcases are distinguished,
namely Case A of individual variation only in household time taste and IHF strength and
Case B of individual variation only in susceptibility to social influence. For Case A Section
7.2 derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a collective catastrophe
and for Case B Section 7.3 demonstrates that a collective catastrophe already occurs under
weak regularity conditions. For both subcases this leads to an interesting long-run average
labour supply schedule with two domains of catastrophic long-run behaviour alongside a
domain of persistent and hysteretic long-run behaviour. Section 7.4 shows how the necessary
and sufficient conditions for (separately) unstable IHF in Case A depend on the collective
catastrophe condition in that case. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 add BPI and unstable IHF with
respect to consumption and corporate time to the models. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes.Co//ec/i've Agfa'/ /orwiar/o/i: fl/V a/id u/u/afr/f ///F 171
7.1 General analysis
As a generalization of the AQM case of unstable IHF and no BPI as_analysed in Chapter 4,
separately unstable IHF at given long-run equilibrium value J^ • L * of the social house-
hold time environment (see under (6.5)) polarizes the individual habit states into two long-
run corner equilibria at zero and maximal (7,-) corporate hours or into one of these equilibria
(sec Fig. 4.1 in Sec. 4.2). Accordingly, at changing values of exogenous variables and at the
given predetermined social environment s^, some group members may then engage into
individual catastrophes from zero to maximal corporate hours or the reverse. As a result, the
social household time environment will start to change somewhat, but since the implied BPI
feedback on the supply of corporate hours is reinforcing (see Sec. 5.3), this will only rein-
force the individual catastrophes. In addition, this reinforcing feedback will trigger subse-
quent individual catastrophes of other group members. Moreover, as will be shown in this
chapter, when the social influencing is sufficiently strong, the reinforcing feedback can even
lead to a rocketing number of group members engaging into individual catastrophes, i.e. to a
collective catastrophe. We then have a "two-stage rocket" as described in the introduction of
this chapter. Whereas the individual catastrophes of the first stage are connected with the
habit slope term in the stability condition (6.6) in Subsection 6.1.3, the collective catastro-
phes of the second stage are not connected with the negligible social environment slope term
in (6.6), since this slope holds for given long-run equilibrium values of the individual habit
states, and hence does not take into account the discontinuous shifts in these values as a
result of the individual catastrophes.
In order to adjust the social environment slope for this effect, we should make a clear
distinction between stable individual long-run equilibria of the habit states (0 or 7- cor-
porate hours) at a given value of the social environment on the one hand and a long-run
overall equilibrium of both the individual habit states and the social environment on the
other hand. We define /V" as the number of group members in stable individual equilibrium
who prefer a maximal number of household hours and hence do not participate to the labour
market at a given value of the social environment S£. When 5£ changes by d.i£ from a
long-run equilibrium value s^, individual catastrophes from zero to maximal corporate hours
and the reverse may arise (sec Subsec. 6.1.3). As a result, the number of non-participating
persons /V" will, in the continuous approximation for large A/, change by /v"^*.*^. Hence,
assuming a uniform maximal number of corporate hours 7, the average household time L in
long-run individual equilibrium will change by _7/V""_a"jr. This change should be added
to the change according to the social environment slope in (6.6), but, for large W and
assuming that no employed person is on the backward-sloping part of her (or his) long-run
labour supply curve and hence is unrestricted, the latter change is negligible (see Subsec.
6.1.3). Dividing by dj£, the adjusted social environment slope at s^ then becomes
/"• r" * (7-1)
In this slope the individual habit states as having stable long-run equilibrium values 0 or 7
have become implicit functions of the social environment. Thus, the stability problem has172 "• - Oiaprgr 7
been reduced to a problem in terms of one state variable only, namely the social environ-
ment with respect to household time. Accordingly, the superscripts * in (7.1) denote evalua-
tion of the derivatives at a long-run equilibrium value of this social environment, and a
necessary and sufficient condition for stability of such an equilibrium is given by the slope
in (7.1) being smaller than one. Similar stability conditions are found in the literature on BPI
in dichotomous consumption demand (see, e.g., Granovetter and Soong, 1986, and
lannaconc, 1989).
Moreover, analogously to the case of BPI only in Sections S.4 and 5.5, it can be shown
(for particular cases) that the collective catastrophes of the second stage of the two-stage
rocket go together with the slope in (7.1) becoming equal to one. However, before this can
be shown, we should first demonstrate how collective catastrophes can arise in the present
case of separately unstable IMF in combination with BPI. Therefore, we consider this case as
an extension of the aggregate case of unstable IHF only and no BPI, which has been analy-
sed in Section 4.8. There we directly aggregated the individual long-run labour supply
schedules to an average long-run labour supply schedule with entry and exit curves as
displayed in Figure 4.11. „. ^,
What happens with such an aggregate schedule when BPI comes into play? In answering
this question we first regard a general situation in which all parameters and variables except
the wage rate w and the total discretionary time 7 (and, of course, the social household
time environment .v^) vary over individuals. In the case of a considerable BPI the term
YLLI^L '" (6-9b) in Section 6.2 becomes important. Assuming that both a, and ft, are
positive, this affects the individual short-run reservation wages w,.,. = 6,7a,-• On the other
hand, this social influence is exogenous to an ;'m//'v/c/u£f/ #ra«p /n<wft<>r in the short as well
as long run (see Assumption IX in Sec. 5.2). Therefore, in order to analyse the long-run
effects of BPI in the case of separately unstable IHF, we can start from the individual long-
run entry and exit wages in that case a/ #/ve/t /wig-rn/i ?aui7i6rium va/we$ s^- = L * o/ //ie
(p.vj><'ff<'</) 5«r/a/ iw/rowwMf. In this way the first stage of the two-stage rocket is incor-
porated into the second stage.
The individual long-run entry wage w* coincides with the short-run reservation wage
w,., = />,7d, of person i when he has fully got used to non-participation or maximal house-
hold time (.v^| = 7). Therefore, an expression for the entry wage w* at given long-run
equilibrium value of the social environment is obtained by substituting 5^,- • T and J£ = £.*
into (6.9b) and substituting (6.9a) and (6.9b) into H*,., = fe,7a,-. This results in
«Xi - 1%.
Now the crucial point is that each person's entry wage depends positively on the long-run
average household time Z.* in her group and that Z.* is equal to T times the proportion
/V™*//V of group members who have not yet entered the labour market (assuming that no
employed person is on the backward-sloping part of her long-run labour supply curve, the
long-run household time of all the employed persons is zero). When most group members
are still at home, the average household time Z. * is large, so the entry wages of persons who
would enter the labour market in the absence of BPI is substantially increased. In otherCo/Zmivg tofa'f/ormariow: flf/ and n/utofr/f ///F 173
words, these persons are deterred from entering the labour market by most members of their
social group staying at home. On the other hand, as the wage rate rises and more people
enter, the long-run average household time in the group decreases, and hence the entry
wages decline. Thus, whereas forerunners enter the labour market at much higher entry
wages than without BPI due to the social influence of the stay-behinds, the latter enter at
lower entry wages than without predecessors due to the social influence of these
predecessors. As a consequence, the variance of the entry wages over the group members
decreases.
A similar story can be told on the long-run exit wages w,- . These arc given by (4.13)
for H-* in Section 4.3 with the household time taste parameter ot^ being replaced by the
soc/a/fTy irt/fK^flmf,) /rause/ioWrim? /or/? cx^ := a^, + Yz.£i^* and with r* » |otxx,| and
a* = a^, - |otxxjl^Oj- For the sake of exposition we consider a first-order approximation
of this formula for 40:?,T|a^^-| « a* which is given by
(see Appendix 7A). Note that this expression differs only from the formula for the long-run
entry wages in (7.2) by the positive habit formation minus satiation tendency term
(Yz,Li ~ |c^|_,|)r. In fact, the expression represents the short-run reservation wage w,.,- » &,•/«,•
of person i when he has fully got used to maximal employment or zero household time
(*Li * 0). This short-run reservation wage is lower than the long-run exit wage.' When w
falls below it, the person will leave the labour market tf/'/vrf/v (i.e. not in stages as in the
case of a decline of w below the long-run exit wage, but above the short-run reservation
wage). In an analogous way as the distribution of the long-run entry wages, the distribution
of these reservation wages, or, approximately, long-run exit wages, will be compressed by
the BPI.
When the social influence as geared by the susceptibility to social influence Y/.L, '*
sufficiently strong, it may even decrease the variance in the entry or exit wages of a number
of group members to zero. This results in a collective catastrophe at a certain entry or exit
wage. Then the individual variation is, at least for a part of the social group, compensated by
the social influence process. This phenomenon is derived below for the particular case of
exogenous individual variation only in the household time taste a^, and the (relative) IHF
strength Y^£, - Ict^J (Case A) and for the case of exogenous individual variation only in
the susceptibility to social influence Y/,£, (Case B). The phenomenon has implications for
the long-run average labour supply schedules in these two cases which are also derived. We
assume that the IHF is such that each group member goes through individual entry and exit
catastrophes as described by Figure 4.2 in Section 4.2. In Section 4.4 we will come back to
this assumption.
' This reservation wage corresponds to the intercept a^ /a * of the long-run reservation wage H^
as a function of </' in Figure 4.4c in Section 4.4. This intercept is smaller than the long-run exit
wage *•'* = H-' for d* < d".174
7.2 Case A: variation in household time taste and IHF strength
First, we consider exogenous individual variation in the positive household time taste a^,
only. We regard a^, as a continuous variable a^ with density function /(a^). What
happens with long-run average labour supply when the wage rate is rising from zero? Since
the susceptibility to social influence y^ is never negative, the long-run exit wages w,*
according to (7.3), and hence the long-run entry wages w* according to (7.2), are positive,
implying that at w * 0 all group members are, in the long run, always non-participating and
(fully) collectively used to that. Then the long-run average household time L * is equal to
7", so the long-run entry wage Wj of the first entrant at w rising from zero has the positive
numerator minot^, • (Y/x ~ |c^^|)7" • Y^£^- Thus, at rising w, nobody will enter the
labour market for w below w* due to positive minimal household time tastes (the first
term of the numerator), habit sensitivity (the second term) and social influence by the other
group members (the third term). This is indicated by the long-run average labour supply
schedule in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 Long-run average labour supply schedule for AQM in Case A of exogenous in-
dividual variation in household time taste only.
* By "(fully) collectively used" we mean thai both the individual habit states and the expected or
perceived social environment have been fully adapted to their long-run equilibrium values.Co/tecfiw /lafciV/orwafJon: fi/7 a/id wnsfafcte ///F 175
However, as w rises beyond H'| , forerunners will enter and work, in the long run, the
maximal number of corporate hours. First persons with low household time tastes will enter
and next persons with higher household time tastes. This leads to increases in the long-run
average labour supply, and hence to decreases in the long-run average household time L*,
and this lowers the entry wages of the stay-behinds. The long-run average household time, or T
times the proportion #*"*/# of stay-behinds, is equal to 7" times the proportion of the social
group for which the household time taste a^ is higher than the household time taste a^, of
the last or marginal entrant(s). This proportion can be written as 1 - F(a^,), where F(a^)
is the distribution function of a^. Then, js a^, rises by an infinitesimally small amount
da^,, the long-run average household time Z. * declines by Tf^ (a^,)da^, » r/(a^,)</a^,,
so the total change in the long-run entry wage w* as given by (7.2) is positively propor-
tional to [1 - Y/x^("ti)l^"z.c
This change becomes negative when Y/_£"7"/(«/,,) becomes larger than one, so when the
product of the susceptibility to social influence y^£ and the proportion of marginal entrants
/(a^,) is sufficiently large. This implies that the long-run entry wage of the next entrants is
lower than that of their predecessors as a consequence of the social influence of these
predecessors. In Figure 7.1 this happens at w = H-*' and W* = //*'. For the case where
the density function /(a^) is continuously differentiate and unimodal, the long-run entry
wage of the marginal entrants as a function of the average long-run labour supply W * just
before their entrance is given by the upper sharply sigmoid curve in Figure 7.1. This
function behaves qualitatively in the same way as the long-run entry wage w, of the
marginal entrant(s) as a function of their household time taste ct^, as considered above,
since A/* = 7" - L* is a monotonously increasing function of a^. The condition under
which these two functions start to decline at tv = vv*\ can be reformulated as saying that
the value /(«{,,) of the density function at the household time taste of the marginal en-
trants) becomes larger than l/(y^7). According to Figure 7.2 this happens at the "mar-
ginal household time taste" ct^.
From this figure it also follows that the "entry wage function" in Figure 7.1 will again
start to rise at a marginal household time taste a^, or an average labour supply //* , for
which /(tt{_,) becomes again smaller than l/tY^T"). The entry wage function then rises
until at W*^ the same level is reached as at /?*'. Appendix 7B shows that this corresponds
to a marginal household time taste <x^ in Figure 7.2 for which the surface area under the
l/(Y^£-7") line between <x^ and a^ is equal to the surface area under the curve of the
density function between ct^ and a^. (The surface areas 5, and Sj arc then equal to each
other.) This surface area indicates the proportion of group members whose long-run entry
wages are lower than the entry wage *-*' of predecessors and who are therefore involved in
a collective catastrophe from //*' to //*' at that wage. We call these group members
con/ormutt and all their predecessors rwidtefferj. Following physics, the proportion of
' Thus, in contrast to the entry curve in Figure 4.11 in Section 4.8, this curve describes not only
(stable and unstable) // * as a function of the wage rate, but also, because of the feedback of // * on
the entry wages, the entry wage of marginal entrants as a function of //*.176
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Figure 7.2 Household lime tastes of marginal entrants at which collective entry and exit catastro-
phes start and end for an (a; unimodal and (6) bimodal continuously differentiable
density function. . . . . '
trendsetters /? * /7" which is required for a collective catastrophe to occur can be referred to
as a cn7«ca/ ma.w. It is indicated by the surface area under the curve of the density function
left to a^. After the collective catastrophe has occurred, there are still some group members
left who stay at home. For w rising at levels above »••*', these stay-behinds will enter. We
call them /<ig#ar<&. Their proportion is given by the surface area under the curve of the
density function right to a^.
It is important to note that the entry wages of the conformists in Figure 7.1. being lower
than the entry wage vi'*' of predecessors are conditional on the presence of these predeces-
sors entering at w . Accordingly, at rising H> the conformists will only enter after these
predecessors have entered at vv *'. Asa result, the conformists enter at the same qJfccHw
long-run entry wage w* . This implies that the distribution of the (effective) long-run entry
wages over the individuals collapses to a distribution with an infinitely high and infinitely
narrow peak at tv*' as displayed in Figure 7.3a.* This peak represents the conformists,
whereas the left tail of the distribution refers to the trendsetters with low household time
tastes and the right tail to the laggards with high household time tastes. The surface areas of
the left and right tail indicate the proportions of trendsetters and laggards, respectively.
* Technically, such a peak is called a 8 -function or Dirac function.
' When the density function /(a^) is symmetric, it follows from Figure 7.2a that the proportion of
• U trendsetters, and hence the surface area of the left tail of the density function A(w ). is larger than
the proportion of laggards, and hence the surface area of the right tail of /I(H'*'). Moreover, it can be
proven that *(»»•) goes to infinity for »»• approaching w from below, but goes to a finite value
for w *' approaching w *' from above.fl/7 a/id u/uraM? /WF 177
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Figure 7.3 Distributions of effective long-run entry wages in fa) Case A and (fc) Case B.
For w rising above vv , the entrance of laggards leads to a further increase in the long-
run average labour supply till its maximal value 7" for w above H>^ , at which all laggards
have entered (see Fig. 7.1). When w rises further, the first to reach the backward-sloping
part of her individual long-run labour supply schedule is the group member with the lowest w,,
in Figure 4.2 as given by (4.13), where the household time taste a^ does not need to be
replaced by the social household time taste a^, := a^, + Y/_f^*' since the average house-
hold time Z. * is now equal to zero. This group member has the highest household time taste,
and hence is the last entrant N. As a consequence, the average long-run labour supply
schedule becomes backward-sloping for w = **\/v-
For H> above »v^ all group members have a job and are collectively used to that. When w
then starts to decline, the average long-run labour supply //* will first increase, next remain
equal to its maximal value 7", and start to decrease only at the exit wage H>^ of the first
leaver or last entrant, which is lower than her entry wage w^, as implied by (7.2) and (7.3).
First persons with high household time tastes will quit and next persons with lower house-
hold time tastes. However, analogously tothe case of the entry wages, the resulting increases
in the average long-run household time Z.* raise the long-run exit wages H>, as given by
(7.3). For the case where the density function /(ot^) is continuously differentiate and
unimodal, the long-run exit wage of the marginal entrants as a function of the average long-
run labour supply W* just before their entrance is given by the lower sharply sigmoid curve
in Figure 7.1. The condition under which this function starts to rise at tv = *•** and W* = //* ,
again sutes that the value /(ct^,) of the density function at the household time uste of the
marginal entrants becomes larger than 1/(7^^7"). Now, however, this does not hold in
Figure 7.2 for rising marginal household time uste at a^, but for declining marginal house-
hold time uste at a^. At decreasing W* the "exit wage function" in Figure 7.1 starts again
to decline at //*' corresponding to a^ in Figure 7.2. At //** in Figure 7.1, or a^ in
Figure 7.2, the same exit wage level is reached as at W*^, with an analogous equality of178 C/tapttr 7
surface areas in Figure 7.2 as in the entry case. In a similar way these surface areas indicate
the proportion of group members whose long-run exit wages are higher than the exit wage
»v of predecessors and who are therefore involved in a collective catastrophe from // * to // *
at that wage. Again, there may be laggards who quit only at lower exit wages. The exit
wage H>| of the last laggard, or first entrant, has the positive numerator min cc^, + y^7",
implying that below w* all group members are, in the long run, non-participating and
collectively used to that.
As a consequence of the collective catastrophe, the distribution of the qjfecfiv* long-run
exit wages collapses to a distribution with an infinitely high and infinitely narrow peak at
>•>**, which is analogous to the distribution in Figure 7.3a. However, now the right tail of
the distribution represents the trendsetters with high household time tastes and the left tail
the laggards with low household time tastes. As shown in Figure 7.2a, these laggards in
leaving the labour market are trendsetters in entering, and conversely laggards in entering are
trendsetters in quitting. However, a number of trendsetters in entering are conformists in
quitting and some trendsetters in quitting are conformists in entering. Thus, some but not all
conformists in entering are also conformists in quitting, and the reverse. From the analysis
given above it follows that such collective catastrophes in entering and leaving the labour
market will occur if and only if
Here max/(a^) denotes the maximal value of the density function.
However, just as in Section 4.8, we may wonder what happens when w rises from zero
till a level tv" at which only some trendsetters have entered the labour market (see Fig. 7.1)
and, after the long-run equilibrium W" being established, again declines to zero. Then,
analogously to Section 4.8, the trendsetters will switch back to non-participation only at their
relatively low exit wages w,- as given by the exit curve in Figure 7.1. Therefore, the long-
run average labour supply of the social group will be inelastic for vr declining from w° (as
indicated by a vertical dashed line) until the exit curve is reached, and follow this highly
elastic curve afterwards. In general, long-run average labour supply is inelastic between the
solid "stable" parts of the entry and exit curve in Figure 7.1, whereas it becomes suddenly
highly elastic, when the wage rate reaches one of these parts.*
However, what about the region around the dashed parts of the entry and exit curve? Can
this region be reached by successive rises and declines in w? Starting from a long-run
equilibrium point, it cannot because of the collective catastrophes in the entry and exit curve.
On the other hand, these collective catastrophes take time to work out themselves. Consider,
for example, a situation in which conformists are involved in a collective catastrophe on the
entry curve, so are collectively increasing the average labour supply in their social group
from W* to /)*'. Suppose that at a certain level W of that average labour supply the
wage rate declines. In the short run, the average labour supply then also declines, but in the
long run, several things happen. On the one hand, the decline of the average labour supply is
* The "stable" parts of the entry and exit curves consist of long-run equilibria like /4 and 5 in
Figure 4.12 for given w.Co//gcrivg toWf/orwiariow: fl/Y ow/ Mn.»afe/f /Wf179
reinforced by the BPI. On the other hand, the individual household time demands as func-
tions of the individual habit states rise, so that a number of the demands of the conformists
obtain an interior unstable equilibrium like C, in Figure 6.1. When an individual habit state
is to the left side of such a watershed, it will continue its individual catastrophe towards zero
household hours, but when it is to the right side of the watershed, it will return to maximal
household hours. The net result of these short- and long-run effects for the average labour
supply is ambiguous. If w remains sufficiently high above the dotted part of the entry curve,
most individual catastrophes, and hence the collective catastrophe, will continue, but a
"stable" long-run equilibrium of average labour supply is then reached at a lower level on
the solid part of the entry curve. If w falls near or below the dotted part of the entry curve,
but still sufficiently far above the dotted part of the exit curve (e.g., to w^), the average
labour supply adjusts to a long-run value /7*. which tends to be lower than /7', but which,
at further changes of H> between the entry and exit curve, remains inelastic. Finally, if »v
declines near or below the dotted part of the exit curve, a collective catastrophe back to non-
participation will set in.
Thus, generally we can distinguish a band of percirte/ir and /lyrterpfic long-run behaviour
between the entry and exit curve and two zones of rafof/ropA/r long-run behaviour outside
this band. Note that this configuration forms a combination of features of the long-run
average labour supply schedule in the case of only unstable IHF with respect to household
time in Figure 4.11 in Section 4.8 and features of the labour supply schedule in the case of
only unstable BPI with respect to household time in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.4. Accordingly,
the band of persistent and hysteretic long-run behaviour is not found in models of only
unstable BPI with respect to dichotomous short-run behaviour (see, e.g., lannacone, 1989,
App., and Granovetter and Soong, 1986).
Such a configuration is also obtained when we use the exact expression for the long-run
exit wage according to the pertinent variant of (4.13) instead of its first-order approximation
(7.3). The only difference is that the band width between the entry and exit curve in Figure
7.1 is then no longer a constant with as numerator the habit formation minus satiation
tendency term (y^ - |cx^^| )7~. but varies with /7*7 A second modification results when
the susceptibility to social influence is so strong and/or the maximum of the density function /(a^)
in Figure 7.2a is so high as to make the surface area S, large. Then we may have situations
in which there are no laggards in entry or exit, implying that w^ in Figure 7.1 becomes
smaller than vi'*' and Figure 7.3a turns into Figure 7.3b.
A third modification is given by the case where the density function /(ot^) is continuous-
ly differentiate and bimodal. Then we may have a situation as in Figure 7.2b, implying two
collective catastrophes in both the entry curve and the exit curve of the long-run average
labour supply schedule in which different minorities of the social group are involved. This
leads to entry and exit wage distributions which have two infinitely high and narrow peaks.
Moreover, the laggards of the first collective catastrophe go smoothly over into the trendset-
ters of the second one. However, similarly to the second modification mentioned above, we
' Since the approximation (7.3) underestimates the exit wage (see footnote 1), it overestimates the
band width between the entry and exit curves. This is due to the underestimation of the stabilizing
effect of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption as expressed by the parameter c" = |oixxl
(sec the approximation condition for (7.3) to hold).180
may also have situations in which laggards in entry or exit are absent and in which the two
collective catastrophes even melt together into one. From Figures 7.2a and 7.2b it can be
deduced that a collective catastrophe in which a majority of the social group is involved will
occur more easily as the susceptibility to social influence is stronger or as the variance of
the household time taste is smaller.
So far we have considered exogenous individual variation in the household time taste
a^y only. What happens if we allow individual variation in the IHF strength y^, - |a^^J
too? This affects the long-run entry wages according to (7.2), but not the long-run exit
wages according to (7.3) or the pertinent variant of (4.13). In (7.2) the first two terms of the
numerator then vary and we can formulate • ^n* t v - . •; :
rVopo.v<7»'on 7./ Avjw/ntf //»a/ a// group nKvu/wrs d/jp/ay u/u/al>/f ///F and i/idmdua/
/rop/iw Of /« /•Vgure 4.2. Fwr//w OHM/H? ero^fnauj i/iaVvia'/tti/ var/a/io/i o/i/y I/I //i
/w/d ///we /fli'W a^ and /A? /WF j/rfn#//» "y^ - |a^^| a/id con///i«oi«/y d/yjteren/iaWe and
r /wmoda/ d<vMiry /unr/ions /(/>„). H'/iere ft^ = a^ + (Y/.Z. ~ l<*£^|)7" /or
and fe^ - a^ /or MIW. 7YI«I a ro//«7»vp cataj/ropne I/I ^nfry or er// can occur (f
and o/i/y (f ^ ^-' *^' ^'^ ^r«-^fc^
•!- vi^,- ?u^-;i, (7.5)
ffiar#/na/ oj, • o^ or o* a/ n-n/cn /Ac co//^rr/v« ca/airropnc je« in, w JI'VCT oy fn^
<*nd.v, « «i7/i€r df/<»rm//i^d m //if 5ante vfa^ 05 a^ or a^, r€jpec/iv€/y, in
7.2 or i'.v caua/ /o /n£ nign«/ oj, = />J^ or /owes/ oj, • o^*,, r«p«-fiw/y.
As a result, we obtain entry and exit curves and distributions of effective long-run entry and
exit wages similar to those in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.3a or 7.3b, respectively. A difference
for the entries, but not for the exits is that now the trendsetters have low household time
tastes and/or low habit formation strengths and laggards high household time tastes and/or
high IHF strengths. As a consequence, the long-run average labour supply schedule is similar
to the schedule in Figure 7.1, but the values of average labour supply at which the exit curve
starts to rise or decline, do not generally coincide with the corresponding values for the entry
curve. More importantly, analogously to Section 4.8, long-run trajectories within the band
between the entry and exit curve may not be straight vertical lines, but may consist of
circling small hysteresis loops like those in Figure 4.11.
7.3 Case B: variation in susceptibility to social influence
In the case where only the non-negative susceptibility to social influence Y^£", varies over
individuals, matters are partially different from those in the case of the previous section. We
regard Yj.£,- as a continuous variable y^£" with density function £(Y{.£)- Since the house-
hold time taste ct^ is positive, the long-run exit wages H^* according to (7.3), and henceCo/tecriw AflWf/orwario/i; fl/7 and 181
the long-run entry wages according to (7.2), are positive, implying that at u> = 0 all group
members are, in the long run, always non-participating and collectively used to that. The
long-run average household time demand L * = 7" is then equal to 7", so the long-run entry
wage H>] of the first entrant at w rising from zero has the positive numerator
ct£ + (Y/x - |a£jj)r + miny^.7". Thus, at w rising from zero, nobody will enter the
labour market for w below H-J . This is indicated by the long-run average labour supply
schedule in Figure 7.4.
w*>
H
Figure 7.4 Long-run average labour supply schedule for AQM in Case B of exogenous individual
variation in susceptibility to social influence only.
However, as H» rises beyond w* , forerunners will enter and work, in the long run, the
maximal number of corporate hours. First persons with low susceptibilities to social influen-
ce will enter and next persons with higher susceptibilities. This leads to increases in the
long-run average labour supply, and hence to decreases in the long-run average household
time L*, lowering the entry wages of the stay-behinds. The long-run average household
time, or 7 times the proportion of stay-behinds, is equal to 7" times the proportion of the
social group for which the susceptibility to social influence Y/X •& higher than the suscep-
tibility y^j-: of the last or marginal entrant(s). This proportion can be written as 1 - G(YJX,),
where G(Y^^) is the distribution function of Y^£"- Then, as Y/x, rises by an infinitesimally182
small amount ^Y^/J,. this leads d/mv/y to a rise in the long-run entry wage w, as given
by (7.2), which rise is positively proportional to dy^£-^ 7"[ 1 - G(Y/.£,)1- On the other
hand, it leads also //u//r«7/y via /.* to a decline in w, , which is positively proportional to
change in *"* is given by
«(Y^-))dY^-, ••• (7-6)
where •* denotes positive proportionality.
This total change in R-* becomes negative when Y/.L, tf (Y/./T,) becomes larger than
1 - GJ(Y/£,•), so when the product of the susceptibility to social influence Yj.L( "nd '"^
proportion of the marginal entrants j? (Y/,£/) exceeds the proportion of stay-behinds 1 - G (Y/x,) •
This implies that the long-run entry wage of the next entrants is lower than that of their
predecessors as a consequence of the social influence of these predecessors. In Figure 7.4
this happens at w • # and W* • /?*'. For the case where the density function #(Yz.£")
is continuously differentiable. unimodal. symmetric and zero outside the interval |0,2y^£-],
the long-run entry wage of the marginal entrants as a function of the long-run average labour
supply /7* just before their entrance is given by the upper hill-shaped curve in Figure 7.4.
According to Figure 7.5 the condition at which this function starts to decline is fulfilled at
the "marginal susceptibility to social influence" Y.r- (The two surface areas indicated are
then equal to each other.) From Figure 7.5 it also follows that such a point where the con-
dition is fulfilled always exists, since Y/./7J?(Y/.£") is always larger than 1 - Gty^jj) for
¥/.£ " ^LL- Moreover, it is easily seen from Figure 7.5 that the latter inequality holds also
for all Y{,£" * Yj,£ for which j?(Y/,£") >" 0. This implies that the "entry wage function" in
Figure 7.4 continues to decline for Y; r, >• 7,,- or W' >•//*' until W* = 7. (At this point
the slope is zero and w is equal to the entry wage w = w^ of the last entrant with numer-
ator ot£ • (Y/,£ - |<X£jJ)7\) As a result, we have now a collective catastrophe from W*
to 7* with, in contrast to Case A, no laggards.
The reason of the absence of laggards is that persons with higher susceptibilities to social
influence conform to the majority. The proportion of conformists is given by the equal
surface areas indicated in Figure 7.5. The critical mass of trendsetters is equal to the comple-
ment of these surface areas G(Y. .-)• It is smaller, and hence the proportion of conformists
is larger, as the variance of the susceptibilities to social influence is lower. (The surface area
C(Y,.-) is then smaller relative to the square surface area Y, rJ?(Y, r)-) Moreover, for the
specific kind of density function in Figure 7.5, this critical mass is always smaller than a
half.
The conformists enter at the same «3(f«7iir long-run entry wage vi* . This implies that
the distribution of the (effective) long-ran entry wages over the individuals looks as shown
in Figure 7.3b. The peak represents the conformists, whereas the left and only tail of the
distribution refers to the trendsetters with low susceptibilities to social influence. For higher *'
all employees reach the backward-sloping part of their long-ran labour supply curve at the
same w* (see Fig. 4.2 in Sec. 4.2), since the long-ran average household time Z.*, and
hence (the individual variation in) the social influence term Y{.£"^* '" (6-9b) has becomeAaMr/o/Tnario/i: BP/ and 183
Figure 7.5 Susceptibility to social influence of marginal entrants at which collective entry catastro-
phe starts for a continuously diffcrcnliablc, unimodal and symmetric density function
which is zero for y^ > 2y^£'- H ^'' • ^ '"• :-;••'*••' •<" ^ <?*• ••?
zero. As a result, the long-run average labour supply curve is backward-sloping beyond M>^4
This implies that when w starts to decline from above *v*. the long-run average labour
supply W* will again reach maximal average employment 7 below w\ . The long-run
average household time /T* is then zero, and this has the interesting implication that the
long-run individual exit wages in (7.3) are independent not only of the IHF strength y^x - !<*{.{. I.
but also of the susceptibility to social influence Y/,f- This means that the exit behaviour of
group members who are all maximally employed and collectively used to the corresponding
zero household time, is not affected by social influence between the members. In the present
case of variation in YL/T only, this result implies that the long-run exit wages are equal to
the same w*^ with numerator a^. Therefore, when »v declines under vv* , all group
members will collectively start to work fewer corporate hours. Their motivation to do so will
be reinforced by the other group members doing the same, implying a rise in Z-*. and hence
a rise in the exit wage w*^. As a result, the group members will not stop reducing their
corporate hours until they are all non-participating, so W* =0. Thus, the exit behaviour
displays a collective catastrophe at vv which does not require a critical mass and in which
all group members are involved.
Just as in Case A we may wonder what happens when w rises from zero till a level w°
at which only some trendsetters have entered the labour market and, after the long-run
equilibrium /7° being established, again declines to zero. The long-run average labour
supply of the social group will then be inelastic until an exit curve is reached, and follow
this highly elastic curve afterwards. Analogously to Case A, the exit curve represents the
long-run exit wage of marginal entrant(s) as a function of the average long-run labour supply // *
just before their entrance, and is parallel to the entry curve. This exit curve also indicates114
what happens when, in the midst of a collective entry catastrophe at A/ , the wage rate
declines under the entry curve. For »v sufficiently high above the exit curve (e.g. »*• = w*),
the average labour supply adjusts to a long-run inelastic value /7*, which tends to be lower
than //'. On the other hand, when w declines near or below the exit curve, a collective
catastrophe back to non-participation sets in, which tends to end at a "stable" equilibrium on
the solid part of the exit curve at which still a number of exit laggards are fully employed.
Note that the band of persistent and hystcretic behaviour between the entry and exit curve
has now another shape than in Figure 7.1 for Case A.
Again, a similar configuration is obtained when we use the exact expression for the long-
run exit wage according to the pertinent variant of (4.13) instead of its first-order ap-
proximation (7.3). We can then formulate
7.2 /4.V.?MW<' f/ia/ a// j
Jrop/i« flJ i/i Fiflwrr 4.2. F«r//ifr a.uumc f.u>#f/ir>M.v tm/ivu/ua/ var/attTwi in //if 5KJffp/iMi7y
to jodfl/ i>i/7Mfmf Y/,£ f>/i/y and a cr>H/i>iM«u.v/y
rf^/u/ry /wncfi'o/i J?(Y/,£) w/i/r/i « z^ro outt/Yfr //if i/iwva/ (0,2Y^£"). 77ifn a
ra/a.v/rr>p/if m f/i/ry or «// raw a/wavj occur. 77IP co//f c/ivf fn/ry cato5/rop/i<> 5<>K /« af
Y /
i« a/ a//
slfnu/ran«oiul)i and fndi wi//i //if/Irs/ f/i/ran/ H-I7/I //if /owes/ y^ = 7^ *
More generally, such a proposition and a long-run average labour supply schedule similar to
that in Figure 7.4 presumably hold for a large class of density functions g(Y/X). "° matter
how small the average Y{.£ of 'he susceptibilities to social influence or how large their
variance.
7.4 Conditions and configurations of equilibria
When we have simultaneous variation in both the household time taste a^, (or fe^,) and
"//.£•*' matters become much more complex. This holds even in the special case in which the
distributions of these parameters are independent of each other. Therefore, this case is not
elaborated here and we only mention some global results. Under certain collective catastro-
phe conditions, the long-run average labour supply schedule and the distribution of the entry
wages are similar to the schedule in Figure 7.1 and the distribution in Figure 7.3a or 7.3b.
On the one hand, there are a number of trendsetters in entry with low household time tastes,
low habit sensitivities and/or low susceptibilities to social influence. On the other hand, there
may be laggards in entry with high household time tastes, high habit sensitivities and/or high
susceptibilities to social influence. However, many laggards may have low susceptibilities to
social influence, since laggards are facing a low average household time L* and hence a
* This holds, since the speed of an individual exit catastrophe is lower as the susceptibility to
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low social influence Y/./T,^-* on their behaviour. This makes the labour supply of laggards
rather insensitive to variation in Y/,£",••
As a result of the analysis of Case A, this case can be decomposed in two subcases.
Assuming individual variation in household time taste only, these two subcases are indicated
as Case III and IV in Table 6.1 in Subsection 6.2.4. In both (sub)cases all individuals are
assumed to display unstable IHF and individual hysteresis and catastrophes between non-
participation and maximal employment as in Figure 4.2. Moreover, in both cases we then
have a collective hysteresis loop and long-run equilibrium trajectories within this loop (see
Table 6.2 in Subsec. 6.2.4). Necessary and sufficient conditions under which these phenom-
ena show up in the AQM are given by the conditions in situation (i) of Proposition 4.1 in
Section 4.4 for the case of IHF with respect to household time only except that the house-
hold time taste parameter a^ should be replaced by the social household time taste
a^,- :» ot^,- + Y^f^/ for all group members (see also Fig. 4.4c). Here /-,• is the long-run
average household time just before the entrance of group member i . This is equal to the
long-run average household time just before the exit of group member / , since the order in
which the group members leave the labour market at declining w is the reverse of the order
in which they enter at rising w.
Because the w^ line in Figure 4.4c moves upwards with increasing a^, whereas the
w*" curve remains fixed for given c*, the under limit a"_ and the upper limit a^ in the
condition d_ < d* < a"^, as determined by the intersections of this line and curve, move
towards each other with increasing a^. This implies that the conditions are the strongest for
a group member with the highest, or maximal, social household time taste a^ . Therefore,
• m the conditions for all group members are equivalent to the conditions for a^ . Since the
entry wage H»* of the marginal entrant is increasing with <x£,-, a^™ corresponds to a
maximal w,- . When collective catastrophes do not occur as in Figure 4.11, the maximal
entry wage is given by w^ , so a^ = a^ = a^ = a^, since Z,^ • 0. The resulting
conditions are indicated under Case III in Table 6.1. The collective catastrophe condition
(7.4) for the susceptibility to social influence Y/,£ and the density function /(ct^) of the
individual household time tastes is then not fulfilled.
On the other hand, when collective catastrophes do occur, there are two possibilities. If
there are entry laggards as in Figure 7.1, the maximal entry wage is again given by w^ , so
**Z.™ " •*£*• ^ **** ^^ "° ^""^ ^ggards, the maximal entry wage is given by »v*', at
which the collective catastrophe sets in, so a^ is equal to the corresponding social house-
hold time &j_ . The existence of fi^ depends on the fulfilment of the collective catastrophe
condition (7.4), and its value is determined by Y/,£" and /(<*£,)• When, for example, y^£
rises, ft^ can be shown also to rise. This makes the conditions for |ot^^| and Y^t " l**z.z.l
more stringent. However, from a theoretical point of view, the resulting mutual interdepen-
dence of conditions for collective entry and exit catastrophes to occur is not a problem, since
0 < c*(&£ ) and |d*(tt£ )| < ^(o:^ )l "°'^ ^"" *"^ value of ft£ . In the subcase of
entry laggards we can even make the conditions somewhat weaker by replacing a™ by &£ .
A number of laggards with the highest household time tastes may then behave as indicated
by Figure 4B in Appendix 4B and we end up with the same conditions as in the subcase of
no entry laggards. These conditions are indicated under Case IV in Table 6.1.186
If we allow individual variation in the IHF strength too, we can derive similar conditions
for Case IN, but for Case IV the conditions become somewhat more complicated. As argued
in Section 4.8, the order in which the group members leave the labour market at declining
w, may then not be the reverse of the order in which they enter at rising w. This makes the
long-run average household times just before the entrance of group member / and just
before the exit of group member / , and hence the corresponding social household time
tastes, unequal to each other. This case is not elaborated here. In Case B of individual
variation in the susceptibility to social influence Y^£, the conditions for the IHF strength are
identical to those under Case IV in Table 6.1 with tt£ "°* being equal to a^ + Y*-L*'.
On the other hand, in order to allow a collective catastrophe, the density function # (¥/.£•)
has at most to satisfy some regularity conditions (see Proposition 7.2), so in this case we can
distinguish only a Case IV.
In Section 7.1 we mentioned that collective catastrophes can be shown (in particular
cases) to go together with the slope in (7.1) becoming equal to one. In particular, this should
hold for the Cases A and B as analysed in the two previous sections. Therefore, we should
consider the short-run average household time demand L as a function of the social
environment .v,~ (recall from Section 7.1 that the individual habit states have become implicit
functions of the social environment). Just as Figure 4.12 in Section 4.8 can be derived from
Figure 4.i i, graphs of this household time demand function for various values of the wage
rate can be read off Figures 7.1 and 7.4. For Case A such graphs for u> = w,w = w° and
»v • u' are represented by Figure 7.6. The graph for w = w displays the interesting
phenomenon that the continuum of long-run equilibria of Figure 4.12 for the case of only
unstable IHF has been split by the unstable BPI into three disjunct segments which are
interconnected by an entry catastrophe for lower .s^ and L (so higher //) and by an exit
catastrophe for higher j£ and L. Comparing this graph with the graph of Z. in Figure 5.4
in Subsection 5.5.2 for the case of unstable BPI only, we can also say that the three discrete
long-run equilibria /4, B and C have been stretched out by the separately unstable IHF into
three continua of long-run equilibria. Note that, in contrast to equilibrium C, the interior
equilibria of the middle continuum are not unstable in the same way as C. For Case B of
Figure 7.4 a similar phenomenon can be derived for w = H ^ except that then the continuum
for lower .?£ is replaced by a discrete equilibrium for L* =0. This more restricted variant
of the phenomenon has also been found by Naylor (1989) in an application of the theory of
social custom of Akerlof (1980) and is referred to as a "trimodal outcome" by him (see
Section 8.7).
However, when w rises from w , the exit catastrophe becomes smaller and the higher
two continua approach each other until the exit catastrophe disappears and the two continua
become connected at W* for a certain w. For w rising further to w", this configuration
remains qualitatively the same, but the interconnected continuum ^shrinks, the entry catastro-
phe grows and the other continuum reaches a corner equilibrium Z. * = 0 for w = »v^ . The
resulting graph for w » *••'' is displayed in Figure 7.6b. When n> rises above w", the
higher continuum further shrinks until it turns into a point at z7 = 7" - //*' for w « H>*' as
shown in Figure 7.6c. For w rising beyond H'*' this discrete equilibrium disappears, in-
ducing a collective entry catastrophe towards the lower continuum. Since the household timeCoWwrive . fi/7 and ///F 187
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Figure 7.6. Short-run average household time demand as a function of the social environment for
various values of the wage rate, indicated by bold lines and curves.
demand function is smooth for w > tv , it is, for continuity reasons, smooth for w • vi>
too, and this implies a tangency condition for the collective entry catastrophe with the slope
in (7.1) being equal to one.
For H> declining from w^, an analogous story can be told with an identical tangency
condition for a collective exit catastrophe from a discrete equilibrium at Z. = 7" - // for
H> = »v* . For collective entry and exit catastrophes in Case B of Figure 7.4, a similar
reasoning holds except that both catastrophes go on till a corner equilibrium and except that
also the exit catastrophe starts from a corner equilibrium. In the latter case too a tangency
condition can be shown to apply, implying that the slope in (7.1) is equal to one. This,
however, seems exceptional for a collective catastrophe from a corner equilibrium. The case188 C/iapter 7
of BPI and stable IHF of Section 6.2 suggests that more generally such a catastrophe would
be expected to go together with the slope in (7.1) being larger than one. Furthermore, we
note that in the Cases A and B the condition that the slope in (7.1) is equal to one, should
coincide with the corresponding condition as formulated in the Propositions 7.1 and 7.2,
respectively. This can indeed be shown to hold true, but proofs are not given here.
Finally, the collective catastrophe conditions which have been derived in the previous
sections, may be compared to those derived in Subsection 6.2.4 for the case of stable IHF
(see Case II in Table 6.1). We can then conclude that the former conditions are less general,
but also much more precise than the latter conditions. Therefore, we may wonder what
happens according to the analysis in this section when the IHF is stable. In that case the
long-run individual reservation wages are again given by (7.2) and we can expect the same
kind of mechanism as in the case of unstable IHF. Now, however, the effect of entrance by
group members on the long-run average household time L* is smaller, since the IHF will
usually not drive the entrants to working the maximal number of corporate hours in the long
run. Therefore, in the particular case of individual variation in the household time taste and
the IHF strength, the susceptibility to social influence YJX should be larger than according
to condition (7.5) in order to induce a collective catastrophe. Unfortunately, an exact analysis
looks very complicated in this case as well as in the particular case of variation in
is therefore beyond the scope of this study. : '}.
7.5 BPI and unstable IHF in consumption , -
So far we have analysed BPI and unstable IHF with respect to household time only. When
we add_BPI and unstable IHF with respect to consumption, not only the_ social environment
slope Lj_ for household time, but also the social environment slope X^_ for consumption
should be adjusted in the stability condition (6.18) in Subsection 6.3.1. As an extension of
the derivation of (7.1), this leads to the necessary and sufficient stability condition
Here W" is the number of group members in stable individual equilibrium who spend a
maximal number of household hours, so are non-participating, at given values of the social
environments A£ and s^\ Again, it can be shown (for particular cases) that collective catas-
trophes go together with the slope in (7.7) becoming equal to one, but before that, it should
be demonstrated how these collective catastrophes can arise.
As an extension of the analysis in the previous sections, this can be done by considering
the individual long-run entry and exit wages at given long-run equilibrium values 5- = Z.*
and J£ • X* of the (expected) social environments. The long-run entry wages w^ are
obtained by substituting $^, * 7", 5£ = L*, s^, = K^, and 5jf = X* into the formulas for
fc, and <i,-, respectively (see (6.9b)), and by substituting the resulting expressions into
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(cf. (7.2)). Thus, each person's entry wage depends positively on the long-run average
household time L * in her social group, but negatively on the long-run average consumption
X*. This average consumption is equal to HT(/V-/V""*)//V + KQ, where (/V-N"")//V
denotes the proportion of group members who have already entered the labour market
(assuming that none of these group members is on the backward-sloping part of her long-run
labour supply curve). When most people are still at home, X* is relatively small, so the
entry wages of forerunners is only slightly lower than in the absence of consumption BPI.
On the other hand, as the wage rate rises and more people enter, the long-run average
consumption in the group increases, and hence the entry wages decline. This implies a
suppressing effect on the entry wages of the stay-behinds in addition to that due to the
household time BPI, and hence an additional compressing effect on the variance of the entry
wages between the group members.
A similar story can be told on the long-run exit wages w,* . These are given by (4.13) in
Section 4.3 with a^ = a^+y^-L*. f *-la^J-Yxxi »"<* "* "«x.••Y*x.•*' -<%,•
where a^,- + Yxx,'-^* can be called the social(ly influenced) consumption taste. These
expressions for the exit wages can easily be shown to be decreasing in a*, and hence in
X*. As the wage rate declines and more people leave the labour market, the long-run
average consumption in the group decreases, and hence the exit wages rise. This implies a
raising effect on the exit wages of the stay-behinds in addition to that due to the household
time BPI, and hence again an additional compressing effect on the variance of the exit
wages between the group members.
When the combination of the susceptibility to social household time influence Y/,£/ and
the susceptibility to social consumption influence Y*x, is strong enough, it may even
decrease the variance in the entry or exit wages of a number of group members to zero. This
results in a collective catastrophe at a certain entry or exit wage. This phenomenon can be
derived for particular cases like Case A and Case B in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. The resulting
collective catastrophe conditions for Y {.£(,) and Yxxi/i *"* weaker, but much more complex
than those in Propositions 7.1 and 7.2. This, however, is not elaborated here, and we confine
ourselves to the following remarks.
Cases like Case A can be decomposed in subcases like Case III and IV in Table 6.1 in
Subsection 6.2.4. In cases like Case B collective catastrophes in entry or exit can practically
always occur, so we can then distinguish only a Case IV. The long-run average labour
supply schedules seem similar to those in Figures 7.1 and 7.4 for Case A and B, respec-
tively, except for two differences. First, there will be no backward-sloping part for a suf-
ficiently strong combination of IHF and BPI with respect to consumption.
Second, in the case of variation in the susceptibility to social consumption influence
Yxx~i only, the forward-sloping part is likely to look like that in Figure 7.1 except that there
are no laggards in exit. Thus, in contrast to Figure 7.4 for Case B, there are then laggards in
entry and trendsetters in exit. The latter trendsetters have the lowest susceptibilities to social
consumption influence, and hence are most inclined to reduce their corporate time, and190
hence their consumption, at a declining wage rate. At a certain M*^ a critical mass of exit
trendsetters is reached and a collective catastrophe towards non-participation sets in. This
collective transition will not leave behind laggards, since persons with higher susceptibilities
to social consumption influence are likely to conform to the majority. On the other hand,
such persons are trendsetters in entering the labour market, because for them a higher con-
sumption level, and hence corporate work, are more important than for persons with lower
susceptibilities. At a certain vv*' a critical mass of entry trendsetters is reached and a
collective catastrophe to maximal employment occurs. Now, however, this collective tran-
sition may leave behind laggards with lower susceptibilities to social consumption influence.
In this and all other cases we may again have, for a certain interval of the wage rate, a
"trimodal outcome" of cither three continua of long-run equilibria or two continua and a
discrete equilibrium. In addition, collective entry and exit catastrophes are again charac-
terized by tangency conditions with the left-hand side of (7.7) being equal to one as in
Figure 7.6c.
7.6 BPI and unstable HIF in corporate time
When we add BPI and unstable IMF with respect to corporate time to the BPI and unstable
IHF with respect to household time, we can again follow the reduction procedure explained
in Section 6.4. This yields a reduced utility function with the same arguments as in the case
of BPI and unstable IHF with respect to household time only. As a consequence, we have a
"two-stage rocket" with the same stability condition (7.1) and the same formulas (7.2) and
(7.3) for the long-run entry wages H^ and the long-run exit wages H^ .
Therefore, in Case A of individual variation in the household time taste a^ and the
household time IHF strength -d^ := Y{.Li ~ l**z.Lil- Proposition 7.1 continues to hold,
implying a long-run average labour supply schedule like that in Figure 7.1. Now, however, a^,-
is a "net" household time taste which, by virtue of (6.20a), can be written as
. (7.9)
Here &^,- and &^, are the "pure" household and corporate time tastes, ~^//,-:=?////;
is the "pure" corporate time IHF strength, and Y///7, is the susceptibility to "pure" social
corporate time influence. Moreover, -<^V now is a total household time IHF strength which,
by virtue of (6.20c) and (6.20b) in Section 6.4, is equal to the sum (~<^,) + (~<^w,) °^ '"^
"pure" household time and corporate time IHF strengths.
These equations imply that when in Proposition 7.1 not only &^, and -d£,-. but also
6^, and -«//,• are allowed to vary among the group members, ftj as representing the /-
dependent terms in the numerator of (7.2) or (7.3) is given by the first three terms of (7.9)
for exits, whereas 6* for entries is equal to 6^_, - &^,- + (-</^,-)7\ Thus, the exit wages as
well as the entry wages vary with an IHF strength. Whereas trendsetters in entry have low
"pure" household time tastes, high "pure" corporate time tastes and/or low "pure" household
time IHF strengths, trendsetters in exit have high "pure" household time tastes, low "pure"
corporate time tastes and/or low "pure" corporate time IHF strengths. Furthermore, laggardsCo//m/vg Aafar/o/Twa/io/i: flP/ a/irf M/urafrfe 7//F191
in entry and exit have characteristics which are opposite to those of trendsetters. In addition,
it seems plausible to assume that group members with a low (high) "pure" household time
IHF strength -d£. also have a low (high) "pure" corporate time IHF strength -<//,. (see the
ends of Sees. 4.5 and 4.8). Then both trendsetters in entry and trendsetters in exit have low
-<^- as well as low -d,j,. whereas both laggards in entry and exit have high -d^ as well
as high -dy/,-. The collective catastrophe condition is again given by (7.5), where according
to (6.20d) in Section 6.4, the susceptibility to social household time influence Yf,£, is now
equal to the sum y^£", + ?//«, of the susceptibilities to "pure" social household time and
corporate time influence.
In Case B of individual variation in Y/./> matters become more complicated when not
only YtL/' but also Y///7, is allowed to vary among the group members. Substituting (6.20d)
in Section 6.4 into (7.2) and (7.3) and combining it with the expression (7.9) for ct^,. we
obtain two /-dependent terms Y/.£i^* " ?///7i•"* '" the numerator of (7.2) as well as (7.3).
However, forerunners in entry face a low average employment //*, so their entry wages are
almost independent of the susceptibility to "pure" social corporate time influence Y///7,-
Therefore, the entry situation_of forerunners is similar to that in Proposition 7.2, and since
the endogenous increase in W * reinforces the positive feedback of the endogenous decrease
in L*, a collective entry catastrophe can practically always occur. The trendsetters will then
have (relatively) low susceptibilities to "pure" social household time influence ?/./> but
may, in principle, have high as well as low Y///7,- However, analogously to the above
assumption for IHF strengths, it seems plausible to assume that group members with a low
(high) Yj.£,- have also a low (high) Y///7,- Then trendsetters in entry will have low Y/jT, as
well as low Y/,/7,. :
On the other hand, when, as in Figure 7.4, potential quitters face a maximal average
employment //*, and hence a zero average household time L*, their exit wages are in-
dependent of Yf.£V- Nevertheless, their exit wages still depend on the variation in Y///7;> so
they will not all quit at the same exit wage M*^ as in Figure 7.4. Yet, analogously to the
entry case, a collective exit catastrophe can practically always occur as a result of a positive
feedback of an endogenous decrease in W* reinforced by an endogenous increase in L*.
The trendsetters will then have (relatively) low Y///7, as well as low Y{./> *° ^vc the same
characteristics as the trendsetters in entry. Therefore, we can draw the interesting conclusion
that, in this case of variation in susceptibilities to social household and corporate time
influence only, the trendsetters in exit more or less coincide with the trendsetters in entry.
A combination of this entry and exit behavior seems to lead to a long-run labour supply
schedule like that in Figure 7.1. However, in contrast to this figure, there will be no laggards
in entry and exit, when, as assumed above, group members with a low (high) Y^x,- have a
low (high) Y///7, too. The reason is that for laggards in entry the average corporate time
W* would be high, and hence the average household time L* low, implying that the varia-
tion in Y///7, would be more important than the variation in Yt£"/- Therefore, laggards in
entry should be persons with a low Y////,• but because of the assumed positive correlation
with a low Y£,£•,•• such persons would already have entered as trendsetters or early confor-
mists. Analogously, laggards in exit should be persons with a low Y/,/J,. but because of the
assumed positive correlation with a low Y////,. such persons would already have quit as
trendsetters or early conformists.192 ' C/mp/gr 7 1
This leaves us with one substantial difference of the long-run labour supply schedule with
that in Figure 7.4, namely the presence of trendsetters in exit as a consequence of the
individual variation in the susceptibility to "pure" social corporate time influence. In ad-
dition, the conditions for the marginal ^^-- and t///7, at which collective entry and exit
catastrophes set in, are much more complex than the pertinent conditions in Proposition 7.2,
but are not elaborated here.
Finally, so far it has been assumed implicitly that the long-run exit wages w * as given
by (7.3) (or (4.13) with a^, + Y/x,*-* '"stead of a^) are all positive. This implies that the
exit wage H-* at which the collective exit catastrophe sets in, is positive. However, in the
present case this exit wage may be negative, which can be seen as follows. The numerator of
the expression in (7.3) is equal to the "net" socialdy influenced) household time taste
"t/ '" "z-i * YtLi *-"• Using (7,9) and (6.20d) in Section 6.4, this household time taste can
be expressed as W^vr-'r'^^sfi^fr' *»•*••;.;.\*• . " -'- --.- ,•;•>-....
Figure 7.1 suggests that at w • w** and W* = W*^, at which the collective exit catastro-
phe sets in, W* is larger than Z,*. Then it follows that, when at this point the "pure" cor-
porate time taste &„, is sufficiently high relative to the "pure" household time taste 6^, the
"pure" corporate time IHF strength -d," • is sufficiently large, and ^£, is sufficiently large
relative to ?////,• (recall that f ^. and t^/7, have been assumed to be positively correlated),
the expression in (7.10) at tv « w** and /7* = /?**, and hence H-**, are negative. In that
case no collective exit catastrophe occurs for positive w, so the majority will, even in the
long run, remain maximally employed when w falls to zero. This can describe a strong form
of "collective workaholism" (see the description of "collective workaholics" at the end of
Sec. 5.2 and cf. the end of Subsec. 5.5.3).
7.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has analysed an AQM for labour supply which combines the effects of behav-
ioural preference interdependence (BPI) with those of unstable individual habit formation
(IHF). The first four sections considered BPI and unstable IHF with respect to household
time only. For two cases of individual variation in household time taste, IHF strength and
susceptibility to social influence, (necessary and) sufficient conditions for the existence of
collective catastrophes and hysteresis as well as long-run average labour supply schedules
were derived. Such labour supply schedules were found to display two domains of catastro-
phic long-run behaviour alongside a band of persistent long-run behavior.
The last two sections added BPI and unstable IHF with respect to consumption and
corporate time, respectively, to the BPI and unstable IHF with respect to household time.
Generally speaking, this did not lead to essentially different results, but there were some
interesting enrichments. Especially the addition of BPI and unstable IHF with respect to
corporate time implied more symmetric entry-exit pictures. However, what has not beenfl/7 193
considered so far, is the combined effects of adding BPI and unstable IHF with respect to
both consumption and corporate time. We can then expect a combination of the effects of
the separate additions. Taking all individual variation cases together, a long-run labour
supply schedule will then resemble the schedule in Figure 7.1, with collective entry and exit
catastrophes and with trendsetters and laggards in entry as well as exit.
The expected tendencies in characteristics of these trendsetters and laggards in terms of
the varying "pure" taste parameters, IHF strengths and susceptibilities to social influence are
summarized in Table 7.1. From this table we see that the characteristics of laggards always
tend to be opposite to those of the corresponding trendsetters. At first sight, one would
expect that trendsetters in exit and entry tend to have the same characteristics as laggards in
entry and exit, respectively, but the table shows that this holds only for the taste parameters,
the consumption IHF strength and the susceptibility to social consumption influence. Where-
as laggards in entry tend to exhibit high household time and corporate time IHF strengths
and high susceptibilities to social household time and corporate time influences, trendsetters
in exit score oppositely on these characteristics, and hence equally to trendsetters in entry.
Analogously, the latter trendsetters score oppositely on these characteristics to laggards in















































Table 7.1 Characteristics of trendsetters and laggards in entry and exit in terms of "pure" taste
parameters. IHF strengths and susceptibilities to social influence for household time,
corporate time and consumption.HM C/iap/gr 7
within the band of persistent long-run behavior in a long-run average labour supply schedule
like that in Figure 7.1 (sec Sec. 4.8).'
When other parameters or exogenous variables than those in Table 7,1 vary among the
group members such as. for instance, the (discretionary) income of the husband (component
of K#) for married women, this will have the same kind of effects as variation in taste
parameters. In particular, the expected tendencies in characteristics of trendsetters and
laggards in terms of the varying parameter(s) or variable(s) are simitar.
Furthermore, we remark that the labour supplies, and hence the incomes of the husbands
of married women, may be high and persistent as a result of strong collective habit for-
mation by these husbands with respect to (family) consumption, corporate lime and house-
hold time (cf. Sec. 3.5). This has a suppressing effect on the long-run labour supply by
married women. Conversely, low levels of the latter labour supply will, in the long run,
reinforce high levels of the male labour supply (which is then a state variable fer female
labour supply). On the other hand, collective catastrophes in either labour supply will, is the
long run, affect the other one and may even trigger collective catastrophes in the oilier or*.
This implies a fascinating dynamics of interacting collective habit formations in mate and
female labour supply. From the discussion in Subsection 2.2.7 it foitows ftoi there ate mere
souaes of such a dynamics than the interaction via family income. However, an siafeoratksn
of the resulting dynamics is beyond the scope of Jhis study.
Finally, in Section 3.6 it has been argued that the effects of fnstftutfonaf or demand' sfde
rationings of labour supply and/or the effects of endogenous social security benefits should
be added to our IHF models of labour supply. This holds also with respect to our BPI and
combined IHF/BPI models. As shown in Subsections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, both complications
lead to discontinuous s/w/7-rn/i individual labour supply schedules like those in Figures 2.3
and 2.4. This means that discontinuous rationings and/or social security benefits polarize
individual labour supply in a way which resembles the long-run polarization by unstable IHF
(see also other models of dichotomous short-run behaviour like the participation model in
Ch. 9). A difference is that unstable IHF, in contrast to the former phenomena, implies also
individual hysteresis. However, adding only weak IHF with respect to household time,
consumption or corporate time to the discontinous short-run individual labour supply schedu-
les, we obtain discontinuous long-run individual labour supply schedules like (the lower half
of) Figure 3.3 in Section 3.5 or Figure 4.2 in Section 4.2, which describe individual hyste-
resis in addition to individual catastrophes. Combining these models with BPI, we are in a
same kind of situation as in the models of unstable IHF and BPI analysed in this chapter.
More specifically, we can distinguish two cases like Cases III and IV in Table 6.1 in Sub-
section 6.2.4 without the upper pairs of conditions for unstable IHF. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for a collective catastrophe to occur are then likely to resemble the lower con-
dition (7.4) in Case IV, but are not derived here. On the other hand. Section 9.10 will derive
such a condition for a dichotomous participation model.
' Note that the equal scores in Table 7.1 on the household and corporate time IHF strengths as
well as the equal scores on the susceptibilities to social household and corporate time influences are
implied by the assumed positive correlations of these characteristics for household time and corporate
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Appendix 7A Derivation of (7.3)
• 2
The expression for w, = H-_- according to the pertinent variant of (4.13) can be rewritten




For 4a£,T |a^^,| « a* this formula can be approximated as
• 2
W; = '.,, , 27 |axx,
1 - 1 - (7A.2)
which is identical to (7.3).
Appendix 7B Derivation of equality of surface areas S, and Sj in Figure 7.2 ,
The average labour supply /? in Figure 7.1 and the corresponding marginal household
time taste a^_ in Figure 7.2 are determined by the condition that the long-run entry wage'
u'y of the corresponding marginal entrant(s) as given by (7.2) is equal to the "collective
entry wage" vv*'. In the present case of exogenous individual variation in the household
time taste a^ only, this holds if and only if
a,
-/'•I (7B.1)
where £*' is the average household time corresponding to W for / = 1,3. Since L" is





In Figure 7.2 the left-hand side of this equation represents the surface area under the tf
line between a^ and a^ and the right-hand side is equal to the surface area under the curve
of the density function between a^ and a^. It then follows easily that the surface areas Sj
and 52 are equal to each other.CHAPTER 8
Dynamics of Social Norms
".../ toot p/^ajur? in rne jam* vic« no/ on/y/or in* enyojmfnf o/u'/ia/ / did,
DM/ a/io/or //i£ app/a««f / won."
Con/ew/o/is 0/ dugurfi'nf, fiooifc //, Sec. ///
A theory of preference formation which is related to the theories of individual habit for-
mation and behavioural preference interdependence considered in the previous chapters, is
the f/iwry 0/joci'a/ ratfo/n (TSC) of Akerlof (1980). This theory models the impacts of
beliefs in social norms on economic behaviour as well as a long-run feedback of that behav-
iour on the social norm beliefs. The former impacts represent the effects of infOTia/tzid
jwiV;/ «omu and 5000/ rowfro/ as well-known in sociology. The latter feedback describes
processes of internalization and "externalization" of a social norm, by which beliefs in that
social norm change.
In this chapter a variant of the TSC along the lines of Romer (1984) is applied to labour
supply. In preparation to this application. Section 8.1 reviews the basic assumptions of the
TSC and Sections 8.2 and 8.3 give an overview of social norms which seem to play a role in
male and female labour supply. Only the implications of social norms in female labour
supply are elaborated, but the implications of social norms in male labour supply are similar.
Sections 8.4 and 8.5 show that the application of the TSC to a so-called household norm is
analogous in structure to a limiting case of Case B of the AQM of collective habit formation
in Section 7.3. This is with the proviso that the intergenerational process by which social
norm beliefs change in the conception of Akerlof is replaced by an intrapersonal belief
changing process. On a conceptual level, this relativizes the distinction between social norms
and habits as made by Elster (1989, p. 100). If we envision the concept of habit in a broader
sense as general attitude or habitus (cf. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1971) and with the qualifica-
tion just mentioned, the effects and dynamics of social norms in the TSC can then be
interpreted as one of the possible "channels" through which unstable IHF and BPI may
proceed. Moreover, it is argued that the parameter restrictions on the AQM which cor-
respond to the labour supply application of the TSC, are implausible. This is important,
since, as analysed in Section 8.6, the insights and conditions which have been obtained from
the AQM, turn out to be sensitive to these parameter restrictions on a number of essential
points. One of these points is that the restrictions automatically imply unstable IHF, and
hence individual catastrophes and individual and collective hysteresis as well as very weakDy/iamics o/socia//uvms 197
conditions for collective catastrophes, whereas in the AQM stable IHF and absence of
catastrophes and hysteresis are certainly possible.'
In Section 8.7 a comparison with other applications of the TSC by Akerlof (1980), Romer
(1984), Booth (1985) and Nay lor (1989) makes clear that the present application adds two
pairs of essential elements to the overall picture, namely the pair of individual and collective
catastrophes and the pair of individual and collective hysteresis. However, the extended
model has still a number of drawbacks and should therefore be further extended. This is
done in the Sections 8.8-8.10 by introducing the effects of a social norm of financial in-
dependence in the female labour supply model. Finally, Section 8.11 concludes.
8.1 Theory of social custom .I^KM--, PS/ .;•"•"<!>.•>•>;! • !-.•.- .-.-• /^.c.^-' ;•.'; ,-• ,•• ^.-n Hv
:-.-.v..:'; •:• : •>'-.•: .•.-J£»ss •':ij"?O?y:-^'f! ftr*i H> ;•*.. ;f w :V !•':,• •-.- >''! •;.?>•='• .M.( : ' .:!• *, !:i'.! -tv-A^iii;
In an article under the title "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one
consequence" (1980), George Akerlof presents a theory which explains why social norms are
obeyed even when that is disadvantageous from the usual economic point of view. Akerlof
uses this theory to explain the persistence of a fair rather than a market-clearing wage,
implying an explanation of involuntary unemployment. Here we apply Akerlof's theory to
labour supply. •*'•*'•-•'•'''
Akerlof starts from the following assumptions. First, he assumes the existence of a social
norm in a community, with a fraction of that community (denoted m) subscribing to this
norm. Second, it is assumed that persons i care about their reputation /?,• in their com-
munity in addition to caring about their consumption X,' of goods and services and, for
believers in the social norm, in addition to caring about the agreement of their actions with
that norm. This leads to individual utility functions
* ^*™' *^* * * (8.D
where A,- is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i obeys the social norm and equal
to zero if / disobeys the social norm, n, is a dummy variable equal to one if / believes in
the norm and equal to zero if / does not believe in the norm, and e, represents i's personal
tastes. The variables X,-, /?,• and /4, are choice variables, whereas /i, is a state variable (sec
below) and e,- is an exogenous parameter.
However, the reputation /?, and the social norm behaviour 4, are not independent choice
variables. According to Akerlof's third assumption the reputation of an individual depends
on her obedience of the social norm and also on the fraction wi of community members who
believe in that norm. The larger the number of believers, the more reputation is lost by
disobeying the norm. The reputation of person / can therefore be written as a function
' See also the labour supply model of Kapteyn and Woiniez (1990) and the consumption demand
model of, e.g.. Pollak (1976a) (who, however, use linear specifications other than the AQM).
* Akerlof speaks of social customs and codes of honour or codes of behaviour, but following Dc
Neubourg (1988), I prefer to use the term of "social norm", since the latter term has the advantage of
denoting a concept which is commonly used in sociology. Its meaning covers that of code of behav-
iour as meant by Akerlof, whereas the behaviour which is prescribed by a social norm, can be
considered as a social custom.198
which depends positively on /I, and negatively on m (and the parameters of
which are assumed independent of /). This describes the effect of softa/ cowrro/ as well-
known in sociology.
Substituting the reputation functions in the utility functions (8.1), we see that the in-
dividual utilities depend on the social norm behaviour A, in two ways. First, indirectly via
the sanction of loss of reputation in case of disobedience of the norm, and second, for
believers in the norm, directly since believers care about the agreement of their action with
the norm.' If believers do not follow the norm, they suffer from a utility loss due to a
discrepancy between their behaviour and their own norm belief. This utility loss can be
associated with the concept of cog/ii/ive c/i55o«a«ff of Festinger (1957) * and with feelings
of guilt (cf. Earl, 1983). It may be conceived as consisting of losses of, among other things,
self-esteem (or "reputation with oneself'!), self-confidence and personal identity and mea-
ning (cf. Lutz and Lux, 1988). These inner sanctions of not obeying the norm are the result
of mftTna/iza/iVwi o/ f/?p norm, which is another key concept of sociology.
In order to analyse the implications of such a model, Akerlof considers a particular
specification of the individual utility functions (8.1) which is given by
fl,,/*,;«,.e,) - aX, * Pe,/?, - y/i,(l - A;) ='' (8.2)
(omitting an irrelevant constant). Here a, P, «,• and y are all positive parameters. The taste
parameter e, indicates one's sensitivity to reputation and y represents the loss of utility
from (fully) disobeying the social norm (<4, = 0) by a (full) believer in the norm (w, = 1).
The reputation function is specified as
*M,,iti) - -pm(l - /»,). (8.3)
Here p is a positive parameter denoting the loss of reputation from (fully) disobeying the
social norm (/t, = 0) when everybody else (fully) believes in the norm (m = 1). Substitu-
ting (8.3) into (8.2) yields
(/, - aX, - pe,pm(l - A,.) - y«,(l - /!,). (8.4)
The second and third term represent the sanctions of loss of reputation and cognitive dis-
sonance, respectively, and model the effects of social control and internalization of the social
norm, respectively. The sanctions introduce elements of, respectively, social-psychological
and individual-psychological inertia into the behaviour of individuals.
Specification (8.4) can be simplified by "transforming away" terms which are independent
of the short-run choice variables X, and /t^ (see Sec. 4.1). This leads to
(/, - aX, + Pe.pm/t, + Y«,A- (8-5)
Now the second and third term do not represent sanctions of utility losses, but can be
interpreted as rcwunfr of utility gains in terms of reputation and cognitive consonance for
•* The implied dualistic motivation structure of the norm behaviour resembles that according to the
attitude/subjective norm theory of Ajzcn and Fishbcin (1977).
* Sec also Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Tazclaar and Wippler (1981) and De Neubourg (1985).o/socia/ worms 199
obeying the social norm. This implies the interesting conclusion that the social norm behav-
iour of the individuals is independent of whether it is stimulated by sanctions of utility
losses or by rewards of utility gains! The reason of this equivalence relation is that we have
here a model of myopic behaviour, in which individuals do not take account of future utility
gains or losses in their decision (cf. Sec. 4.6).
In the short run, the community fraction of believers m and the individual norm beliefs
n, are exogenous with respect to the choice variables. Given these beliefs, the threats of loss
of reputation and cognitive dissonance motivate the members of the community to conform
their behaviour to the social norm. However, since the community members also care about
their consumption, it may be advantageous for some members not to conform to the norm.
Akerlof assumes that, in the long run, this undermines the belief in the social norm in the
community. If there are fewer persons obeying the norm in the current generation than there
are believers, the number of believers in the next generation will fall to the number of
obedients. Conversely, community members who do not believe in the social norm, but are
induced to conform to it by fear of loss of reputation, are assumed to reinforce the belief in
the social norm in the community. If there are more persons obeying the norm in the current
generation than there are believers, the number of believers in the next generation will rise
to the number of obedients. This assumption of Akerlof can be interpreted as describing that
the childrens' generation internalizes social norms according to the social norm behaviour of
the parents' generation. Thus, the intemalizalion of norms by children is not determined by
what educators tell them, but by what these educators actually do, i.e. by the examples they
make. This seems quite plausible and implies a normative kind of BPI where the parents'
generation forms normative reference groups of the children (see Subsec. 5.1.2). As a
particular specification of this preference formation process Akerlof assumes the differential
equation
) * (86)
where F is the fraction of the community which obeys the norm and 8 is a positive ad-
justment parameter. When the individuals are not rationed in their choice behaviour, F is a
function of the fraction of believers m. In general this function is non-linear, implying that
the differential equation (8.6) is non-linear.
In order to apply this model to labour supply we should specify the content of the social
norm in relation to labour supply. There are then several possibilities for male as well as
female labour supply. These possibilities are discussed in the next two sections.
8.2 Social norms in male labour supply
In Western societies a strongly dominant social norm in relation to labour supply is given by
the work ethic norm that a person should work for a living. This norm goes back as far as
biblical wisdom telling Adam "In the sweat of thy face shah thou eat bread".' Notwithstan-
* This norm should, however, not be identified with the related, but stronger work ethic norm
which is implied by the Protestant Work Ethic as conceived by Max Weber. See Fumham (1990) for200 Cliaptf r fl
ding the existence of elaborated systems of social security providing transfer incomes of
different types, this work ethic norm is still adhered to by vast majorities of the populations.
It is sustained and reinforced by the fact that not only money income, but also status,
prestige and power arc distributed among the population according to whether or not a
persons works and the type of work he/she does.
It is, however, clear that the work ethic norm does not apply to the entire population
equally: the norm recognizes legitimate reasons for non-application. The most obvious
groups within the population for which the work ethic norm is believed to be irrelevant or
less relevant, arc the very young members of the population, the older members, those who
are unable to work, those who follow full-time education, and those who have income from
property''. Since the norm is said not (or less) to apply to the members of these groups,
they are not expected to obey the norm and their legitimized "disobedience" must not be
interpreted as potentially undermining the work ethic norm. Therefore, these groups are left
out from the analysis. Crudely put, the remaining part of the population can be described as
the individuals aged between 16 and 64, except those who are unable to work, follow full
time education or have income from property. However, even this group cannot be regarded
as homogeneous in relation to the work eihic norm. At least two major groups have to be
distinguished: men and women. The first group will be considered in this section and the
•econd group in the next section.
The norm that an individual should work for a living applies in full force to the male
members of the restricted population. In our societies this means that male individuals are
supposed to have a job or at least to actively look for a job. Thus, obedience or disobedience
to this norm is a positive function of the individual labour supply in terms of paid corporate
hours //,-. Then, however, the question arises how many paid corporate hours should be
worked in order to obey the norm, or how large (small) W, should be to make M, = 1
(/!,• = 0). A simple assumption is to define ,4, = 0 for W, = 0 and <4, = 1 for W, > 0, but
this does not seem very adequate, since it is implausible that already a very small number of
paid corporate hours is sufficient to (fully) obey the norm.
A more plausible alternative is to suppose that the work ethic norm for men states not
only that a man should have a job, but also that he should earn enough money in this job (or
jobs) to make a (decent) living for himself and/or his family without needing a supplemen-
tary social security benefit. We call this the frrajdwimifr norm. This norm can be assumed
to be (fully) obeyed (i4g, = 1) if and only if the total non-benefit income is at least equal to
the social minimum K^, (which depends on the size of / 's family). Supposing that the
non-labour income of the man as well as the incomes of the other family members are zero
(K(,, = 0), the total non-benefit income is equal to the man's labour income *•-,//-. Then
the breadwinner norm variable /t^, as a function of the man's paid corporate hours W, can
be specified as
a recent survey of psychological research on the Protestant Work Ethic; see also Scitovsky (1977)
and sec below.
* It is interesting to note that in some cases and during specific periods in history (e.g., among the
propertied classes in 18th and 19th century England) stigma attached to working (at least in "trade")
rattier than to idleness. Although the mechanisms that arc responsible for this important exception.
arc fascinating, we disregard such cases in order to simplify the present analysis.Dy/ia/n/cs o/joci'a/ worms 201
y (8-7)
^«;(tf|) = 0, »/H',.W- < K^,, or W- < **'
This sharp dichotomy between fully obeying and not obeying the breadwinner norm can
be shown to be consistent with empirical results of Moffitt (1983) on the stigmatization
effects of participation in a welfare program in the U.S.A.. In Moffitt's model the disutility
of participation has a flat stigma component arising from participation per sc as well as a
variable stigma component which varies with the size of the benefit. An empirical test of
this model suggests a strong flat stigma, but no variable stigma. However, Moffitt has some
data problems and his results seem less plausible for social security systems which are less
stigmatizing than the welfare program considered in his paper7 Then it seems to matter for
the breadwinner norm whether a man who draws a supplementary benefit, earns a larger or
smaller part of his income in a job. In such a case it seems more realistic to conceive the
breadwinner norm variable /lg, as a continuous variable with values in the range |0,l |,
indicating to what «r/«if a person is obeying the breadwinner norm (see also Romer, 1984).
The discrete specification (8.7) may then be replaced by the continuous specification
no: V,'' I/ ~ 1 » '/ *• I ^ ^—^— •
Here tig is a positive elasticity parameter which depends on how the norm obedience is
perceived. When it is judged as important whether a man needs a (supplementary) social
security benefit p^r rc (cf. the flat stigma of Moffitt), the norm obedience for //, in the
transfer regime will be relatively low, which is described by a value of rjg larger than one
(see Fig. 8.1). In particular, when t|g goes to infinity, the continuous specification (8.8)
approaches the discrete specification (8.7). On the other hand, when the extent of norm
obedience is judged only according to the s/ze of the benefit needed (cf. the variable stigma
For that welfare program the participation rate within the Wi#/A/? population was estimated by
Moffitt to be only about 45 percent. This is certainly much lower than the corresponding participation
rate for most European social security systems and seems to be related to stronger stigmatization
effects of the U.S.A. welfare program. In fact, our treatment of the breadwinner norm implicitly
assumes that when a person is eligible for a (supplementary) social security benefit, he will take it.202
of Moffitt), the norm obedience for low levels of the benefit will be relatively high, which is
described by a value of r^ equal to one or even smaller than one.*
1
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Figure 8.1 Extent of obedience to the breadwinner norm as a function of corporate time.
When a man needs a (supplementary) benefit for his family, and hence does not fully
obey the breadwinner norm (-4^, < 1), he will suffer from a loss of reputation as a bread-
winner (negative tfj,, as implied by (8.3)) and, if he believes himself in the breadwinner
norm (positive /i^,). from cognitive dissonance (negative third term on the right-hand side of
(8.2)). It is also possible that a man is supposed to obey an even stronger work ethic norm,
namely that he should earn a labour income which is as high as possible given the normal
full-time working week and given his earning capacity. There is at least one underlying
reason for such a norm. A "good family man" (/« a rrad/r/Ywa/ .WVIJ*) may be expected to
provide his family with the highest possible wealth given the normal full-time working
week. (There may be a second underlying reason: a "good citizen" might be supposed to
make the highest possible contribution to the total production in his society as measured by
his labour income.) Whatever be the underlying reason, this work ethic norm implies that a
It is also possible that in the ov»7i perception of a person who does not fully obey the norm, the
extent of norm obedience for W, in the transfer regime is higher, and hence the elasticity parameter r|e
lower, than in the perception of relevant others who do fully obey the norm. This may be due to
reduction of cognitive dissonance and implies a difference in specification of the norm variable as
function of W, in the second and third terms of the utility function (8.5).Dy/iam/c$ o/ soda/ nomis 203
man should work full-time in a job (or jobs). We call it the (,?w></) /ami/v man norm. Its
implications do not differ very much from those of the breadwinner norm. In terms of the
specification (8.8), ^^//w, has to be replaced by the number of hours in a normal full-time
working week with the side condition that the hourly wage rate w, should be as high as
possible and at least positive. In this case a man already suffers from a reputation loss and,
if he believes himself in the norm, from cognitive dissonance, when he works less than full-
time.
One further step may be to assume that the contents of the work ethic norms arc related
not only to simple subsistence or to the standard full-time working week, but also to the
implicit norms governing the career process (or the implicit norms defining whether a man
can be considered as belonging to a certain group such as, e.g., "the dedicated workers"). In
order to make a career (or to be accepted as a member of a certain group), it may be neces-
sary to do more than just work the standard number of corporate hours. It may be required
that one spends all or practically all his discretionary time on his corporate work. This social
norm may be called the "wiac/io norm". The social values underlying it may be related to the
Protestant Work Ethic as conceived by Max Weber (see Maccoby and Terzi, 1979, and
Furnham, 1990). Again, the analysis is not fundamentally different from the previous cases.
The macho norm may be fully obeyed only above, say, 60 weekly hours of corporate
work.' Consequently, unless a man works more than 60 corporate hours per week, he will
lose reputation as a macho and, if he believes himself in the macho norm, suffer from
cognitive dissonance.
Although the hypothetical work ethic norms which have been considered in this section,
are rather traditional, they seem still to play a dominant role in modern societies. This holds
especially for the breadwinner norm and the family man norm, whereas the macho norm
seems important only in (certain) social groups. On the other hand, there arc indications that
these norms have been eroding in subcultures of long-term unemployed and of certain other
social groups. In the latter groups the macho norm is absent and the family man and bread-
winner norms have been relativized in conjunction with changing role definitions of the male
and female partners in the family. As a result of these role changes, a new norm for men
may be emerging, which will be explained after an analysis of social norms in female labour
supply in the next section.
8.3 Social norms in female labour supply
In the case of social norms in female labour supply a sharp distinction should be made
between single and non-single women. Just as for men, for single women (between 16 and
64 years old) the breadwinner norm holds, i.e., a single woman is expected to make a
(decent) living for herself and/or her child(ren) by a job without needing a supplementary
social security benefit, unless a legitimate reason makes the norm inapplicable. The family
man norm, prescribing full-time corporate work, may apply to a lesser degree than for men
Formally, one is then often paid for a standard workweek only, but the overtime can be con-
sidered as being implicitly paid for by a higher hourly wage rate.204
and the macho norm does not generally seem to apply (when it does apply, it could be
called the virago norm). u .
Non-single women are mostly married. Therefore and since we want to start the analysis
with traditional norms, we consider first the traditional work ethic norm for married women.
The general work ethic norm that a person should work for a living (see the beginning of the
previous section) can be said to apply to married women too. However, traditionally this
general norm has been interpreted for married women in a quite different sense than for
men. Whereas in a traditional role definition the husband is expected to earn the family
income in a job, the wife is supposed to take care of the household and the children. In fact,
the wife is even supposed to devote all her discretionary time to the household and the
children and not to be involved in paid work elsewhere. This norm, which we refer to as the
/ww.v<'WJ norm, played a dominant role in many OECD countries during the fifties and
sixties.
Obviously, obedience or disobedience of the household norm /4^, is a positive function of
the number of discretionary hours which is spent in the household, so of the household time
L,. Moreover, the household norm is fully obeyed (,4^, = 1) only when all the wife's
discretionary time 7", is spent in the household. This amount of discretionary time may be
conceived as depending negatively on the number of children of woman i and positively on
the uvuilablc home help and day care (sec also Sec. 2.3; thus, 7"- may be larger or smaller
than a full-time working week). We could then assume <4^, = 0 for Z,, < 7", and -4^, = 1
for L, • 7*,, but, just as in the case of work ethic norms for men, such a sharp dichotomy
between disobeying and obeying the norm does not look very realistic. Analogously to (8.8)
in the previous section, a more realistic specification of >4^(L,) would then be
where T|^ is a positive elasticity parameter which depends on how the norm obedience is
perceived (cf. Fig. 8.1). This specification implies that the norm obedience A^, increases
continuously from 0 for /,, = 0 to 1 for L, = 7",.
More specific variants of the household norm may also play a role, the obedience of
which is a positive function of the amount of time devoted to household production or of the
results of household production such as clean windows, ironed shirts and/or a hot meal each
day. When, however, the straightforward household norm is the dominant and society-wide
accepted norm for married women, married women do not lose utility due to a loss of
reputation as a housewife and mother and due to cognitive dissonance if and only if they
spend all their time in the household, so when they do not have a job.
Confronting this theoretical conclusion with the empirical fact of a strong increase in the
labour force participation of married women in many OECD countries since World War II
(see Sec. 9.1 for details), we may explain the latter decrease in obedience of the household
norm by strong decreases in the average belief in the household norm in that period. In fact,
empirical evidence for the Netherlands supports such an explanation (see Sec. 9.2). At the
same time new work ethic norms as advocated by women's liberation movements may have
been emerging. The most important one is a./?na«r/a/ /mfcvwmtenrt' norm, stating that a non-
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of her (male) partner. Analogously to the continuous specification (8.8) of the extent of
obedience to the breadwinner norm (and neglecting effects of the tax system), the extent of
obedience to the financial independence norm /t^- as a continuous function of the woman's
paid corporate hours W, could be specified as
'' ' I v •* I ...
-V,(//,) = 1. J///, ^
(8.10)
Here y^,- is now the individual minimum necessary for woman j to be financially in-
dependent (which may depend on the social class of woman j ). Graphically, this specifica-
tion can be represented by a graph similar to Figure 8.1 with ^/^,7v*', instead of J'.vAf//w^.
Alongside or instead of financial independence, self-fulfilment in and by means of a job
may have become a new work ethic norm for non-single women. The extent of obedience to
this se(/'-/w#'''''^"' /iorm may be specified analogously to the continuous specification (8.10)
of the extent of obedience to the financial independence norm with l^i /*•'; replaced by the
minimal number of corporate hours which are judged to be necessary for self-fulfilment,
^Mi (which may depend on the kind of job of woman /). Graphically, this can again be
represented by a graph similar to Figure 8.1 with W^,- instead of K^j/iVj. '"
In a liberal social group in which a belief in an "emancipation" norm of financial in-
dependence and/or self-fulfilment has developed, a woman will suffer from a loss of reputa-
tion and cognitive dissonance as an "emancipated" woman, when she does not have a job of
sufficient hours to be financially independent and/or to fulfil herself. At the same time,
however, such a woman may belong also to another social group (e.g., her next of kin)
several members of which still believe in the household norm. Moreover, the belief in the
household may not completely have disappeared in the liberal group and/or in the woman
herself. When in such a situation the woman has a job in order to avoid a loss of reputation
and cognitive dissonance as an "emancipated" woman, she may still suffer from a loss of
reputation and/or cognitive dissonance as a housewife and mother. Thus, whatever she docs,
she will never be without reputation loss and cognitive dissonance. This describes (external)
ro/e con/7/ctt as well-known in sociology.
The changes in role definitions of the male and female partners in the family, which
induce such role conflicts, may also lead to an extension of the breadwinner norm to non-
single women in the sense that both partners are supposed to contribute to making a (decent)
living for themselves and/or their children. As a counterpart of this norm there can then
emerge an extension of (a weak variant of) the household norm to men in the sense that both
partners are expected to contribute to the care of the household and/or the children.
8.4 Household norm and collective habit
Having specified the possible contents of social norms in relation to male and female labour
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social custom, as described in Section 8.1, for male and female labour supply. In this study,
however, only the effects and dynamics of social norms in female labour supply are
elaborated. This and the subsequent two sections derive the implications of the household
norm, whereas Sections 8.8-8.10 add the effects of the financial independence norm.
In order to derive first some general implications of the household norm, we substitute its
specification (8.9) into the general individual utility functions (8.1) and into the general
reputation function (as specified by, e.g., (8.3)). Substituting the reputation function into
(8.1), we then obtain individual utility functions {/(X,,L,;/i£,,m^,e^,). Maximization of
these utility functions with respect to X, and L, under the usual income constraints
X, i w,-(7",- - £,•) • J'o, yields individual consumption and household time demand func-
tions X(W,.,KQ^^7",."/.,.">£,«£,) and Z.(H»,-,Ko,-,r,-,/ijr_,-,m^,e^), respectively. When these
demands are not rationed, they determine the short-run behaviour of married women for
given values of the individual and overall household norm beliefs n^, and m^, respectively.
In the long run, these norm beliefs are assumed to change endogenously according to the
differential equation (8.6). However, in order to be able to express the overall norm obedien-
ce F in this equation in terms of the individual household times, we should first reinterpret
it in line with the reinterpretation of the individual household norm obedience /l^, as a
continuous variable in the previous section. This reinterpretation is that F^ represents the
average extent of obedience to the household norm <4^ in a community or social group of
married women.'" When the elasticity parameter T|^ in (8.9) happens to equal one, imply-
ing a linear specification, A^, and hence F^, is approximately equal to the average house-
hold time z7 in the social group divided by the average discretionary time 7". Substituting
this into the equation (8.6), multiplying the left and right-hand sides of (8.6) by 7", and
aggregating the individual to average household time demand functions as in equations
(4.24) and (5.9), we obtain for the non-rationing case ,.^ ^ ^xc /'s.-?'*^
- fmj. (8-11)
Here the absolute or relative deviations of the i-dependent exogenous variables w,-, y^, and 7",
from their averages (see Assumption X in Sec. 5.2) and the distribution of the personal tastes
e^ are assumed to be constant, and hence omitted from the arguments of the average house-
hold time demand function. Furthermore, /i, is the vector («,,,...,«»«•) of individual
norm beliefs.
These individual norm beliefs as well as the overall norm belief m^ should also be
reinterpreted. In Section 8.1 equation (8.6) has been interpreted as describing that the chil-
drens' generation internalizes social norms according to the social norm behaviour of the
parents' generation. Since this social norm behaviour has now become a continuous variable,
it seems adequate to conceive the individual norm belief n^, too as a continuous variable
with values in the range 10,1). indicating to what m^i/ the married woman i believes in
the household norm (see also Romer, 1984). Then the overall norm belief m^ can be inter-
' Note that F was already equal to A in the discrete case.
" The A/th individual norm belief n^ is omitted, since it is determined by the Af - 1 other norm
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preted as the average extent of belief in the household norm in a social group of married
women n^.
Now it is interesting to compare the general model derived so far with our general model
of IHF and BPI with respect to household time only as analysed in Section 6.1. The latter
model assumes utility functions f/'(^,X,;^,,5^) and the differential equation (6.2). where
the vectors w, y and 7 in the average demand function can be replaced by their averages w\ ^
and 7". These functions and equation happen to be analogous to the utility functions
(/(X,-,/.,•;«£,-,m^.e^,-) and the differential equation (8.11) obtained above, for constant 7,
and hence constant 7,, i = 1 /V (see above). The individual household time habit .ir^
then corresponds to 7, times the individual household norm belief «^,, the social household
time environment S£- corresponds to 7 times the average household norm belief wi^, and the
adjustment speed 6^ corresponds to the adjustment parameter 8^. That this analogy is not
sheer coincidence, can be clarified by considering the particular specification (8.5) of Aker-
lof's utility functions. . „ ! ';'.-"•'"•'•'
Applying specification (8.5) to our labour supply application of the household norm for
married women and substituting (8.9) with r|^ = 1 into (8.5) yields
'£,•• (8.12)
This specification has been written in a form comparable with the AQM specification (6.7)
in Subsection 6.2.1. Putting j^ = 7", «^, and j£- = Twi^, we see that (8.12) corresponds to
a limiting case of (6.7) with a^, " «/./ = "iXi = 0. Tte parameters a^,-, Y/.Z.I *"d
Yi,Li should then be equated with a, Yf,/7",-* and (P^e^,p^)/(f T,), respectively.
The parameter restriction cx^, = 0 is due to the assumption implicit in (8.2), (8.3) and
(8.9) that a married woman loses or gains utility from household time only via obeying more
or less the household norm. This assumption is very implausible, since a married woman
will derive more or less pleasure (or nuisance) other than reputation and cognitive con-
sonance from staying at home. A simple way to take such norm-independent "psychic
income" from household time into account is adding the term oc^Z,, to the utility function
(8.12). Moreover, individual differences in household time taste can then be described by the
parameter a^,.
The other parameter restrictions a^, = 0 and <x^, = 0 exclude diminishing marginal
utilities of consumption and household timc'^ and are consequences of the assumed linear-
ity of the utility function (8.2) and the reputation function (8.3) in the choice variables X,,
/?, and A,-. The linearity of the utility function implies perfect perceived substitutability of
consumption, reputation and, among other things, self-esteem. On the one hand, this property
may be a good approximation of the observations that a lot of people seem to pursue an
increase in reputation as a substitute for a lack of self-esteem, that others may regard self-
'* Note that m was already equal to /i in the discrete case. See Section 8.7 for a different inter-
pretation of m by Romer (1984. p. 722).
" See footnote 48 in Subsec. 2.2.5.208Oiflptf r 3
esteem as a rather good substitute for reputation, and some persons may (consciously or
unconsciously) perceive eating more food as a compensation for a lack of reputation or self-
esteem. On the other hand, most people will view reputation and self-esteem as insufficient
substitutes of consumption and, conversely, eating more food as a poor compensation for a
lack of reputation or self-esteem. Therefore, the perceived substitutability of consumption,
reputation and self-esteem seems, in general, rather imperfect. Moreover, the implied linear-
ity of the utility function (8.12) in X, and L, has the implausible implications of constant
marginal utilities and perfect substitutability of consumption and (discretionary) household
time, and of indifference curves being straight lines and hence excluding, for almost all
values of the exogenous variables, interior solutions for the individual short-run labour
supplies. Rather it seems realistic to assume diminishing marginal utilities of consumption
and household time as prescribed by the First Law of Gossen, implying imperfect substitut-
ability of consumption and household time. This can be implemented by relaxing the param-
eter restrictions mentioned (see Section 8.11 for further extensions).
We can then conclude that (he AQM specification (6.7) in Section 6.2 is a more adequate
representation of the labour supply preferences of married women than the more restricted
Akerlof specification (8.12).'* Therefore, the insights and conditions for collective catas-
trophes and hysteresis to occur which have been obtained from the AQM, seem more
reliable than corresponding insights and conditions for the case of the Akerlof specification.
Nevertheless, in order to assess the robustness of the insights and conditions according to the
AQM to the restrictions in the Akerlof specification, we could compare these insights and
conditions with those for the Akerlof specification. This is done in Section 8.6. However,
before that we should take into account that there is a difference between the
intergenerational process by which social norm beliefs change in the conception of Akerlof
and the combination of individual habit formation and adaptation of the social environment
as described by our "canonical" model. This is analysed in the next section.
8.5 Dynamics of social norm beliefs
In the conception of Akerlof the social norm beliefs change by a specific kind of social
influence ftffww/i generations, whereas in our "canonical" model the individual habits and
social environment change by the influence of individuals on themselves and by the social
influence wir/im a generation, respectively. Thus, the intergenerational process of Akerlof is
not covered by our model. On the other hand, the social norms beliefs may change not only
in a very long run by the intergenerational process, but also in a much less long run by
intrapersonal and intragenerational processes.
The intrapersonal process may work as follows. Believers in the norm who. nevertheless,
prefer to disobey it to a certain extent, suffer from cognitive dissonance (sec (8.4)). In such
a situation, in which the members do not want to change their norm-violating behaviour.
'•* Recall, however, from Sections 4.2 and 7.1 that also the AQM docs not seem very adequate,
since in the case of unstable IHF. it has the implausible implication that married women with a part-
time job will, in the long run. cither spend all their discretionary time in a (full-time) job or have no
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they could reduce their cognitive dissonance in the long run by conforming their norm belief n,-
to their norm behaviour A,-, so by letting erode their norm belief. Conversely, disbelievers in
the norm who, nevertheless, are induced to conform to it to a certain extent, may internalize
the norm to the same extent. In the Akerlof model, however, this cannot be the result of
reduction of cognitive dissonance, since disbelievers do not suffer from that. It should rather
be interpreted as the result of an enlargement of cognitive consonance (see (8.5)) as motiv-
ated by a need to justify or legitimize one's own behaviour by a social norm in which the
person believes herself. As the mirror image of reduction of cognitive dissonance, this can
be assumed to lead to a utility gain in terms of increases in self-esteem, self-confidence,
personal identity and meaning, etc..
A particular specification of this intrapersonal belief changing process which implies the
average belief equation (8.6) with wi = /T and F = A (sec the previous section) by a simple
aggregation, is given by the differential equations •„,* ; •-••:; iy-*^S:-.. /-•• •? .v?-s-wtn!;>i--"
n, = 8(A, - «,-). 1 = 1 N. (8.13)
In the non-rationing case the individual norm behaviour A, is a function of the individual
norm belief n, and the average norm belief »». This implies that the individual belief
equations (8.13) are then linked to each other via the average belief m. For constant values
of the exogenous variables, a long-run (stationary) equilibrium ft* of this system of /V
differential equations is given by the system of A/ algebraic equations /\,(n*,m*)"n*,
1 = 1 /V. Thus, in long-run equilibrium all believers in the social norm obey it and all
disbelievers disobey it. This is also found by Akerlof and Romer (1984).'* Moreover,
substituting (8.9) with rj^ = 1 into (8.13) and multiplying the left and right-hand sides of
(8.13) by 7",, we obtain differential equations which, for constant 7",-, 1 = 1 ,...,/V, are of the
same form as the individual habit equations (6.1). Thus, this intrapersonal process by which
social norm beliefs change implies a dynamics similar to that of our "canonical" model.
On a conceptual level, this relativizes the distinction between social norms and habits as
made by Elster (1989, p. 100). If we envision the concept of habit in a broader sense as
genera] attitude or habitus (cf. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1971), we could interpret individual
and average household nonn beliefs as specific a5/?<r/.v of individual household time habit-
(us) states and the social household time environment, respectively. Moreover, the effects of
cognitive dissonance and reputation on individual behaviour may be regarded as specific
mechanisms through which the influences of individual habits and the social environment are
working. Finally, the intrapersonal process by which social norms change could be con-
sidered as a specific "channel" through which individual habit(us) formation and adaptation
" Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984) do not consider the theoretical possibility in their models that,
in a long-run equilibrium with the number of believers being equal to the number of obedicnts. some
believers with a low sensitivity to reputation disobey the norm, whereas an equal number of disobedi-
ents with a high sensitivity to reputation obey the norm. On the other hand, when starting from a
situation where all community members are believers as well as obedicnts. the values of exogenous
variables change, the first to break the norm, and hence to lose their belief in it, arc the members
with the lowest sensitivity to reputation. This suggests a positive correlation between belief and
sensitivity to reputation, which excludes the theoretical possibility mentioned and which is explicitly
assumed by Naylor (1989) (see his Assumption 6).210 C7»ap/gr &
of the social environment are proceeding. In other words, we may interpret the former
process as a specific mode of co/feeft ve Aato/fus) /orma/io/i as described by our model.
In the case of an intragenerational, but interpersonal belief changing process, matters are
different. Then the individual norm beliefs are directly influenced by either the norm beliefs
or the norm behaviours of other individuals of the same generation. Such individuals may
form a normative reference group of the person from which she adopts social norms (see
Subsec. 5.1.2). There may be several motives for this adoption of social norms like, for
instance, needs for belongingness and social approval."' Such social benefits can depend
positively on the degree of conformity of one's own norm belief to the norm beliefs or norm
behaviours of others, but should be distinguished clearly from reputation in the short-run
model as depending positively on the degree of conformity of one's own norm IWiav/ou/- to
the norm beliefs of others.
Furthermore, only adoption of social norms from others in as far as this is induced by
their norm bf/uiwYwrf, can serve as an micro-underpinning of the long-run macro-equation
(8.6), since this requires a feedback of norm behaviours on norm beliefs. Adoption of social
norms from others on the basis of merely their norm beliefs can explain how individual
extents of norm beliefs n, may converge , but it does not explain how in a community
of only full believers (n, • m • 1) the norm belief may erode or how in a community of
only disbelievers («, • m * 0) a norm belief may emerge. On the contrary, the last two
phenomena can be explained by a feedback of norm behaviours on norm beliefs, and a
particular specification of an interpersonal variant of such a feedback, which implies the
average belief equation (8.6) by a simple aggregation, is given by the differential equations
«,. - 8(F - #i,) i = 1 N. (8.14)
In the non-rationing case the average norm behaviour F is, in general, a function of all
individual norm beliefs n, and the average norm belief m. Hence, the individual belief
equations (8.14) are then linked to each other. For constant values of the exogenous variab-
les, a long-run (stationary) equilibrium £* of this system of A/ differential equations is given
by n, • F(/J*,WI*), i = 1 /V. This implies that all individual norm beliefs converge to
the same average norm belief wi*.
However, since the individual norm behaviours may remain different from each other due
to different sensitivities to reputation, these behaviours may deviate from the corresponding
individual beliefs in long-run equilibrium. This is inconsistent with results found by Akerlof
(1980) and Romer (1984) as well as with our individual habit equations (6.1). Therefore, this
interpersonal process by which social norm beliefs change, generally implies another kind of
'* Sec, for example, Ncwcomb (1947).
" Cf. Krclle (1968) and the models of formation of life style groups of Schokkaen (1982b, Sec.
V.B.IU).
'* This important limitation also applies to the cpidcmiological model of the diffusion of social
norm beliefs and labour supply behaviours of Dc Neubourg (1985. 1988). In this model the infected
persons seem to be those who neither believe nor obey the social norm, and the non-infected persons
seem to be those who both believe and obey the social norm. Thus, all believers obey the norm and
vice versa, so m = F. and hence m = 0 in (8.6). This implies that, at least in its present form, the
model of Dc Ncubourg describes a long-run dynamics which is different from that of Akerlofs
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dynamics than Akerlof s as well as our model. On a conceptual level it could be considered
as a specific mode of behavioural preference interdependence as analysed in Chapter 5
according to which individual norm beliefs as aspects of individual habits are not foniied
under the direct influence of one's own behaviour, but under the direct influence of the
behaviour of others. In the next section, however, we assume only an intrapcrsonal belief
changing process as described above and investigate the implications of the parameter
restrictions in the Akerlof specification (8.12) for the occurrence of collective catastrophes
and hysteresis.
8.6 Collective catastrophes and hysteresis • • > .
At first sight, the conditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis to occur in the case of
the restricted Akerlof specification (8.12) seem to be obtained by simply imposing the
parameter restrictions on the AQM conditions. However, this is not automatically correct,
since, as already referred to in Section 8.4, linearity of the utility function excludes unique
interior solutions of the first-order condition as given by the individual short-run labour
supply functions (6.8) in Subsection 6.2.1." On the other hand, this linear case can be
shown to form a limiting case of the AQM. Substituting the parameter restrictions into (6.9a)
and (6.9b), it then follows that there are non-negative individual short-run reservation wages
w^j = b,/a which are given by
(8.15)
For w above tv^,- there is a unique comer solution W, = 7,- for the individual short-run
labour supply. For w = w,., an indifference line coincides with the budget line, implying
that all values of //, are solutions. When the denominator of (8.15) is positive, the reser-
vation wage is positive, and for w below w,., there is a unique corner solution for //, = 0.
This implies a discontinuous short-run individual labour supply curve with a catastrophe
between tf, = 0 and W, = 7, at w,,.*>
In the long run we then have, for any positive habit sensitivities Y/,^,, a situation similar
to that in the AQM case of BPI and unstable IHF with its polarization of individual labour
supply to zero and maximal corporate hours (see Sec. 7.1). This corresponds to the Cases III
and IV in Table 6.1 in Subsection 6.2.4. (Note that the parameter restriction a^, « 0
excludes the Cases I and II, since the parameters Yj,£" aid y^ both are, by definition, non-
negative for all persons.) However, in the present case of the Akerlof specification and
assuming, just as in Section 7.1, a uniform 7, there is exogenous individual variation only in
the sensitivity to reputation e^,, and hence in the susceptibility to social influence
Note that the parameter restrictions imply c,- = </,•« 0 and hence a zero denominator in (6.8).
^ The shape of this short-run labour supply curve is similar to that in the case of an institutional
rationing of labour supply at zero and full-time employment (see Subscc. 2.2.4). In the present case,
however, the total discretionary time 7, of woman / may be larger of smaller than a full-time
working week.212
* (P/.*LiP/.)/^' *>ut ™" '" ^ household time taste a^ = 0 and the habit sen-
sitivity y^£ • Y/,/7"*. Analogously to Proposition 7.2 in Section 7.3, it then follows that.
for a presumably large class of density functions of y^ or e^, there can a/wavs occur a
collective catastrophe in entering the labour market. This leaves us with a case like Case IV
in Table 6.1 in Subsection 6.2.4. Besides to the absence of variation in household time taste
and habit sensitivity, this result can be attributed to the parameter restrictions <*xXi ~**££i ~^.
which exclude short-run satiation effects of diminishing marginal utilities of consumption
and household time (note that satiation counteracts IHF and BPI).
In order to derive long-run average labour supply schedules for a social group of married
women (see Fig. 8.2), we first consider the case of H- rising from zero and suppose that at
H> » 0 all group members do not participate in the labour market and are collectively used
to that, c.q. fully believe in the household norm, i.e. .*£,• • 5j_£ • 7", c.q. «^, = m^ = 1 for
all / (cf. Sec. 4.8).*' For w below H',*' » (y^ + p^rnine^, p^)/(7a), nobody will enter
the labour market because of sanctions of cognitive dissonance and reputation loss, but for
higher w trendsetters will take a job with maximal hours. First women will enter who are
the least sensitive to their reputation among their housewive-friends (lowest e^,) and next
women who arc more sensitive to their reputation. At a certain vi*' a critical mass A/'Vr
of trendsetters is reached, and beyond **•*' the remaining conformist housewives collectively
also take a job with maximal hours. This immediately leads to maximal employment of all
women, and in the long run all women will have collectively got used to that, c.q. will have
completely lost their belief in the household norm, so s^, = s^£- = 0, c.q. n^, = m^ = 0
for all i . For higher w the long-run average labour supply remains maximal, since there is
no incentive to reduce the individual labour supplies. This is due to the restriction a^ = 0,
which implies that household time has no utility other than possible utilities from reputation
or cognitive consonance, the latter utilities being zero in the present situation.
For the same reason, in such a maximal employment situation the individual exit wages
as given by (8.15) with /^, = m^ = 0 are equal to zero. This implies that, at declining H\
all group members will remain maximally employed (even for w = 0), i.e., that maximal
employment of all group members and the corresponding absence of belief in the household
norm (wt^ « 0) form a (stable) long-run equilibrium for all w. Together with the behaviour
of entrants to the labour market for w rising from 0, this leads to a long-run average labour
supply schedule as represented in Figure 8.2. This figure displays also a long-run labour
supply schedule in the special case that the susceptibility to social influence y^jj or P^e^,- p^,
is zero for all group members. The entry wages are then the same for all group members,
and in the present case they are equal to H*' = y^/(Ta). Thus, there are no trendsetters
and all women are involved in a collective catastrophe at the uniform entry wage.
However, returning to the more plausible case that at least some married women are
susceptible to social influence from their group, suppose that H- first rises from zero till a
level vv " at which only some trendsetters have entered the labour market and, after the long-
run equilibrium being established, again declines to zero. In the long-run equilibrium at w",
the trendsetters who have entered, have collectively got used to that, c.q. have completely lost
*' By "collectively used" we mean thai both the individual habit states and the expected or per-







Figure 8.2 Long-run average labour supply schedule for Akerlof specification with household
norm, zero household time taste and exogenous individual variation only in sensitivity
to reputation (or no sensitivity to reputation).
their belief in the household norm (n^, = 0). This implies that they do no longer suffer
from cognitive dissonance, and hence will leave the labour market only at an exit wage,
given by (8.15) with «^, = 0, which is substantially lower than their entry wage. Therefore,
the long-run average labour supply of the married women will be inelastic for w declining
from w° until the exit wage of those working women is reached who are most sensitive to
their bad reputation among their housewife friends (highest e^,). Those women will then
quit, and at lower w the other working women will quit in order of decreasing sensitivity to
reputation, which is the reverse of their order of entrance. However, if w again starts to rise
from a long-run equilibrium at w' before all trendsetters have returned to their households,
the trendsetters who have returned, have again be converted to the household norm and will
enter only at a higher entry wage because of cognitive dissonance sanctions. The long-run
average labour supply of the married women is then again inelastic until at rising w the
entry curve is reached. For w rising beyond that point, the elastic entry curve is followed.
It is also possible that in the midst of a collective entry catastrophe at W , the wage rate
declines under the entry curve. For »v above the exit curve, the average labour supply will
adjust to a long-run inelastic value /7* which tends to be lower than /7', but higher than
W* , i.e., a number of entry conformists is maximally employed, whereas other entry
conformists are not employed. On the other hand, when w declines below the exit curve, a
collective catastrophe back to non-participation sets in, which tends to end at a "stable"214
equilibrium on the solid part of the exit curve at which still a number of exit laggards are
maximally employed. Thus, we have again a band of persistent and hystcretic long-run
behaviour between the entry and exit curves and two domains of catastrophic long-run
behaviour outside this band.
8.7 Comparison with social custom literature
More generally, similar results as found in the previous section could be expected to hold for
other applications of Akerlofs theory of social custom, in particular for the application to
fair wage setting by Akerlof himself and Romer (1984). Therefore, it seems to make sense to
compare our AQM results wilh corresponding results of Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984).
In their approach the wage setting is determined by the interplay of labourers and owners of
capital. The utility functions and reputation functions of the labourers are given by (8.2) and
(8.3) in Section 8.1, respectively. On the other hand, the capitalists have similar utility
functions and reputation functions, but the utility functions do not contain a cognitive
dissonance term (the capitalists do not have a conscience!), and in the model of Romer the
utility loss from reputation sanctions is negatively quadratic in the social norm behaviour (cf.
(8.4)). Other differences between the models of Akerlof and Romer are that Romer assumes
continuous social norm behaviours and beliefs, and defines the overall belief variable m as
the fraction of labourers who have some belief in the social norm (i.e., for whom n, > 0).
In both models the long-run evolution of wi is given by (8.6) and three propositions on the
existence and nature of long-run equilibria of m are derived. The propositions of Romer arc
analogous to those of Akerlof, but slightly stronger. Therefore and since the assumptions of
Romer are more close to our assumptions than those of Akerlof, we consider the proposit-
ions of Romer. Omitting details which are less relevant for the comparison with our
AQM results, these propositions amount to:
I. A zero fraction »i of believing labourers always represents a long-run equilibrium.
II. Assume that the distributions of reputation parameters like (J e,p in (8.4) are boun-
ded. There are then two cases. If the cognitive dissonance sanctions y «,• on disobed-
ience to the social norm (d, = 0) by a believer in the norm («,• > 0, see (8.4)) are
sufficiently strong relative to the utility gains from a higher consumption by disobed-
ience, there is a positive m " such that any m < m^ yields a long-run equilibrium. If
the cognitive dissonance sanctions are not sufficiently large, wi = 0 is a stable long-
run equilibrium.
III. If the parameters of the linear term in the individual utility losses from reputation
sanctions of the capitalists are sufficiently large relative to the utility gains from a
higher consumption by disobedience to the norm, m = 1 is a stable long-run e-
quilibrium.
*' In Romcr's model the extent of violation of the social norm is described by the absolute
difference Ivr-iTI between the wage w and the fair wage iv. This corresponds to 1 -^i" 1 -Z.,/7"=#,/r
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Comparing these propositions with our AQM results, we find the following points of agree-
ment and disagreement. First, in the AQM a long-run equilibrium for m^ » 0, so /7* = 7,
exists for all values of the exogenous variables only in the limiting case that the household
time taste parameter ot^, = 0 for all group members / (see Fig. 8.2), since only then there
is no incentive for obeying more or less the household norm when «£, = m^ = 0. In the
general situation that ct^ > 0 for all /, a distinction should be made between cases like
those in Table 6.1 in Subsection 6.2.4. Above we have seen that only a case like Case IV
with individual variation only in the susceptibility to social influence Yj,£,- = (P/.*LiPf.)/^
corresponds to the Akerlof specificanon. This holds also with respect to the model of Romer,
so Figure 7.4_in Section 7.3 applies. According to this figure a long-run equilibrium for
wi^ = 0, so W* =7", exists only for *'^ S M' S w). Here »v** = a^/a with
a * o^ - |<Xxxl^o *"d *'• '* given by (4.13) in Section 4.3. The latter expression for
w, implies that this upperbound is due not only to a positive Ctj_, but also to a positive
diminishing marginal utility of consumption r* = |cx^|.
In Case IV with individual variation in a^, only, to which Figure 7.1 in Section 7.2
applies, we have a similar situation, but then the lower bound tv^ and the higher bound
>v^ tend to be more restrictive. This holds also for Case III, to which a figure like Figure
4.11 in Section 4.8 applies. In the Cases I and II, to which figures like Figure 4.9 in Section
4.7 and Figure 5.3 in Section 5.4 apply, a long-run equilibrium for »i^ = 0, so //* = 7",
does often not exist for any w. At the most we then have a long-run equilibrium like -4 in
Figure 5.2 in Section 5.3 at which a majority of the social group does not believe in the
social norm, but at which there are still some persons who believe in it to some extent.
Thus, in many cases our AQM excludes a pure "neoclassical" equilibrium in which nobody
more or less believes in a social norm and in which such a social norm has therefore no
effect on the individual behaviour. We may even have a situation as described by /- in
Figure 5.2 in which there is only one equilibrium B at which everybody fully believes in the
social norm.
In the first case of Romer's Proposition II, the cognitive dissonance sanctions y"/ for
«,- > 0 are so strong as to guarantee that /« f/i£ 5>wrf rw« all persons who have some belief
in the social norm also fully obey it, independently of any influence from a reputation
sanction. Conversely, if the utility losses from reputation sanctions like pe,pm in (8.4) are
sufficiently weak, i.e. for m < /n", //i //ie j/w/7 run all persons who disbelieve the social
norm also disobey it because of consumption gains. Such short-run equilibria in which the
persons who obey the norm exactly, coincide with the persons who have some belief in it,
are automatically also long-run equilibria. Thus, any initial distribution of individual norm
beliefs with m < m " forms a long-run equilibrium.
In the labour supply counterpart of Romer's model as represented by Figure 8.2, this
situation occurs for w < w^ , where Wyy is the entry wage of the last entrant and is given
by (8.15) for w^, = 1 and m^ = 0, so is equal to y^/(7a). This inequality is equivalent to
Y/, £ aw7\ expressing that the cognitive dissonance sanction y^, for a full believer in the
household norm (/»£,- = 1) should be at least as strong as the utility gain from the additional
Cf. Akerlof (1980, p. 765).216 C/iap/gr 8
consumption wT when working maximal corporate hours.^* For the specific configuration
of Figure 8.2, any point to the right of the dotted pan of the exit curve is then located in the
band of persistent long-run behaviour, so represents a long-run equilibrium with /n^ < rn^,
where wi^ is given by the dotted curved On the other hand, for w > w^ points with
sufficiently low positive wi^ lie in the domain of catastrophic entry behaviour. Then m^ = 0
is a stable long-run equilibrium. In the more general Cases IV of Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.1
in Sections 7.3 and 7.2, a property as in Proposition II holds only for H> > >v*^ = cx^/a or
w £ Wjy • maxa^/a, respectively, so for sufficiently high w or a or sufficiently low
a^ or maxa^,. A similar qualification applies to Case III as represented by Figure 4.11 in
Section 4.8, and in the Cases I and II as represented by Figure 4.9 in Section 4.7 and Figure
5.3 in Section 5.4 the property disappears. ,>-..,-.•. % a ' • •*>*•*<.- :
A stable long-run equilibrium for n»£ « 1 as in Proposition III occurs in Figure 8.2 for
H» £ w'j , where tv, is the entry wage of the first entrant and is given by (8.15) for
"£/"'• *L< * "™"'Li ""<* ">L " I- so is equal to (Y^ + P^mine^p^J/Cra). A suf-
ficient condition for this inequality to hold independently of the value of the cognitive
dissonance parameter 7/, is P^mine^p^ £ aw7" or, equivalently,
pj_ i (aw7")/(P^mine^,).^ This condition is also sufficient for a stable long-run e-
quilibrium for wi^ • 1 in the more general Cases IV of Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.1, but then
it is moreover sufficient if w £ (min)a^,/a, or equivalently, (min)a^,<) 2 aw, so if the
(minimal) household time taste is sufficiently high to induce all women in the social group
to conform to the household norm. Both conditions apply also to the other Cases II, I and
HI- „;•;.„•
Results which are similar to those of Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984) are obtained by
Booth (1985) and Naylor (1989) in applications of Akerlof's theory to trade union member-
ship and collective strike action. The analysis of Naylor is the most advanced: as already
mentioned in the previous section, he finds a "trimodal outcome" with two continua of long-
run equilibria and a discrete equilibrium for m =0, and he analyses the effects of changing
values of several parameters on this outcome. Our Figures 8.2 and 7.4 display such a trimod-
al outcome for w = u•*, and Figure 7.1 exhibits for w = H ^ a less restricted variant of a
trimodal outcome with three continua of long-run equilibria. The effects of a changing wage
rate have been analysed in the previous section, showing that a trimodal outcome is at most
obtained for a restricted range of the wage rate.
However, in comparison to the analyses of Naylor and the other authors our model adds
two major insights. First, it demonstrates how the historical time paths of the exogenous
variables determine W'/HC/I individual and overall long-run equilibria out of the broad ranges
of possible equilibria are actually approached. This finding is referred to as individual and
collective hysteresis. Second, our model shows how at certain values of the exogenous
** Cf. Proposition II of Akerlof (1980). that considers only cases in which the reputation parameter p
approaches 0.
For sufficiently small P^Pt ^ entry wage vr^ may also be higher than the highest exit wage.
In that case we have m^' = 1 for w above this exit wage. On the other hand, in the model of Romer m "
is not specified.
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variables a rra/u/fio/i may occur from one individual or overall equilibrium to another. Such
transitions are called individual and collective catastrophes, respectively.
Moreover, in order to derive plausible conditions for such phenomena to occur, Akerlof's
particular specification of his model has been extended to a continuous additive quadratic
model. This has the advantage of making visible that the phenomena which arc implied by
Akerlof's specification occur only when certain parameter conditions are met. However, the
extended model has still a number of drawbacks and should therefore be further extended.
Such extensions will be analysed in the next sections.
8.8 Financial independence norm: Akerlof specification
Notwithstanding their advantages, the extended TSC as well as the AQM derived in the
previous chapter still suffer from the drawback that the implied piecewisc-lincarity of the
individual demand functions in the individual norm beliefs or habit states precludes stable
individual equilibria from being interior in the case of separately unstable individual (dis)be-
lief formation or IHF. This seems implausible especially for married women with a part-time
job, since it implies that these married women would, in the long run, either spend all their
discretionary time in one or more jobs or have no job at all (see footnote 8 in Sec. 4.2). One
way to remedy this drawback is the following.
As counterparts of the IHF and BPI with respect to consumption and corporate time, the
TSC can be extended so as to allow for the effects and dynamics of social "emancipation"
norms of financial independence and self-fulfilment, respectively, alongside the household
norm in female labour supply. In Section 8.3 it has been noted that, whereas in the fifties
and sixties the household norm played a dominant role in many OECD countries, since the
end of the sixties the "emancipation" norms came up. An important "emancipation" norm is
the financial independence norm, which is specified by (8.10). The coming three sections
will analyse the implications of this norm for short and long-run female labour supply
according to extensions of the TSC. This section and the next will consider the case where
only the financial independence norm plays a role, and Section 8.10 will add the household
norm to this case.
Specification (8.10) can be rewritten in terms of the total consumption X, of the family
of the female labour supplier by using the usual binding income constraint X, = w,W,- + K^,,
where K^, is assumed to be the income of the husband. This implies w,W, « X, - K^^,
and substituting this into (8.10) yields
1
x - y V^
y (8.16)
Thus, now the social norm variable M^-• is a positive function of consumption X,, so con-
sumption cannot play the role of the incentive to breaking the norm as in the TSC. However,
this role can be taken over by household time L,-, which, following specification (8.5), leads
to individual utility functions218
where a^, p^, e^,, p^- and y^ are again positive parameters.
Analogously to the procedure in Section 8.4, we substitute (8.16) with r|f = 1 into
(8.17). Moreover, since K^,. and K/^, are assumed to be exogenous, terms which depend on
these variables, but not on the behaviour variables, can be transformed away. Assuming that K,^,
it the same for each group member, we then obtain
for X; £ y^., + yiu and
(8.18b)
for X< 2 KQ( + K/nf. Now the second and third term in (8.18a) seem to correspond to the
two terms Yxx,*X|X, * YxxVx*/ *"'^h are added to the AQM specification (6.7) in
Subsection 6.2.1 in order to account for IHF and BPI with respect to consumption (see Sec.
6.3). In the extended (6.7) we should then put fy, = y^'ip,, Jjf = ^/M^F- "/./ ~ **!.•
"«* «X< " " 0 XX, = "LL<
However, this is not entirely correct, since, in the long run, the state variables y^ n^, and y^ /»j/r
are not adjusted to the family consumption levels X,- and X as s^,- and s^", respectively, but
to the wife's own income levels wW, = X, - y^, and w// = X - y^,, respectively. There-
fore, the formation of (dis)beliefs in the financial independence norm can be interpreted as a
specific mode of collective habit formation only with respect to the wife's own income. On
the other hand, because of the assumed exogeneity of the income of the husband y^,, the
dynamics of this collective habit formation is analogous to that of collective habit formation
with respect to consumption. This analogy will be used in the following. However, we will
then take into account that the analogy holds only for X, £ y^, + y^, or //, S y^/*"
(see (8.10) in Sec. 8.3). As shown below, this leads to an interesting modification of the
results of the AQM for consumption IHF and BPI.
For the same kind of reasons as the parameter restrictions in (8.12), the parameter restric-
tions a^,- « Ctyx, = cc^£, = 0 in (8.18) are implausible and should therefore be relaxed.
However, for the sake of comparison, we first analyse this restricted case. Since the utility
functions as given by (8.18) are then linear in L,- and X, in both regimes, the indifference
curves generally consist of two straigh' segments (see Fig. 8.3), with slopes given by the
marginal rates of substitution
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for X, < KQ, + y,^ and -dX,/rfZ., = l^/tf^ = ~ ^ */ * >0i * >W '"st as in the
standard model, the short-run reservation wage M^- is equal to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion for Z. = 7", and this is given by the marginal rate of substitution in (8.19) (cf. (8.15)).
For M' below w^. there is a corner solution for Z., = 7" or //, = 0. For w equal to w,,, the
right segment of an indifference curve coincides with the opportunity frontier, implying that
all values of //, between and including 0 and K/^/w^, are solutions. Herewith it has been
assumed that K/^/H-,., is smaller than the maximum T of //,-, and this holds for all values
of flf,, mf and e,r, if and only if y^ + p,. maxe^Pf < a^7\ For H- above H-,,, there is
a unique interior solution for //, = 1^/w\ This implies a discontinuous short-run individual
labour supply curve with a catastrophe between //, = 0 and //, = K/^/H'^ at w,.; and a




Figure 8.3 Determination of short-run labour supply in the presence of a financial independence
norm and a constant marginal utility of household time under a standard constraint for
>v < w,,, »v = w,.; and w > H-,., (dashed bold lines). Indifference lines are solid bold.
The dashed bold line with arrows indicates the optimal points for w > w,.,..
However, this story holds only when /i^, and/or m^ is positive, i.e., when the person
herself believes in the financial independence norm to some extent and/or when some other
persons in her social (reference) group believe in it. There is then at least one incentive to
obey this norm, and this incentive becomes stronger relative to the marginal utility of
household time a^as w rises, since one can then (fully) obey the norm for a lower //,, so
with a smaller loss of household time. Beyond w = >v,., the incentive becomes stronger than
a^, inducing the person to enter the labour market. Moreover, since the marginal utilities of
norm obedience and household time are independent of A/,, it is then advantageous to obey220 Chapter S
the norm fully. On the other hand, it is not advantageous to work more corporate hours than
minimally necessary to fully obey the norm, since this would imply a larger loss of house-
hold time, whereas consumption does not have a marginal utility above that derived from
norm obedience. All this results in a discontinuous jump from W, = 0 to //, = ^/M/*",.,-
Finally, when H- rises further, the number of corporate hours W, = J'/AJ/H' which is needed
to fully obey the norm, decreases. This feature is similar to that in the case where a minimal
necessary consumption level (see Subsec. 2.2.4) or a breadwinner norm (see Sec. 8.2) in
combination with an insufficient other income dictates an positive under limit on //, which
is inversely proportional to w.
In contrast to the reservation wage (8.15) in the case of the household norm, the reser-
vation wage given by (8.19) in the present case of the financial independence norm decreas-
es with increasing n^, and m^. Conversely, when both n/r, and m^ are zero, i.e., when
nobody in the social group of person / believes in the financial independence norm, the
reservation wage in (8.19) is infinite. This means that she as well as the other members of
her social group will remain non-participating for any w. There is then no incentive to enter
the labour market, since the marginal utility of norm obedience Yf'if, + Pf *f,-pf "•. and
hence the marginal utility of consumption, is zero (recall that in the present restricted case
consumption has no other marginal utility than that_derived from norm obedience). This
implies that non-participation of all group members (W = 0) and the corresponding absence
of belief in the financial independence norm (nif • 0) form a stable long-run equilibrium
for all w. This result is in agreement with Proposition I of Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984)
as discussed in Section 8.7.
Consider now, as a counterpart, a situation in which all group members fully believe in
the financial independence norm, i.e. flp, = wi^ = 1 for all / . When w is then higher than
each group member's exit wage w^- as given by (8.19) with «^,- = m^ = 1, i.e. for w
above w,** - max (y/M"z.)Wf + PF«FIPF ) = (V/wO^)/(Yf + Pfmine^pf), all persons
will fully obey the norm by working K/^/M' corporate hours (assumed to be smaller than T
as above), and hence fully preserve their beliefs in the norm. Therefore, this less than
maximal employment situation with W = ^/^/H' and nif = 1 then forms another stable
equilibrium alongside the non-participation equilibrium with W = 0 and m^ = 0. This is
indicated in Figure 8.4. When w falls below H* , the women who are the less sensitive to
their reputation among their working friends (lowest e^,) will leave the labour market. As
w further declines, also women who are more sensitive to their reputation quit, and at a
certain vv*^ a critical mass (y^/vi'*^-W**)/(K^/>v*^) of trendsetters will be reached
such that beyond H- the remaining conformist jobholders collectively also leave their job.
This immediately leads to non-participation of all women, and in the long run, all women
will have completely lost their belief in the financial independence norm, so n^, = m^ = 0
for all w. There is then no longer any incentive to enter the labour market, so the long-run
average labour supply remains zero for any w.
The exit curve, describing the long-run exit wage of the marginal quitters as a function of
the average long-run labour supply W * just before their exit, is analogous to the entry curve
in Figure 8.2 in Section 8.6 and may run as indicated in Figure 8.4. Below this curve we
have a domain of exit catastrophes and above the curve a band of persistent and hystereticDynamics 0/ soria/ norwu 221
Figure 8.4 Long-run average labour supply schedule for Akerlof specification with financial in-
.,.,. , , dependence norm, zero consumption taste and exogenous individual variation only in
sensitivity to reputation.
long-run labour supply. Although there is no long-run entry wage, there is, analogously to
the exit curve in Figure 8.2, an entry curve for positive W*, which may be located as in
Figure 8.4. Above this curve and below the W* = K^ /w curve there is a domain of entry
catastrophes, and between the entry and exit curves and below the //* * P/A//**' curve we
have the band of persistent long-run labour supply. When you turn Figure 8.4 upside-down,
you can see its similarity to Figure 8.2.
8.9 Financial independence norm: AQM
From the derivation of short and long-run labour supply schedules in the previous section it
can be deduced that these schedules are independent of the income of the husband K^,. This
holds since obedience to the financial independence norm is, by definition, independent of
^0,, while being the only source of the marginal utility of (family) consumption. However,
the latter restrictive assumption as well as the assumption of constant marginal utilities of
consumption and household time are very implausible. Therefore, these restrictions should be
relaxed, which can be done by extending the specification (8.18) to the additive quadratic222 Otaptfr
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for X, £ KQ, + K/^ and
'/M
(8.20a)
for X, £ y^, • K^, where a^ < 0, a^ > 0 and a^ < 0. Just as in the case of Figure
8.3, the indifference curves consist, for positive /i^, or wi^, of two segments (see Fig. 8.5),
but now they are strictly convex to the origin with diminishing marginal rates of substitution
which arc given by „/•**'V " f
i -•:...... V ••-, v (8.21b)
for X, £ KQ, + y^. Therefore, in contrast with Figure 8.3, there is a unique solution for
any w, and hence no discontinuity in the short-run individual labour supply curve. In the
interior of both regimes this labour supply curve will usually be a part of a standard back-
ward-bending curve (see Figure 8.6), but at the kink in the indifference curves for X, = ^Q, + ^/^,
there is a regime switch from the supply curve for n^- > 0 or m^ > 0 to the supply curve
for /i^ = »tj7 =0. As implied by Figure 8.5, there is then a range of w between w^-
and H>. in which the opportunity frontier is neither tangent to the lower segment of an
indifference curve nor to the higher segment. The optimal point then remains on the X, = l^, + */M
line in Figure 8.5, implying that short-run labour supply then follows the //, = y^/*" curve
in Figure 8.6.
However, in contrast to the short-run labour supply curve implied by Figure 8.3, short-run
labour supply is larger than ^/^/H" for w > w^. The reason is as follows. On the one hand,
the marginal utility y^- «^, + P^ e^, p^m^ of obedience to the financial independence norm
falls discontinuously to zero at W, = ^/M^'< implying a discontinuous drop in the marginal
utility of consumption, and hence a discontinuous increase in the marginal rate of substitut-
" This does not hold because the positive «f, or m^ drop(s) to zero at the regime switch, but
because its (their) effect docs so.Dy/ia/mcs norms 223
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Figure 8.5 Determination of short-run labour supply in the presence of a financial independence
norm and diminishing marginal utilities of household time and consumption under a
standard coastraint for w = w_ (tangcncy lo lower segment of solid indifference curve)
and for w = H^ (langcncy lo higher segment of solid indifference curve). The dashed
ias_-.-j,.!i> line with arrows indicates the optimal points for H>,- < w < w,. .
ion. On the other hand, now the marginal utility of consumption does not fall to zero, and
hence the marginal rate of substitution does not go to infinity, since there is now another
source of (family) consumption utility than norm obedience which is represented by the
consumption taste parameter a^ (and the diminishing marginal utility term -|«xxl^Oi)-
Therefore, a sufficiently high rise in w can compensate for the discontinuous increase in the
marginal rate of substitution, and hence induce a married woman to work more corporate
hours than is necessary for fully obeying the financial independence norm. In addition, in
Figure 8.6 it has been assumed that the consumption taste is sufficiently high relative to the
satiation tendency layyiy^; and the individual minimum K;w so as to imply a forward-
sloping labour supply curve just above >v = »v-;.
The reservation wage w,., is given by the marginal rate of substitution in (8.21a) for
Z., = 7 and X,- = y^,. This implies that even when both n^,- and m^ are zero, i.e., when
nobody in the social group of person / believes in the financial independence norm, there is
a finite reservation wage. Assuming that the income of the husband KQ, is (approximately)
the same for every group member, it then follows that all group members will collectively
enter the labour market for w rising beyond the entry wage224 CAarpter 8
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Figure 8.6 Short-run individual labour supply schedule for AQM specification with financial
independence norm and positive consumption taste.
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The denominator of this expression for the entry wage represents the incentive to the entry.
Consequently, in contrast to Figure 8.4, non-participation of all group members (// = 0) and
the corresponding absence of belief in the financial independence norm (wi^ = 0) now form
a stable long-run equilibrium only for w below vv*'. This is indicated in Figure 8.7.
If the norm beliefs would remain zero after entry, the average labour supply would follow
a representative standard backward-bending labour supply for n/r, = ^i^ = 0 (see Fig. 8.7).
This, however, does not hold, since according to the differential equations (8.13) and (8.6)
the group members are assumed to develop a (partial) belief in the financial independence
norm as they start to work a number of corporate hours. This development of norm beliefs
by the group members themselves as well as by the other group members reinforces their
motivation for corporate work and prompts them to work more corporate hours. Assume
now that the cognitive dissonance parameter y^ is so high as to make the process of reinfor-
cement by the group members themselves separately (locally) unstable in analogy to unstable
consumption IHF. According to the analogue of the stability condition (3.9) in Section 3.3
with (/^j • 0 and 8^ • 1 for the present (moving-average) case, this holds when
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Figure 8.7 Long-run average labour supply schedule for AQM specification with financial indepen-





where the collective entry wage w*' is given by (8.22). Since this expression for #*' is
independent of y/r, (8.23) is already an explicit condition for y^. If it is fulfilled, the
process of reinforcement by the group members themselves separately induces individual
entry catastrophes to full obedience to the norm as well as full belief in it. This holds for all
group members simultaneously, since they enter collectively, so the individual entry catastro-
phes imply a collective entry catastrophe with neither trendsetters nor laggards. This collec-
tive catastrophe occurs independently of the strength of the reputation mechanism and is
analogous to the collective exit catastrophe in Figure 7.4 in Section 7.3. Just like the latter
catastrophe, the former catastrophe with its absence of trendsetters and laggards is charac-
teristic for the present simplified case of individual variation in the sensitivity to reputation e^
only.
However, in contrast to the collective exit catastrophe in Figure 7.4, the collective entry
catastrophe in Figure 8.7 ends at an assumedly interior stable equilibrium. Consider w with226
*•>*' iivS w*, where »v* is determined in the short-run schedule in Figure 8.6 for the
present case of a uniform y^, and hence a uniform w . Then the interior long-run equilib-
rium is given by W = ^/A//*" ^^ ^* same reasons for which the short-run individual labour
supply in Figure 8.6 has this value for w, £ w £ w, . Also for the same reasons the long-
run average labour supply above >v* coincides with the short-run average or /-independent
individual labour supply for /i^, « myr = 0. Thus, in comparison with Figure 8.4 for the
Akerlof specification in the previous section, the long-run labour supply schedule has an
additional backward-bending part.
When in such a situation of full norm belief and obedience by all group members, w falls
below w* .the group members will first not reduce their corporate time because of cog-
nitive dissonance and reputation loss sanctions. On the contrary, just as in Figure 8.4, they
will increase their corporate time to continue their full obedience to the norm until beyond
H>| the least reputation-sensitive group members start to quit. For >*• declining further,
there will, under the condition (8.23) and under weak regularity conditions like those in
Proposition 7.2 in Section 7.3, occur a collective exit catastrophe at a certain exit wage w**.
Analogously to the collective entry catastrophe in Figure 7.4 in Section 7.3, this collective
exit catastrophe will leave no laggards, and hence end at the long-run corner equilibrium for
zero average labour supply and zero average and individual belief in the financial indepen-
dence norm.
The exit and entry curves resemble the entry and exit curves, respectively, in Figure 7.4
turned upside down, but have a somewhat different shape. Again, they imply domains of
collective entry and exit catastrophes as well as a band of persistent and hysteretic long-run
labour supply. Note that the domain of entry catastrophes is larger and the band of persistent
labour supply smaller than the corresponding domain and band in Figure 8.4 in the previous
section. The implied higher entry mobility is due to the positive consumption taste.
Figure 8.7 has been derived under the assumption that the cognitive dissonance parameter
Yj~ is so high as to make the process of reinforcement by the group members themselves
separately unstable. However, this assumption is stronger than necessary and perhaps plausi-
ble. Collective entry and exit catastrophes can also arise in a case like Case II in Table 6.1
in Subsection 6.2.4 in which only the sum of Yf and the average product p^- ?pp/r of the
reputation parameters is so high as to make the awi/wrtfd' process of reinforcement by the
group members themselves as well as by other group members unstable (in analogy to an
unstable combination of consumption IHF and BPI, see Sec. 6.3). In the NIV case of no
individual variation in the reputation sensitivity e^,< this holds, analogously to the above
case of high separate YF (cf- Subsec. 6.2.2), when
where the collective entry wage w'*' is again given by (8.22). Thus, again (8.24) is already
an explicit condition for Yf * PF'FPF- ^ '' •* fulfilled, the combined reinforcement
process induces in entry as well as exit collective and hence individual catastrophes between
zero norm obedience and belief and full norm obedience and belief by all group members.D vwflm/r5 0/ jorifl/ no/mi 227
In the IV case of individual variation in e^,-, collective and hence individual catastrophes
in entry and exit occur under a condition for y^ + P/rC/rpf in the spirit of Proposition 6.1
in Subsection 6.2.4, which condition is more complicated and stronger than (8.24). Under the
present condition there are trendsetters in exit with lower sensitivities to their reputations as
financially independent women, as in Figure 8.7, but moreover, the individual entry catastro-
phes of some of such women may end at individual equilibria for less than K/A//M' corporate
hours, so for less than full norm obedience and belief (cf. the end of Subsec. 6.2.4). The
collective entry catastrophe will then also end at less than I^/H' corporate hours. Only
when Yf + P/rC^pf fulfils an even stronger condition than the above condition, the
collective entry catastrophe will end at an equilibrium with full norm obedience and full
norm belief by all group members. In that situation we obtain a similar long-run average
labour supply schedule as in Figure 8.7 except that in a case like Case II in Table 6.1 in
Subsection 6.2.4, the band of persistent long-run labour supply is reduced to a curve of
unstable equilibria. ' ^ " ' , •• ' ' =-;!'
More generally, there will be individual variation also in other parameters and exogenous
variables than the reputation sensitivity e^, such as the consumption taste ot^,, the income
of the husband Kg,, the cognitive dissonance parameter y^,, the individual minimum K^,
and the household time taste a^,-. Generally this leads to a "smoothing out" of the kinks in
Figure 8.7 and, when certain collective catastrophe conditions stronger than (8.24) are
fulfilled, to collective entry and exit catastrophes between more than zero and less than
y/^/w average corporate hours. In a case like Case IV in Table 6.1 in Subsection 6.2.4, in
which a stronger variant of (8.23) holds, there will then be trendsetters as well as laggards in
both entry and exit (cf. Fig. 7.1 in Sec. 7.2). This, however, is not elaborated here.
Another social norm alongside the financial independence norm which may play an
important role in the labour supply of "emancipated" women, is the self-fulfilment norm as
specified in Section 8.3 below (8.10). This can easily be shown to lead to similar short and
long-run labour supply schedules as in the case of the financial independence norm, with the
minimal self-fulfilment hours //^ instead of K/^/vf. A simplification then is that W^,
unlike ^/^/w, is independent of w, implying that the // = J^/*' curve is replaced by a
vertical // = //^ line in the average labour supply schedules. Moreover, unlike a very
strong working of the financial independence norm, a very strong working of the self-fulfil-
ment norm may imply a non-positive individual or collective long-run exit wage. In such
cases women who lose their job and cannot find another one, will individually or collec-
tively volunteer in the long run. Apart from the fact that //^ does not need to be high, these
cases correspond to the strong forms of individual or collective "workaholism" which have
been considered in the Sections 4.5, 5.2, 6.4 and 7.6. However, proofs of these statements on
the working of the self-fulfilment norm are beyond the scope of this study.
8.10 Household norm and financial independence norm
This section combines our model of the effects on female labour supply of the financial
independence norm with that of the effects of the household norm into a model in which
both norms can exist Such a model can be used to describe the erosion of the household228
norm and the (possible) emergence of the financial independence norm in several OECD
countries in the last three decades. As an extension of the specifications (8.2) and (8.5) in
Section 8.1. the individual utility functions are then specified as
where the subscripts "Z." and "F" refer to the household and financial independence norm,
respectively, and where all parameters are positive. The reputation /?£, denotes the reputa-
tion of woman i as housewife and mother, whereas /?^, stands for her reputation as finan-
cially independent woman. These reputations are functions of the corresponding norm
obediences /4^, and ^ and the corresponding average norm beliefs w^ and m^, which
functions are specified as fl^Mf,,-."^) ° Pz.'"z.^z.i **"^ /?f(<4f,."if) = Pf "if ^f,--
Substituting these reputation functions and the norm obedience functions (8.9) with
T)^ • 1 and (8.16) with T)f » 1 into (8.25), transforming away irrelevant terms, and adding
two negative quadratic terms in consumption and household time, we obtain the additive
quadratic specification
(8.26a)
for X, * >Q, + K/w and
I
V, rt, , + B; e. iP,»li 2
for X, S y^j, + y^, where a^ < 0 and a^^ < 0. Just as in the case of Figure 8.5 in the
previous section, the indifference curves consist, for positive /if,- or m^, of two segments
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(8.27b)
for X, S y^j, + K^. Analogously to (8.21), these marginal rates of substitution imply short-
run individual labour supply schedules like those in Figure 8.6 in the previous section. A
difference is that for n^, > 0 and/or m^ > 0, i.e. for positive beliefs in the household norm,
the marginal rates of substitution in (8.27) are higher than those in (8.21), since the beliefs
enhance the marginal utility of household time. In particular, the reservation wage w,., as
given by the marginal rate of substitution in (8.27a) for L, = 7" and X, * K^ is then higher
(but still finite), and for any given w above the reservation wage, short-run labour supply is
lower.
Suppose now that at w = 0 all group members do not participate and have fully adapted
their norm beliefs to that, i.e., they fully believe in the household norm (n^, • m^ • 1 for
all /) and they do not believe at all in the financial independence norm (n^, • «ip - 0 for
all j). The individual long-run entry wages H>- are then given by
These entry wages are all positive, so for w rising from zero, the initial situation will remain-'
a long-run equilibrium until w reaches the lowest entry wage w* . Assuming that the
income of the husband K^,, is (approximately) the same for every group member, this entry
wage is higher than the collective entry wage vv*' = (a^- |a^^|7)/(a^- |a^^| K^,) in
Figure 8.7 in the previous section because of the cognitive dissonance and reputation loss
sanctions with respect to the household norm.
Consider now first the NIV case of no individual variation in the sensitivities e^ and e^
to the reputations as housewife and mother and as financially independent woman. The
group members then have the same individual entry wage as given by (8.28), implying that
they will collectively enter for u> rising beyond this entry wage M>*' . They will then develop
a (partial) belief in the financial independence norm, while letting erode their belief in the
household norm. This happening in the group members themselves as well as in other group
members will reinforce their motivation for corporate work and induce them to work more
corporate hours. In its turn, this will again strengthen their belief in the financial indepen-
dence norm and weaken their belief in the household norm, etc..
Assume now that romAin*?*/ the sums y^ + P^C/rpf and y^ + PL^LPZ. °^ cognitive
dissonance and reputation parameters for the financial independence norm and the household
norm are so high as to induce collective and hence individual entry catastrophes towards full
obedience to the financial independence norm as well as full belief in it. This can happen in
two situations which correspond to the analogues of Figure 4.4c and Figure 4.6 in Section
4.4 for the present model, with a financial independence norm instead of collective habit230 C/iapter 8
formation with respect to consumption.^ For example, in the former situation of a strong
working of the household norm, an extension of the reasoning in Subsection 6.2.2 for the
NIV case leads to the collective catastrophe conditions
0 < P :- |a*x| - Yxx " Yxx - l«xxl " -^y " -f^fi < <> (8.29a)
' ,/J-,»t<f« »j*l jfj? J'M ^fcriM -iV!.;:,- •.•••• w;r -.• .-;•• >r .. - •• • • .
J* :- |o^| - Tit - Ttt - I«LLI " -^ " -^-^ < £ < 0. (8.29b)
Here J* and <7, are increasing and decreasing functions of F*, respectively, and for con-
venience we use the same symbols y^ and Yxx for our collective habit formation param-
eters with respect to the wife's income (see Sec. 8.8) as in the case of collective habit
formation with respect to consumption. The conditions (8.29) can be rewritten as
(8.30b)
Moreover, assume that ^para/«/v the sum y^ + P^e^p^ of the cognitive dissonance and
reputation parameters for the household norm is not sufficiently high to induce collective
and hence individual entry catastrophes to complete disobedience to the household norm as
well as complete disbelief in it (W* = 7"). In the above situation example this happens when
one of the conditions (8.30a) and (8.30b) is not fulfilled for y^ = (J^ e^ p/r = 0 and hence
c* » l^xxl* *° when, for instance, for this relatively large value of c"*, the upperbound
rf^ becomes more negative than rf* or when F* itself becomes larger than cj (this case
corresponds to Figure 4.4a). In such cases there will, just as in Figure 8.7, occur individual
entry catastrophes and hence a collective entry catastrophe from zero to K^ /w*' corporate
hours. Note that in this equilibrium the group members, while fully believing in the financial
independence norm, still belief to some extent in the household norm.
For w rising further, the long-run labour supply will again follow the K/^/H> line until it
meets a labour supply curve for /»/:,- = mp = 0. This curve represents the long-run average
labour supply as a result of the working of the household norm, but not of the financial
independence norm (this norm does not have an effect in the regime of (8.30b)). Because of
the separately stable working of the household norm as assumed above, this curve will be
continuous, albeit flatter than corresponding short-run curves (see Sec. 3.5), and it may
therefore have a standard, though more pronounced backward-bending shape. For w above
a certain u> *, long-run labour supply is described by such a curve. Note that this w * will be
** The maximal corporate time 7" should then be replaced by >VM/>»'. the long-run reservation
wage w,* docs no longer depend on the habit sensitivity y^ and the susceptibility to social influen-
ce Txx> *"d **'- depends on the habit sensitivity y^ and the susceptibility to social influence y^£.
Neither of these modifications leads to qualitatively different effects of changes in c* and </*, but
they imply other formulas for H^* . »'*. H- *. J * and d *./ci o/socia/ «ormj 231
more near to w as the working of the household norm is stronger and hence the cor-
responding long-run labour supply curve is flatter.
When H' again falls below w , the group members will first not reduce their corporate
time because of cognitive dissonance and reputation loss sanctions in relation to the financial
independence norm. On the contrary, they will, just as in Figure 8.7, increase their corporate
time to continue their full obedience to the nonn until, for w declining beyond a certain
w , all group members collectively start to quit. Under the conditions (8.29) or (8.30) this
will lead to a collective exit catastrophe. Analogously to the collective entry catastrophe in
Figure 8.7, this collective exit catastrophe will end at the long-run corner equilibrium for
zero average labour supply and zero average and individual belief in the financial indepen-
dence norm, but full average and full belief in the household norm. However, apart from the
absence of trendsetters in the present NIV case, a difference with Figure 8.7 is that in the
present case the exit wage v*'*~ tends to be higher as a result of the working of the house-
hold norm (see (8.30a) with positive /i^, and wi^).
In a special case like Case IV in Table 6.1 in Subsection 6.2.4 with high Y/, and/or Yf.
the exit and entry curves look like the left parts of the entry and exit curves in Figure 8.7,
again implying domains of collective entry and exit catastrophes and a band of persistent and
hysteretic long-run labour supply. However, as a consequence of the additional cognitive
dissonance effect of the household norm, the latter band will be broader than in Figure 8.7.
On the other hand, in a special case like Case II in Table 6.1 with lower y^ and Yf. the
band of persistent long-run labour supply is reduced to a curve of unstable equilibria.
More generally, the household norm counteracts the positive consumption taste in forming
a resistance against entry, but when the entry eventually takes place, the erosion of the
household norm in combination with the emergence of the financial independence nonn may
reinforce the entry into a collective catastrophe. On the other hand, the financial indepen-
dence norm counteracts the positive household time taste in forming a resistance against exit,
but when the exit eventually takes place, the erosion of the financial independence norm in
combination with the rise of the household norm may reinforce the exit into a collective
catastrophe. Contrary to the models for one norm, this extended model of two opposite
norms has the interesting implication that a pure "neoclassical" equilibrium in which nobody
more or less believes in a social norm («, = w = 0 for all i), is a/woy.y excluded (cf. Sec.
8.7). Every group member always believes to some extent in either the household norm or
the financial independence norm or both.
Similar, but more complex results are obtained when we allow individual variation in the
reputation sensitivities e^, and e,r, and in other parameters and exogenous variables. In
general, individual variation in more parameters and exogenous variables leads to stronger
collective catastrophe conditions like those in Table 6.1, which, if fulfilled, imply collective
entry and exit catastrophes between more than zero and fewer than J'/^/w average cor-
porate hours. The kinks in Figure 8.7 are then "smoothed out". In particular, in a case like
Case II in Table 6.1,_the collective catastrophe conditions are obtained by replacing the
bounds c*, <T and J* in (8.29) and (8.30) by more stringent bounds c*, rf* and d* as
functions of the degrees of individual variation. Variation in the sensitivity to the reputation
as housewife and mother e^, leads to trendsetters with low e^, preceding a collective entry
catastrophe as in Figure 7.4 in Section 7.3. As a counterpart, variation in the sensitivity to
the reputation as financially independent woman e/r, leads to trendsetters with low e^.,232
preceding a collective exit catastrophe as in Figure 8.7. Variation in other parameters and
exogenous variables will, in a case like Case IV in Table 6.1, often imply trendsetters as
well as laggards in both entry and exit, as in Figure 7.1 in Section 7.2.
Another extension is adding the self-fulfilment norm to the analysis. This may lead to
somewhat more complicated results, but these are not essentially different from those found
above (see. however, the end of the previous section). This holds also when we add other
forms of collective habit formation with respect to household time, consumption, one's own
income and corporate time. When the sum total of all these forms of collective habit for-
mation, including the formations of (dis)beliefs in the household and self-fulfilment norm, is
only destabilizing in combination with the formation of (dis)beliefs in the financial indepen-
dence norm, we can again obtain a long-run average labour supply schedule like that in
Figure 8.7. As referred to at the beginning of Section 8.8, in the case of married women the
individual long-run labour supply schedules underlying such an average schedule are more
plausible than schedules like that in Figure 4.2 in Section 4.2. describing individual hyster-
esis and catastrophes between zero and maximal corporate hours.
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8.11 Concluding remarks - ••-= .;• .;• v • < t :
In this chapter variants of the theory of social custom (TSC) of Akerlof (1980) have been
applied to female labour supply, and it has been demonstrated that these applications are
largely analogous in structure to limiting cases of the AQM for BPI and unstable IHF with
respect to household time and/or consumption. This turned out to have several implications
and it has been argued that unrestricted AQM specifications give more adequate represen-
tations of the labour supply behaviour of married women than the more restricted Akerlof
specifications. Moreover, a comparison with the literature on applications of the TSC has
made clear that our applications add two essential pairs of elements to the overall picture,
namely the pair of individual and collective catastrophes and the pair of individual and
collective hysteresis. Finally, an important extension of the TSC consisted in combining the
models for two opposite social norms, namely the household norm and the financial indepen-
dence norm, into a model in which both norms can exist. Contrary to the TSC, this exten-
sion turned out to have the interesting implication of always excluding "pure" neoclassical
equilibria in which nobody more or less believes in a social norm.
Although the TSC implies a less adequate representation of the labour supply behaviour
of married women than the AQM, it is superior to the general AQM and most other specific-
ations of IHF and BPI in the literature in giving an erp/anari7>n of a specific mode of BPI by
a reputation motive working via a reputation function and the utility function. In the present
chapter this explanation has been supplemented by the explanation of a specific mode of IHF
by the working of a cognitive consonance/dissonance motive in the utility function. On the
other hand, in the general AQM and most other specifications of IHF and BPI in the litera-
ture such explanations are absent: the utility function is usually specified as a black box (in0/ \oc/<// norms 233
a rather ad-hoc way) and does not contain explicit motives of IHF and BPI.*' Then the
question arises whether other or more general modes of collective habit formation than the
mode modelled by the TSC can be explained in a similar way. This question is tackled by a
general approach to explaining preference formation along the lines of Stigler and Becker
(1976) in Vendrik (1988). Unfortunately, a discussion of this approach is beyond the scope
of this study.
Anyway, in the present chapter the merits of both the TSC and the general AQM of
collective habit formation have been combined by extending the Akerlof specification of the
utility function in the TSC to an AQM specification of this utility function. Moreover, in
order to remedy the, for married women, implausible exclusion by the AQM of interior
stable individual equilibria in the case of separately (locally) unstable individual (dis)belicf
formation or IHF, the effects of a financial independence norm have been added to the AQM
specification of the TSC for the household norm. Another extension of the AQM which
remedies the implausible implication mentioned, is adding higher than second order terms to
the utility function in the spirit of catastrophe theory (see Sec. 4.6 and Becker and Murphy,
1988, p. 683). Such an addition can be rationalized by making in the TSC the very plausible
assumption of diminishing marginal utilities of not only consumption, but also of reputation
and, among other things, self-esteem. In a utility function like (8.5) this assumption leads to
additional mixed fourth-order terms in social norm behaviours and beliefs, and intuitively the
assumption can be argued to imply the possibility of one or two interior stable individual
equilibria in the case of separately (locally) unstable individual (dis)belief formation (as in
Fig. 3.1 in Sec. 3.2). However, this extension of the TSC should be further elaborated.
Another subject which has not been elaborated in the present chapter is the effects and
dynamics of social norms in male labour supply. The results of such an elaboration would be
partly similar to corresponding results for female labour supply. For example, neglecting the
effects of social security benefits on the income constraint, results for the breadwinner norm
and the family man or macho norm would be largely analogous to those for the financial
independence norm and the self-fulfilment norm, respectively.'"' On the other hand, for the
labour supply of men as opposed to that of married women the availability of social security
benefits is important, so its effects on the income constraint should be taken into account.
For the case of a minimum social security benefit as in Subsection 2.2.3, the implications of
the family man norm for short-run male labour supply are derived by De Neubourg and
Vendrik (1993) (see also Sec. 10.3). These implications are similar to those of various levels
of "psychic income" of corporate time for the same social security case (see, e.g.. Subsection
2.2.5).
A related point which has been neglected in the present chapter, is the likely interaction
A notable intermediate case is given by the lognormal utility function of Van Praag (1971).
Contrary to the usual black-box approach, this specification is derived in a rigorous way from
assumptions about motives formed by characteristics of goods (see Van Praag, 1968, and Goedhart
and Kapteyn, 1978). On the other hand, the IHF and BPI are specified in a rather ad-hoc way without
explicit motives.
Moreover, results for a weak household norm for men as mentioned at the end of Section 8.3
would be related to some extent to the results for the household norm for married women. For-
tunately, the former norm is not too strong, since otherwise this book might not have been written.234 Ctoptf r 8
of the formations of (dis)belicfs in social norms by husband and wife. This interaction may
proceed via the family income in the family budget constraint (see Sec. 7.7), but it may also
be of a more direct type. For example, the husband may belong to a normative reference
group of the wife, and the reverse. However, an elaboration of the dynamics of such indirect
and direct norm interactions between husband and wife is beyond the scope of this study.
Although the extensions of the TSC and AQM as considered in the present chapter are
substantial improvements, they may not be sufficient to meet two other drawbacks of the
AQM, namely (0 within the class of additive utility functions the AQM of IHF with respect
to consumption categories performs less favorably in empirical consumption studies than a
linear expenditure threshold model (Taylor and Weiscrbs, 1972, and Weiserbs, 1974), (JI)
additivity of the utility function is rejected in many empirical studies (see, e.g., Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980. p. 140). These drawbacks suggest a need for a non-additive specification
of the utility function. However, allowing higher than second order terms, such a specifica-
tion will have too many parameters to be manageable. In order to restrict the number of
parameters in a plausible and not-ad-hoc way we need another separability structure of the
utility functions than additivity. Such a separability structure is derived in Vcndrik (1988) by
employing the same general approach which is used to explain preference formation, but
should be further elaborated.
Finally, the theoretical results which have been derived in this and previous chapters,
should be empirically tested. Although full-blown empirical tests are far beyond the scope of
this study, the next chapter will discuss the empirical relevance of some theoretical results of
this study. In particular, we will then make preliminary attempts to assess the role of social
norms and collective habit formation in the developments of the female labour force par-
ticipation in the Netherlands and in the U.S.A..CHAPTER 9
Dynamics of Female Participation
This chapter investigates the empirical relevance of the theoretical models which have been
set forth in the previous chapters, by applying them to the developments of the labour force
participation of Dutch and American married women since World War II. Whereas the
participation rate of Dutch married women was remarkably low and stable till 1960, it grew
strongly after 1960. Econometric time-series analyses of this development have been given
by Mol et al. (1988) for the period 1889-1985 and by Romme (1987, 1990) for the shorter
period 1971-1985. Although the empirical results of the former study seem plausible, the
study suffers from the drawback of not explicitly taking into account the probably important
impacts of social norms and collective habit formation (CHF). Romme, on the other hand,
includes variables for the impacts of social norms and behavioural preference interdepen-
dence (BPI) in linear and loglinear logit participation equations for female (birth) cohorts,
and finds consistently significant, stable and important coefficients of these variables. For
CHF this result is confirmed by cross-section estimates for 1985 of the detailed micro-
economic individual labour supply model of Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990). However,
Romme's specifications of his participation equation are not systematically derived from an
underlying micro-economic labour supply model. Moreover, he does not distinguish the
female cohorts according to civil status (married or not) and number and age of children.
As an improvement on that, this chapter derives general and logit participation equations
for a social group, cohort and subpopulation of married women with school-going (or small)
children on the basis of the theoretical models of the previous chapters. The logit par-
ticipation equation resembles the loglinear logit participation equation of Romme, so
Romme's empirical results can be considered as a support of the empirical relevance of our
theoretical model of the impacts of social norm change and CHF on female labour supply.
On the other hand, the latter model suggests that the loglinear as well as the linear
participation equation of Romme contain severe specification errors. Moreover, our
theoretical model implies different specifications of the participation equation for entry and
exit behaviour as a result of hysteretic persistence effects of individual habit formation
(IHF). The modelling of such effects by Clark and Summers (1982) is shown to be incorrect
due to a severe aggregation error.
The endogenous dynamics of CHF and social norm beliefs according to our theoretical
model turn out to imply long-run elasticities of the participation rate with respect to the
wage rate and other exogenous variables which essentially differ from the corresponding236
short-run elasticities. More specifically, the long-run elasticities vary with the level of the
participation rate according to an essentially different hump-shaped profile. This is shown to
imply serious doubts on the empirical simulation finding of Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) of
a strong and dominant impact of the own wage rate on the development of the participation
rate of Dutch married women since World War II. The implications of the hump-shaped
participation rate profile of the long-run elasticities for the long-run dynamics of the
participation rate of married women are elaborated. If we make a simplifying assumption,
the profile is demonstrated to lead, in a regime of constant relative change rates of the
exogenous variables encouraging participation, to a sigmoid shape of the time profile of the
participation rate which is considerably "sharper" than the sigmoid shape of a logistic curve
implied by static labour supply models like that of Hartog and Theeuwes. We call the former
curve super-exponential-logistic. More adequately than the logistic curve, such a curve can
account for the empirical pattern of a remarkably persistent low participation rate of Dutch
married women before I960 and a strongly growing participation rate of these women after
1960. The persistence of the low participation rate before 1960 is then partially explained by
low values of long-run elasticities of exogenous variables, whereas the strong rise of the
participation rate after 1960 is partially explained by higher values of such elasticities. In
close connection, the persistence of the participation rate of American married women just
after World War II (Clark and Summers, 1982) is explained as the result of hysteresis effects
of IHF. Such hysteresis effects are also shown to explain differences in as well as
convergence of participation rates among countries.
The strong rises in the participation rate of Dutch married women after 1960 and of
American married women after 1950 may have been caused by collective catastrophes within
social groups, i.e. by large shifts in the participation rates of social groups as a consequence
of (infinitesimally) small changes in the exogenous variables. Then the long-run elasticities
of the participation rate of the social group become infinite as a result of unstable
behavioural preference interdependence (BPI). A necessary and sufficient condition for such
a collective catastrophe in the participation rate is derived. Just as in Section 7.2, we obtain
a labour supply schedule with a persistent domain, where the long-run participation rate
follows (small) hysteresis loops, and two catastrophic domains. Aggregating such schedules
to the level of cohorts or (sub)populations is shown to preserve the hysteresis properties, but
to "smooth out" the collective catastrophes. Because of the scarcity of disaggregated data on
the level of social groups the latter property severely hinders the identification of collective
catastrophes on that level. The hysteresis properties imply that the persistence of the
participation rate of American married women just after World War II can be explained not
only by IHF. but also by unstable BPI within social groups. Finally, it is argued that the
development of the participation rate of Dutch married women after World War II may be
conceived in a stylized way as the result of a cultural cycle superimposed on an upward
labour demand trend. The cultural cycle is caused by a combination of collective habit (and
norm belief) formation in a medium long run and collective satiation in a very long run.
Since the two mechanisms can be associated with conceptions of Marx and Maslow (1943,
1970). respectively, the cycle is referred to as the Marx-Maslow cycle.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.1 reviews the main results of the
econometric time-series analysis of the long-run development of the labour force par-
ticipation of Dutch married women by Mol et al.. Section 9.2 analyses the impacts of social237
norms and collective habits on this development, referring to empirical results of Romme
and of Kapteyn and Woittiez. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 derive participation equations for one
social group of married women with school-going (or small) children on the basis of the
theoretical models of the previous chapters. Section 9.5 aggregates these participation
equations to the level of a (birth) cohort or subpopulation of married women with school-
going children and adds the effects of BPI between social groups. Section 9.6 discusses
Dutch survey proxies for the norm belief variables in these aggregated participation
equations and analyses the econometric evidence of Romme on the impacts of such proxies.
Moreover, the modelling of the persistence effects of IHF on labour force participation by
Clark and Summers is criticized.
Then, Section 9.7 gives a short description of historical evidence on the endogenous
dynamics of social norms and collective habits in the participation of Dutch married women.
Section 9.8 derives the implied hump-shape of the participation rate profile of the long-run
elasticities of the participation rate with respect to the wage rate and other exogenous
variables. The ensuing serious doubts on the empirical simulation finding of Hartog and
Theeuwes are expressed. Section 9.9 elaborates the implications for the long-run dynamics of
the participation rate of married women. In particular, the super-exponential-logistic curve is
derived and the hysteresis effects of IHF are analysed. Section 9.10 analyses the possibility
of collective entry and exit catastrophes and derives a condition for such catastrophes as well
as implied long-run participation rate schedules. Section 9.11 introduces the Marx-Maslow
cycle and Section 9.12 concludes.
9.1 Female labour force participation: the Dutch case i
Since World War II there has been a substantial increase in the labour force participation of
















































































Table 9.1 Female labour force participation rates in some OECD countries: 1950-1991 (in %).
Sources: OECD (1979), Demograptoc Tre/nfc /95O-/990, Paris; OECD (1990). krtw
Forcf Sfcirwrics /96S-79SS, Paris; OECD (1992). Z^/wr Force Sfcwisncj /97O-/990.
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the Dutch female labour force participation rate was far below that in other OECD countries.
Only Spain, which was in a less advanced state of economic development, had a similar
participation rate.
Moreover, these data indicate that the increase in the Dutch female labour force par-
ticipation rate started later than in most other OECD countries, namely after 1960. This is
shown in Figure 9.1, which displays the Dutch developments of the participation rate of all
women as well as those of married and unmarried women between 1889 and 1985. Thus, we
see that the time pattern of the overall participation rate is mainly determined by the time
pattern of the participation rate of married women. Whereas this participation rate was
remarkably stable between 1889 and 1960, it was growing strongly after that from 7% in
1960 to 36% in 198S. This meant a multiplication by five in 25 years.
I
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Figure 9.1 Labour force participation rates of married and unmarried Dutch women: 1889-1985 (in
%). Source: data of Mol ct al. (1988, Fig. 1.1).
This phenomenon has induced a lot of research on the labour force participation of
married women. However, a survey of the most important econometric studies since the mid-
seventies by Mol et al. (1988) reveals that most of these studies are confined to cross-section
analyses and that only some recent studies combine such an analysis with a short time-series
analysis. As far as I know, econometric time-series analyses of long-run developments of the
labour force participation of Dutch married women have only been carried out by Mol et al.
(1988) for the period 1889-1985 and by Rommc (1987, 1990) for the much shorter period
1971-1985. Non-econometric analyses of historical trends are given by, among others.Dy/iam/cs o/ji'mo/f po/tic/pa/io 239
Hartog and Theeuwes (1985, Sec. II), Kok and De Neubourg (1986. Ch. Ill) and Dc Neu-
bourg (1988, Ch. IV). The main results of Mol et al. are dealt with in this section, whereas
the main results of Romme, Kok and De Neubourg, and Dc Neubourg will be discussed in
subsequent sections.
On the basis of their survey and the availability of long-term data, Mol et al. choose a
number of explanatory variables on the supply and demand sides of the labour market. The
empirical analysis leads to a reduction of this number of exogenous variables to five. Three
of these five variables belong to the supply side, namely age of the women, number of
children, and education of the women. Two variables relate to the demand side, namely the
share of the service sector in total employment and the share of the number of persons with
a part-time job in the total labour force (of men as well as women). Here we discuss only
those results with respect to these variables which are of interest in the present context.
First we consider the age effects. Separating the development of the participation rate of
married women into the developments of the participation rates in different age groups, we
obtain Figure 9.2. In this figure the unimportant age group of 15-19 years has been omitted.
For all remaining age groups except that of 60-64 years, the participation rate was again
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Figure 9.2 Labour force participation rates of Dutch married women, distinguished into age classes:
1889-1985 (in %). Source: dala of Mol el al. (1988, Fig. 2.3).240C/mptf r 9
age group of 20-24 years from 13% in 1960 to even 60% in 1985 and was growing at a
somewhat slower pace in the age groups of 25-29, 30-39 and 40-49 years. Remarkably, the
last three age groups display a similar time pattern. On the other hand, the participation
growth was much lower in the age group of 50-59 years and very low in the age group of
60-64 years.
An important cause of the participation booms in the age group of 20-25 and, to a less
extent, in that of 25-29 years may be that after 1960 a growing number of women kept their
jobs when marrying and delayed the birth of the first child. More generally, a drop in the
birth rate was an important cause of the participation growth in all age groups till 60 years
and, in particular, favoured re-entry at older ages. First more women with grown-up children
re-entered, next more women with school-going children, and finally, as implied by Figure
2.6 in Mol et al., a growing number of women with children under school age re-entered or
kept their jobs after 1977. -si?'«h -•.-;.•• ii<;;.-'.u-w
Another important cause of the participation growth in all age groups till 60 years was the
rising level of education. Especially the number of married women with a higher education
increased strongly, and especially the participation of this group of women rose dramatically.
In general, the positive effect of the educational level on the participation of women results
from the impacts of a number of factors (see, e.g.. Siegers, 1983, pp. 417-418). First, a
higher level of education leads to a higher real wage rate, making participation more attrac-
tive. More generally, a higher level of education leads to more attractive job packages of
real wage rate, job qualities and hours (see Subsec. 2.2.4). Moreover, a higher level of
education is likely to raise the taste for corporate time. On the other hand, a higher educat-
ional level of women may be correlated with a higher educational level and hence a higher
real income of the husband, which makes participation less attractive.
Before 1960 the majority of the few married women who did paid work, had unskilled, so
low-paid and full-time jobs. After 1960 the combination of the rise in the level of education
and an increasing demand for skilled female labour in the service sector led to a strong rise
in the average real wage rate of women in the sixties and seventies (see, e.g.. Table 7 of
Hartog and Theeuwes, 1985). The positive effect of this rise on the participation of married
women was reinforced by a very important tax reform in 1973. According to this reform a
woman's labour income was taxed separately from her husband's income instead of being
added to it. Although the average real wage rate of men and hence the income of husbands
also rose strongly (see, e.g., the last-mentioned table of Hartog and Theeuwes), the net effect
of wage rises and tax reform on the participation of married women was likely to be sub-
stantially positive, since the real wage rate of women rose more strongly than that of men
and since the female own wage elasticity was probably substantially larger in absolute value
than the cross wage elasticity after the tax reform in 1973. For example, Renaud and Siegers
(1983) and Hartog and Theeuwes estimated the own gross wage elasticity in 1979 as 1.87
and 1.99, respectively, and the cross gross wage elasticity as -.36 and -.31, respectively
(using the same data set). For the own net wage elasticity in 1981 Siegers (1985) found the
value 1.71.
However, before the tax reform in 1973 the cross gross wage elasticity was likely to be
substantially more negative, since the increase in the income of the husband then led to a
higher marginal tax rate for the additional family income of the wife (see Mol et al., p. 29).
This implies a smaller or even negative difference between the absolute values of the owncs o//<fma/f parfidpariow 241^
wage and cross wage elasticities before 1973. Moreover, an endogenous participation dynam-
ics like that explained in the Sections 9.8-9.10 implies smaller absolute values of both wage
elasticities by common factors, and hence a smaller difference between these absolute values
in the sixties and a much smaller difference in the fifties. Therefore, due to the combination
of the fiscal regime before 1973 and forms of endogenous participation dynamics, the wage
effect on the participation of married women may have been smaller in the sixties and much
smaller in the fifties.'
On the other hand, the above-mentioned high estimate 1.71 of the own net wage elasticity
in 1981 suggests that the tax reform in 1973 had a strong direct impact on the participation
of married women by implying a slump in the marginal tax rate, and hence a jump in the net
real wage rate of married women. However, this does not show up as a structural break in
the participation developments around 1973 (see Figs. 9.1 and 9.2). This may be related to
the first oil crisis. On the other hand, when in 1984 and 1985 the tax reform of 1973 was
partially reversed by so-called earning couple measures, about 10.000 women resigned from
their job (see Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, 1986, p. 69). This may partially explain
the decline in participation of the age group of 20-24 years and the slow-down of the rise in
participation of the age groups of 24-59 years between 1983 and 1985 according to Figure
9.2 (see also Fig. 9.1).^ Another explanatory factor may be discouragement by the high
unemployment, but according to Mol et al. such a negative discouraged worker effect is
dominated by a positive added worker effect (see, however, Romme, 1990).
A crucial factor which may have been more important for the increase in the participation
of married women since 1960 than the rise in the wage rates and the tax reform of 1973,
was the increase in the availability of part-time jobs (Mol et al.). Since the second half of
the fifties employers tried to attract more married women to the labour market by creating
part-time jobs, and after 1960 this began to have the intended effect. Especially women with
children took part-time jobs with the result that in 1990 78 percent of the Dutch married
women worked less than 35 hours (Allaart et al., 1991, Tab. 2.7).
Although, at first sight, the five explanatory variables of Mol et al. as discussed above
seem to offer a plausible explanation of the stable low level of the labour force participation
of Dutch married women before 1960 and of its booming increase after 1960, a closer look
raises some doubts. These doubts are expressed in the next sections.
' This is not taken into account in the backward simulation of the participation rates of married
women from 1979 to 1947 by Hartog and Theeuwes, Section IV. This simulation is based on cross-
section estimates for 1979 of a static individual labour supply function without tax variables, and
hence neglects the effects of both the fiscal regime before 1973 and forms of endogenous par-
ticipation dynamics. Therefore, their finding of strong and dominant own-wage effects in the develop-
ment of female participation since 1947 is likely to be due to an overcstimation of these wage effects
for the period between 1947 and 1973. See Sees. 9.8-9.10 for details on an endogenous participation
dynamics.
* See Bruyn-Hundt and Van der Linden (1989) for a recent inventarization of government regulat-
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9.2 Impacts of social norms and collective habits
The explanation of the long-term development of the participation of Dutch married women
by Mol et al. gives rise to a number of questions. First, changes in social norms, collective
habits and social attitudes, which seem very important in the Dutch participation history
according to historical descriptions (see, e.g.. Sec. 2.4 of Mol et al.), are not explicitly taken
into account in the model of Mol et al.. As proxies for the changes in social norms with
respect to the role of the married woman Mol et al. introduce the upward trends in the
degrees of secularization and urbanization. However, although the degree of secularization is
significant in (first-difference) logit participation equations for the whole period 1889-1985
as well as for the period 1960-1985, both proxies do not survive selection exercises.
On the other hand, for the much shorter time period 1971-1985 Rommc (1987, 1990)
introduces a more reliable proxy of the general support of social norms regarding the par-
ticipation of married women. This proxy is obtained from a questionaire item in the reports
of the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (1986). In an, after 1978 almost yearly,
questionnaire among a representative sample of the Dutch population the following question
is asked: "What do you think of a married woman with school-going children who has a
job?". The following answers could be given: (1) recommended. (2) not objectionable, or (3)
objectionable. As shown in Figure 9.3, the percentages of these answers have changed a lot
between 1965 and 1985 (and 1991). Whereas in 1965 17% of the Dutch population thought
that a married woman with school-going children having a job was recommended or not
objectionable, this percentage had risen to 70% in 1985. Romme assumes that this combined
percentage of "recommended" and "not objectionable" is a good proxy of the general support
for a norm in favour of female participation (see Fig. 1 of Romme for the development of
this proxy over time and see Sec. 9.6 for a critical remark on this proxy). Next, regressions
of logit participation equations including this proxy yield consistently significant and stable
coefficients of this social norm variable. However, if we compare this important result to the
corresponding results of Mol et al., it should be noted that most explanatory variables of
Romme arc different from those of Mol et al. (see Sec. 9.6 for details).
Some of the explanatory variables of Romme represent the participations of the same and
earlier (birth-)cohorts in previous periods and can be associated with the impacts of
behavioural preference interdependence.^ Also these impacts are significant and very large
in the case of a loglinear logit specification of the participation equation (see Sees. 9.4 and
9.6 for details). For micro-economic cross-section data for 1985 these significant impacts of
collective habits are confirmed by the detailed micro-economic individual labour supply
model of Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) (see also Kapteyn, Woittiez and Ten Hacken, 1989).
They find significant effects of individual habit formation and behavioural preference inter-
dependence on individual labour supply.
A second question concerning the results of Mol et al. is related to the strong impact of
the age variable (which is represented by dummies for the age groups). Figure 9.2 shows
' Rommc introduces these lagged participation variables in his participation equations in order to
describe the influence of social norms via social reference groups. However, this interpretation of the
lagged participation variables seems wrong, since the influence of social norms is already captured by
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Figure 9.3 Public opinion on married women with school-going children having a job: 1965-1991
(in %). Source: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (1986. 1992).
that in the period 1960-1985 the participation in younger age groups was mostly higher than
the participation in older age groups. Exceptions are given by the participation in the age
group of 30-39 years being somewhat lower than the participation in the age group of 40-49
in 1960 and 1971 (see also Fig. 2.5 of Mol et al.)- These empirical facts are the net or total
results of two different kinds of effect, namely of so-called (Mrf/i-)c0/w/7 qgfertt and of ///<?-
cyc/e ej[f<?<:/s (cf., e.g., Joshi and Overton, 1984). According to the former effects the par-
ticipation in more recent cohorts was practically always higher than and sometimes equal to
the participation in earlier cohorts in all age groups between 20 and 64 in the period 1960-
1985 (see Fig. 2.5 of Mol et al.). Similar results for all women have been obtained for the
U.S.A. and Great Britain for much longer time spans (see, e.g., Killingsworth and Heckman,
1986, Sec. 2) and for Sweden.* Thus, in these countries as well as in the Netherlands be-
tween 1960 and 1985, more recent female cohorts were generally more oriented towards
corporate work than were earlier cohorts. For the Netherlands this explains the above-men-
tioned finding of higher participation in younger age groups.
On the other hand, life-cycle effects have quite different implications. These effects result
from the developments of the participations of individual women over their lifetimes. For
cohorts of women who marry and get children, these developments typically imply a bimod-
al (or multimodal) life-cycle participation profile with a decline at childbearing and child-
rearing ages and a rise due to re-entries at older ages (see, e.g., Killingsworth and Heckman,
1986, Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). For the Netherlands the latter rise accounts for the above-mentioned
* Kok and De Neubourg (1986. Sec. III.3) give some evidence for the period 1963-1983.244 CAap/cr 9
exceptional finding of the participation in the age group of 30-39 years being somewhat
lower than the participation in the age group of 40-49 in 1960 and 1971. However, for other
re-entry ages and years this life-cycle effect is more than compensated by the cohort effects.
Moreover, the decline of the participation at childbearing and childrearing ages reinforces the
cohort effects with respect to the differences in participation between age groups.
Whereas the causes of these life-cycle effects are rather obvious, the causes of the cohort
effects are somewhat less obvious. Important factors seem to be given by higher levels of
education and lower total numbers of children of women in more recent cohorts. Therefore,
parts of the impacts of the variables education and number of children in the model of Mol
et al. are likely to run via the age group dummies, implying underestimations of the total
impacts of these variables. More importantly, however, historical descriptions of the Dutch
developments in female participation suggest that another (but related) important cause of
the cohort effects is given by more "progressive" social norm beliefs, collective habits and
needs in more recent cohorts (see Kok and De Neubourg, 1986, Ch. HI). To possible origins
of these phenomena we will come back in Section 9.11.
The cohort effects were accompanied by modifications in the life-cycle participation
profiles of married women. Before I960 a very powerful social norm stated that a married
woman should not have a job in order to take care of the household and the children.
Between 1914 and 1955 this household norm (see Sec. 8.3) was even institutionalized in a
law requiring dismissal of female civil servants on marriage. Only in the fifties the house-
hold norm began to lose grounds and, combined with an increasing delay of the birth of the
first child and other factors, the further erosion of the norm in the sixties led to a booming
practice of women keeping their job when marrying. Moreover, the erosion of the household
norm contributed to a strong increase in re-entries by married women with grown-up child-
ren.
On the other hand, a weaker variant of the household norm stating that women with
school-going children should not have a job, at first remained strong and began to erode
only in the mid sixties (see Fig. 9.3). Then, however, it eroded extremely fast between 1965
and 1970 as expressed by the sharp fall in Figure 9.3 of the percentage of the answer
"objectionable" from 84% in 1965 to 44% in 1970. As a result, more women with school-
going children re-entered. Finally, in the late seventies and eighties the weakest variant of
the household norm stating that women with children under school age should stay at home,
began to lose its influence. Whereas in 1982 57% of the women of 21-37 years were of the
opinion that a job and having children under school age cannot be combined, in 1988 a
minority of 38% took that view (De Graaf, 1989). In combination with better day care
facilities this contributed to the development after 1977 of a growing number of married
women with small children re-entering or keeping their jobs. As a result, among the most
recent cohorts there will have been a dampening of the dip in the life-cycle participation
profile at childbearing and childrearing ages that was characteristic of earlier cohorts.'
A third question regarding the study of Mol et al. is related to the assumed exogeneity of
the variables number of children and education. In fact, in our modern time of broad access
* This result has also been found for the U.S.A. for earlier cohorts (see Killingsworth and Heck-
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to birth control methods and education for women, both variables are subject to choice by
women and may even be choice variables in simultaneous long-run choices of education,
participation and number of children (see for simultaneity of the last two choice variables,
e.g.. Siegers, 1985, Sec. III.6). In that case education and number of children should be
treated as endogenous choice variables in more or less simultaneous long-run preferences of
married women with respect to education, participation and number of children. After I960
these preferences have apparently changed, but then the question arises why? Probably
important "objective" opportunity factors are birth control methods, education opportunities,
reasonably paid part-time jobs and day care facilities becoming more broadly available for
married women. However, a probably equally important role was played by changes in
"subjective" preference factors as social norms, collective habits, social attitudes and needs.
Such changes in "subjective" factors may have played an important role not only on the
supply side of the female labour market, but also on the demand side in the decrease of job
and wage discrimination of women (sec, e.g., Schippers and Siegers, 1991) and in the
increase of the availability of part-time jobs since the second half of the fifties. But then the
question arises whether, in their turn, these changes in "subjective" factors on the supply and
demand sides were exogenous or endogenous. Obviously, by their very nature, collective
habits are endogenous, since they are formed by (collective) experiences with either par-
ticipation or non-participation behaviour. Does this also hold for social norms, as suggested
by the long-run models in Sections 8.1 and 8.5, and for social attitudes and needs? These
questions are addressed in Section 9.7 for social norms and attitudes and in Section 9.11 for
needs. Before that, however, the next three sections derive participation equations for sub-
populations of married women which include variables for collective habits and social
norms.
9.3 General participation equation for one social group
This section and the next two derive equations for the labour force participation rates of
specific subpopulations of married women, including variables for collective habits and
social norms. First, this section derives a general participation equation for one social group
in these subpopulations. Then, the next section analyses a logit specification of the general
participation equation. Finally, Section 9.5 aggregates this logit participation equation to the
level of (birth) cohorts or subpopulations and adds behavioural preference interdependence
between social groups to the equations.
Since observed paths of participation rates will generally deviate from their long-run
equilibrium paths (see the end of Sec. 3.5), they can be described only by equations for
short-run participation rates, taking into account the actual disequilibrium values of the state
variables. In general, the short-run participation rate in a social group P is equal to the
fraction of group members i whose short-run reservation wage w^ is lower than the wage
rate H^- prevailing for them. Combining the AQM for collective habit formation of Subsec-
tion 6.3.2 (and Sec. 6.4) with the AQM for social norms of Section 8.10, the short-run
reservation wage w,., can be expressed in the parameters of the thus augmented AQM as246 CTiaptfr 9
Here the parameters a^, and (ty, represent the household time and family consumption
tastes of married woman i , 7, is her total discretionary time, K^, is the income of her
husband, tt^ and a^Xi describe diminishing marginal utilities of household time and
(family) consumption, Yt/./ &"d Yxxi arc ^ household time and consumption habit sen-
sitivities, J^, and ty, are the corresponding habit states, y^- and y^, are the suscep-
tibilities to the social household time and consumption environments *£- and J^\ y^, and
Y/r, are cognitive dissonance parameters with respect to the individual beliefs in the house-
hold norm and financial independence norm n^, and «^,, K^,- is the individual minimum
income for being financially independent, and Y^-e^PLI *"<* YF,«F,PF, arc reputation
parameters with respect to the average beliefs in the household norm and financial indepen-
dence norm w^ and /H^. * :«7u f «„
The values of the slate variables, i.e. the values of the habit states, the social environ-
ments and the individual and average norm beliefs, and hence the level of the reservation
wage of woman i , depend on the kind of situation in which the decision to participate or
not is made. In one situation, woman / holds a job and may decide to /teep /NT 70ft when
marrying or when getting her first or second or such-and-such child. As mentioned in the
previous section, decisions to keep one's job when marrying boomed in the sixties, whereas
decisions to keep one's job when getting one's first child have increased since the eighties.
In another situation, woman 1 is a housewife with children, and may decide to Cre-^n/fr the
labour market, when the children have grown up or have become school-going. Such (re-en-
tries have grown considerably in number since the sixties.
First, we consider the latter situation. The short-run reservation wage of woman 1 is then
a short-run e/ifry wage, and the woman is more or less used to maximal household time, no
corporate time and a family consumption level equal to the income of her husband. As-
suming, for the sake of simplicity, that habits are formed in one year, we can approximate
woman i"s habit states averaged over year / as 5^,-, => ^-,-,_i = 7",-,_i and fy,-, = ^i;-i ~ ^o/r-i •
where the superscript a stands for "actual value". Similarly, woman /'s social household
time and family consumption environments 5£, and 5^ in year f can be approximated as
the average actual household time L,^, = 7",., - //,", and the average family consumption
K0,_, + H»,.,W^, in year r-1 in I'S social reference group. This social reference group
can be expected to consist of married women who have grown-up or school-going children
and who also share a number of other characteristics with woman 1 like level of education,
age, number of children, region of residence, status, etc. (cf. Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 1985,
Sec. 7.2). In this section and the next we assume that the social reference group of woman 1
coincides with her membership group or social group as defined by characteristics as men-
tioned, and that every other member of this group has the same social group as social
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According to the models for the long-run dynamics of social norm beliefs in Sections 8.S
and 8.8, the individual and average beliefs in the household norm and financial independence
norm are also determined by the behaviour in the past. On the other hand, direct information
on these beliefs can be obtained from the SCP surveys mentioned in the previous section.
Therefore, we do not here express the social norm beliefs in the past behaviours. Again, in
this section and the next we assume that any woman i's normative reference group(s) for the
household norm and financial independence norm coincides with her membership group or
social group, as being the same for every group member.
In the case of a decision to keep one's job when marrying or when getting a child, the
short-run reservation wage of woman i is a short-run «rir wage. Then woman i is more or
less used to the amounts of household time, corporate time and consumption resulting from
her last job. Similarly to above, we can then approximate woman i's habit states in year f
as *L.-r " *•,"-! " Vl " ",7-i ^d s*,, - X,"_, - K^,,., * w,.,_,##£,. where X,?_, and
^Oif-i ™ay now stand for woman i's own actual consumption and own other income before
her marriage. Especially the corporate work experience will lower the exit wage, whereas a
low consumption experience before marriage as compared to the high consumption level
resulting from marrying a man with a high income leads to a relatively high exit wage.
Again, woman ;"s social household time and family consumption environments ,V£", and J^
in year f can be approximated as the average actual household time L,_| = 7",_| - W,_|
and the average actual family consumption KQ,_, + *V,//,°, in year r-1 in i's social
(reference) group. Now this social (reference) group will consist of married women with
small children or married women in general. To the individual and average beliefs in the
household norm and financial independence norm the same statements as above apply.
Adding a stochastic disturbance term somewhere in our micro-economic labour supply
model, we could express the probability of participation of woman i in terms of the distrib-
ution function of this stochastic disturbance as well as the expression (9.1) for the reser-
vation wage, and the wage rate. In principle, we could then estimate the resulting expression
for the participation probability for micro-economic cross-section data, following the usual
probit method (see, e.g., Killingsworth, 1983, Ch. 4, and Hartog and Theeuwes, 1985, p.
S245). Here, however, we are interested in long-run developments of participation rates,
requiring a time-series analysis. Since for such a time-series analysis only macro-economic
(or meso-economic) data are available and since we want to obtain more insight in the
macroeconomic implications of the microeconomic dynamics, the expression for the par-
ticipation rate should be expressed in terms of macroeconomic averages of the wage rate and
of the variables and parameters in the expression (9.1) for the reservation wage. However,
this aggregation (cf. Sees. 4.7 and 4.8) should take into account that the theoretical models
for collective habit formation and social norms in this study have been aggregated only to
the level of social groups. Therefore, we should make a clear distinction between the meso-
economic level of social groups and the macro-economic level of (birth) cohorts or (sub)pop-
ulations.
* Simulations over time on the basis of cross-section estimates for a particular point in time as
carried out by Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) are dubious. See footnote 3.248
First, we consider the aggregation from individual participation decisions in the social
group of woman < to the participation rate of that social group. This can be done in several
ways, but in a time series context the most appropriate and simple way is expressing the
participation rate in terms of the distribution of one continuous deviation variable e with
mean zero, which distribution can be assumed to be approximately constant over time (cf.
Assumption X at the end of Sec. S.3). To find such an e, we first note that the participation
rate of a social group can be expressed as the fraction of group members for whom the
quotient w,.,-/**'/ is smaller than one. The wage rate w, in the denominator of this quotient
may be assumed to change over time by roughly the same percentage for each group mem-
ber (as in Assumption X in Sec. 5.3). Similarly, the reservation wage tv,, in the numerator
of the quotient may, as a first approximation, be assumed to change over time by roughly
the same percentage for each group member.^ Then the same statement holds with respect
to the quotient itself, and we define e, as the relative deviation (<7, - 9)/? of the quotient <?,
from its group average ^ - i^/iv. The participation rate of the social group can then be
expressed as the fraction of group members / for whom (»v,./vF)(l + e,) is smaller than one,
which is equivalent to In(1 + e,) < lntv - lnw,.. If we consider ln(l + e,), for a large
number of group members A/, as a continuous variable e and approximate w,. as 6/a, it
then follows that .-:? ,- , ;m..w 1
where F is the (cumulative) distribution function of e. Note that the mean of the distribu-
tion of e" is zero and that its variance and higher-order moments are constant over time as a
consequence of the assumptions made above.
9.4 Logit participation equation for one social group
Regarding the specification of the distribution function F in (9.2), the most plausible as-
sumption seems to be that the distribution of e is normal, but for reasons of simplicity and
comparability with the usual logit specifications, it may also be approximated by a logistic
distribution. In the latter case the distribution function F is specified as F(e) = (1+e"**)"',
where K is a constant that is inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the distrib-
ution by a factor fl/y^." Applying the usual logit transformation /ogi/P := ln[/>/(l -/*)]
to the participation equation (9.2), this equation becomes
' On the one hand, this percentage may have the same sign as the percentage of change of the
wage rates as a result of a same direction of change of the incomes of the husband Kp,-. On the other
hand, the percentage may have the opposite sign, when a rise (fall) of the wage rates leads to a
higher (lower) average corporate time in the social group, and hence via the mutual social influence
to lower (higher) reservation wages (see Sec. 7.1).
* This can be read from the expression (11) for the logistic density function in terms of its mean
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, = K(lnw, - Inn-,,) • K(lnw>, • Ina, - lnfe,), (9.3)
where the time dependence has been indicated. Now we can substitute the (approximate)
averages of the expressions for a, and fc, in (9.1) into (9.3). Next, for the two participation
situations considered above, the habit states and social environments can be approximated by
the individual and average actual household time and family consumption in the previous
year, and these behaviours can be expressed in the individual and average actual corporate
hours in the previous year.
However, the average actual corporate hours //,_, depend on the endogenous labour force
participation rate in the previous year /*,_]. In order to make the resulting endogenous
dynamics visible and to facilitate a comparison with participation equations in the literature
(see below), we express A/,_| in /*,_, as follows. The average actual corporate hours W,_j
are equal to the employment ratio £,_, (proportion of group members who are employed)
times the average actual corporate hours o/f/i<» fmp/fly«/ group wip/n/w.v //,_,. The employ-
ment ratio £,_] is, in general, lower than the participation rate P,_|, since the latter rate also
includes the unemployed group members who search for a job (see Clark and Summers,
1982, p. 833). The number of these unemployed group members as a fraction of all par-
ticipating group members defines the unemployment rate u,_,, and it then easily follows that
the employment ratio £,_, is equal to 1 - u,_, times the participation rate /*,.,.
;, A positive unemployment rate u,_[ implies that the labour supply of the group members
is rationed with respect to the number of jobs. In addition, recent Dutch data for the female
labour supply of hours (Allaart et al., 1989, 1991) also indicate overemployment in the sense
that many women who hold a job would like to work fewer hours. This implies a rationing
of the average p/r/i?rm/ corporate hours of the employed group members. Both kind of
rationings have not been taken into account in the theoretical models underlying the par-
ticipation equations (9.2) and (9.3), so we should make ad hoc assumptions on nature and
effects of the rationings. Regarding the rationing of the average preferred corporate hours of
the employed group members, we assume for the sake of simplicity that the number of job
hours are exogenously fixed by the employers. This implies that the average actual corporate
hours of the employed group members W,_| are exogenously given (see, however, below).
The average actual corporate hours of all group members //,", are then equated to
In addition, the rationing of the average corporate hours of the employed group members
makes entrance to the labour market less attractive, implying that the individual reservation
wages will be higher than ft,7a, (see Subsection 2.2.4). Since the size of the increment has
not been derived for our AQM models, we assume ad hoc that in an overemployment
situation as mentioned above the average household time taste a^, is raised by an increment
that is proportional to the positive gap W,_, - W,_j between the averages of the actual and
the preferred corporate hours of the employed group members. For the sake of simplicity we
again assume that this gap is exogenously given. Furthermore, as a result of a discouraged
worker effect unemployment is assumed to raise the average household time taste, and hence
the average reservation wage, by an increment that is proportional to the unemployment rate
M,. Finally, we conceive the average wage rate iv, as a real net wage (so we abstract from
progressive taxation effects).250
Having made all these assumptions and additions, we can write out the logit participation
equation (9.3) for the case of a social group of re-entering married women as
(9.4)
Hot averages of products of parameters and variables have been approximated by the
products of their averages, and all average parameters except the taste parameters %, and
5^, have been assumed independent of time. The taste parameters can be considered as
implicit functions of exogenous variables which are not made explicit in the participation
equation. For example, the average consumption taste 5^, is likely to depend positively on
the average number and age of children and the qualities of consumption goods, and the
average (net) household time taste ct^, can be expected to depend positively on the average
number of children and negatively on the average age of the children, the average level of
education of the group members, the average efficiency of household production, and the
average working conditions (see also Vendrik, 1988, p. 17). • *~ '
The wage rate term describes the always positive substitution effects of changes in the
average wage rate on the logit of the participation rate, and hence on the participation rate
itself. Note that there is no income effect of changes in the wage rate on the participation,
since at zero labour supply changes in the wage rate do not affect one's own income (see
also Pencavcl, 1986, pp. 32-33). The term - l^xl^O/ represents the negative participation
effect of the average income of the husband. In particular, when this income declines as a
consequence of husbandsbecoming unemployed, the term describes the added-worker effect.
The term (Y^ + Yxx ^O/-i models the positive participation effect of collective habit for-
mation with respect to family consumption as far as determined by the incomes of one's
own and other women's husbands in the previous year. The next term, which is proportional
to the lagged participation rate />,_,, describes the positive participation effect of behavioural
preference interdependence (BPI) with respect to family consumption as far as determined by
the labour incomes of other employed group members. It implies a positive feedback of
changes in the participation rate in the previous year on a determinant of the participation
rate in the present year, and hence a long-run multiplier effect on the participation rate (see
Sec. 9.7). This feedback is stronger as the wage rate w,_, and the average actual corporate
hours of the employed group members //,_, are higher and as the unemployment rate M,_J
is lower. Note that there is no participation effect of individual habit formation (1HF) with
respect to family consumption as far as determined by the labour income of the woman
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after entry, so does not lead to an increase in the participation rate. On the other hand, such
IHF has a negative effect on exits from the labour market, when after a period of (uniform-
ly) declining <7,- = H^/»V,- and hence entries, the <?, again rise. Here, however, we assume
that the <7, only decline, and we come back to this complication at the end of the section.
The next two terms model the positive participation effects of one's own belief and the
average group belief in the financial independence norm as a result of cognitive dissonance
and reputation sanctions. The average own belief variable /F^, has a superscript A to indicate
that for women who have already re-entered the labour market, their belief in the financial
independence norm if they would not yet have re-entered, so were still housewives, should
be considered. Analogously to the IHF term for zero labour income considered above, the
reason of this procedure is that a possible increase in one's own belief in the financial
independence norm after and as induced by entry only reinforces the entry decision, so does
not raise the participation rate. The remaining positive participation effects of one's own
belief and the average group belief in the financial independence norm are larger as the
average individual minimum income K^, is lower, since the extent of obedience to the
financial independence norm is then more sensitive to variations in the labour income. Recall
from the previous section that although the norm belief variables arc endogenously deter-
mined by the (lack of) participation in the past according to the long-run models of Chapter
8, they are not expressed in lagged participation rates in (9.4), since there is direct empirical
information on the norm beliefs. •''»•• :\^ ;ivfs;?>, ii';^/i !srKv«J>!:.:*«-'.«f
Whereas the average consumption taste %, has a positive participation effect, the ave-
rage household time taste a^, has a negative participation effects for obvious reasons. The
term - |a^^|7", represents a positive participation effect of the average total discretionary
time 7",. This results from more (less) satiation with discretionary household time when one
does not participate (L, = 7,), as_ the total discretionary time 7, is larger (smaller). The
average total discretionary time 7", is equal to the total available time of 24 hours a day
minus the average minimal necessary household time (see Sec. 2.3), and the latter minimal
household time can be assumed to depend positively on the average number of children and
negatively on the average age of the children, the availability of day care and home help,
and the average efficiency of the household production. Since the average number of Dutch
children has declined since the sixties and since the average household production efficiency
has increased secularly, the average minimal necessary household timein the Netherlands
may have declined, and hence the average total discretionary time 7", may have risen,
implying a positive effect on the participation rate. However, it seems difficult to distin-
guish such effects from similar effects on the average household time taste a^,.
The term (y^x + y^£-)7^_j describes the negative participation effect of collective habit
formation with respect to household time as far as determined by the average maximal
discretionary household time 7",., in the previous year. This negative participation effect
counteracts the above positive participation effect of satiation with respect to household time
and is larger (smaller) as 7",_j is larger (smaller). The next term, which is proportional to the
' On the other hand, nowadays parents seem to spend more time on the_upbringing of their
children than in the past. This may be associated with a negative effect on 7,, and hence on the
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lagged participation rate /*,_,, describes the positive participation effect of behavioural
preference interdependence (BPI) with respect to household time as far as determined by the
corporate hours of other employed group members. Again, it implies a positive feedback of
changes in the participation rate in the previous year on a determinant of the participation
rate in the present year, and hence a long-run multiplier effect on the participation rate. This
feedback is stronger as the average actual corporate hours of the employed group members
//,_, are higher and as the unemployment rate u,_j is lower. Note that there is again no par-
ticipation effect of individual habit formation (IHF) with respect to household time as far as
determined by the corporate hours of the woman herself, since these corporate hours are zero
before entry and only reinforce the entry decision after entry, so do not raise the
participation rate. The next two terms model the positive participation effects of one's own
belief and the average group belief in the household norm as a result of cognitive dissonance
and reputation sanctions. These effects are larger as the average total discretionary time 7",
is lower, since the extent of obedience to the household norm is then more sensitive to
variations in the household time.
Although the participation equation (9.4) is rather complex, its dynamic lag structure
seems still too simple, since empirical results of Van de Stadt et al. (1985) and Clark and
Summers (1982) strongly suggest that individual habits and (expected) social environments
are adjusted to the corresponding individual and average behaviours in much more than one
year. The individual habits and social environments can then be approximated as moving
averages of the corresponding behaviours in preceding years f-x with uniform exponential-
ly declining weights (1-X.)A.*~', where the positive "memory coefficient" X. is equal to 1
minus the positive adjustment speed 8 (cf. Sec. 5.2). However, since the resulting expres-
sions in the participation equation are terms in arguments of logarithms, we cannot simplify
the participation equation by applying a Koyck transformation as in Clark and Summers (p.
834). Therefore, and since the modifications can be shown not to affect the long-run mul-
tipliers, the analysis in the next sections sticks to the unmodified participation equation (9.4).
Another complicating modification of the participation dynamics is implied by a certain
degree of endogeneity of the average actual corporate hours of the employed group members
W,_, which is suggested by the historical fact that since the end of the fifties employers
have been offering an increasing number of part-time jobs in order to attract more married
women to the labour market (Mol et al., 1988, p. 30). This means that employers have been
taking the preferred corporate hours of married women into account in their offers of cor-
porate hours, and implies a positive dependence of the average flrmu/ corporate hours W,_,
on the average /m;/<»rr<'</ corporate hours //,_, of the employed group members. However,
the latter corporate hours depend on the social environments (and the average norm beliefs),
so on the average actual corporate hours W,"j of a" group members in the preceding year,
and hence on the endogenous participation rate />,_2 and the average preferred corporate
hours of the employed group members W,_2 in that year, which again depend on the same
variables in the preceding year r - 3, etc.. These reinforcing feedbacks imply a complicated
dynamics, which we consider as a second-order effect and neglect here. Thus, in the fol-
lowing we continue to assume exogeneity of the average actual corporate hours of the
employed group members W,".
Next, for a social group of women who do or do not keep their job when marrying or
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re-entering or not can be derived. This participation equation differs from (9.4) by additional
terms which describe the negative effect on exits of IHF with respect to the higher (family)
consumption and the lower household time as a result of having a job. This, however, is not
elaborated here. Finally, in the case of re-entered women, such women will again leave the
labour market when their short-run exit wages decline under their wage rates, since they
become older, since their husbands reach a higher salary scale or since their children start to
earn their own income. The resulting decline in the participation rate cannot be described by
the participation equation (9.4), but can be described only by a participation equation for the
subgroup of re-entered women which is similar to that for women who do or do not keep
their job when marrying or getting children as mentioned above. However, for this case it
can be argued that the density function of the exit wage-wage proportions in the subgroup of
re-entered women may be very skew, so that an approximation of this density function by a
logistic one seems dubious. Anyway, we then have a rigi'm? jwifr/i from a participation
equation for entries to another participation equation for exits. This complication is related to
the complex hysteresis structure of long-run labour supply schedules as represented by
Figure 4.11 in Section 4.8 or Figure 7.1 in Section 7.2, according to which labour supply
paths depend on the sequence of rises and declines in the wage rate (relative to the reser-
vation wages) in the past. Analogously to the discontinuous shifts of the long-run individual
corporate hours between zero and maximal hours as a result of unstable IHF, we have here
discrete shifts of an individual participation variable between the values zero and one (see
Sec. 9.9). The complication also implies that the representation of the persistence effects of
IHF on participation by Clark and Summers (1982) is inadequate (see Sec. 9.6).
9.5 Aggregation and BPI between social groups
The previous section has derived the logit participation equation (9.4) for one social group
within a subpopulation of married women with grown-up or school-going children who do or
do not re-enter the labour market. However, data for the norm belief and other variables in
such a participation equation on a social group level do not seem available. Therefore, and in
order to obtain insight in the determinants of the participation rate on the level of (birth)
cohorts or an entire subpopulation, the participation equation (9.4) should be aggregated to
such a level. The subpopulation which will be considered in this section, consists of all
married women with school-going and no younger children who did not have a job before
the youngest child reached the school-going age (and who do or do not re-enter the labour
market).
A straightforward and approximative aggregation of the participation equation (9.4) is
obtained by taking the averages of the left-hand and right-hand sides of (9.4) over all social
groups within a cohort of the subpopulation (or within the entire subpopulation) and by
approximating the averages of logarithms, quotients and products by the logarithms, quoti-
ents and products of averages. This results in a participation equation of the same form as
(9.4), where the constant factor K is replaced by its average K over all social groups in the
cohort, where /*,(_]) and M,_] are the participation rate and unemployment rate of the
cohort, and where the average variables and parameters denote averages over all individuals
in the cohort However, this specification of the aggregate participation equation contains a254
very severe aggregation error. This can be seen by deriving the participation equation for the
cohort directly from the individual quotients <7, of reservation wage and wage rate in the
same way as the participation equation for one social group (9.3) in the previous two sec-
tions. We then obtain again a participation equation of the same form as (9.4) with the
variables and parameters being defined on the cohort level, but now the constant factor it is
inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the distribution of the individual quotients
<7, over //JC ro/iorr. Since this standard deviation is likely to be much larger than the stan-
dard deviations for the separate social groups within the cohort, the constant factor (c will be
much smaller than the average constant factor ic over the social groups.
This result has very important implications for the values of the elasticities of the par-
ticipation rate with respect to the exogenous variables on the cohort level versus the social
group level. For example, the short-run wage elasticity of the participation rate can easily be
shown to equal the constant factor ic or ft times 1 - P,. Consequently, for a given level of
the participation rate /*,, this wage elasticity is much lower on the cohort level than on the
social group level as a result of the aggregation. Similarly, other short as well as long-run
elasticities as being positive functions of the constant factor will also be much lower. In
Section 9.10 we will sec that this property hinders the empirical identification of collective
catastrophes in social groups.
On the other hand. Section 9.8 will show that the long-run elasticities of the participation
rate on the cohort level are raised, when one adds the participation effects of behavioural
preference interdependence (BPI) ftefvm'n social groups in the cohort to the participation
effects of BPI tviWn social groups. However, this rise will be relatively small, since the
former BPI can be expected to be much smaller than the latter. In the context of our general
BPI model as constructed in Section 5.2, adding BPI between social groups amounts to
relaxing Assumption VI and extending the social reference group /?G,- of woman / beyond
I'S social group. With respect to this extension at least two sets of simplifying assumptions
can be made. First, as a generalization of Assumption VIII in Section 5.2, we may assume
that the extended social reference group of each woman i consists of all other women
within i"s cohort (of married women with school-going children) and that, alongside e-
quivalcnt neighbour interactions between members of the same social group, there are
weaker equivalent neighbour interactions between members of different social groups. This
means that each woman i , in her perception of her social consumption and household time
environment, assigns the same reference weight to every woman y in other social groups,
but that this reference weight is smaller than the uniform reference weight attached by i to
other members of the same social group. We can then decompose ;"s social environments in
a social environment formed by the behaviour of all members of /'s social group and a
social environment formed by the behaviour of all members of other social groups. The
former social environments can then be approximated as in the previous section, and if we
assume that the number of women in the cohort is large compared to the number of women
in /"s socta_l group, the latter social environments can be approximated as the average con-
sumption X,_, and the average household time L,_, of all women in the cohort (cf. (5.8) as
implied by Assumption IX in Section 5.2).
In the participation equation for the cohort these social environments formed by other
social groups lead to additional terms Yxx"*'-i ^ '"^ consumption BPI and y^£-oZ-,_i
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on the right-hand side (see (9.4)). Here the superscript » stands for "other social groups"
(see also Van de Stadt et al., 1985. Kapteyn and Wansbeek^l985. Sec. 7.3, and Kapteyn and
Woittiez, 1990). If we make the same substitutions for X,_, and ZT,,, as in the previous
sections, we then obtain somewhat higher coefficients of KQ,-). H",_, W,°'O -M,_J)/*,_J,
7",_I and fy_'(l -M,_J)/*,_[ in the cohort variant of the participation equation (9.4).'"
A second kind of extension of the social reference group /?C, of woman i beyond i"s
social group results when woman / refers to the behaviour of women in some, but not all
other social groups in her cohort or subpopulation. For example, Kapteyn ct al. (1978) and
Van Praag et al. (1979) (see also Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 1985. Sec. 7.2) find that in an
evaluation of their income individuals refer to the incomes of other individuals whose level
of education is the same or higher, but not lower. Similarly, in consumption demand models
Pollak (1976a) and Schokkaert (1982b, Sec. V.B.IV) assume a hierarchical emulation pattern
in which each individual's preferences are influenced by the consumption behaviour of
members of higher(-status) groups. In his estimations of participation equations for Dutch
female cohorts, Romme (1987, 1990) finds a significant impact of the participation rate of
the preceding (on average) five year older cohort. Let us consider this impact in the context
of our participation equation for a cohort of married women with school-going children, and
let us assume for simplicity that it results from BPI between social groups in successive
cohorts which have the same characteristics other than age (e.g., apart from marital status
and having school-going children, the level of education). Moreover, assume equivalent
neighbour interactions as above and approximate the social environments formed by these
older social groups as the average consumption and the average household time in these
groups in the previous year. This can easily be shown to lead to additional terms Y^x"' */-l
for the consumption BPI and Y^-i Z^l"j for the household time BPI in the arguments of the
second and third logarithm on the right-hand side of the participation equation for cohort/:
(see (9.4)). Here the superscript (*)-l refers to the preceding older cohort, and the averages
are taken over this cohort. Making substitutions for X,_j and L,_] analogous to above, we
then obtain additional terms in 'Q,.], W,_] «,.] (1 ~w,.j)',_] , ',_] and
tf^l *(1 -u,_] J/',.] in the variant of participation equation (9.4) for cohort *. Such terms
can also be shown to result when we assume in addition equivalent neighbour interactions of
BPI between social groups in successive cohorts which have different characteristics other
than age (e.g., level of education).
Still another kind of extension of the social reference group /?G, of woman / beyond J'S
social group results when woman i refers not only to the behaviour of other women, but
also to that of men such as her husband and his and her male friends. However, in the
labour supply model of Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990) this reference to the behaviour of men
is estimated to be zero. On the other hand, woman /'s normative reference groups for the
household norm and financial independence norm are likely to consist not only of married
'" Note that when these coefficients are estimated, the separate contributions of the BPI's within
and between social groups are not identifiable. This lack of identifiability holds also for the micro-
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women with school-going children to whom the norms apply, but also of persons like her
husband, parents and friends to whom the norms do not apply. In this case the available SCP
data for the norm beliefs (see Fig. 9.3 in Sec. 9.2) do not allow a distinction between a
normative influence on woman i of the average norm belief in her own cohort and that of
the average norm belief outside her cohort. The SCP data provide only proxies for the
overall average norm beliefs in the whole of Dutch (adult) population, so we are prompted
to assume that these proxies can capture both kind of normative influences. The average
norm belief variables m^, and /w^, in the cohort variant of the participation equation (9.4)
should then be redefined as the overall average norm beliefs in the Dutch population. More-
over, the average norm beliefs n^, and /F^, in each cohort of married women with school-
going children, if all these women would not yet have re-entered the labour market, should
be approximated by the overall average norm beliefs. This may not be a bad approximation.
A disadvantage of the approximation is that it makes the contributions of the cognitive
dissonance and reputation sanctions to the total effect of the norm beliefs unidentifiable.
9.6 Social norm proxies and econometric evidence - '
Our proxy for the overall average belief in the household norm is given by the percentage of
the answer "objectionable" in Figure 9.3 on the question: "What do you think of a married
woman with school-going children who has a job?". This percentage fell sharply from 84%
in 1%5 to 44% in 1970 and then further declined, up to some recoveries, to 20% in 1990.
According to our interpretation this implies that in the Netherlands the belief in the house-
hold norm eroded extremely fast in the roaring second half of the sixties and eroded at a
more moderate pace in the seventies and eighties. The development of the social norm proxy
of Romme (see Sec. 9.2) is given by the complement of this time pattern. In regressions of
a linear and a loglinear specification of a logit participation equation for Dutch female
cohorts over the period 1971-1985, Romme finds consistently significant and stable coef-
ficients of his social norm variable as well as of the participation rates of the same and older
cohorts in the preceding year, and only weakly significant and less stable coefficients of the
wage rate. Moreover, in the more plausible loglinear specification of the participation
equation the coefficients of the social norm variable and the lagged participation rates are
considerably higher than the coefficient of the wage rate. Furthermore, the significance of
the social norm variable may become more pronounced when also the "cultural revolution"
in the second half of the sixties could be included in the estimation. These results of Romme
can be considered as a support for the empirical relevance of our theoretical model of the
impacts of social norm change and collective habit formation on female labour supply. For
when Romme would have used the household norm proxy instead of his complementary
norm variable, the results mentioned would be the same in the case of his linear specifica-
tion of the participation equation and presumably similar in the case of his loglinear specifi-
cation. In addition, together with some other empirical results of Romme, they raise serious
doubts on the reliability of empirical purely neo-classical results like those of Hartog and
Theeuwcs (1985), who find strong and dominant own-wage effects in the development of
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On the basis of his estimation results Romme also makes projections of the aggregated
female participation for 1987 and 1989. He distinguishes three routes: a minus-route where
the social norm variable and unemployment rate change by -2% and 2%, respectively, a
zero-route where these variables do not change, and a plus-route where they change by 2%
and -2%, respectively. These routes turn out to imply projections which are considerably
higher than conventional trend-extrapolations for the period 1985-1989 (sec Romme. 1987).
A later comparison of these forecasts with actual values reveals that the rise in female
participation between 1987 and 1989 is predicted remarkably well by the loglinear specifica-
tion of Romme's participation equation: while the predicted rise in participation lies in the
route range between 140.000 and 164.000, the actual rise in participation is 146.000 (CBS,
1992)." Since our participation equation (9.4) resembles Romme's loglinear specification,
this result too is encouraging for our model.
However, in comparison with our participation equation (9.4) the participation equations
of Romme have three important drawbacks. First, unlike (9.4) Romme's equations have not
systematically been derived from an underlying micro-economic labour supply model, but
were specified ad hoc. These ad hoc specifications have the advantage of being simpler than
(9.4) and therefore perhaps being more easy to estimate, but (9.4) and the implications of the
loglinear specification for the long-run elasticities of the participation rate (see Sec. 9.9)
suggest that both specifications contain severe specification errors. A second important
drawback of Romme's participation equations is that the female cohorts are not distinguished
by household composition such as being single or not and number and age of children. As a
third related drawback, Romme includes neither such life-cycle variables nor variables for
the level of education, the income of the husband, and the rationing of the number of job
hours. The impacts of the rising level of education and the rising income of the husband are
implicitly taken into account to some extent by the wage rate variable, but the probably
important impact of the educational level other than via the wage rate is neglected (see Sec.
9.1). On the other hand, a participation equation like (9.4) which meets all these objections,
has not yet been estimated and may pose thorny data and estimation problems.
A drawback of the participation equations of Romme which seems less severe, is the
absence of a good proxy for an emerging "emancipation" norm of financial independence
and/or self-fulfilment of non-single women. As an indication for this norm emergence in the
Netherlands we could consider the development of the percentage of the answer "recom-
mended" in Figure 9.3. More specifically, this percentage may serve as a proxy of the
average beliefs in the financial independence norm m^, and w^, in the cohort variant of the
participation equation (9.4). While the percentage of "recommended" rose considerably from
2% in 1965 to 16% in 1970, it fluctuated between 1970 and 1981, and again rose con-
siderably from 11% in 1981 to 32% in 1991. Thus, in 1991 the percentage of the Dutch
population which recommended labour force participation by married women with school-
going children, had become substantially higher than the percentage which objected to it.
This rise in the proxy for the average belief in "emancipation" norms for non-single women
may also be important in explaining the rise in the labour force participation of Dutch
" On the other hand, this remarkable prediction success may be a coincidence, since the so-called
AKT data of the CBS. that were used in Romme's estimations and predictions, are based on another
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married women. However, the estimation results of Romme do not give indications on this,
since Romme includes the percentage of "not objectionable" in his proxy of the general
support for a norm in favour of female labour force participation.
;- A related important role in the participation increase may have been played by growing
molv for financial independence and/or self-fulfilment and by collective habit formation
with respect to a woman's own income and/or a woman's own corporate time. The former
needs can be incorporated in the participation equation (9.4) as increases in the consumption
taste parameter Oy, and as decreases in the household time taste parameter a^,, respec-
tively. The latter collective habit formations can be shown to imply increments to the BPI
coefficients of the own income term and the own corporate time term, respectively.
This brings us to a crucial feature of these lagged-participation-dependent terms, namely
that they originate from BPI, but not from IHF. The source of this surprising result is that in
a regime of (uniformly) declining proportions of the individual reservation wages and wage
rates </,• • M^/V^,-. and hence of an increasing proportion of (rc-)cntered married women, the
IHF's only reinforce the entry decision after entry, so do not lead to an increase in the
participation rate (see Sec. 9.4). Conversely, in a regime of (uniformly) rising proportions of
the individual reservation wages and wage rates, and hence of an increasing proportion of
women who have left the labour market, the IHF's only reinforce the exit decision after exit,
so do not lower the participation rate. This essential property is not recognized by Clark and
Summers, who incorporate IHF, but no BPI in their model. By an extremely loose ag-
gregation procedure (p. 832) they "derive" an endogenous IHF term in their participation rate
equation, which is subsequently expressed in lagged employment ratio's (p. 834) and hence
implicitly in lagged participation rates (see Sec. 9.4). Thus, they make a severe aggregation
error which leads to an incorrect interpretation of the persistence effects of IHF on par-
ticipation. In our participation equation (9.4) such persistence effects of IHF are represented
by the IHF parts of the terms in K^,., and 7",.,, which describe the negative participation
effects of a housewife being used to a low level of family consumption and a high level of
household time as compared to the situation in which she would have a job. Alongside these
persistence effects of IHF there arc persistence effects of BPI in (9.4), which are represented
by the BPI parts of the terms mentioned as well as by the negative participation effects of a
low lagged participation rate.
Another feature of (9.4) which is absent in the model of Clark and Summers as well as in
the participation equation of Romme, is the mediating influence of the average corporate
hours of the employed group or cohort members, W,.j. on the BPI effects of the lagged
participation rate. As remarked at the end of Section 9.4, this is likely to reinforce the
feedbacks of the lagged participation rate in a complicated way. On the other hand, this does
not alter the following essential implications of these feedbacks. Whereas the feedbacks can
cause persistence of a status quo of a relatively low or high participation rate, they can also,
when the participation rate has nevertheless started to change due to exogenous causes,
strongly amplify such changes. The latter property, which too seems unrecognized by Clark
and Summers, follows from the long-run dynamics of our model. This long-run dynamics is
analysed in Section 9.8-9.10. However, the models for the long-run dynamics of social norm
beliefs in Sections 8.1 and 8.S suggest that then also such an endogenous dynamics of the
average norm belief variables in the participation equation (9.4) should be taken into ac-o//c ma/f parfinpofi'o/i 259
count. Before we do so, we first discuss some historical evidence on the endogeneity of the
dynamics of social norms in the next section.
9.7 Endogenous dynamics of social norms :
Regarding social norms historical descriptions of the Dutch developments in female par-
ticipation strongly suggest that the low female participation before I960 originated from
certain economic and social conditions and interests, and that it was legimitized e.r poi? by
social norms emphasizing the natural role of the woman as mother and housewife (see, e.g.,
Clason, 1981, and Molle et al., p. 26).'^ Due to the late industrialization and the high birth
rate in the Netherlands, there were sufficient men to work in the factories, so in contrast to
other countries married women were not needed in the factories to suppress the male wages
(Siegers, 1981, p. 557, and De Neubourg, 1988, pp. 156-161). This led to a strict labour
division between paid work of men and unpaid work of women (including participation in
the husband's business), which was raised to the status of social norms and institutionalized
in several government regulations. In their turn, these social norms and institutions rein-
forced and consolidated the labour division, which confirmed the social norms and institut-
ions, etc. (see Siegers, 1986, p. 87).
This consolidating process was further reinforced by the high unemployment in the
thirties as well as by a social phenomenon which was typical for the Netherlands. This
phenomenon was the emancipation movement of the Dutch Roman Catholics, which had a
strong interest in catholic women bearing and raising a large number of children (see Van
Heek, 1954, and De Neubourg, 1988, pp. 161-163). When a catholic woman married, she
was supposed to start the reproduction immediately, and when she failed to do so, she and
her husband were visited by a parish priest who urged them to do more their best. Only
when in the fifties the Catholics achieved their emancipation, this social pressure loosened.
Thus, the Catholic emancipation movement stood in the way of the "emancipation" of
married women.
Another factor which contributed to the Netherlands having a particular historical back-
ground concerning female labour force participation, was the fact that in World War II the
demand for female labour did not increase in contrast to other countries. Thus, when after
World War II the demand for female workers increased, this demand was confronted with
the very powerful social norm that married women should stay at home. This household
norm had been built up and reinforced by a very long historical tradition in which neither
employers nor married women, as groups, had acquired experience with and, as a result, got
accustomed to labour force participation by married women." In spite of the increased
demand for female labour, this led, in combination with the very low net earnings of married
women, to a low participation of these women in the forties and fifties.
'* See Elster (1989) for some objections to such an explanation of the existence of social norms in
terms of self or common interests. However, Elster's analysis has the drawback of being remarkably
static and ahistorical.
'•* De Neubourg (1988, p. 155) even goes back to the seventeenth century in order to explain this
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Nevertheless, eventually the economic reality of a persistent surplus demand for labour
began to undermine the household norm in the course of the fifties. Most political parties
became more liberal on this point, the law requiring dismissal of female civil servants on
marriage was abolished in 19SS, and the business sector even tried to attract married women
by offering part-time jobs. In combination with other factors as discussed in Section 9.1, this
led to a strong rise in the participation of married women in the sixties.'* This rise was
accompanied by a dramatic shift between 1965 and 1970 in the public opinion regarding
married women with school-going children having a job (sec the previous section). On the
one hand, the implied strong erosion of the pertinent household norm is likely to have
contributed substantially to the rise in participation. On the other hand, this erosion of the
household norm may have been caused by, among other factors, the economic reality of a
rising participation and hence a rising employment of married women with school-going
children. Underlying mechanisms of the latter feedback may be formed by reduction of
cognitive dissonance and social influencing of social norm beliefs as explained in Section
8.5. Together with the former causation it implies a mutually reinforcing process of changes
in household norm beliefs and participation, which partially explains the booming character
of both changes. Moreover, this process was further reinforced by other forms of collective
habit formation.
However, this explanation can be shown to be insufficient to explain the fact that the
erosion of the household norm between 1965 and 1970 was much stronger in absolute terms
than the rise in participation of married women with school-going children in the entire
sixties. On the other hand, the long-run model of Section 8.5 can be modified into a more
complex model so as to give a good fit of the data, and this more complex model can be
shown to imply dynamic effects similar to those of the simpler model of Section 8.5. There-
fore, and since the more complex variant has not yet been fully elaborated, the analysis of
the long-run dynamics of female participation in the next section assumes that the social
norm beliefs develop according to the long-run model of Section 8.5, i.e. in a way analogous
to the dynamics of collective habits.
Finally, at the end of Section 9.2 we also raised the questions of endogeneity of social
attitudes and needs. Social attitudes can be considered as being moulded by social norms and
collective habits, and hence as being endogenous in the long run. Section 9.11 will argue
that needs are likely to be endogenous in the very long run and that this endogeneity may
have been an important cause of the onset of the female participation increase in the sixties.
'* The statements of Dc Neunourg (1988) that the female participation rate in the Netherlands was
very small in the sixties and the seventies and has been on the upgrade since 1980 (p. 153). and that
the labour demand surplus in the sixties only marginally induced Dutch women to enter the labour
force (footnote 8 on p. 159), are based on data for the fora/ female participation rate in the Nether-
lands as compared to other industrialized countries (see Tab. 9.1 and Fig. 9.1). While being partially
correct in this international context, the statements arc misleading with regard to the development of
the participation rate of Dutch marrini women over time. On the other hand, the rise in this par-
ticipation rate in the sixties was insufficient to satisfy the increasing demand for labour. This was one
of the factors inducing the massive recruitment of foreign workers in the course of the sixties and the
first half of the seventies (Koot and Van dcr Wiel. 1982. Sec. 1.2. and De Neubourg. 1988. above
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9.8 Long-run elasticities •••••' •
This section and the next two analyse the long-run dynamics of the participation rate of a
social group or cohort of married women with school-going children according to the par-
ticipation equation (9.2) in Section 9.3 or (9 .4) in Section 9.4 and according to the long-run
social norm model of Section 8.5. The latter model can be incorporated into the former
equations by conceiving the individual and average group beliefs in the household norm and
the financial independence norm as specific aspects of individual habit states and social
environments with respect to household time and one's own income, respectively (see Sees.
8.4 and 8.S). This implies that, just as the individual habits and social environments, the
social norm beliefs are assumed to be adjusted to the actual behaviour in one year, and
hence to be proportional to the actual behaviour in the preceding year. The norm belief
terms in the participation equation (9.4) or (9.2) then become a part of overall IMF and BPI
terms with an average household time habit sensitivity ^/.^ 'hat includes the average cog-
nitive dissonance effect of the household norm Y^/7" , an average susceptibility to the
social household time environment ?£zT that includes the average reputation effect of the
household norm P^e^p^/f *, and an average susceptibility to the social family consumption
and own income environment 7xx *"*" includes the average reputation effect of the financial
independence norm P/rE/rp/r/^/M .Here the average total discretionary time f and the
average individual minimum income K/^ have been assumed independent of time, and there
is no cognitive dissonance effect of one's own belief in the financial independence norm,
since this belief has been assumed to be proportional to the zero own income before entry.
On the basis of the thus simplified participation equation (9.4), we can now give the
following picture of the long-run dynamics of the participation rate of a social group or
cohort of married women with school-going children. Consider a situation of approximately
long-run equilibrium and suppose that an exogenous variable changes. For example, suppose
that the average wage rate rises. Then also the participation rate of the social group (or
cohort) rises. By several kinds of bandwagon effect (see Subsec. 5.1.2) this renders par-
ticipation more attractive for the group members who have not yet entered, so lowers their
entry wages. As a result, group members whose entry wages drop below the wage rates
prevailing for them, also enter, implying a further rise of the participation rate. This induces
again bandwagon effects, raising the participation rate, etc., until a new long-run equilibrium
is reached.
The relative rise of the participation rate in long-run equilibrium as a result of a one-
percent relative rise of the average wage rate is expressed by the /on#-/-«/i wage Warf/ciTy o/
* parn'cipario/i rate £- . Here the long-run equilibrium /** is a function
/>'(w,,5x,,y0,,/7",H,,aj.,,«"-//,'). Similarly to relation (3.10) in Section 3.4, the
long-run wage elasticity £- can be related to the short-run wage elasticity of labour force




(see App. 9 A). Here £_ .is the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to the
lagged wage rate in the pertinent term for consumption BPI. This elasticity appears in the
formula for the long-run wage elasticity, since a change in the wage rate induces, in the long
run, a change in the lagged wage rate. More importantly, it induces, in the long run, also a
change in the lagged participation rate, leading to a multiplier effect as indicated by the
multiplier in front of the two elasticities on the right-hand side of (9.5) (see below).
The lagged-wage elasticity £_ .in (9.S) can be expressed in the short-run wage elas-
*'(-il ..... ...... ..... ..,.,.... ..
ticity as £f,.£l! .. - £-,.£- ,.. where £* ,. denotes the elasticity of a", with
respect to the lagged wage rate at the long-run equilibrium and can easily be shown to equal
the share of the pertinent term for consumption BPI in <7,*. Hence, (9.5) can be rewritten as
(9.6)
Thus, the long-run wage elasticity has become equal to a modified multiplier times the short-
run wage elasticity. ' V
The derivative f ^ in the denominator of this multiplier is obtained by differentiating
the right-hand side of the participation equation (9.2) in Section 9.3 to /*,_, at the long-run
equilibrium P* as
/(lnvv, + lna,* -
a,
-„,_,) (9.7)
(see App. 9A). Here the function / is the density function of ln(l + c), where c is the
relative deviation of the individual proportion of the short-run reservation wage and the wage
rate, <f • w^/vv, from its average. Furthermore, a,* and ft, are the values of a, and ft,
evaluated at P,_, = /**. The expression in (9.7) has the interesting implication that because
the values of the usual density functions / vary strongly with their argument, also the
(modified) multiplier in (9.6) will vary strongly with that argument. Since the long-run
participation rate is equal to the corresponding distribution function by virtue of (9.2), and
hence is monotonously increasing in the same argument, it then follows that the multiplier,
and hence the long-run wage elasticity of the participation rate, will change considerably as
the long-run participation rate rises.
To be more precise, let us also consider what may then happen with the other time-
dependent factors in (9.7). In several OECD countries a rise in the female participation rate
seems to have mostly been accompanied by a relatively strong rise in the average wage rate
H>,_, , a weaker (relative) decline in the employment rate 1 - H,_, and a weaker decline in the
average corporate hours of employed women W,"_*j (see Killingsworth and Heckman. 1986,
Sec. 2.1, for the U.S.A. and Great Britain). Moreover, the "parameter" b, as representing the
average marginal utility of household time when one does not participate (Z., = 7",-, see
(6.9b) in Subsec. 6.2.1), is likely to have then declined relatively strongly and the develop-263
ment of the "parameter" a, as representing the average marginal utility of family con-
sumption when one does not participate (X, = J^,,-, see (6.9a)). seems ambiguous. The net
result of these tendencies may have been a rise in the product of factors by which the
density function value in (9.7) is multiplied, which rise could be expected to be weak
relative to the overall variation in this density function value.''
The participation equation (9.2) implies that the density function value in (9.7) times a
small increase dP* in the long-run participation rate represents the number of group mem-
bers who enter the labour market in long-run equilibrium as a result of that change. Assume
that this density function value as a function of the long-run participation rate P, is uni-
modal and approximately symmetric. The maximum of this function is then reached for a
long-run participation rate of about 50%. Consider now the product of this function and the
other factors in the expression for the derivative /^ in (9.7). The supposed rise in the
product of these factors as a function of the long-run participation rate has the effect of
shifting the maximum point of the density function to a maximum point of Pp at a higher
long-run participation rate. Suppose that the maximum value of P^ which is reached, is
lower than one (see the next section for the opposite case). Then, as the long-run par-
ticipation rate rises, one divided by the denominator in (9.6), i.e. the unmodified multiplier
in (9.5), first increases from one to a maximum value for a long-run participation rate higher
than (about) 50% and then decreases to one.
The elasticity £_ in the numerator of the modified multiplier in (9.6) as representing
the share of the term ?xx ^/-l^-i '" <*/• where fyt* '* the average corporate hours of a//
group members, can be argued to have typically risen in several OECD countries during the
last three decades. The implied rise of this elasticity as a function of the long-run par-
ticipation rate has the effect of shifting the maximum point of the unmodified multiplier to
a maximum point of the modified multiplier at an even higher long-run participation rate.
Empirical results of Romme (see the next section) suggest that the maximum value of the
modified or unmodified multiplier may be in the order of tens or hundreds.
On the other hand, approximating the unimodal density function by a logistic one, leading
^>
to the participation equation (9.4), the short-run wage elasticity £-.. at the long-run par-
• • *^ I
ticipation rate P, is given by icO-P, ) (see App. 9.1), so decreases linearly with a rising
long-run participation rate from the positive value K to zero (see Fig. 9.4). As a result, we
can expect that the long-run wage elasticity £ - will first decrease (somewhat) from K, but
next rise to a maximum value £ *" considerably higher than K and then decrease to zero.
This profile is indicated in Figure 9.4, assuming a cautious maximum value 4 of the modi-
fied multiplier and supposing that the participation rate /'*" at which the maximum value
" A notable exception are the early eighties in especially the Netherlands, when the average wage
rate declined, the employment rate declined strongly (Romme, 1986. p. 19). and the marginal utility
of household time 6, may have risen due to a discouraged worker effect. However, the resulting
decline in the product of factors by which the density function value in (9.7) is multiplied, may still
be weak relative to the variation in this density function value, and is. as a first approximation,
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£"* of the long-run wage elasticity is reached, is not far from 50%.'* These assumptions
imply that £"* will be about equal to two times the maximum value of the short-run wage
elasticity K. Thus, the hump-shaped participation rate profile of the long-run wage elasticity
it essentially different from the talus-shaped participation rate profile of the short-run wage
elasticity.
Figure 9.S Talus-shaped participation rate profile of short-run wage elasticity £_ . (dashed bold)
and hump-shaped participation rate profile of long-run wage elasticity £ - (solid) for
Dutch married women.
Intuitively, the hump-shaped participation rate profile of the long-run wage elasticity can
be explained as follows. When the average wage rate rises at a low or high value of the
long-run participation rate, a relatively small number of group members in one of the tails of
the unimodal and rather symmetric distribution of the entry wages will enter in the short run.
By several kinds of bandwagon effect this will, in the long run, induce other group members
in the distribution tail to enter also, but again the number of these group members will be
relatively small. On the other hand, when the average wage rate rises at an intermediate
value of the long-run participation rate, the group members who enter in the long run as a
result of bandwagon effects, will be in the hump of the entry wage distribution, so their
number will be relatively large. This leads to a hump shape of the multipliers and hence of
the long-run wage elasticity as functions of the long-run participation rate, which shape is
essentially different from the talus shape of the participation rate profile of the short-run
wage elasticity.
A similar essential difference between the participation rate profiles of the long-run and
short-run wage elasticities can be derived for a social group or cohort of other sub-
'* Noie that multiplying the modified multiplier with the short-run elasticity has the effect of
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populations of married women like married women with small children, who do or do not
keep their job when getting children. Then, (approximately) aggregating the participation-
elasticity profiles over all cohorts in all subpopulations to the population of all married
women can be expected also to yield a similar difference between the participation profiles
of the long-run and short-run wage elasticities. This essential difference has adverse implica-
tions for the reliability of a backward simulation of the development of the participation rate
of married women over time on the basis of cross-section estimates of a static labour supply
function as carried out by Hartog and Theeuwes (1985. Sec. IV). For a 1979 nation-wide
cross-section they estimated an own-wage elasticity of 1.99. The participation rate profile of
such a static own-wage elasticity can be expected to have a talus-shape similar to that of the
participation rate profile of our short-run wage elasticity (see also Hartog and Theeuwes, p.
S248). Consequently, in Hartog and Theeuwes' backward simulation of the participation
rates of married women from 1979 to 1947, it is implicitly implied that the own-wage
elasticity was higher than 1.99 in earlier years as the participation rate was lower. Therefore,
it is not really surprising that they find a strongly dominating impact of the own wage on the
development of the participation rate of married women between 1947 and 1979.
On the other hand, our model suggests a completely different picture. As the actual values
of the participation rate can be expected to follow its long-run equilibrium values at a
distance (see the end of Sec. 3.5), the long-run wage elasticity can be regarded as an ade-
quate indicator of the total impact of the wage rate on the participation rate. Since the
participation rate of married women in 1979 was 25% according to the data of Hartog and
Theeuwes, the corresponding long-run participation rate P^g will be higher than 25% and
may be located in Figure 9.4 as indicated. Then the long-run wage elasticity would be lower
than its 1979 estimate in earlier years, as the participation rate was lower.
Next, the question is whether an estimate of the long-run wage elasticity at 1979 would
be higher or lower than the 1979 estimate 1.99 of the own-wage elasticity of Hartog and
Theeuwes. Empirical results of Kapteyn, Woittiez and Ten Hacken (1989) suggest that the
former estimate would be lower than the latter. For two Dutch cross-section samples in 1985
they find long-run wage elasticities of the average number of corporate hours of non-single
women with and without children which are much lower than corresponding wage elasticities
obtained from a standard model like that of Hartog and Theeuwes (see Kapteyn et al., p.
157). A similar result can be expected to hold with respect to the wage elasticities of par-
ticipation for these samples. Since the participation rates of the non-single women in these
samples were considerably below 50%, the corresponding long-run participation rates at
1985 are likely to be left to the point P*" in Figure 9.4, where the participation rate profile
is assumed to reach its maximum. This would imply that the long-run wage elasticity of the
participation rate of non-single women at 1979 would be lower than the same elasticity at
1985. Combined with the high probability that the standard wage elasticity of participation
of non-single women at 1979 would be higher than the same elasticity at 1985, this leads to
the expectation that the long-run wage elasticity at 1979 would be (considerably) lower than
the 1979 estimate 1.99 of the own-wage elasticity of Hartog and Theeuwes.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that, in a backward simulation of the participation rates
of married women from 1979 to 1947, the long-run wage elasticity could be expected to
decline from a value (much) below 1.99 in 1979 to lower values in earlier years as the
(long-run) participation rate was lower. This strongly suggests that the impact of the own266
wage on the development of the participation rate of married women between 1947 and 1979
has been greatly overestimated by Hartog and Theeuwes. On the other hand, the above
analysis also suggests that low estimates of long-run wage elasticities for the eighties like
those of Kapteyn et al. not need to hold for the nineties with their higher participation rates
and hence presumably higher long-run wage elasticities (see also Kapteyn and Woittiez,
1987, Fig. 3). Therefore such estimates do not seem directly usable for projecting the par-
ticipation and corporate hours effects of. for instance, a change in the fiscal regime in the
nineties.
Long-run wage elasticities vary strongly not only with time, but also with the level of
aggregation. In Sections 9.4 and 9.S we already saw that the constant tc, and hence the
short-run wage elasticity of participation KO-P, ) (sec Fig. 9.4), are inversely proportional
to the standard deviation of the distribution of the individual proportions <7 = W^/H' over the
social group or cohort, and hence are lower at a higher aggregation level (and at given
participation rate P,). Thus, the participation rate profile of the short-run wage elasticity at
the long-run participation rate />, has a more gradually declining talus shape as the ag-
gregation level is higher. In addition, the density function / and hence the modified mul-
tiplier in (9.6) will have a less pronounced participation profile as the aggregation level is
higher and hence the individual variation stronger. This holds despite the higher suscep-
tibilities to social influence ^x and ^^ in (9.7) as a result of BPI between social groups,
since this BPI is relatively weak (see Sec. 9.5). Together the aggregation tendencies of the
participation rate profiles of the short-run wage elasticity and the modified multiplier imply
that the participation rate profile of the long-run wage elasticity will be (considerably) less
pronounced as the aggregation level is higher. In particular, the maximum value £ *™ of the
long-run wage elasticity will be lower. The reason of this result is that, at a higher ag-
gregation level and hence lower levels of the density function / around its maximum, a one
percent rise of the wage rate in this region induces a smaller percentage of the women to
enter the labour market, and the resulting changes in the social environments of the stay-
bchinds induce a relatively smaller percentage of them to enter also.
So far we have considered only wage elasticities of the participation rate. However, in
Section 9.1 we saw that several other (more or less) exogenous variables like the number
and age of children, the level of education (not via the wage rate), and the availability of
part-time jobs are likely to have played an important role in the development of the par-
ticipation rate of Dutch married women during the last century. With respect to these varia-
bles also short-run and long-run elasticities of the participation rate can be derived from the
participation equations (9.2) and (9.4). Then it turns out that we obtain relations between
long-run and short-run elasticities which are analogous to (9.5), with the derivative Pp
again being given by the expression in (9.7), but in which the elasticity of the participation
rate with respect to the lagged exogenous variable is mostly zero. Thus, in the latter case, in
order to obtain the long-run elasticity the short-run elasticity should be multiplied by the
unmodified multiplier in (9.5). Moreover, just as the long-run wage elasticity in (9.6), all
long-run elasticities can be expressed as a modified multiplier times the short-run
" This docs not deny that for that purpose the full model structure of Kapteyn et al. can be used
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elasticity. The modified multiplier then has the same denominator as in (9.6), but the numer-
ator is given by one "share elasticity" or the sum of two "share elasticities" of <7, or minus
one "share elasticity" or minus the sum of two "share elasticities" of /> with respect to the
exogenous variable in year / and, in the case of the sum, in year r-1. The pronounced
hump-shaped participation rate profile of such a multiplier implies that all long-run elas-
ticities too will have a hump-shaped participation rate profile. The next section will consider
the implications of such a profile for the development of the participation rate of married
women over time.
9.9 Participation rate dynamics and hysteresis '
This section analyses the long-run dynamics of the participation rate of a social group,
cohort or (sub)population of married women, which results from hump-shaped participation
rate profiles of the long-run elasticities of the participation rate with respect to the exogen-
ous variables. We denote the exogenous variables that appear in a, as z," z^ and the
exogenous variables in ft, as z, z^. Using the expressions for the long-run elasticities
obtained in the previous section, a relative change Aln/>* := InP* - lnP,*, in the long-run
participation rate P, can be expressed as
1+E_ . Alnvi\ + > £„ '+£ „ Alnz,, - >




Here the elasticities within the brackets are "share elasticities" of a, and 6, with respect to
the exogenous variables in years f and /-I, where the "share elasticities" with respect to
f-1 are mostly zero.
Since the last expression in (9.8) is rather complex, we make the simplifying assumption
that the sum of the terms between the brackets is approximately proportional to the relative
change Alnu>, in the average wage rate over time, so is equal to aAlnw,, where a is a
constant larger or smaller than one. The expression in (9.8) then becomes
AlnP* = H!_Alniv,. ' . (9.9)
The logarithm of the average wage rate may then serve as an indicator of the changes in all
exogenous variables, so that the long-run participation rate P* can be considered as a
function f*(lnw,). Since the short-run wage elasticity £_ . in (9.9) can be logistically
approximated as K(1-/>, ), the graph of the function /**(lnvt',) would approximately have268 Oiaptf r 9
a logistic shape, if the derivative Pp in (9.9) were zero for all values of /*,", = /*". This
is the shape implied by static labour supply models like that of Hartog and Theeuwes
(1985).
On the other hand, in our model the derivative /*p in (9.9) is substantially larger than
zero for intermediate values of />,*, • /**. Then the implied hump shape of the par-
ticipation rate profile of the long-run "overall" wage elasticity (i.e. the factor by which
Aim*', in (9.9) is multiplied) has the effect of making the function P*(lnH-,) grow stronger
than exponentially (constant growth rate or elasticity) for />, not too much lower than the
maximum point of the profile (cf. /**" in Fig. 9.4), and decline stronger than logistically
(linearly declining growth rate or elasticity) for /•* sufficiently higher than the maximum
point. This results in a sigmoid shape as roughly represented by the solid curve in Figure 9.S
which shape is considerably "sharper" than the logistic shape. It describes a (relatively) high
degree of persistence at low as well as high levels of P, as a result of (relatively) low long-
run elasticities, and strong changes at intermediate levels of P * as a result of relatively high
long-run elasticities. We call such a curve a 5up?r-erpo/i?;i/i<i/-/0gi5ft'r curve (SEL curve). Its
defining properties can be expected to be rather robust to relaxing the crude simplifying
assumption made above.
•*.'{*W?-.-f ••• -'"Trrs -;"!i f- "-';:•:• -•
Figure 9.5 Supcr-exponcnlial-logistic curve of P," as a function of ln»T, (solid), and collective
hysteresis loop of P,* of American married women after World War II (dotted).
What are the implications of this SEL curve for the development of the participation rate
of married women over time? Consider first a regime of a constant growth rate Alnw, = y
of the average wage rate. By virtue of the simplifying assumption made above, this implies
a constant, though generally different, weighted sum of the growth or decline rates of the
other exogenous variables (including *•,_,). If we substitute Aln»v, = y in (9.9), it is easilyDywo/wi'cj o/./irmfl/f pamc/pafio/i 269
seen that the long-run participation rate /** as a function of year f will then develop
according to a SEL curve. Since the shape of the development of the actual participation rate
over time will be a "smoothed out" variant of the shape of the development of the long-run
participation rate, the actual participation rate may then develop according to a SEL-likc
curve. Such a curve can account for the empirical pattern of a remarkably persistent low
participation rate of Dutch married women before 1960 and a strongly growing participation
rate of these women after 1960 (sec Fig. 9.1). However, it does not seem to give u proper
description of the less than exponential growth of this participation rate in the first half of
the eighties. Possible causes may be the strong rise of the unemployment during that period,
the fact that the average real wage rate of Dutch women then declined (Romine, 1986, p.
19), and the fact that the average number of children below five years did not decline any
more in the first half of the eighties (Mol et al., 1988, Fig. 3.2). Such developments can be
incorporated in the difference equations (9.8) or (9.9). but it then becomes an empirical
question how the time profile of the participation rate is predicted to look like.
Still, on the explanation of the empirical pattern of a remarkably persistent low par-
ticipation rate before 1960 and a strongly growing participation rate after I960 we can make
the following statements. Whereas conventional static labour supply models like that of
Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) and Mol et al. (1988) try to explain this empirical pattern by
unfavourable levels and small changes of exogenous variables before 1960 and favourable
levels and large changes of such exogenous variables after 1960, our labour supply model of
an endogenous dynamics of collective habit formation and social norms seems to offer a
more convincing explanation by adding the explanatory power of hump-shaped participation
rate profiles of the long-run elasticities of exogenous variables. According to these profiles
the persistence of the low participation rate of married women before 1960 is partially
explained by low values of long-run elasticities of exogenous variables, and the booming
character of the rise of the participation rate after 1960 is partially explained by higher
values of such elasticities. Before 1960 the mutually reinforcing forces of collective habits
and social norm beliefs on the one hand and of the actual low participation of married
women on the other hand consolidated the status quo of a low participation rate and of
corresponding collective habits and social norm beliefs (see Sec. 9.7). On the other hand,
after 1960 a similar kind of mutually reinforcing forces strongly accelerated the changes in
the participation rate of married women and in the corresponding collective habits and social
norm beliefs. Of course, this theoretical explanation should be empirically tested by es-
timations of the participation equation (9.4) in Section 9.4, but it looks promising.
As noted in the previous section, the density function /, and hence the modified mul-
tiplier in (9.6), will have a less pronounced participation rate profile as the aggregation level
is higher. This implies that the hump shape of the participation rate profile of the long-run
elasticities, and hence the "sharp" sigmoid shape of the time profile of the participation rate,
will be (considerably) less pronounced as the aggregation level is higher. This explains the
more pronounced time profiles of the participation rates of married women in the age groups270 C/ia/wr 9
of 25-29, 30-39 and 40-49 years according to Figure 9.2 as compared to the time profile of
the participation rate of all married women below 65 years in Figure 9.1."*
That the multipliers in (9.6), (9.8) and (9.9) may become very high, is suggested by the
estimation results of Romme for the more plausible loglinear specification of his par-
ticipation equation for female cohorts. The final variant of this specification can be shown to
imply that the multiplier is equal to 500 (!) for zero long-run participation rate and declines
as, in good approximation, 1/f, as the long-run participation rate rises. However, this
participation rate profile of the multiplier as being essentially different from the hump-
shaped profile implied by (9.6) seems very implausible and suggests a severe specification
error in Romme's loglinear participation equation." Still, at the lowest aggregation level
of the social group the multiplier in (9.6) may become very high and even infinite at inter-
mediate levels of the participation rate, when the BPI between the group members is strong
and/or the individual variation of the reservation wage-wage proportions is weak. The case
of an infinite multiplier will be analysed in the next section.
So far we have mainly analysed what happens when the average wage rate and the other
exogenous variables change so as to encourage participation of married women. Suppose,
however, that after a period of such encouraging changes the average wage rate or other
exogenous variables start to change in the opposite direction, and hence start to disencourage
participation. This seems to have happened in the U.S.A. just after World War II (Clark and
Summers, 1982, Sec. 2). Between 1940 and 1944, when large numbers of men were drawn
into the Armed Forces increasing the job prospects and potential earnings of women, the
participation rate of married women rose precipitously from 15.6% to 23.9%. After the
transitory developments of the war had passed, the participation rate was expected to fall
back sharply to or below the long pre-war trend, but it declined only to 20.0% in 1947 and
increased to 23.0% in 1950. Clark and Summers ascribe this to persistence effects of, among
other factors, individual habit formation (IHF).
In our model the persistence effect of IHF is described as a regime switch from a par-
ticipation equation for entries without an IHF effect of corporate work to another par-
ticipation equation for exits of (re-)entered married women with an IHF effect of corporate
work (see the end of Sec. 9.4). The former equation implies an upwards development of the
long-run participation rate P, along a SEL curve like the solid curve in Figure 9.5. Let us
assume that the lower half of this curve describes the rise of the long-run participation rate
of American married women before and during World War II. The long-run participation
rate at 1945 may then be located on the curve as indicated. The IHF effect of corporate
work implies that after 1945 the long-run participation rate did not fall back along the curve,
but developed along another curve as indicated by the dotted curve in Figure 9.5. This curve
is a small (collective) hysteresis loop like those in Figure 4.11 in Section 4.8. but it is less
'* The less pronounced time profiles of the participation rates in the age groups of 50-59 and 60-
M years as compared to the time profile for the whole population can be associated with the fact thai
the participation rates remained low. and hence were located in the relatively low left tails of the
participation rale profiles of the long-run elasticities.
" Even more severe specification errors arc made by Clark and Summers (1982). whose loglinear
logarithmic participation equations imply constant short-run elasticities as well as constant multipliers,
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pronounced, since the persistence of the participation of the (re-)entcred married women is
only a part of the development of the participation of the whole population of married
women. The hysteresis loop indicates a second regime switch at (about) 1947, after which
the participation rate again started to rise. (For reasons of exposition the distance between
the 1945 and 1947 points is somewhat exaggerated in Figure 9.5.) After 1947 there was a
persistence effect of IHF by those married women who had left the labour market between
1945 and 1947 and had got used to staying at home to a certain extent. However, as the
average wage rate or other exogenous variables again became increasingly favourable for
participation, such women re-entered the labour market and an increasing proportion of other
married women (re-)entered or kept their job when marrying or getting children. The overall
strong and steady increase of the participation rate of American married women between
1947 and 1990 can then be represented by an upward movement of the long-run pur-
ticipation rate along the dotted curve. As indicated in Figure 9.5, this growth path is predic-
ted to approach the original pre-1945 growth path. However, in the course of 1990 the
participation rate of American married women again started to decline (Breedcveld, 1991).
Figure 9.5 describes this turning point by a regime switch at 1989. The turning point is
likely to be due to cultural reactions, to which we will come back in Section 9.11.^"
The hysteresis loop in Figure 9.5 has two interesting implications. First, it indicates that
the persistence after the war of the strongly risen participation during the war led to a
growth path which long remained at higher participation rates than the growth path which
would have been followed, if there had not been a strong rise of the participation rate during
the war and a subsequent decline. The latter situation applies to a country like the Nether-
lands, where the participation rate of married women remained low during the war. The
resulting lack of experience with and accustomization to participation of married women can
(partially) explain why also after the war the participation rate of Dutch married women
remained lower than the participation rate of American married women and, more generally,
than the corresponding participation rate in most other OECD countries. Besides this dif-
ference in participation experience during the war, also earlier differences are likely to have
played an important role in the continuously lower participation rate in the Netherlands (see
Sec. 9.7).
A second implication of the hysteresis loop in Figure 9.5 is that as the average wage rate
and the other exogenous variables continue to change in a participation encouraging direc-
tion, the persistence effect fades away as indicated by the convergence of the dotted curve to
the solid curve. This can partially explain why in the long run the participation rate of Dutch
married women is likely to catch up with the corresponding participation rate in other OECD
countries (see the strong rise in the participation rate of all Dutch women between 1985 and
1991 according to Table 9.1). Another explanatory factor for such a convergence might be
BPI between countries.
*° For these cultural reactions lnw, is likely lo be not an adequate indicator, but for the sake of
exposition Figure 9.5 pretends it is.272 CTiapter 9
9.10 Collective catastrophes
In the previous sections it has been assumed that the maximum value of the derivative
Pp in (9.7) is lower than one. This implies that as the long-run participation rate rises, the
multiplier in formula (9.6) for the long-run wage elasticity of the participation rate remains
finite. However, from (9.7) we can see that when the susceptibilities to social influence
y^jf and 7^£ arc high and when the density function of the reservation wage-wage propor-
tions / is high-peaked by weak individual variation, the derivative Pp can be larger than
or equal to one. This may especially happen at the low aggregation level of a social group.
To analyse this possibility we consider the participation rate P, in year r as a function
/*(/*,_! ;z,) of the participation rate P,_, in the preceding year for given values of the
vector of all exogenous variables z,. In general this function is given by the participation
equation (9.2) in Section 9.3, where the norm belief terms in <7, and A), have become a part
of overall IHF and BPI terms (see the beginning of Sec. 9.8). This equation implies that P,
as being equal to the distribution function value F(e,) for e, « lnw, + InJ, - In ft, will
usually have a sigmoid shape as a function of this argument, and hence probably as a
function of P,_|. For certain ranges of the exogenous variables z, the curve of the latter
function P(P,.,;2,) may then look as in Figure 9.6. The intersections 4,, B, and C, of this
curve with the equilibrium line P, = P,_, indicate the loci of three long-run equilibria P* ,
P, and P, (cf. Fig. 5.4 in Subsec. 5.5.2). The slope of the curve at these long-run
equilibria represents the derivative Pp := Pp (P,*;z,) referred to above. This slope is
smaller than one for the equilibria P, and P, and larger than one for the equilibrium
P* . By well-known arguments this can be shown to imply that the equilibria P* and
P* arc stable, whereas the equilibrium P* is unstable (see the step-by-step adjustment
path between P * and P* in Fig. 9.6 and cf. Sees. 3.2 and 5.3).
This configuration implies that the actual participation rate P, is converging to one of the
two stable long-run participation rates P, and P * . Hence, we are still in the situation of
the derivative Pp := P/> (P*;z,) being smaller than one, implying a finite multiplier,
which has been extensively analysed in the previous section. However, in the configuration
of Figure 9.5 this situation can become drastically different when the exogenous variables
z, sufficiently change. Consider a social group of married women with school-going children
that has a low participation rate near the long-run participation rate P, . This may describe
the situation of many social groups of Dutch married women in the fifties and sixties.
Suppose now that the exogenous variables z, start to change steadily over time so as to
encourage participation. Examples from the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies are a
declining birth rate, a rising level of education of married women, and a rising real wage
rate of women. The effect of such changes on the curve of the participation function P(P,_,; z,)
in Figure 9.6 can be an overall upward movement. As a result, the stable long-run e-
quilibrium /t, and the unstable long-run equilibrium C, move towards each other, and will,
at certain values of the exogenous variables z *', coincide into one unstable equilibrium and273
Figure 9.6 Participation functions /*(/*,_] ;z,) with three long-run equilibria 4,. 6, and C, for
various values of the exogenous variables z,. For 7, beyond z*' a collective entry
catastrophe and for z, beyond 2'^ a collective exit catastrophe occurs (as indicated by
the arrows). ••'''•••••••••• '"' •••'•"•• •••'•'-.•.«*•.-•,•:••.JW->
subsequently, for z, beyond £*', disappear. Then, only the stable equilibrium S, at a high '
participation rate is left, so the social group of married women will move to that e-
quilibrium. This means that an infinitesimally small change in the exogenous variables z,
beyond £*' induces a large number of group members to follow each other in entering the
labour market. Such a large shift in the participation rate as a consequence of an in-
finitesimally small change in the exogenous variables is a co/fcc/ive ra/a.sf/Y>p/ie (sec Sec.
5.4 and Subsec. 5.5.3, and cf. Sec. 3.5).
Consider now a social group of married women with school-going children that has a
high participation rate near the long-run participation rate P* . This may describe the
situation of many social groups of American married women at the end of World War II
(see the previous section). Suppose that the exogenous variables z, start to change over time
so as to discourage participation to a considerable extent. This is likely to have happened in
the U.S.A. just after the war as large numbers of men returned from the battle-field. Such
changes can lead to an overall downward movement of the curve of the participation func-
tion P(P,_j;z,) in Figure 9.6. As a result, the stable long-run equilibrium S, and the
unstable long-run equilibrium C, move towards each other, and may, at certain values of the
exogenous variables z*^ and for some social groups, coincide into one unstable equilibrium
and subsequently, for z, beyond z , disappear. Then, only the stable equilibrium /4, at a
low participation rate is left, so the social group of married women will move to that e-
quilibrium. This means that an infinitesimally small change in the exogenous variables z,
beyond £ * * induces a large number of group members to follow each other in leaving the274
labour market. Thus, we have here a collective exit catastrophe. However, in the above-
mentioned example of American women such a collective exit catastrophe may have oc-
curred for some social groups only, considering the persistence of the overall participation
rate. Moreover, it seems hard to be distinguished from a collective exit within a short time
as a result of a large shift in the values of the exogenous variables within that time. There-
fore, we will consider another possible example in the next section.
In both cases the collective catastrophe goes together with the participation curve in
Figure 9.6 becoming tangential to the long-run equilibrium line at the relevant long-run
participation rate for: « f*' and r * f , respectively. The derivative P^ •='*/» C*-'/)
is then equal to one, making the (modified) multiplier in (9.6) and (9.8) and hence the long-
run elasticities of the participation rate infinitely large. Such a phenomenon can occur only
when just before its possible occurrence, there exists an unstable long-run equilibrium like
P,* in Figure 9.6, where the slope of the participation curve is larger than one. However,
this equilibrium is never observed directly and should be solved from the highly non-linear
equation P, • P(P,;;,) before it can be substituted into the slope condition.
A more practical condition for a collective catastrophe to occur is obtained by considering
the actual short-run participation behaviour as expressed by the participation equation
A*. » /"(/",..;z.) and taking the first difference of this equation as
Here Z is the total number of exogenous variables and P, is zero for most of them. This
difference equation describes an unstable explosive process if and only if the slope Pp is
larger than one. Such a process is a collective catastrophe, in which a small change in the
participation rate AP,_, as a result of small changes in exogenous variables amplifies itself,
et cetera, into a large shift in the participation rate, until a domain of participation rates is
reached where the slope Pp is again smaller than one. The collective catastrophe con-
dition that the slope P^ should be larger than one in some range of the participation rates,
is equivalent to the condition that the maximal slope P/> over the whole range of the
participation rates should be larger than one, i.e., analogously to (9.7),
max
It is interesting to compare this condition for collective catastrophes in participation with
condition (7.4) in Section 7.2 for collective catastrophes in the average supply of corporate
*' Such a collective caiastaiphc occurs also in the outbreak of an epidemic disease. The implied
analogy is used in the cpidcmiological models of the diffusion of social norm beliefs and par-
ticipation behaviour of De Ncubourg (1985. 1988) and Dc Neubourg and Vcndrik (1989). See,
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hours in the case of BPI and unstable IHF with respect to household time only. We should








This condition differs from condition (7.4) in the following respects. First, the susceptibility
to the social household time environment Y/,£ in (9.12) includes also the average reputation
effect of the endogenous household norm (see the beginning of Sec. 9.8). Secondly, the
average actual corporate time of the participating group members W,t'(l - M,_,) in (9.12)
is usually much lower than the maximal corporate time 7 in (7.4). Whereas the former
corporate lime has been assumed to be exogenously determined by the employers (sec Sec.
9.4), the latter corporate time is the long-run result of the endogenous unstable household
time IHF of the group members themselves. Thus, the role of unstable IHF in (7.4) has been
taken over in (9.12) by exogenous rationings by employers in combination with the discrete
participation variable. On the other hand, in reality the rationings by employers will be
endogenous to a certain extent (see Sec. 9.4), so that the IHF partially regains its role and
average habit sensitivities enter into the collective catastrophe conditions (as in Case IV in
Table 6.1 in Subsec. 6.2.4). It seems, however, very hard to derive collective catastrophe
condition for this more complex case.
A third difference between the conditions (9.12) and (7.4) is that the density function / in
(9.12) denotes the density function of e = In (1 + c) with c being the relative deviation of
the individual reservation wage-wage proportion, whereas / in (7.4) stands for the density
function of the individual household time taste cc^. Condition (7.4) has been derived for the
case of individual variation in the household time taste only, and in that particular case it is
easily shown that e = e = (a^-a^)/ft. The denominator of the last expression explains
the presence of an additional denominator ft, in (9.12) as compared to (7.4).
Although the condition (9.12) holds for collective entry as well as exit catastrophes, the
participation curves in Figure 9.6 for given values of the exogenous variables 2, have
different positions for entry and exit behaviour. This is due to the additional terms in the
participation equation for exits, describing the IHF effects of corporate work. These terms
make the participation curves for exits higher than those for entries in Figure 9.6 and imply
an even larger difference between the f** at which the collective exit catastrophe occurs
and the f *' at which the collective entry catastrophe occurs. This is illustrated by Figure
9.7, again assuming that lnv?, is an adequate indicator for the changes in all exogenous
variables. The right sigmoid curve is the e/irry curve, which describes how the long-run
participation rate increases as lnw, rises and hence encourages entries (cf. Fig. 7.1 in Sec.
7.2). The solid part of this curve indicates stable long-run participation rates like /* * and
/*, in Figure 9.6 and the dotted part represents unstable long-run participation rates like
/* * in Figure 9.6. At In w *' a collective entry catastrophe occurs as indicated by the right
dashed bold line. Similarly, the left sigmoid curve is the e«7 curve, which describes how the276
long-run participation decreases as lnw, declines and hence encourages exits. The solid and
dotted pans of this curve again represent stable and unstable long-run participation rates.
respectively. At lnw
bold line.
.-.•2 a collective exit catastrophe occurs as indicated by the left dashed
P*(lnw,)
Figure 9.7 Long-run participation rate schedule Tor a social group of married women with a persis-
tent hystcrctic domain and two catastrophic domains.
This configuration implies (collective) hysteresis (just as Fig. 7.1 in Sec. 7.2, see Sec.
3.5). Consider, as a possible example, the case of American married women with school-
going children during and after World War II. During the war many social groups of these
women may have been involved in a collective entry catastrophe as indicated by the entry
curve in Figure 9.7. On the other hand, when just after the war the job opportunities, as
indicated by lnvv,, got again worse, these social groups did not move back along the entry
curve, but followed a persistent hysteresis path, as indicated by dots with an arrow in Figure
9.7, towards the exit curve and, when having more or less reached this exit curve, more or
less moved along it afterwards. For some social groups the decline in lnw, may have been
so strong as to induce a collective exit catastrophe, but such social groups too continued to
have a higher participation rate than they had at the same values of lnw, before the war, as
a result of the hysteresis effect of IHF (in combination with the discrete participation vari-
able). For the social groups who did not engage into a collective exit catastrophe, the dif-
ference in participation rate before and after the war was considerably higher, since for them
the hysteresis effect was due not only to IHF as in the case of stable BPI in the previous
section, but also to locally unstable BPI implying two levels of stable long-run participation
rates at given Invv,. When after about 1947 the job opportunities, as indicated by lnw,,
again improved, both kind of social groups are "predicted" to have followed a persistent
hysteresis path towards the entry curve such as in Figure 9.5. More generally, the band
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ticipation rate follows small /iwf«T«/.? loops as in Figure 9.5. On the other hand, there are
two domains outside this band where the long-run participation rate goes through collective
ca/osfroptes (see Sec. 7.2). • ;
What happens with the long-run participation rate schedule in Figure 9.7. when it is
aggregated to the level of a cohort or the whole subpopulation of married women with
school-going children? In the collective catastrophe condition (9.11) the density function /
will have a lower peak as the aggregation level is higher, but on the other hand the suscep-
tibilities to the social consumption and household lime environments ^xx ""^ ?£./" ^'" **
higher by the additional BPI between social groups. Still, since the latter BPI is weak, the
former effect of a lower peak of/ will dominate, and strongly diminish the probability of a
collective catastrophe at the level of a cohort or the subpopulation. This implies that, where-
as collective catastrophes may occur at the level of social groups, such collective catastro-
phes are likely to occur at entry wages ti'j. or exit wages w'j that differ among the social
groups it. When the number /C of social groups within the cohort is very large, the relative
contribution of each separate collective social group catastrophe to the development of the
overall participation rate may be negligible (cf. Assumption IX in Sec. S.2). Then, such
collective catastrophes are fully "smoothed out" in the long-run participation rate schedule
for the cohort or subpopulation (just as individual catastrophes arc fully "smoothed out" in
the long-run average labour supply schedule in Figure 4.11 in Section 4.8 ^). More specif-
ically, if we assume that all members of the cohort or subpopulation are involved in collec-
tive social group catastrophes, the entry and exit curves can be derived to be SEL curves
like the solid entry curve in Figure 9.5. On the basis of such aggregated curves collective
catastrophes within social groups cannot be identified. More generally, the scarcity of
disaggregated data on the level of social groups severely hinders the identification of collec-
tive catastrophes on that level. On the other hand, the collective hysteresis properties of
Figure 9.7, as being the result of both IHF and BPI, survive the aggregation to a long-run
participation rate schedule for a cohort or subpopulation of married women with school-
going children (as in Fig. 4.11 in Sec. 4.8). In addition, the small hysteresis loops in the
band between the entry and exit curves are now caused not only by the IHF, but also by the
unstable BPI within social groups (analogously to the unstable IHF within persons in Fig.
4.11).
To be able to compare the implications of such a schedule with those of Figure 9.5, we
should further aggregate the former schedule to the level of a cohort or population of all
married women. We should then also include social groups of women keeping their job or
not when marrying or getting children. To such a social group an exit curve like that in
Figure 9.7 can apply, but now such a curve should be given a different interpretation. It
describes how, at a rise of lnvw, beyond lnvv*^, a much higher proportion of employed
(married) women who get a child (or marry) in year /, keep their job, so that the par-
ticipation rate of all married group members with small children converges to a much higher
long-run value. Such a collective catastrophe has the complicating feature that only employ-
ed married women who get a child in year / or later, will be involved in the collective
^ More generally, the effects of strong BPI within social groups and weak BPI between social
groups are analogous to those of strong IHF within persons and weak BPI between persons, respec-
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catastrophe, since other married group members with small children are likely to persist in
either staying at home or keeping their job. This renders a demographic dynamics of flows
in and out of the social group of married women with small children an essential element of
the analysis and violates the assumption of a fixed social group which was made in the
previous chapters of this book. Consequently, even with a constant density function of
reservation wage-wage proportions as assumed in the present chapter, collective catastrophe
conditions become more complex and stronger. Such conditions, however, are not elaborated
here. On the other hand, the aggregation of the long-run participation rate schedules of all
kinds of social groups of married women to the level of a cohort or population of all mar-
ried women can be expected to yield SEL-like entry and exit curves that are more pronoun-
ced than the entry curve in Figure 9.5, as a result of strong or even unstable BPI within
social groups and weak BPI between social groups. Moreover, the hysteresis loop of the
participation rate of American married women in Figure 9.5 can now be explained not only
by I III*, bul also by unstable BPI within social groups.
Such results also hold when we take into account BPI of cohorts with respect to older
cohorts. On (he one hand, bandwagon effects (see Subsec. 5.1.2) in a social group with
respect to a similar social group in an older cohort tend to delay a collective catastrophe,
since an older cohort is usually less prone to change than a younger cohort (see also the next
section). On the other hand, reverse bandwagon effects in a social group with respect to a
similar social group in an older cohort may trigger a collective catastrophe. This interesting
and important possibility will be discussed in the next section.
9.11 Collective satiation
At the end of Section 9.2 it was contended that the change in the long-run preferences of
Dutch married women with respect to education, labour force participation and number of
children after I960 is likely to have been caused by certain "objective" opportunity factors as
well as certain "subjective" preference factors. Of the latter factors social norms, collective
habits and social attitudes were argued in Sections 9.7-9.10 to be endogenous in such a way
that they either consolidate a status quo of a low or high participation rate or reinforce
changes in the participation rate once these have set in. However, such endogenous processes
of collective habit and norm belief formation and erosion do not explain why changes in the
participation rate, and hence in the collective habits and norm beliefs, would set in. Such
onsets of social changes may be explained by "objective" opportunity factors like birth
control methods, education opportunities, reasonably paid pan-time jobs and day care facil-
ities becoming more broadly available for married women, but these factors too seem
(partially) endogenous, since they tend to be promoted by the "emancipation" of married
women. Moreover, the question may arise whether, in addition to more or less exogenous
"objective" factors like the increase in the demand for female workers after World War II
and the technical progress of birth control methods, certain "subjective" preference factors
may also have played a role in the onset of "emancipatory" change in the Netherlands after
1960.
The answer to this question is affirmative: the onset of changes in the long-run preferen-
ces of Dutch married women with respect to education, labour force participation andDynamics o//fmo/f porriripafiVwi 279
number of children after 1960 may have partially been caused by a set of
"subjective" preference factors, which we refer to as <y>//mnr .va/iu/in/i (with respect to
household time). This stands for a combination of individual long-run satiation, inter-
generational long-run satiation, and reverse bandwagon effects with respect to the older
generation and older (birth) cohorts. Individual long-run satiation with respect to household
time has been described at the end of Section 3.5 as the phenomenon that for a housewife
accumulation of satiation with her large amount of household time may eventually lower her
entry wage under the prevailing market wage and induce her to enter the labour market.
However, such an intrapersonal satiation effect may play a role only in the re-entries of
women who have a long household time experience, i.e. for older women, whereas the
participation changes are stronger for lower age groups.
In the onset of participation change in these lower age groups, intergenerational long-run
satiation and reverse bandwagon effects may have been inportant. Intergencrational long-run
satiation with respect to household time is the phenomenon that accumulation of satiation of
a housewife with her large amount of household time may deter her daughler(s) to become
also a housewife and induce her (them) to participate to the labour force. In addition, a
daughter may find it attractive in itself to react against her mother and/or older sister(s) and
to behave non-conformistic with respect to them by participating. This leads to reverse
bandwagon effects in the generation of the daughters with respect to the generation of the
mothers and/or in a younger cohort with respect to an older cohort (see Subsec. 5.1.2.a). The
satiation as well as the reverse bandwagon effects can be incorporated into the reservation
wage equation (9.1), and hence into the participation equations (9.2) and (9.4), by making
the household time taste a^,- a negative function of state variables for the satiation and
reverse bandwagon effects.
All these effects can start up changes in the participation rate and even trigger collective
catastrophes within social groups. Then, however, the question arises why this may have
happened in the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies, but not in earlier decades. Regar-
ding the forties and fifties. World War II is likely to have played an important role. After
the war there was a strong general feeling that the rebuilding of the country required a strict
labour division between men rebuilding the country and women bearing and rearing children.
In terms of the needs hierarchy of Maslow (1943, 1970), strong emphasis was laid on the
satisfaction of needs of lower order like physical and social needs. This may have sup-
pressed the working of long-run satiation with household time and may have motivated
conformistic behaviour. On the other hand, when the rebuilding of the country was com-
pleted in the course of the fifties, the need for a strict labour division loosened, and long-run
satiation with household time and non-conformistic tendencies began to get room to work. In
terms of the gratification-activation principle of Maslow we could say that in the late fifties
and sixties the gratification, or satiation of lower-order needs activated higher-order needs
like individualistic needs for independence, non-conformism, power and self-fulfilment.
This activation of higher-order needs may have been a strong force behind the onset of the
" This strong emphasis can be associated with the deprivation-domination principle of Maslow
(see also Vendrik. 1988).
** The gratification-activation principle is related to the distinction between necessary and luxury
goods in economics.280
strong participation rise in the sixties and seventies. Moreover, it may have affected the
social norm beliefs not only indirectly via the rise in participation, but also directly.
In other OECD countries similar social change processes may have taken place. For the
U.S.A. Yankelovich (1981) finds in public opinion surveys a dramatic shift around 1970
from a self-sacrificing ethics to a self-fulfilment ethics. Surprisingly, however, this did not
lead to a higher participation rate of American married women in 1980 relative to that in
1970 (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, Table 2.5; this may be due to the high unemploy-
ment rate in 1980). In 1990 the participation rate of American married women even declin-
ed, probably due to a cultural anti-movement in the form of groups like "Mothers home" and
"Mothers first" (Breedcvcld, 1991). This cultural anti-movement may be explained as the
result of intergenerational and intrapersonal long-run satiation with corporate time of married
women. More specifically, it may be explained in Maslovian terms as the result of an
accumulating satiation of individualistic needs in combination with an accumulating depriva-
tion of social needs and values with regard to raising and caring for children. One may then
also think of an increasing awareness of the adverse long-term consequences of latchkey
children. According to the deprivation-domination principle of Maslow such a situation is
bound to lead to an increasing emphasis on social needs and values of raising and caring for
children, and hence, in the American situation of limited day care, to a decline in the labour
force participation of married women. For some social groups of married women the latter
decline may take the form of a collective exit catastrophe or of a catastrophic fall in the
proportion of group members who keep their job when getting children, or in the proportion
of group members who re-enter the labour market when the children go to school. This,
however, is merely a speculation. '. >.' ,\« SR*I "jm» tlofi^owi arts
In other OECD countries a similar cultural reaction to the "female participation move-
ment" of the last decades can take place in this or the next decade(s). On the other hand, in
a country like the Netherlands where the day care seems less inadequate than in the U.S.A.,
this cultural reaction may only curb the growth in the participation rate of married women
(and curb the erosion of household norm beliefs and the growth in "emancipation" norm
beliefs). The long-run development of the participation rate of Dutch married women since
World War II into the coming decade may then be conceived in a stylized way as the result
of a ru/runi/ cvr/e superimposed on an upward trend in the "economically" demanded
participation rate of married women (see Fig. 9.8). The latter participation rate is the par-
ticipation rate of married women demanded by employers which is adjusted for the effects of
collective habit formation and social norms on the demand side of the labour market. This
theoretical concept of a latent "economic" labour demand needs further elaboration, but here
I only introduce the idea and simply assume that this demanded participation rate increased
exponentially since World War II except for a slump in the first half of the eighties. The
cultural cycle is caused by the combination of collective habit (and nonn belief) formation in
a medium long run and collective satiation in a very long run (cf. the psychological long
cycle in footnote 19 in Sec. 3.5). The collective habit formation can be associated with the
Marxian conception that the economic situation in which a social class finds itself (e.g.,
participation or not) determines its social consciousness (including collective habits and
nonn beliefs). Therefore, and since collective satiation can be associated with the needs
theory of Maslow, the cultural cycle may be referred to as the Marv-Mas/ow rvr/* (<*,
shorter, the M & M cycle).Dynamics o//<?ma/f parrici,pafjV>n 281
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Figure 9.8 The long-run development of the participation rale of Dutch married women after World
War II as a cultural cycle (bold) superimposed on an upward "economic" demand trend
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Between 1945 and 1960 the Marx-Maslow cycle kept the participation rate at a stable low
level below the demand trend as a result of the persistence effects of strong collective habits
and household norm beliefs. This led to an increasing shortage of female labour supply,
which in combination with collective satiation and other factors set the participation rate
rising in the course of the sixties.^ This rise led to an erosion of collective household time
habits and household norm beliefs and a growth of collective consumption and financial
independence habits, which reinforced the participation increase, etc.. As a result of these
reinforcing feedbacks the cultural cycle pushed the participation rate in the course of the
seventies above the demand trend, causing a rise in the unemployment rate of married
women. This rise curbed the growth in the participation rate in the first half of the eighties,
but as the unemployment rate again declined in the second half of the eighties, the growth in
the participation rate rallied. In the nineties collective satiation might again curb the growth
in the participation rate, and hence again cause a shortage of female labour supply. This
description is rather loose and should be refined.
Finally, we make two remarks. First, the more "progressive" social norm beliefs, collec-
tive habits and needs in more recent cohorts, which have been mentioned in Section 9.2,
may partially be explained by intergenerational satiation and reverse bandwagon effects (in
25- ' The increasing shortage of female labour supply can be deduced from the increasing recruitment
of foreign workers between the mid-fifties and early seventies (sec Koot and Van der Wicl, 1982,
Sec. 1.2, and De Neubourg, 1988, p. 159, footnote 8).282
addition to the endogenous factors of a higher level of education and a lower total number of
children in more recent cohorts). Secondly, collective satiation may have played a role not
only on the supply side of the labour market, but also on the demand side. The strong
secular rise in the share of the service sector in total employment, which has been found to
be a significant factor in the participation increase of married women by Mol et al. (1988),
is sometimes associated with a working of the gratification-activation principle of Maslow
(see above). In that view the subsequent growths of the agricultural sector and manufacturing
sector in the past led to a satiation of physical lower-order needs, and this activated higher-
order needs, creating an increasing demand for services.
•• -•.-• V'
9.12 Concluding remarks . • . \
In this chapter we have done the following things. First, we reviewed some econometric
time-series analyses of long-developments of the labour force participation rate of Dutch
married women. The focus of this review was on the significant and important impacts of
social norms and collective habits. To model these impacts as well as those of other variab-
les, a general and a logit participation equation for one social group of married women with
school-going children were derived on the basis of the theoretical models of the previous
chapters. These participation equations were aggregated to the level of a (birth) cohort or
subpopulation of married women with school-going children, and the effects of BPI between
social groups were added. The econometric evidence on the impacts of the norm belief and
collective habit variables in these aggregated participation equations was discussed and the
modelling of the persistence effects of IHF by Clark and Summers (1982) was criticized.
Next, we gave some historical evidence on the endogenous dynamics of social norms and
collective habits in the participation of Dutch married women. Ensuing long-run elasticities
of the participation rate with respect to the wage rate and other exogenous variables were
shown to have a hump-shaped participation rate profile, which is essentially different from
the participation rate profile of the corresponding short-run elasticities. On the basis of this
theoretical result we criticized the empirical simulation finding of Hartog and Theeuwes
(1985) of a strong and dominant impact of the own wage rate on the development of the
participation rate of Dutch married women since World War II. As an improvement on the
logistic shape of a simplified time profile of the participation rate implied by static labour
supply models like that of Hartog and Theeuwes (1985), a super-exponential-logistic shape
of this time profile was derived. According to the latter shape the remarkable persistence of
the low participation rate of Dutch married women before 1960 is partially explained by low
values of long-run elasticities of exogenous variables, whereas the strong rise of the par-
ticipation rate of these women after 1960 is partially explained by higher values of such
elasticities. Moreover, the persistence of the participation rate of American married women
just after World War II (Clark and Summers. 1982) can be explained as the result of hyster-
esis effects of IHF.
The possibility that the long-run elasticities of the participation rate of a social group
become infinite as a result of unstable behavioural preference interdependence (BPI), was
shown to imply collective entry and exit catastrophes. A condition for such catastrophes was
derived and, just as in Section 7.2. we obtained a labour supply schedule with a persistentDynamic? «//fma/f parrin'pa/ion 283
domain, where the long-run participation rate follows (small) hysteresis loops, and u catas-
trophic domain. Aggregating such schedules to the level of cohorts or (sub)populations was
shown to preserve the hysteresis properties, but to "smooth out" the collective catastrophes.
The hysteresis properties turned out to add unstable BPI within social groups to the explana-
tion by IHF of the persistence of the participation rate of American married women just after
World War II. Finally, we conceived the development of the participation rate of Dutch
married women after World War II in a stylized way as the result of a cultural cycle super-
imposed on an upward labour demand trend. This cultural cycle was supposed to be caused
by a combination of collective habit (and norm belief) formation in a medium long run and
collective satiation in a very long run.
A complication in the Dutch data for female participation is that until 1987 the par-
ticipation data of the Central Bureau of Statistics were based on an undcrlimit of twenty
hours per week as a criterion for having a job. When this underlimit was lowered to zero
hours as from 1987, suddenly 250.000 additional women working outside the home were
observed! This important effect can be taken into account in the participation equations for
married women by redefining the participation rate before 1987 as the fraction of those
married women for which the preferred number of corporate hours per week, as given by an
individual labour supply function like (4.S) in Section 4.1, is higher than twenty. This leads
to additional terms and more complex IHF terms in the participation equation (9.4) in
Section 9.4, but the implied participation dynamics does not seem essentially different from
the participation dynamics which has been analysed in this chapter.
Appendix 9A Derivations of (9.5) and (9.7) .......'.,,,:
Consider the long-run participation rate P*(w, ,z,) with z, denoting the vector of all
exogenous variables (and time-dependent parameters) other than the average wage rate w,.
This participation rate is defined as the short-run participation rate P(w,,w,_,,z,,z,_j,/',_|)
in long-run equilibrium for constant values of the exogenous variables, i.e. for v?,_, » w,,
z,_j = z, and P,.| = /'*(>v, ,z,). The long-run wage elasticity of the participation rate £-
can then be written as
where " |*" means that the "short-run derivatives" of /*(iv,,w,_, ,z,,z,_,,P,_,) are evaluated
at iv,_| = iv,, z,_, = z, and />,_, = P*(w,,z,). Rearranging terms and dividing by
l-ain/»/dln/»,_,|* = 1-Pp , we then obtain (9.5).
Differentiating the right-hand side of the participation equation (9.2) to P,_i at the long-






Then, differentiating the expressions for J, and ft, given in (9.4), we obtain (9.7).
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Summary and Perspective
In this final chapter we give a summary of the study in Section 10.1 and a short evaluation
of its results in Section 10.2. Moreover, Section 10.3 puts forward some suggestions for
further research.
10.1 Summary . . ..
This study applies three preference formation theories to labour supply, namely the theory of
myopic individual habit formation and individual long-run satiation, the theory of
behavioural preference interdependence, and the theory of social custom. These theories are
incorporated into the microeconomic theory of labour supply and implications of this
incorporation are derived. In doing so, the three preference formation theories are extended
and integrated. Moreover, the focus is on the effects of non-linear forms of dynamics of the
preference formations in combination with aggregation from the microeconomic to the
macroeconomic behaviour. It is shown that in contrast to the existing models of stable
individual habit formation (IHF) and stable behavioural preference interdependence (BPI) in
labour supply, non-linear and locally unstable IHF and BPI can explain profound changes in
labour supply preferences and behaviour such as when long-term unemployed become little
motivated to get a new job or when former housewives develop a strong orientation towards
paid work.
After an overview of the standard microeconomic model of individual labour supply and
some relevant extensions of this model, the general structure and implications of the short-
run labour supply models to be used in this study are formulated at the end of Chapter 2. In
all following chapters these short-run models are complemented with specifications of the
endogenous long-run dynamics of state variables in the context of the preference formation
theories mentioned. The long-run labour supply effects of non-linear forms of these
dynamics are analysed.
In particular. Chapter 3 and 4 analyse the implications of myopic individual habit
formation (IHF). Chapter 3 argues that the existing models of stable IHF in labour supply
cannot explain profound changes in preferences and behaviour as mentioned above.
Therefore such changes are modelled as the outcomes of IHF which has an unstable long-run
equilibrium between two stable long-run equilibria as in the addictive consumption model of286C/tt/pffr /Q
Becker and Murphy. This leads to a polarization in behaviour and habit state: one of the two
stable equilibria may describe the behaviour and habits of an "emancipated" woman with a
job or a workaholic, whereas the other stable equilibrium may correspond to a housewife or
a "voluntarily long-term unemployed" person. The time paths of exogenous variables like the
wage rate or rationings in the past determine which of the two stable equilibria is actually
approached. This is called //K/M'/C/M;/ ^lyj/mw/.v. At certain values of exogenous variables an
unstable IHF process from one towards the other stable equilibrium may occur. Such a
transition is referred to as an i/u/iYi</u<i/ raftM/rop/if in the sense of Thorn (1975). Individual
catastrophes in behaviour and habits may have occurred (and still occur) in the "eman-
cipation" process of individual married women.
Chapter 3 analyses this non-linear dynamics of IHF in labour supply for IHF with respect
to consumption, household time and corporate time and for a general (additive) utility
function. In particular, necessary and sufficient (in)stability conditions are derived and in the
case of instability schedules of individual long-run labour supply as a function of the wage
rate are obtained, displaying individual hysteresis and catastrophes. At the end of the chapter
the unstable IHF model is complemented with individual long-run satiation, and cases of
discontinuous short-run labour supply schedules are considered. Next, Chapter 4 derives
necessary and sufficient conditions for individual hysteresis and catastrophes for an additive
quadratic specification of the utility function. Moreover, this specification is used to trace the
macroeconomic implications of the derived schedules of individual long-run labour supply
by aggregating them to schedules of average long-run labour supply under various
assumptions on the individual variation in utility function parameters, exogenous variables
and habit states.
Chapter 5 analyses the non-linear dynamics of behavioural preference interdependence
(BPI) with respect to average consumption, average household time and average corporate
time for a general as well as an additive quadratic utility function. Analogously to the
corresponding IHF cases, collective developments of a lack of corporate work motivation in
subcultures of long-term unemployed persons and of a strong corporate work motivation in
social groups of former housewives are modelled as the outcomes of (bandwagon) BPI
which has an unstable long-run equilibrium between two stable long-run equilibria. In one of
the latter stable equilibria a majority of the social group may not participate to the labour
market. In the other stable equilibrium a majority of the same social group may have a job.
Which of the two equilibria is actually approached at a certain moment depends on the past
history of the social group. This is called collective hysteresis. Moreover, under certain
conditions the social group may collectively enter or leave the labour market in an unstable
BPI process from one towards the other equilibrium. This is referred to as a collective
catastrophe. Such collective transitions within social groups may have played (and still play)
a role in the strong rise of the labour force participation of married women in many OECD
countries since World War II.
An attractive feature of the general and additive quadratic BPI models is that their
structures are partly analogous to the structures of the corresponding IHF models of Chapters
3 and 4. This analogy is employed in deriving necessary and sufficient (in)stability
conditions as well as schedules of average long-run labour supply as a function of the
average wage rate, displaying collective hysteresis and catastrophes. On the other hand, the
BPI models are shown to imply additional stabilizing effects of individual variation within•Summary arnf /xrspecri'vf 287
the social group. For the additive quadratic BPI model necessary and sufficient conditions
for collective catastrophes and hysteresis can then be derived. Finally, a comparison is made
between the different effects on average labour supply of unstable BPI and unstable IMF.
Chapters 6 and 7 integrate the IHF models of Chapters 3 and 4 with the BPI models of
Chapter 5 into models of collective habit formation (CHF). First, for two moderately general
subcases of CHF with respect to household time only, simple necessary and sufficient
(in)stability conditions are derived in Section 6.1. However, these conditions turn out not to
be the relevant (in)stability conditions in the case of BPI and separately unstable IHF. For
that case a modified relevant (in)stability condition is derived in Chapter 7. Accordingly,
Section 6.2 and subsequent sections of Chapter 6 are restricted to the case of BPI and
separately s/aft/f IHF, whereas Chapter 7 analyses the case of BPI and separately mi.vfc/M'
IHF. In order to investigate the labour supply dynamics implied by the conditions in Section
6.1, Chapter 6 considers an additive quadratic specification of the CHF model (AQM). It is
shown that, in the presence of exogenous individual variation, the IHF not only reinforces
the destabilizing effect of BPI, but also counteracts it by amplifying the stabilizing individual
variation. Again necessary and sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes and hysteresis
are formulated, and BPI and separately stable IHF with respect to consumption and corporate
time are added to the models.
The case of BPI and unstable IHF is analysed for the AQM specification in Chapter 7.
Then collective catastrophes and hysteresis can arise as a result of a sort of '7MY.>-.S7U#<'
roevtef". In the first stage the unstable IHF induces individual catastrophes of some group
members from zero to maximal corporate hours or the reverse. The second stage fires when,
due to a sufficiently strong BPI, these individual catastrophes trigger subsequent individual
catastrophes of other group members to such an extent that collective catastrophes arise.
Then, for instance, a rocketing number of group members starts to work a rocketing number
of corporate hours. Considering unstable IHF and BPI with respect to household time only,
two subcases of individual variation only in household time taste and IHF strength (Case A)
and only in susceptibility to social influence (Case B) are distinguished. For both subcases
(necessary and) sufficient conditions for collective catastrophes are derived as well as
interesting long-run average labour supply schedules with two domains of catastrophic
behaviour alongside a domain of persistent and hysteretic behaviour. Finally, unstable IHF
and BPI with respect to consumption and corporate time are added to the models.
In Chapter 8 a variant of the theory of social custom (TSC) of Akerlof (1980) along the
lines of Romer is applied to labour supply. Only the implications of social norms in female
labour supply are elaborated, but the implications of social norms in male labour supply are
similar. The application of the TSC to a so-called household norm is shown to be analogous
in structure to a limiting case of Case B of the AQM of CHF in Chapter 7. This is with the
proviso that the intergenerational process by which social norm beliefs change in the
conception of Akerlof is replaced by an intrapersonal belief changing process. If we envision
the concept of habit in a broader sense as general attitude or habitus and with the
qualification just mentioned, the effects and dynamics of social norms in the TSC can then
be interpreted as one of the possible "channels" through which unstable IHF and BPI may
proceed. Moreover, it is argued that the destabilizing parameter restrictions on the AQM
which correspond to the labour supply application of the TSC, are implausible. The chapter
continues with a comparison with other applications of the TSC, which makes clear that the288Oiaptfr /0
present application adds two pairs of essential elements to the overall picture, namely the
pair of individual and collective catastrophes and the pair of individual and collective
hysteresis. Finally, the female labour supply model is further extended by introducing the
effects of a social norm of financial independence.
Chapter 9 investigates the empirical relevance of the theoretical models which have been
set forth in the preceding chapters, by applying them to the developments of the labour force
participation of Dutch and American married women since World War II. As an improve-
ment on ad hoc participation equations of Romme (1987, 1990), general and logit
participation equations for a social group, cohort and subpopulation of married women with
school-going (or small) children are derived. These participation equations describe the
impacts of CHF as well as social norm beliefs and have different specifications for entry and
exit behaviour as a result of hystcretic persistence effects of IHF. The modelling of such
effects by Clark and Summers (1982) is shown to be incorrect due to a severe aggregation
error.
The endogenous dynamics of CHF and social norm beliefs turn out to imply a hump-
shaped participation rate profile of the long-run elasticities of the participation rate with
respect to the wage rate and other exogenous variables. This is shown to imply serious
doubts on the empirical simulation finding of Hartog and Theeuwes (1985) of a strong and
dominant impact of the own wage rate on the development of the participation rate of Dutch
married women since World War II. As an improvement on the logistic shape of a
simplified time profile of the participation rate implied by static labour supply models like
that of Hartog and Theeuwes, a so-called super-exponential-logistic shape of this time profile
is derived. According to the latter shape the remarkable persistence of the low participation
rate of Dutch married women before 1960 is partially explained by low values of long-run
elasticities of exogenous variables, whereas the strong rise of the participation rate of these
women after 1960 is partially explained by higher values of such elasticities. In close
connection, the persistence of the participation rate of American married women just after
World War II (Clark and Summers, 1982) is explained as the result of hysteresis effects of
IHF. Such hysteresis effects are also shown to explain differences in as well as convergence
of participation rates among countries.
The strong rises in the participation rate of Dutch married women after 1960 and of
American married women after 1950 may have been caused by collective catastrophes within
social groups. A necessary and sufficient condition for such a collective catastrophe in the
participation rate is derived. Just as in Chapter 7, we obtain a labour supply schedule with
two catastrophic domains alongside a persistent and hysteretic domain. Aggregating such
schedules to the level of cohorts or (sub)populations is shown to preserve the hysteresis
properties, but to "smooth out" the collective catastrophes. The hysteresis properties turn out
to add unstable BPI within social groups to the explanation of the persistence of the
participation rate of American married women just after World War II by IHF. Finally, the
development of the participation rate of Dutch married women after World War II is
conceived in a stylized way as the result of a cultural cycle superimposed on an upward
labour demand trend. The cultural cycle is supposed to be caused by a combination of
collective habit (and norm belief) formation in a medium long run and collective satiation in
a very long run. Since the two mechanisms can be associated with conceptions of Marx and
Maslow respectively, the cycle is referred to as the Marx-Maslow cycle.289
10J Evaluation
The approach which has been chosen in this study is theoretical and deductive. It can be
regarded as an exploration of theoretical possibilities on the basis of non-linear dynamic
extensions of the microeconomic theory of labour supply. In the view of the author, this
exploration has been fruitful for the following reasons.
Especially Chapter 9 has made plausible that a number of the theoretical extensions
analysed may have empirical relevance. In particular, these extensions offer an intuitively
appealing explanation of the empirical pattern of a remarkably persistent low participation
rate of Dutch married women before 1960 and a strongly growing participation rate of these
women after 1960. Moreover, our explanatory model strongly suggests that the models
underlying the few econometric studies on this long-run development (Hurtog and Theeuwcs,
Mol et al., Romme) are severely misspecified. In addition, the modelling of hysterctic
persistence effects of IHF on female participation by Clark and Summers is shown to be
incorrect. Furthermore, Chapters 3 and 5 have argued that individual and collective
developments of a lack of corporate work motivation of long-term unemployed persons
cannot be explained by the existing stable IHF and BPI models (e.g.. Kuptcyn and Woiitiez),
but can be modelled as the outcomes of unstable IHF and BPI (including erosion of beliefs
in work ethic norms).
However, this theoretical study is fruitful not only because it offers explanations of
particular empirical phenomena. By modelling the impacts of IHF, BPI and social norms on
labour supply within a general non-linear dynamic framework, the study leads to a thorough
integration of the corresponding theories, in particular of the theory of social custom of
Akerlof, into CHF theories. Moreover, by demonstrating that even extreme labour supply
phenomena like profound preference changes can be covered by extensions of the
microeconomic theory, the study shows the broad scope and strong flexibility of the one-
utility maximizing model. Hopefully, this contributes to clarifying the deep controversy
between neo-classical economists and their critics on the scope of microeconomic models.
More generally, the study aims to contribute to the integration of sociological and
psychological insights into microeconomic models. Although the behavioural assumptions
underlying the microeconomic models in this study may seem too crude to sociologists and
psychologists, most of these assumptions may still be sufficiently accurate in a macro
context (see Sec. 1.6). This issue should be further investigated by analysing the robustness
of the models to alternative and possibly more plausible behavioural assumptions from
sociology and psychology. However, I expect that this will not lead to essential differences
in macro dynamics, but rather to refinements.
One of these refinements is suggested by Vendrik (1988), who generalizes the approach
of Stigler and Becker (1977) to explaining preference formation in the context of labour
supply and who uses it to derive a more plausible separability structure of utility functions
than additivity (see Sec. 8.11). This generalization is organized in a general utility
maximizing framework which is conceived as a hierarchy of means-ends relations and which
consists of an "economic" and a psychological part. Such a hierarchy can be useful as an
ordering and integrating framework for microeconomic and psychological (as well as
sociological) motivation and satisfaction theories and demonstrates how psychological and290 C7»ap/<T /0
sociological theories can be incorporated into a microeconomic framework without using a
reductionistic economic terminology like that of the Chicago School.
This approach as well as that of the present study are similar in spirit to the work of
economists like Akerlof, Frank and Granovetter and sociologists like Lindenberg (e.g., 1990)
and Wipplcr (e.g., 1985, 1986). The great challenge is to integrate sociological and
psychological insights into economic thinking while doing full justice to these insights. In
the words of Baxter (1988, p. 260), "if economics is to become a social science in the fullest
sense, it must build on the foundations of psychology and sociology, rather than rely on its
own improvisations of these subjects. We might then hope for an economics with a truly
human face." Moreover, a start can then be made towards reversing the overly strict division
of labour in social science. The present study may be considered as a small step in that
direction.
Notwithstanding this positive judgement of the study, it should be emphasized that the
theoretical models developed remain to be tested empirically. This should be an important
subject of further research, which may meet severe difficulties. Moreover, Akerlof's
differential equation for the dynamics of social norms in female labour supply ought then to
be modified into a more complex equation. This modification as well as other possible
extensions and applications are discussed in the next section.
10.3 Further research
In the analysis of the long-run dynamics of female participation in Chapter 9 it has been
assumed that the social norm beliefs develop according to the long-run model of Section 8.5,
i.e. in a way analogous to the dynamics of collective habits. However, as argued at the end
of Section 9.7, this assumption is incorrect Dutch survey data of the Social Cultural
Planning Bureau (1986. 1992) and the Central Bureau of Statistics (see De Graaf, 1989)
strongly suggest that, whereas collective habits are formed or wear off on the basis of the
average participation behaviour in the past, changes in average social norm beliefs anticipate
changes in the average participation behaviour. The SCP data imply an "own" dynamics of
social norm beliefs, which led especially in the second half of the sixties to a very explosive
swing in the social norm beliefs. On the other hand, this cultural dynamics does not seem
fully autonomous, but seems to be affected by the participation behaviour of trendsetters.
This again implies an endogenous dynamics of social norm beliefs, but now this dynamics is
not described by Akerlof's differential equation (8.6) in Section 8.1, but by a more complex
differential equation. Similarly to (8.6), this diffusion equation can be shown to imply
collective and individual hysteresis and the possibility of collective catastrophes within social
groups, the latter even with a higher probability.
Such an endogenous dynamics of social norm beliefs implies that the participation
equations for cohorts of married women with school-going or small children should be
estimated 3imu/fci;if(>M.v/y with the diffusion equations for the social norm beliefs. However,
such an estimation has not yet been carried out. If an implementation led to satisfactory
estimates, it could be used to make simultaneous projections of future levels of participations
and social norm beliefs of cohorts of married women. However, one should then take into
account a demographic dynamics of flows in and out of subpopulations of married women asSummary and /ws/wriir 291
a result of life-cycle events like getting children or like children reaching the school-going
age. Two important theoretical improvements on the participation projections of Rommc as
mentioned in Section 9.6 would then be that the developments of the social norm variables
would be endogenously determined and that life-cycle events would be taken into account.
As another important theoretical improvement on Romme's study, our participation
equations for cohorts of married women have been derived on the basis of an extension of
the individual labour supply function (6.8) in Subsection 6.2.1. However, this individual
labour supply function has implications not only for the participation of married women, but
also for the average (preferred) number of corporate hours of these women. Ensuing kinds of
dynamics of these average corporate hours have been analysed extensively in the Chapters 4-
8. Similarly to the long-run elasticities of the participation rate, the long-run elasticities of
the average corporate hours with respect to the wage rate and other exogenous variables can
be expected to have a hump-shaped participation rate profile. However, in the context of
subpopulations of married women, there are two additional complications that should be
taken into account. First. Dutch data imply a certain degree of rationing of corporate hours
in the sense that many women would like to work fewer corporate hours than they actually
do (see, e.g., Allaart et al., 1989, 1991). Secondly, there is the complication of a demograph-
ic dynamics of flows in and out of subpopulations of married women as mentioned above.
Both complications threaten to make a time-series analysis of the dynamics of average
corporate hours of married women very difficult.
Both this analysis and the time-series analysis of the dynamics of female participation are
based on an aggregation of a microeconomic labour supply function to, successively, the
mesoeconomic level of social groups and the macroeconomic level of cohorts or sub-
populations. These aggregations involve certain simplifying assumptions, which seem rather
crude. For that and other reasons it seems worthwhile to complement the mesoeconomic and
macroeconomic time series analyses with microeconomic cross-section and longitudinal
analyses. Recently, an interesting microeconomic longitudinal study of the participation
dynamics of an American cohort of mature married women has been conducted by Eckstein
and Wolpin (1989). They present and estimate an intertemporal participation and fertility
model in which, in addition to an effect of rational individual long-run satiation with respect
to participation, the effect of corporate work experience on wages is explicitly taken into
account. The latter effect, which has not been considered in the present study, is a result of
the accumulation of human capital as an increasing function of corporate work experience
and makes the wage rate into a state variable which is endogenous in the longer run. In
estimations for the cohort of mature married women (between the ages of 39 and 59), this
effect of experience on wages tums out to be significantly positive and to overwhelm the
individual long-run satiation effect with respect to participation, so leading to persistence in
the employment patterns of these women. Since Eckstein and Wolpin interpret the long-run
satiation effect as a net effect of long-run satiation and individual habit persistence, their
empirical results suggest that the mature American women studied were not kept at their job
by individual (or collective) habit persistence as suggested by the theoretical participation
model of Chapter 9, but rather by their increasing wages as a result of human capital
accumulation and despite an increasing satiation stemming from their participation. This
result seems unfavourable for our participation model, but the following objections can be
raised.292 C/roptfr /0
- Most importantly, Eckstein and Wolpin define and calculate work experience as a stock
of the total number of years since age 18 in which the woman considered worked at least
two weeks during the year. This implies a zero depreciation rate of the stock, which seems
more appropriate for a modelling of satiation with participation in a very long run than for
modelling individual habit persistence, that is likely to work in a shorter run. Individual
habits with respect to participation seem more strongly influenced by work experience in
recent years than in earlier years, implying a substantially positive depreciation rate.' Thus,
we can conclude that individual habit persistence is not properly modelled by Eckstein and
Wolpin, whereas their finding of an individual long-run satiation effect in the very long run
confirms our theoretical assumptions on such an effect at the end of Section 3.5 and in
Section 9.11. On the other hand, the latter finding may be partially due to the neglect of a
negative age effect of a diminishing physical condition on the marginal utility of par-
ticipation. Moreover, the estimation results may change considerably when IHF and BPI with
respect to participation as well as consumption are added to the model of Eckstein and
Wolpin.
Nevertheless, their empirical results strongly suggest that the state dependence of the
wage rate on work experience should be added to our participation model. Furthermore, in a
longer run the wage rate is likely to be affected by market interactions of labour supply and
demand. This implies a second form of state dependence of the wage rate on the average
participation of other labour suppliers and works in the same direction as a reverse
bandwagon effect. Research by Granovetter and Soong (1986) and Day (1986) on a related
state dependence of prices in combination with BPI or IHF in consumption suggests that this
state dependence of the wage rate and BPI or IHF in labour supply may be mutually
destabilizing. However, empirical testing may then become even more difficult.
Another exogenous variable in the female labour supply models of this study which may
be an endogenous state variable in a longer run. is the income of the husband K^.
According to the individual utility-family budget constraint model of Leuthold (1968) the
husband and wife will react to each other's labour supply decisions until a consistent and
stable long-run equilibrium has been reached (see Subsec. 2.2.7). Ashworth and Ulph (1981)
have extended this model with household time BPI between husband and wife (see also
Kapteyn and Woittiez, 1990). As argued in Sections 7.8 and 8.11. these interactions between
husband and wife may imply a fascinating dynamics of interacting collective habit and social
norm formations and erosions in male and female labour supply. For example, a further
increasing participation of Dutch married women in the coming decades may have a
suppressing effect on the male supply of corporate hours and the corresponding collective
habits and social norms. In combination with a further rising wage rate this might even
trigger collective catastrophes within social groups in the now inelastic and persistent labour
supply of men from five to, for instance, four days a week (in the backward-sloping part of
their labour supply curve). In their turn, such declines in male labour supply will reinforce
rises in female labour supply and corresponding changes in collective habits and social
norms.
' Hot/ ct al. (1988, p. 351) estimate the rate of depreciation in the influence of past leisure on
current labour supply to range in value between 0.35 and 0.43.Summary O/K/ ;ws/w»'vf 293
On the other hand, the male supply of corporate hours may remain inelastic for quite
some time because of the strong persistence effects of collective corporate time habits
(including workaholism) and work ethic norms (see Sees. 8.2 and 8.11, and De Ncubourg
and Vendrik, 1992). This pattern of, on the one hand, strong persistence and. on the other
hand, the possibility of strong and even catastrophic declines in male supply of corporate
hours forms a kind of mirror image of the historical pattern of a persistently low par-
ticipation of Dutch married women before I960 and a strongly rising participation of these
women after 1960. Accordingly, a modelling of the former pattern will resemble the
participation model of Chapter 9.
Another interesting application of our theoretical models on male labour supply is related
to the issue of hysteresis in long-term unemployment. The IHF and BPI models in Sections
3.2 and 5.3, respectively, explain how a temporary, but sufficiently long-lasting rationing of
labour supply in the form of involuntary unemployment may lead to permanent "voluntary
unemployment", i.e. non-participation, as a result of locally unstable IHF or BPI. Such
processes involve a strong erosion of collective corporate time habits and work ethic norms
and may occur in certain subcultures of the long-term unemployed (see also De Neubourg,
1991). They imply individual and collective hysteresis dependent on rationings by labour
demand. Just like schedules of long-run individual and average labour supply displaying
hysteresis as a function of the wage rate, schedules of long-run labour supply displaying
hysteresis as a function of labour demand can be aggregated to the macro-level. Associating
a lack of long-run labour supply with a kind of non-participation rate and a lack of labour
demand with a kind of non-employment or labour slack ratio (see Sec. 9.4), we then obtain
a macro-relation between these non-participation rate and non-employment ratio which is
comparable with macro-relations between the natural unemployment rate and the actual
unemployment rate, but which is genuinely hysteretic (see below). This macro-relation
describes the case that, when the non-employment ratio rises from a relatively low level, the
non-participation rate also (strongly) rises, whereas, on the other hand, when the non-
employment ratio again declines, the non-participation rate remains persistently at a
relatively high level. This may be a good description of pertinent developments in many
OECD countries in the seventies and eighties. In addition, our model predicts that, when as
a result of the declining non-employment ratio the wage rate (as compared with the
unemployment benefit) and/or other exogenous variables favouring participation rise and
pass certain (high) levels, strong and even catastrophic declines in the non-participation rate
may occur. Such a non-linear possibility does not seem to be recognized by the current
linear models of hysteresis in unemployment and implies a more optimistic prospect than
these models for the decades to come.
Finally, I would like to mention that the theoretical models which have been developed in
this study in the context of labour supply, can also be applied in other fields. In the first
place, they can easily be applied in microeconomic demand systems for various consumption
categories by virtue of the integration of the microeconomic theories of consumption and
labour supply (see Sec. 2.1). Furthermore, the theory of social custom of Akerlof has been
applied to fair wage setting, trade union membership and collective strike action (see Sec.
8.7). In addition, collective habits and social norms seem to play important roles in the
supply of work effort in organizations (think of shirking) and may form barriers to entry and
exit in industrial as well as labour markets (see, e.g.. Van Witteloostuijn and Van Lier,294 CTtapfrr /O
1992). Hopefully, for such applications as well as others the present study can provide a firm
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Summary in Dutch
Een opmerkelijk verschijnsel in de economische wetenschap is dat in vcel van haar modcllen
nog steeds uitgegaan wordt van de veronderstelling dat de voorkeuren en bchoeftcn van
mensen niet veranderen in de loop der tijd. Dit ondanks het feit dat er steeds nicer
aanwijzingen van het tegendeel zijn. Een treffend voorbeeld op hct gebied van arbeidsaanbod
zijn de veranderingen in houding van emanciperende getrouwde vrouwen ten aanzien van hct
al of niet hebben van een baan. Sinds de jaren vijftig en zestig is de arbeidsmarktparticipatic
van vrouwen in veel OESO-landen sterk toegenomen. Traditioneel hebben eennnmen deze
ontwikkelingen proberen te verklaren als het resultaat van veranderingen in t'innncic'le
variabelen zoals het voor vrouwen geldende uurloon, het inkomen van dc cchtgenoot en het'
belastingstelsel, en van veranderingen in demografische en sociaal-economische variabelen
zoals het aantal kinderen en het opleidingsnivo van vrouwen. Hoewel zulke variabelen voor
een aanzienlijk deel de toename van de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van getrouwde vrouwen
kunnen verklaren, lijken zij maar een deel van het verhaal. Zowel historische beschrijvingen
als terloopse observatie wekken de sterke suggestie dat wijzigingen in gewoonten en sociale
normen en sociale beTnvloedingsprocessen ook een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld. Zulke
wijzingen en processen hebben een rechtstreeks effekt op de voorkeuren van de betrokken
vrouwen, zodat de aanname van onveranderlijke voorkeuren moet worden losgelaten.
Om veranderende voorkeuren in de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van getrouwde vrouwen te
kunnen modelleren, is het echter nodig om psychologische en sociologische inzichten in de
economische modellen te integreren (en dat is iets waar veel economen moeite mee hebben).
Het belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift is om aan deze integratie van inzichten een
bijdrage te leveren. Hoewel het belang van veranderingen in voorkeuren al werd onderkend
door klassieke economen, dateren pogingen om dit soort veranderingen op een systematische
manier in de mainstream economische theorie te verwerken van na de Tweede Wereldoorlog.
De twee belangrijkste ontwikkelde theorieen van veranderende voorkeuren of m.a.w.
voorkeursvorming zijn de theorie van i/irf/viY/tfe/c gevwwwfeiwTm/ig en de theorie van
o/Kfe/7//ig£ a/7ia/iJt<?///Jt/!?K/ va/i v<w>r£ewr<?/i. (Deze theorieen worden echter, blijkens de
aanhef van deze samenvatting, in veel economische modellen niet gebruikt.) Individuele
gewoontevorming is het verschijnsel dat een persoon gewend raakt aan een bepaald gedrag
dat zij (of hij) vertoont, en dat dit haar voorkeur voor dat gedrag versterkt. Onderlinge
afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren betekent dat de voorkeur van een persoon met betrekking tot
een bepaald gedrag be'i'nvloed wordt door soortgelijk gedrag van voor haar belangrijke
personen in haar sociale omgeving. Een andere, maar verwante theorie van voorkeursvor-
ming is opgesteld door de Amerikaanse econoom George Akerlof. Zijn theorie van .voc/a/e
gebrw//t£/i modelleert de effekten van het geloof in sociale normen op economisch gedrag en
ook een versterkende terugkoppeling van dat gedrag op het geloof in sociale normen.306 Summary <n
Tenslotte is de tegenhanger van individuele gewoontevorming //Kftv/7/u?/? iwzarf/'xiflg op
/a/i#<' /<T/WI//I. Dit is het verschijnsel dat mensen op lange termijn genoeg krijgen van een
bepaald gedrag, zodat hun voorkcur voor dat gedrag vermindert. Dit wordt doorgaans als een
onderdeel van de theorie van individuele gewoontevorming beschouwd.
Alle dric genocmdc theorieen lijken heel relevant voor de ontwikkcling van de
arbeidsmarktparticipalie van vrouwen en, meer in het algemeen, voor het arbeidsaan-
bodgedrag van zowel vrouwen als mannen (denk aan arbeidsethosnormen). Aan de andere
kant is hierover nog maar weinig onderzoek gedaan. Daarom worden de drie theorieen in dit
bock tocgepast op arbeidsaanbod door ze te incorporeren in de microeconomische theorie
van hct arbeidsaanbod en door de implicates hiervan af te leiden. Hierbij worden de drie
theoricCn uitgcbrcid en onderling geintcgrcerd. Bovendien ligt de nadruk op de effekten van
een nict-lincairc dynamiek van voorkeursvorming (zie hieronder) en op het afleiden van het
gcmiddcldc gedrag in een sociale groep van mensen uit het individuele gedrag. Een korte
weergave van wat er in de verschillende hoofdstukken van dit boek aan de orde komt, ziet er
als volgt uit. ..,,,..,.,.,...„ ,,. ....... , _,
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Dc standaard microeconomische theorie van arbeidsaanbod modeilecrt het aantal uren dat
men beiaald wil wcrken als het resuliaat van een afweging van inkomen (of consumptie) en
vrije tijd. Uit empirische studies komt naar voren dat zowel aan een bepaald nivo van
inkomen als aan een bepaalde hoeveelheid vrije tijd een sterke mate van gewenning
plaatsvindl. Dit leidt tot een zichzelf versterkend proces van individuele gewoontevorming.
B.v. stel: een huisvrouw neemt een kleine deeltijdbaan aan. Zij raakt dan geleidelijk gewend
aan hct hogere gezinsinkomen en aan de kleinere hoeveelheid tijd die ze overhoudt voor het
huishouden, haar gezin en/of zichzelf (samengevat als "onbetaalde tijd"). Hierdoor kan ze
gemotiveerd worden om een deeltijdbaan van meer uren aan te nemen. Ook hieraan zal ze
gewend raken, en als gevolg hiervan kan ze een deeltijdbaan van nog meer uren ambieren.
Uiteiiulelijk zal zo'n zichzelf versterkend proces zich stabiliseren op een deeltijdbaan van
een bepaald aantal uren. Dit aantal uren wordt een lange termijn evenwicht genoemd. In een
cxtreem geval kan het lange termijn evenwicht liggen bij een hoog aantal uren per week en
heeft de vrouw (of man) zich ontwikkeld tot een "workaholic". Hierbij dient wel opgemerkt
te worden dat in dit model nog geen rekening wordt gehouden met het feit dat vrouwen (en
mannen) niet elk aantal uren betaald kunnen werken dat ze zouden willen. Zo'n zgn.
rantsoenering kan echter in het model ingebracht worden, en de implicaties hiervan komen
ook ter sprake in het boek.
Hoewel een dergelijk model van zgn. stabiele gewoontevorming veel kan verklaren, kan
het niet verklaren waarom bepaalde langdurig werklozen, hoewel ze hun oude baan
onvrijwillig verloren hebben, gedemotiveerd raken om een nieuwe baan aan te nemen.
Bovendien geeft het wellicht een onvoldoende verklaring van emancipatieprocessen waarin
voonnalige huisvrouwen een sterke orientatie op beiaald werk ontwikkelen. In dit bock
worden zulkc diepgaande veranderingen van voorkeuren en gedrag gemodelleerd als de
uitkomsten van <>i.\7a/>ic/c niet-lineaire gewoontevorming. Een model voor dergelijkc
gewoontevorming is ontwikkeld door de recente Nobelprijswinnaar Gary Becker in
samenwerking met Kevin Murphy om het consumptiegedrag van verslaafden te verklaren. Er
is dan sprake van een instabiel lange termijn evenwicht van het aantal betaalde arbeidsuren5«mmflrv in Dw/cn 307
dat inligt tussen een stabiel lange tennijn evenwicht voor een relatief hoog aantal uren en
een ander stabiel lange termijn evenwicht voor een laag aantal uren of nul uur. Dit leidt tot
een polarisatie in gedrag en gewoontes: aan de ene kant. als het aantal betaalile arbeidsuren
aanvankelijk boven de instabiele evenwichtswaarde ligt, inducecrt de gewoontevonning een
stijging van het aantal uren naar het stabiele evenwicht van een relatief hoog aantal uren en
bijbehorende gewenning. Zo'n evenwicht kan het gedrag en de gewoontes van een
"geemancipeerde" vrouw met een baan of een "workaholic" (als het aantal wcrkuren hoog is)
beschrijven. Aan de andere kant, als het aantal betaalde arbeidsuren aanvankelijk onder dc
instabiele evenwichtswaarde ligt (vgl. een waterscheiding), leidt de gewoontevonning lot een
dating van het aantal uren naar het stabiele evenwicht van een laag aantal urcn of nul uur en
bijbehorende gewenning. Het evenwicht voor nul uur kan dan corresponderen met ccn
huisvrouw of een "vrijwillig langdurig werkloze". Daar het aanvankelijke aantal uren afhangt
van de ontwikkeling van exogene (= buiten het model bepaalde) variabelen zoals het uurloon
of de vraag naar arbeid (b.v. werkloosheid) in het verleden. bepalen dc/.e ontwikkclingen
naar welk van de twee stabiele cvenwichten het aantal uren toebeweegt. Dcze eigenschap
van het model wordt in het boek iWiric/uc/f Mw/mw genoemd. Voor bepaalde waarden van
exogene variabelen kan het stabiele evenwicht waarnaar toebewogen wordt. instabicl worden
en vcrvolgens verdwijnen. Als een soon snecuwbaleffekt inducecrt dit een instabicl
gewoontevormingsproces naar het andere stabiele evenwicht. Zo'n drastische overgang wordl
een //uftWrfue/? AataWo/t' genoemd. Individuele katastrofes in gedrag en gewoontes kunnen
zich hebben voorgedaan (en kunnen zich nog steeds voordoen) in het emancipatieproees van
individuele getrouwde vrouwen.
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 van deze studie wordt deze niet-lineaire dynamiek van
individuele gewoontevorming nader geanalyseerd. In het bijzonder worden grafieken van het
individuele lange termijn aanbod van betaalde arbeidsuren als funktie van het uurloon
geconstrueerd en worden voldoende en noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor het optreden van
individuele hysterese en katastrofes afgeleid. Verder wordt het instabiele individuele
gewoontevormingsmodel aangevuld met de effekten van individuele verzadiging op de zeer
lange termijn. Tenslotte worden uit de grafieken van het individuele lange tennijn
arbeidsaanbod grafieken van het gemiddelde lange termijn arbeidsaanbod in een sociale
groep afgeleid. Hierbij wordt rekening gehouden met verschillen tussen mensen in
voorkeuren, gewoontes en externe omstandigheden.
Onderlinge afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren
Een belangrijk onderscheid bij onderlinge afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren is dat tussen zgn.
fcandw'a#tf/i<'/7<?A.7f/i en wn#?A"<w<fa fcaM</w0/>tf/igfjW.7?w. Een bandwagoneffekt houdt in dai
een bepaald gedrag van significante anderen iemands voorkeur met betrekking tot dat gedrag
versterkt. Aan de andere kant is er sprake van een omgekeerd bandwagoneffekt, als een
bepaald gedrag van significante anderen iemands voorkeur met betrekking tot dat gedrag
afzwakt. De literatuur richt zich vooral op bandwagoneffekten, en de Nederlandse
onderzoekers Arie Kapteyn en Isolde Woittiez vinden in een empirische studie met
Nederlandse data significante bandwagoneffekten op het arbeidsaanbod van vrouwen en
mannen. Net als individuele gewoontevonning leidt deze vorm van onderlinge afhankelijk-
heid van voorkeuren tot een zichzelf versterkend proces. Echter, nu speelt dit proces zich
niet af op het nivo van afzonderlijke individuen, maar op dat van een sociale groep van301 Summary m Dufc/i
individuen. B.v., stel dat in een sociale groep van huisvrouwen sommigen een baan
aanvaarden. Dit kan andcre Icdcn van de sociale groep ertoe bewegen om ook een baan te
ncmen of om een baan van meer uren te zoeken. Dit proces van elkaar "opfokken" tot meer
bctaald werk zal uiteindelijk tot een lange termijn evenwicht leiden. waarbij b.v. een
mccrdcrheid van de groep banen van een bepaald (maar in het algemeen onderling
vcrschillcnd) aantal uren heeft en een minderheid thuisblijft.
Ook in dit geval kan het zichzelf versterkende proces instabiel zijn rond een instabiel
lange termijn evenwicht dat inligt tussen twee stabiele lange termijn evenwichten.
Afhankelijk van de beginsituatie beweegt de sociale groep zich dan naar hetzij het ene. hetzij
het andere stabiele evenwicht. In het ene evenwicht werkt b.v. een meerderheid van de
sociale groep uitsluitend als onbetaalde huisvrouw en in het andere evenwicht heeft een
meerderheid ccn bctaaldc baan. Naar welk evenwicht dc sociale groep op weg is, hangt af
van dc voorgeschicdenis van de sociale groep. Deze afhankelijkheid wordt ro//«7iew
AysfWM* genoemd. Bovendien kan onder bepaalde omstandigheden. als een soon
snecuwbalcffckt, een instabiel bandwagonproces ontstaan van het ene naar het andere
stubiclc evenwicht. Dc sociale groep trecdt dan en masse toe tot de arbeidsmarkt of treedt en
masse uit. Dcrgclijkc drastische ovcrgangen binnen sociale groepen worden ro/fec/jVw
JtaM.vrr»/i'.v genoemd en kunncn een rol gespeeld hebben (en nog spelen) in de sterke
loename van de arbeidsmarkparticipatie van getrouwde vrouwen in veel OESO-landen sinds
de jaren vijftig en zestig.
In hoofstuk 5 wordt deze niet-lineaire dynamiek van onderling afhankelijke voorkeuren in
arbeidsaanbod nader geanalyseerd. Eerst wordt een classificatie gegeven van de verschillende
soorten sociale interaktie die ten grondslag liggen aan de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van
voorkeuren in arbeidsaanbod. Vervolgens worden deze sociale interakties samengevat in een
algemeen model, dat een zelfde soort struktuur heeft als het individuele gewoonte-
vormingsmodel. Deze analogic wordt gebruikt om grafieken af te leiden van het gemiddelde
lange termijn arbeidsaanbod in een sociale groep als funktie van het gemiddelde uurloon.
Deze grafieken zien er echter op wezenlijke punten anders uit dan de grafieken van het
gemiddelde lange tennijn arbeidsaanbod die volgen uit het individuele gewoonte-
vormingsmodel (dat geldt op het nivo van afzonderlijke individuen). Dit komt door de
verschillen in voorkeuren en omstandigheden tussen leden van de sociale groep. Deze
heterogeniteit vormt een tegenkracht tegen de neiging tot conformisme als gevolg van de
onderlinge afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren. Daarom leidt de heterogeniteit ook tot voldoende
en noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor collectieve katastrofes en hysterese die sterker zijn dan
in het geval van een homogene sociale groep.
Collectieve gewoontevorming
Om tot een vollediger modellering van bovengenoeinde empirische verschijnselen te komen,
worden de in de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 geanalyseerde modellen van individuele gewoontevor-
ming en de in hoofdstuk 5 behandelde modellen van onderlinge afhankelijkheid van
voorkeuren met elkaar gcintegreerd in de hoofdstukken 6 en 7. Dit leidt tot modellen van
instabiele f<>//«»<7iV»v ,k>fw<w«/<>vomii>i,i». Deze modellen vallen uiteen in twee soorten. In
hoofdstuk 6 worden modellen van onderling afhankelijke voorkeuren en JtoWWe individuele
gewoontevorming onderzocht. terwijl in hoofdstuk 7 modellen van onderling afhankelijke
voorkeuren en i»M7ci/><W? individuele gewoontevorming aan de orde komen. In het eersteSummery in DM/rn 309
geval kunnen de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren en de individuele gewoontevor-
ming elkaar versterken tot een instabiel proces van collectieve gewoontevonning, muar werkt
de individuele gewoontevorming ook remmend op de neiging tot conformisme, doordat ze
verschillen in voorkeuren en gedrag tussen de leden van de sociale groep vergroot. In het
geval van onderling afhankelijke voorkeuren en instabiele individuele gewoontevonning
kunnen collectieve katastrofes en hysteresc zich voordocn als het resultaat van een soon
"Atwfrap.sraA*'/". In de eerste trap induceert de instabiele individuele gewoontevonning
individuele katastrofes van een aantal groepsleden van mil naar een niaxiinaal aantal bctaaldc
arbeidsuren of omgekeerd. De tweede trap ontbrandt, wanneer, ten gcvolge van een
voldoende sterke onderlinge afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren, de individuele katastrofes
daaropvolgende individuele katastrofes van andere groepsleden "triggeren" in die mate dat
een collectieve katastrofe ontstaat. Dan begint b.v. een explosief groeiend aantal groepsleden
een explosief groeiend aantal betaalde arbeidsuren te wcrken. Dcze arbeidsaanboddynamiek
wordt geanalyseerd voor twee subgevallen, nl. Geval A van heterogeniteit van de groeps-
leden in pcrsoonlijke voorkeur voor onbetaalde tijd en in dc mate van geneigdheid tot
individuele gewoontevomiing en Geval B van heterogeniteit in de mate van ontvankclijkheid
voor sociale bei'nvloeding. Voor beide subgevallen worden voldoende (en nood/.akelijkc)
voorwaarden voor collectieve katastrofes afgeleid en worden interessante grafieken van het
gemiddelde lange termijn arbeidsaanbod geconstrueerd, die twee domeinen van katastrofaal
gedrag aan weerskanten van een S-vomiig domein van onveranderlijk hysteresegedrag
vertonen (zie de figuur op de kaft van dit boek).
Dynamiek van sociale normen
Een theorie van voorkeursvonning die verwant is aan de hierboven besproken theorieSn, is
de door George Akerlof ontwikkelde theorie van sociale gebruiken. Deze theorie bestaat uit
een model voor de korte termijn en een model voor de lange termijn. Het korte termijn
model beschrijft de invloed van het geloof in sociale normen op economisch gedrag. Deze
invloed is tweeerlei. In de eerste plaats zullen mensen, als zij geloven in de juistheid van een
bepaalde sociale norm, zich overeenkomstig deze norm willen gedragen om niet met zichzelf
in conflict te raken. Sociologen spreken dan over het effekt van een #pi>i/p/7ia//MWt/t' sww/c
worm. In de tweede plaats zullen mensen, als zij deel uitmaken van een sociale groep
waarvan veel leden geloven in de sociale norm, zich willen conformeren aan deze norm om
niet met de nek te worden aangekeken. M.a.w., de meeste mensen zijn gevoelig voor hun
reputatie in een sociale groep waartoe zij behoren, en dit leidt tot wat sociologen roc/ofe
Cfl/!/ro/<? noemen. Daarnaast wordt in het lange termijn model van Akerlof aangenomen, dat
naannate meer groepsleden de sociale norm in hun gedrag aan hun laars lappen (b.v. met het
oog op economisch gewin), op langere termijn het geloof in de norm in de sociale groep
wordt ondermijnd. Dat wil zeggen: het aantal groepsleden dat nog gelooft in de norm, neemt
dan af. Aan de andere kant, naarmate meer groepsleden zich confonneren aan de norm,
wordt op langere termijn het geloof in de norm in de sociale groep versterkt, d.w.z. het
aantal groepsleden dat gelooft in de norm, neemt dan toe. Aldus beschrijft het lange termijn
model van Akerlof processen van intemalisatie en "extemalisatie" van een sociale norm,
waardoor het geloof in die sociale norm verandert.
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt een variant van de theorie van sociale gebruiken toegepast op
arbeidsaanbod. Eerst wordt een overzicht gegeven van sociale normen die een rol lijken te310 Swm/warv J'/I
spelcn in net arbcidsaanbod van mannen en vrouwcn. Alleen dc implicaties van sociale
normcn in hct arbcidsaanbod van vrouwen worden uitgewerkt, maar de implicaties van
sociale normcn in het arbcidsaanbod van mannen kunnen op een soortgelijke manier worden
geanalyseerd (ze zijn we I op wezcnlijkc punten anders). In het bijzonder wordt de theorie
van sociale gebruiken toegepast op cen traditionele norm, die zegt dat getrouwde vrouwen
met kindcren thuis bchoren te blijven om voor de kinderen en het huishouden te zorgen. We
nocmen dit dc /iu/.v/i»iM//w/7n (of achter-het-aanrecht-norm). Het rcsulterende model blijkt
cen zclfdc soon structuur tc hebben als een grensgeval van het bovengenoemde Geval B van
hct collcctieve gcwoontevormingsmodel in hoofdstuk 7. Dit betekent dat, als we het begrip
"gewoonte" in bredcre zin opvatten als "algemene houding" of "habitus", de effekten en
dynamiek van sociale normen in de theorie van sociale gebruiken kunnen worden
gei'ntcrpretecrd als &n van de mogelijke "kanalen" waarlangs instabiele collectieve
gewoontevonning zich kan ontwikkelen. Vender maakt een vergelijking met andere
toepussingen van de theorie van sociale gewoonten in de literatuur duidelijk, dat de
tocpassing in dit boek twee paar essentiele elementen toevoegt aan het algemene beeld, nl.
individucle en collectieve hysterese en individuele en collectieve katastrofes. Tenslotte wordt
het arbcidsaanbodinodel voor getrouwde vrouwen uitgebreid met een emancipatoire sociale
m>rm vwi ffM/wmi.w'/fr :W/\7«/i</i.(,'/i<'/</, die de traditionele huishoudnorm steeds meer lijkt te
vcrdringen en die zegt dat niet-alleenstaande vrouwen een baan behoren te hebben die hen
financieel onafliankelijk van hun partner maakt. Deze uitbreiding blijkt allerlei interessante
effekten te hebben die ook worden geanalyseerd. JJ. 3*1,, sfi*^,t^
Dynamiek van de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van vrouwen
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt de empirische relevantie van de theoretische modellen die in de
voorafgaande hoofdstukken zijn opgesield. onderzocht door ze toe te passen op lange termijn
ontwikkclingen van de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van Nederlandse en Amerikaanse getrouwde
vrouwen. Terwijl de participatiegraad van Nederlandse getrouwde vrouwen opmerkelijk laag
en stabicl was vanaf eind vorige eeuw tot begin jaren zestig, nam hij daarna sterk toe. De
mogelijke rol van onderlinge afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren en sociale normen in
laatstgenoemde toename is econometrisch onderzocht door de Maastrichtse onderzoeker
Sjoerd Romme voor de periode 1971-1985. Hij vindt significante en aanzienlijke effekten
van deze faktoren, maar zijn participatievergelijkingen zijn niet systematisch afgeleid van
een achterliggend micro-economisch arbeidsaanbodmodel.
Om hierin verbetering te brengen, worden in hoofdstuk 9 participatievergelijkingen voor
een sociale groep of deelpopulatie van getrouwde vrouwen met schoolgaande of kleine
kinderen afgeleid uit de theoretische modellen van de voorafgaande hoofdstukken. Deze
participatievergelijkingen hebben, als gevolg van hysterese-effekten van individuele
gewoontevonning, verschillende specificaties voor toetreding tot de arbeidsmarkt en
uittreding, en zij suggereren dat de participatievergelijkingen van Romme en andere
onderzoekers cmstige specificatiefouten bevatten. De sterk niet-lineaire dynamiek van
collectieve gewoontevorming en sociale normen leidt ertoe dat de zgn. lange termijn
elasticiteiten van de participatiegraad als funktie van het uurloon en andere exogene
variabelen lage waarden hebben bij relatief lage waarden van de participatiegraad en veel
hogerc waarden bij hogere participatiegraden. Dit impliceert dat een verhoging van het
uurloon met een procent in de jaren vijftig en daarvoor, toen de panicipauegraad laag was.Sw/nmarv /"« DufrA 311
een veel kleiner procentueel effekt op de partieipatiegraad had dan in de jaren zeventig en
tachtig met hun hogere participatiegraden. De achterliggende reden is dat de dynamick van
collectieve gewoontevomiing en sociale normen in de jaren vijftig en daarvoor het
traditionele rollenpatroon van man en vrouw bevestigde. terwijl zij in de jaren zeventig en
tachtig de in de jaren zestig ingezette verandering van het rollenpatroon juist versterkte. Op
een ineer overtuigende wijze dan de gebruikelijke statische inodellen, lijkt dit een verklaring
te bieden van de opmerkelijk lage en stabiele panicipatiegraad van Nederlandse getrouwdc
vrouwen voor het begin van de jaren zestig en de sterke toename van dezc panicipatiegraad
daama. , ... , , . , ., _ _ .,,,_.
Laatstgenoemde sterke toename alsmede de eerder ingezette sterke stijglng van de
panicipatiegraad van getrouwde vrouwen in andere OESO-landen kan veroorzaakt zijn door
collectieve katastrofes binnen sociale groepen. Een voldocnde en noodzakelijke voorwaurde
voor deze mogelijkheid wordt afgeleid en een zelfde soon arbeidsaanbodgrafiek als in
hoofdstuk 7 wordt verkregen (zie de figuur op de katt). Door de schaarste aun data op het
nivo van sociale groepen is het echter erg moeilijk om collectieve katastrofes op dit nivo tc
identificeren. Verder wordt het feit dat de panicipatiegraad van getrouwde vrouwen in dc
Verenigde Staten niet sterk daalde, toen de Ainerikaanse soldaten terugkeerden uit dc
Tweede Wereldoorlog, verklaard als het resultaat van hysterese-effektcn van collectieve
gewoontevorming. Tenslotte wordt de ontwikkeling van de panicipatiegraad van Nederlandse
getrouwde vrouwen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog opgevat als het resultaat van een culturele
golf rond een opwaanse trend in de door werkgevers uitgeoefende vraag naar arbeid van
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assumption of stable preferences is still a point of departu-
re of many of its models, despite the fact that there is
growing evidence to the contrary. One striking example of
preference shifts in the field of labour supply is given by
the changes in attitude of "emancipating" married women
towards their participation in the labour market.
In order to construct explanatory models of such phenome-
na, this study applies three theories of preference forma-
tion to labour supply, namely the theory of habit formation
and long-run satiation, the theory of preference interdepen-
dence, and the theory of social custom. These theories are
incorporated into the microeconomic theory of labour
supply, and implications of this incorporation are derived.
In doing so, the three preference formation theories are
extended and integrated. Moreover, the focus is on the
effects of non-linear forms of dynamics of the preference
formations in combination with aggregation from the
microeconomic to the macroeconomic behaviour.
It is shown that in contrast to the existing models of stable
habit formation and stable preference interdependence,
non-linear and locally unstable habit formation and prefe-
rence interdependence can explain profound changes in
labour supply preferences and behaviour such as when
long-term unemployed become little motivated to get a new
job or when former housewives develop a strong orienta-
tion towards paid work. Furthermore, it is demonstrated
that the effects and dynamics of social norms in the theory
of social custom can be interpreted as one of the possible
"channels" through which unstable habit formation and
preference interdependence may proceed. Finally, the
empirical relevance of the theoretical models developed is
investigated by applying them to the developments of the
labour force participation of Dutch and American married
women since World War II.